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Scriptures, Shrines, Scapegoats, and World Politics 
Te efect of religious factors on politics has emerged as a key issue in
political inquiries since the end of the Cold War and the rise of religious
terrorism. However, much of the work on these matters is inconclusive,
marred by controversies and polemics. Te systematic investigations of
these topics have been partial, focusing primarily on the efects of religious
factors on—domestic and international—confict. Scriptures, Shrines,
Scapegoats, and World Politics ofers a comprehensive evaluation of the role
of religion in world politics, broadening the scope of investigation to such
topics as the relationship between religion and international cooperation,
international confict, civil war and the quality of life. Zeev Maoz and
Errol A. Henderson argue that religion is often manipulated by leaders
to advance their political interests. Tey fnd that no specifc religion is
either consistently more bellicose or consistently more cooperative than
other religions. However, religious similarity between states tends to
decrease the propensity of confict and increase the propensity for security
cooperation. Finally, the authors fnd a signifcant relationship between
secularism and human security. 
Zeev Maoz is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University
of California, Davis and Director of the Correlates of War Project. 
Errol A. Henderson is Associate Professor of Political Science at
Pennsylvania State University. 
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Preface 
Religion is one of the most persistent resins that forms and maintains com-
munal bonds. Almost all recorded historical sources—anthropological,
archaeological, textual or oral—document this fact. It is also an important
force defning intercommunal interaction since the dawn of recorded his-
tory. Yet, until quite recently, most mainstream students of world politics did
not pay much attention to the role of religion in confict and cooperation,
explicitly. Just when religious factors seemed to play a smaller role in politi-
cal and social afairs—with growing numbers of secular people and more
states practicing separation between religion and government—mainstream
scholars of world politics began to focus on the interplay between religion
and international relations. 
We have some ideas about this peculiar piece of intellectual history,
which we discuss in the frst chapter. Notably, however, the surge in studies
on religion and world politics started in the early 1990s, just after the end
of the Cold War. Since then, a number of important theories have emerged
connecting diferent aspects of religion to confict and cooperation—
between and within nations—and focusing on religion’s impact explicitly
or implicitly. Several of the hypotheses stemming from such theories have
been subjected to rigorous empirical analyses. Te results, however, are
inconclusive at best. Some theories linking religion to confict and coop-
eration have received empirical support; others have not. Yet, neither the
supportive nor the disconfrming evidence is sufciently robust to allow
unequivocal assessment of the validity of these theories. Moreover, most
studies of religion and world politics are partial and scattered. Te studies
focusing on the linkages between religion and international confict have
ignored the relations between religion and international cooperation and
vice versa. Other studies have focused on the domestic political implications
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of religion, e.g., its efect on civil confict, political stability, and democracy.
While all these studies ofer interesting—if inconclusive—insights, we still
lack a comprehensive account of the overall role of religion in world poli-
tics. Te present study ofers such an account. 
Utilizing a new and comprehensive dataset on world religions, we study
the efect of religion on (a) international confict, (b) international coop-
eration, (c) domestic confict, and (d) human security and welfare. Tese
analyses combine to form a more general understanding of the role religion
has played in world politics since the end of World War II. Tey also enable
us to examine the implications of these results for the future of the interna-
tional system. 
Our approach is more extensive than most studies on the subject in
several important respects. First, we examine the efect of religion on poli-
tics among and within nations. We also examine how religion infuences
the interaction between domestic and international politics. Second, most
studies focus on a single unit of analysis—either the individual state or the
dyad (i.e., pair of states)—whereas we examine the interrelations between
religion and politics across multiple levels of analysis. We focus on individ-
ual states, pairs of states, groups of states and regions, and the international
system as a whole. Tis enables us to reach far more generalizable conclu-
sions than most previous studies on the subject. 
Tird, we focus on a far wider array of behaviors than most previous
studies. Again, this leads to broader and more reliable generalizations.
Finally, the scope of our empirical analyses is considerably wider, and meth-
odologically more innovative than most studies on the subject. Tis makes
our results much more robust than previous investigations. We not only
replicate what others have done but also improve and expand on the theo-
retical treatment of these topics, ofer higher-resolution data, and improve
on the methods and analyses linking religion to world politics. In short, this
is possibly the most comprehensive empirical study of its kind. 
Te authors came to this topic from two diferent perspectives. Maoz’s
interest in religion arises from his focus on international networks. Te
motivating idea stems from a belief that culture plays an important role in
shaping the structure of confictual and cooperative networks. Henderson
came to this topic from his interest in the role of culture in world politics.
His earlier work on the subject focused on tests of one of the most visible
arguments in the feld—Huntington’s (1993, 1996) clash of civilizations
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(CoC) thesis. However, we both felt that the literature and the data on our
respective areas of interests were quite problematic. So we decided to col-
laborate in order to make things better. 
Tis interest coincided with an existing project on religion and society,
led by Professor Roger Finke at Pennsylvania State University. With the col-
legial support of Finke, director of the Association of Religion Data Archives
(ARDA), as well as colleagues in the United States and Israel, and generous
support through a grant from the Templeton Foundation, we developed the
World Religion Project (WRP) dataset. Tis dataset enabled us to launch
a set of empirical investigations into the role of religion in world politics. 
We wish to thank a number of people who have helped with this proj-
ect. First, our coders, graduate and undergraduate research assistants: Carl
Palmer, Aimee Tannehill, Anisha Chikarmane, Molly Sweeny, Paul Johnson,
Katherine Unger, Jaime Jackson, Tatiana Lukoianova, Jaime Harris, Tamara
Tur, Samantha Gallardo, Brad Middleton, Phil Schafer. Second, we thank
Scott Bennett, Robert Martin, and Gail Ulmer for helping us format and
reformat our datasets so that they can be included in the ARDA and COW
websites.1 Tird, we want to thank Roger Finke for his insights and his
support. Last, but not least, the Templeton Foundation supported the col-
lection of the WRP through grant #1342. Any errors of omission and com-
mission, however, are ours alone. 
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Chapter 1 
Religion and World Politics—Theory
and Evidence 
1. Introduction: What Is Religion,Why Does It Matter for
World Politics? 
Religion, in its simplest form, is a belief in the existence of some divine
authority/ies. Tis belief translates to a set of values and moral codes and a
set of rituals and practices that are presumably prescribed by such deities to
humans. Tis interpretation of religion may imply that religion is a private
afair. A person either possesses these beliefs or he/she does not; a person
either follows these values and codes of conduct and rituals or he/she does
not. A person is either “religious” or he/she is not. 
While this simple defnition may be valid, the implication that religion
is only a private afair is inaccurate. If religions were only private afairs,
then individuals would hardly care about the belief systems of others.
Religious persons would not try to convert other people. Te notion of
righteousness would be purely individual: I am a true believer regardless of
whether other people are. If rituals were private afairs, we would have no
churches, temples, mosques, pagodas, or holy burial sites. We would need
no priests, rabbis, mullahs, monks, gurus, or shamans. Holy places would
have been sacred to one individual and meaningless to others. If religions
were private afairs, every person or every other person would have his/her
own scripture: a document that stipulated the existence of diferent God(s)
and prescribed diferent moral codes, values, and righteous behaviors. 
1 
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2 Scriptures, Shrines, Scapegoats, and World Politics 
If religion were an individual trait, and if every person derived a difer-
ent set of beliefs and norms from his/her religion, there would be no reason
to search for the links between religion and world politics. What makes
religion so relevant to social life and to international relations is that most
religions—certainly the more popular ones—form and sustain communal
institutions. Tey contain tangible elements that bind people together in
profound ways. Virtually all religions prescribe collective rituals and direc-
tives for communal behaviors. Tese principles defne not only the identity
of individual believers (or nonbelievers) but also distinguish between com-
munities of believers and communities of nonbelievers. Te moral codes
of many religions not only entail rituals, practices, and values that defne
righteous relations and behaviors among believers but also contain codes of
conduct for believers toward nonbelievers or toward believers of diferent
religions. 
Virtually all religions are institutionalized to one degree or another.
Religious institutions may be as formal, centralized, and hierarchical as the
Roman Catholic Church, or they may be as informal and decentralized as
an African sangoma or a Native American shaman. Tese institutions defne
or interpret the principal values, rituals, and moral codes that constitute a
specifc religion. Tey also defne the identity of believers and diferentiate
between believers and nonbelievers; between religious in-group and out-
groups. Tese institutions typically ordain religious ofcers (priests, rabbis,
mullahs, etc.). Religious institutions ofer key evidence of religions as com-
munal structures. 
Not all religions have scriptures, but many do. Scriptures are the fun-
damental sources of religious beliefs. Tey contain stories about the origins
of religion—typically a story where the superior being(s) revealed itself/
themselves to one or more human beings, the founder(s) of that religion.
Tey contain the basic directives that guide the rituals and moral codes of
believers. Religious institutions are the formal interpreters of these scrip-
tures. And many splits and divisions within and between diferent religions
are centered either on the status of these scriptures or on their interpretation
by diferent institutions. 
Te history of religions traces their origins, development, and
change. History tells us where, when, and how a religion was established
and reveals the relationship between diferent religions. For example,
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3 Religion and World Politics—Teory and Evidence
Christianity developed from Judaism. Likewise, Muhammad, the founder
of Islam, was infuenced by Judaism and Christianity, and incorporated
elements of both into Islam. Te history of religion is also a tale of reli-
gious infghting and of the rise of religious families within the same reli-
gion. History tells us how Eastern Orthodoxy and Protestantism split
from the Roman Catholic Church. It tells us how Islam split into Sunnis,
Shi’ites, Alawites, Ahmadis, and other religious families. It tells us how
Buddhism split into the Mahayana and Teravada families. In short,
history tells us when one community of people formed a new religion
or split into a separate family of the same religion. Te historical record
of most major religions and their branching into religious families and
denominations suggests a common pattern of community formation,
community development, and intercommunal confict and cooperation.
Tis transformational record ofers additional evidence of religion as a
communal institution. 
In quite a few cases the development of religion and its history involved 
confict—sometimes extremely bloody confict—within and between 
communities. Tis tale of religious confict suggests a strong connection 
between religion and world politics. Leaders of communities, whether 
they were prophets, kings, warlords, presidents, or prime ministers, often 
used religion to promote their interests. Wars in the name of one God 
against infdels—believers in other Gods—seem to be a common theme 
in world history. But religion also has been a source of cooperation within 
and between communities. Most religions defne codes of moral con-
duct. Tese help establish common norms among disparate communities. 
Communities that shared similar religious values may have found it easier 
to communicate and cooperate than communities that practiced diferent 
religions. 
World politics is also a story of confict and cooperation between and
within communities. Since religion was such a central driver in the forma-
tion and sustainability of communities, it played an important role in—
domestic and international—political processes. Te story of the formation,
transformation, and impact of religions is intertwined with international
history. In fact, the linkages between religion and world politics are at the
center of some of the most profound controversies in the contemporary
study of world politics. 
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4 Scriptures, Shrines, Scapegoats, and World Politics 
2. Religion in the History and Theory of World Politics—
A Brief Overview 
A brief and, admittedly cursory, review of the relationship between religion
and international confict in history underlines this duality. It illuminates
the ways in which religion has been a source of both confict and coopera-
tion, of intracommunity strife and intracommunity solidarity, of intracom-
munity decline and development. 
Religion in premodern societies often had an important unifying role.
It added some evolutionary advantage to primitive communities, which
organized for utilitarian reasons such as common defense, the pooling of
hunting resources, and reproductive efciency. Religious rituals and sym-
bols served as a unifying factor that added cohesion to such communities.
As such, religion may have played a unifying role in fostering cooperation
and intracommunal welfare. However, once diferent groups of Homo sapi-
ens organized around religious symbols, the relative advantage of religion as
an organizing force in warfare diminished signifcantly (Gat 2006, 100–5).
Gat’s extensive review of war in primitive societies suggests that religion
was an “added” motive to the fundamentally materialist causes of warfare,
but it was not an independent one. Such communities often believed that
sorcery—committed by members of other communities—was the source of
ills and misfortunes that befell one’s community. Such beliefs often served
as a mobilizing instrument for subsequent raids and attacks. 
Te earliest recorded history suggests the salience of religion in the earli-
est civilizations. For example, arguably one of the factors contributing to the
civil war (that marked the tumultuous First Intermediate Period of ancient
Egypt, from 2181 to 2055 bce, and the end of the Old Kingdom) was a
religious dispute between Upper Egypt, which advocated the supremacy
of Amun, and Lower Egypt, which advocated the supremacy of Ra (Shaw
2003). Te reunifcation of the country and the hegemony of Amun-Ra
may have refected a religious compromise to help resolve at least that aspect
of the dispute. Religious texts themselves also provide narratives that sug-
gest the infuence of religion on the international interactions of antiquity,
but these are primarily narratives of faith rather than fact. 
Te Old and New Testaments juxtapose historical episodes, legends,
and religious directives. Stories about the role of religion in shaping inter-
communal confict and cooperation suggest a mixed efect. Te treatment
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5 Religion and World Politics—Teory and Evidence
of the Israelites by the Egyptians and the Pharaoh may have been based on
religious diference and suspicion, but from what the Old Testament tells
us, it is no less likely a story about ethnic and economic exploitation. Since
the Old Testament focuses on the history of the Israelites, we cannot infer
from this story whether other ethnic communities were treated similarly by
Egyptian royalty. However, there is archaeological evidence suggesting that
this was indeed the case (Kemp 2006). 
Te conquest of ancient Palestine by the Israelites could also be con-
strued as a story of religious warfare. But it is just as likely that it was a typi-
cal raid of one tribe against others. Since the Old Testament is told from the
perspective of Jewish religious leaders, every incident of confict between
the Israelites and “pagan” communities could be construed as a tale of reli-
gious warfare. However, most of these stories of conficts between Jews
and their neighbors can be easily attributed to other issues—economics,
territory—just as easily as they can be attributed to religious diferences.1 
Homer’s Iliad and Tucydides’s Peloponnesian Wars are two stories of
confict and diplomacy in the ancient Greek city-state system. Te entire
Greek peninsula and its surroundings (and later the Roman Empire) prac-
ticed the same polytheistic religion. Teir many gods were believed to
engage in human activities such as confict and love afairs. Nevertheless,
both Homer’s and Tucydides’s accounts of the era and its politics—while
mentioning locations such as Zeus’s temple or certain religious rituals—
assigned religion a marginal role in the politics of these periods. 
Te Roman Empire was fairly liberal when it came to religious prac-
tices in its protectorates (Luttwak 1979). Te imperial administrative style
was quite simple:  the Romans allowed their protectorates to be ruled by
autonomous local leaders. As long as a given protectorate paid its taxes
and did not rebel, local communities were left pretty much to their own
devices. Rebellions that took place in the empire (e.g., the Judean rebellion,
Flavius [75] 2014) were driven by economic factors, not by religious dif-
ferences. Te collapse of the Roman Empire was also not due to religious
competition. 
More explicitly religious wars become central to the international poli-
tics of the region marked by the intersection of Europe, North Africa, and
Southwest Asia largely bordering the Mediterranean during the medieval
period. First, the Islamic conquests of the Middle East and North Africa
were driven by both political and religious ambitions, and were accompanied
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6 Scriptures, Shrines, Scapegoats, and World Politics 
by the forced conversion of the occupied populations to Islam (Rogan
2009). Tese motivated the Crusades, and the ensuing confict between
Christians and Muslims in Palestine is an early example of clash of civiliza-
tions (Huntington 1993, 1996) warfare. Tis confict was about religious
control of the holy places in Palestine, Jerusalem in particular. 
It would be a mistake to portray the Middle Ages as an era of interreli-
gious confict, however. Both within Islam and Christendom, wars involved
both traditional contests over resources—for example, territory—and com-
peting succession claims as well as religious diferences. Islam split into
Sunni and Shi’a families originating in the Hussayni rebellion and its sup-
pression by the Ummayads in 680 ce (Rogan 2009). Tis was accompanied
by recurring conficts between Sunni and Shi’a communities. In Europe,
most of the medieval wars were between adherents of the same religion.
Te Reformation and spread of Protestantism in Europe were intimately
related to interreligious warfare—this time between several families of the
same religion. However, the lack of well-defned state structures in Europe
makes it difcult to distinguish such cases as the Wars of Religion in France
or the Eighty Years’ War in the Netherlands—primarily civil wars—from
the Tirty Years’ War that was a combination of intrastate wars (i.e., civil
wars) and interstate wars (Dunn 1979). 
Te aftermath of the Tirty Years’ War—arguably one of the longest
and bloodiest wars in history (Wilson 2011)—brought at least a temporary
respite from “religious” warfare in Europe. Tis is not to say that subsequent
wars did not occur between states of diferent religions or within states
between diferent religious communities. Rather, religion was typically not
a prominently stated issue over which many people fought in the eigh-
teenth, nineteenth, and most of the twentieth centuries. At the same time,
wars between religiously dissimilar societies—primarily in imperialist and
colonial contexts—continued to take place across the world. 
Te story of Eastern religions and of Asian civilization has similar
undertones. Tere are obvious diferences between Far Eastern religions
and the Abrahamic (Judaism, Christianity, Islam) religions (Smart 1998).
Yet the relationship between religion and politics in many Asian societ-
ies was not all that diferent from the history of the West. Communities
organized around common religious beliefs and followed religious lead-
ers. Strictly within-community marriages yielded class systems that were
more internally homogeneous and externally diverse in terms of religion.
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7 Religion and World Politics—Teory and Evidence
Geography also shaped the distribution of religious beliefs. Consequently,
confictual or cooperative relations among diferent communities were also
afected by religious similarity or dissimilarity. Even before East-West trade
began to facilitate Western infuence on Asian societies, confict between
communities in South and East Asia could be described both on religious
grounds and on material grounds. Te relations between European imperi-
alists and local societies were increasingly shaped by the imperial activities
of European powers and missionaries in Asia in the late eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. Te European sense of white supremacy rested both
on tangible factors—such as superior economic and military power and
technology—and on the notion that Christianity was spiritually superior
to other religions and had to be spread in order to bring modernity to the
“primitive” societies of Asia, America, and Africa (Du Bois 1915, Furedi
1998, Mazrui 1988, Abernethy 2000). Tis added another—ideological—
layer to the social, economic, and political/military exploitation of indig-
enous societies by European imperialism. 
Te most destructive interstate wars in human history—the two World
Wars—were not focused on religion. To be sure, Russian support for Serbia
was expressed in part as a result of the former’s view of itself as the protector
of Orthodox allies, in this case Serbia, against Catholic Austria-Hungary.
Te July–August Crisis of 1914 was the spark on a powder keg traced in
large part to the continued decay and breakup of the Islamic Ottoman
Turkish Empire and competition among the Catholic, Protestant, and
Orthodox European states over the spoils of this process as well as the com-
petition for new imperial domains especially in Africa (Du Bois 1915). Not
surprisingly, major parts of World War I were fought between religiously
dissimilar states, for example, between the Ottoman Empire and the
Western powers. But the center of the confict was a struggle between reli-
giously similar Christian states (Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Anglican
states). Te population of most combatants included a mix of several reli-
gious families of Christianity. Similarly, in World War II, the armed confict
between Japan and the United States and its allies, or Nazi Germany and
the USSR involved religiously dissimilar states, but religion was not a major
issue in the war. During the Cold War era, a signifcant number of wars
broke out between religiously dissimilar states. Tese included the Korean
War, the Vietnam War, the Arab–Israeli wars, and the Indo–Pakistani wars.
However, there is little evidence that religious factors played a key role in
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8 Scriptures, Shrines, Scapegoats, and World Politics 
these wars. Te Korean, Vietnam, and Cambodian wars pitted initially reli-
giously similar communities against each other. Only later did these civil
wars expand to interreligious confict. Importantly, the issues over which
these wars were fought were primarily political, not religious. Tere are
certainly strong religious aspects to the Arab–Israeli and Indo–Pakistani
confict. However, religion was not a single, and most likely not a central,
issue at stake in these wars. 
Te complex role that religion has played in the political history of
the world has had only few traces in both ancient and modern theories
of world politics. Te classics of International Relations (IR) theories—
writings by historians, philosophers, military strategists, legal scholars, and
economists—focus only marginally on the role of religion in world politics.
For example, Sun Tzu’s Te Art of War, written sometime in the sixth cen-
tury bce is probably one of the frst treatises on military strategy. It men-
tions of and on some Confucian and Taoist concepts, but in essence it is
about rational management of force (Johnston 1995). Tere is virtually no
place for divine intervention in military afairs, as far as his ideas are con-
cerned (Sun Tzu 1994 [circa 512 bce]). 
Tucydides’s history of the Peloponnesian Wars (Tucydides 1943 [circa
413 bce]) is a story of realpolitik. Religion plays a very minor role in these
wars; the Peloponnesian Wars are about power, dominance, and prestige,
but not about religion. Polytheistic beliefs were common to both Athens
and Sparta as well as to the other city-states in the Greek Peninsula. If any-
thing, the Peloponnesian wars were clearly intrareligious conficts. 
Te political and legal theory of the Enlightenment era—including
Hugo Grotius and the Enlightenment political philosophers (e.g., Adam
Smith, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Tomas Hobbes, Charles Montesquieu,
John Locke, and later, Immanuel Kant) was predicated on the conception
of political systems built on rational foundations. Tis conception relied on
a notion that political order rests on a social contract among people rather
than on a divine directive. Tese theorists also viewed the relations among
political communities as either regulated or unregulated by the same ratio-
nal logic. God plays no role in the brutish Hobbesian state of nature. Nor
does God play a role in Rousseau’s version of the fragility and instability of
the more harmonic relations among states. Nor does God play a role in the
vision of a cooperative system in Comte’s notion of peace through trade or
in Kant’s notion of peace among liberal republics (Waltz 1958, Hofmann
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9 Religion and World Politics—Teory and Evidence
1964, Knusten 1994, Doyle 1986). Importantly, religious institutions, reli-
gious beliefs, and rituals do not play a signifcant role in liberal thinking
about the state and international relations. 
An exception to this view in nineteenth-century political philosophy is
Karl Marx’s treatment of religion as an instrument that both the traditional
elites and the bourgeoisie in industrialized states use to sustain the class
structure and the submissiveness of the proletariat (Elster 1985, 504–10).
Tis conception is an important element of what we characterize as the
instrumentalist perspective of religion and political theory. However, even
in Marxism, religion plays only a supporting role. It is but one instrument,
not even the most central one, by which elites maintain the class structure
of industrialized societies. Indeed, Marx’s historical analysis emphasizes the
emergence of capitalist societies due to separation of religion from politics
and economics. Religion in and of itself is not an element of the social
structure of capitalist states; rather, it is a convenient weapon that capi-
talists have adapted from medieval societies and have used efciently in a
new class structure. Marx’s followers—Lenin, Trotsky, Mao Zedong, and
modern Marxist scholars in the West—have continued this interpretation
of religion as an instrument of class domination. 
Te critique that mainstream political scientists and IR scholars seem to
have downplayed the role of religion in world afairs is not a baseless claim.
Whether motivated by modernization, secularization, or some other impe-
tus, it seems clear that most IR scholars appeared reticent to highlight the
role of religion in their published work. We discuss this point in more detail
in chapter 2. For now, however, we can document the marginalization of
religion in IR research by examining the scholarly publications on various
topics related to world politics. We examined the number of publications
with the word combination “religion” and “international relations,” “inter-
national politics,” or “world politics” using two search engines:  Google
Scholar and Web of Science. 
Table 1.1 provides data on the number of studies with the word combi-
nations “religion and world/international relations/politics” in their titles.
Tese studies cover the period 1945–2018. We compare the number of
studies with these word combinations across two subperiods:  1945–90
and 1991–2018. Such a comparison requires us to take into account the
expansion in the number of publication outlets and the signifcantly better
documentation of publication sources during the latter period. In order to
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10 Scriptures, Shrines, Scapegoats, and World Politics 
Table 1.1. Titles on religion and international (world) politics (relations), 1945–2018 
Word Combination 1945–1990 
(1) 
1991–2018 
(2) 
Pct. Change (3) Relig./Power 
Ratio4 
WOS GS WOS GS WOS GS WOS GS 
Religion—International 
Relations 
Religion—International 
Politics 
Religion—World Politics 
0 
1 
32 
5 
9 
58 
67 
40 
109 
218 
111 
247 
− 
4,000% 
309% 
4,360% 
1,230% 
341% 
Power—International 
Relations 
Power—International 
53 
72 
174 
216 
182 
174 
828 
596 
340% 
242% 
476% 
276% 
Inf. 
16.53 
9.16 
4.46 
Politics 
Power—World Politics 85 207 193 637 227% 308% 1.36 1.38 
Note: WOS: Tompson/Reuters Web of Science, GS: Google Scholar. 
− Undefned because of division by zero, or division of infnity by a real number. 
Relig./Power Ratio is measured by: 
pct chg . ( religion ) 1 2  R P  / = ˝ . 
pct chg power . ( ˝ ) . 1 2  
Tis is the ratio of the percentage change in the number of religion-titled publications (e.g., religion 
and world politics) to the percentage change in the number of power-titled publications (e.g., power 
and world politics). 
No Publications − No Publications . . 1991 2016 − − 1945 1990 pct chg = . 
bN . 
− 
o Publications1945 1990
avoid biases stemming from such changes, we compared these fgures to the
number of publications using the combination of power and international/
world relations/politics over the same periods, which was among the most
common combinations in the scholarly literature in the feld across both
subperiods. 
Te increase in the number of publications including the word “religion”
in their title (combined with various international/world relations/politics)
terms is substantially higher than the increase in the number of publications
including the concept of “power” in the same combination. Te diference
between the number of religion-IR combinations and power-IR combina-
tions are of orders of magnitude, as seen by the R/P ratio scores, and not
merely a marginal increase in the centrality of religion as a topic of inquiry
in the feld.2 
Why were IR scholars reticent to focus on religious factors during the 
Cold War era? One hypothesis is that prominent IR scholars were inclined, 
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for professional and personal reasons, to concentrate on matters that were 
consistent with the stated national security policies and preferences of their 
countries’ leadership. Tis may have also been part of a prevalent academic 
subculture (Oren 2003). It is possible that “the role of religion in interna-
tional afairs has not so much been neglected and overlooked as misrep-
resented and under-theorised” (Pabst 2012, 997). As this table suggests, 
the post–Cold War era witnessed a dramatic shift in publications about 
the role of cultural factors, in general, and religious factors, in particular, 
in world politics. Two watershed events seem to account for this shift: the 
end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks on the United States in 
September 2001.3 Te reality of two superpowers competing in an anar-
chical international system dominated international thinking during the 
Cold War, but this was not separate from, or uninformed by, a framing of 
the competition in terms of a Christian West and an atheistic Communist 
bloc. Te management of this competition was the principal domain of 
realist and neorealist political thought. Te reality of economic and insti-
tutional cooperation was the principal domain of liberal and neoliberal 
institutionalist theorizing. Both schools of thought—paradigms—of IR 
focused on rational and material motivations of states and on the struc-
tural constraints imposed by international anarchy. 
When the Eastern European states abandoned communism, and more
so after the collapse of the Soviet Union, theorists started asking questions
about the kind of structures that would replace bipolarity. Some viewed
the world moving toward unipolarity under the “benign” leadership of
the United States (Nexon and Wright 2007); others saw the world dete-
riorating into chaos (Mearsheimer 1990/91). However, a new conception
emerged, one that shifted the fundamental paradigm from the Cold War
focus centered on the distribution of power in the context of the ideo-
logical confrontation between West and East to a revised conception based
on cultural divides. Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations (CoC) the-
sis contended forcefully that the struggle between superpowers would be
replaced by a struggle among civilizations (Huntington 1993, 1996). Te
fundamental conficts of interest, perspectives, and ideas embedded in dif-
ferent civilizations had been submerged by the superpower standof dur-
ing the Cold War. According to Huntington, civilizational conficts would
rise to the surface and dominate world politics in the post–Cold War era.
Religion plays a pivotal role in Huntington’s conception of civilizations and
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civilizational identity. Hence, his clash of civilizations is fundamentally a
clash of religions. 
Huntington’s ideas created a relatively large splash in the scholarly
community, but had little efect on the policy community initially.
International wars that broke out in the 1990s, such as the frst Gulf War,
the Armenia–Azerbaijan war, the Kosovo war, and the Indo–Pakistani
Kargil war, even though they were wars between states with fundamen-
tally diferent religious identities, were not interpreted as such. However,
the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon (and
the abortive attack leading to the downing of United Flight 93 near
Shanksville, Pennsylvania) on September 11, 2001, revived the CoC the-
sis. Huntington’s ideas were adopted by politicians—principally by the
neoconservative community then in power in the United States. Te
revived interest in terrorism in the scholarly community also focused
on radical Islam and on the presumed infuence of religious ideas and
religious institutions on violent behavior. A  similar focus emerged in
Judaism when a religious fanatic assassinated Israeli prime minister
Rabin in 1995, and has continued with the growing violence on the part
of radical Jewish settlers against Palestinians in the West Bank over the
last two decades. 
Te convergence of rightist evangelical Christian thought, rightist 
evangelical groups and think tanks, and neoconservatism in the United 
States played an important role in the mobilization of public support for 
the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. It also served an important role in the move 
to increase the infringement on personal liberties by security institutions 
via such legislation as the Patriot Act, the formation of detention centers, 
and the legitimation of torture in interrogations of suspected terrorists. 
Te “global war on terror” was framed—sometimes implicitly and some-
times explicitly—as a war of the Western world against radical Islam. But 
the distinction between what constituted “radical” Islam and what consti-
tuted “nonradical” Islam was vague; and simultaneously terrorism associ-
ated with adherents of Western religious traditions was more likely to be 
associated with the individual actors rather than the religions themselves, 
as is often done with Islamists. Te Brexit referendum in England and 
the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States in 2016 
are also indications of the growing anti-Islamic sentiments in the Western 
democracies. 
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Te revived intellectual discourse on religion and world politics has both
explicit and implicit elements. Tese are derivative from various theories of
IR. Te explicit elements consist of such ideas as the CoC thesis, and the
focus on the linkages between specifc religions (e.g., Islam) and particu-
lar violent strategies (e.g., terrorism, suicide bombings). Te implicit ideas
are embedded in the key tenets of a relatively new paradigm of IR: con-
structivism. Constructivism highlights issues of identity, ideational fac-
tors, and socially constructed realities. It argues that these concepts have
a strong impact on world politics. Constructivist scholars do not generally
award religion an explicit role in their ideas about what makes IR work.
Yet, religious factors are logical derivatives of the ideas emerging from this
paradigm. 
Tis survey of historical and intellectual trends linking religion to world
politics serves to highlight two important issues. First, it suggests that reli-
gious factors played an important role in international history. Tis was
the case even when they were not considered important or central to the
development of international interactions. It is certainly the case at present
when the signifcant role of religion in world politics seems to have been
vindicated both in theory and in practice. However, we still have a long way
to go if we are to gain better knowledge of the kind of roles religious factors
play in the formation, evolution, and structure of states, and in the manner
in which they interact with each other. 
Second, the empirical validity of diferent ideas about religion in world
politics has yet to be established. Many ideas about these issues are just
that: abstract notions. We survey below the empirical studies of religion and
world politics. Tis survey shows that many hypotheses that emerge from
these abstract theories have not been subjected to empirical analysis. Te
jury is still out on other ideas that have received relatively serious empiri-
cal scrutiny, such as some aspects of the CoC thesis. Empirical scientifc
research that attempted (or purported) to test the CoC thesis has more
often refuted its main empirical claims regarding civilizations per se. At the
same time, these studies have simultaneously provided some supporting
evidence regarding the increased salience of cultural factors—and religion,
in particular—in world politics. We argue that part of the reason for this
state of afairs has to do with incomplete or fawed specifcations of the
theories linking religion to world politics. Another cause of the problems
and disagreements in the literature is related to methodology: how these
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abstract notions are tested; what kind of evidence is brought to bear on
these issues; and the kind of methods that are employed to test them. 
3. What Is New and Different about This Study? 
Our study addresses several questions. 
1. What is religion? 
a. How do we classify world religions and religious families? 
b. How do we measure the religious characteristics of states, the
religious similarity between states, and the religious character-
istics of broader international structures (such as cooperative
groups or regional groupings)? 
2. What are the religious characteristics of the world? 
a. What are the religious characteristics of the international sys-
tem as a whole? 
b. What are the religious characteristics of regions? 
c. How have these characteristics changed over time? 
3. What role do religious factors play in international confict? 
a. How do the religious characteristics of states afect their con-
fict behavior? 
b. How do the religious characteristics of dyads afect the prob-
ability and magnitude of confict between members? 
c. How do the characteristics of the international system and of
regional subsystems afect degrees of stability and instability in
these structures? 
4. What role do religious factors play in various aspects of interna-
tional cooperation? 
a. How do the religious characteristics of states afect their coop-
erative practices? 
b. How do the religious characteristics of dyads afect the type,
level, and scope of cooperation between members? 
c. What role does religion play in the emergence of cooperative
international structures? 
d. What role do religious factors play in shaping cooperation
across diferent regions? 
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e. How does religion afect levels of cooperation at the global level? 
f. Do religious factors play diferent roles across diferent coop-
erative domains? For example, are religiously similar states
more likely to cooperate in security afairs than in economic
afairs? Is religion a factor in state membership in international
institutions? 
5. To what extent do religious factors afect internal conficts? 
a. Do the religious characteristics of a state afect the likelihood of
civil war outbreak? Do they afect the magnitude and severity
of civil wars? 
b. Does the religious similarity between a state and its relevant
international environment afect the probability of external
intervention in civil wars? 
c. Do civil wars represent a domestic variant of the clash of
civilizations? 
6. Is there a relationship between the religious characteristics of states
and the quality of life of their members? 
a. To what extent do religious factors, compared to other factors,
play a role in economic, social, political, and cultural develop-
ment of states? 
b. To what extent does the religious homogeneity or heterogeneity
of a society afect the quality of life of its members? 
c. Is there a relationship between the religiosity of a society and
the quality of life of its members? Are diferent religions associ-
ated with a better or worse quality of life? 
Tese questions cover rather complex issues. We discuss both the ques-
tions and the underlying ideas that drive them in the following chapters.
However, in this chapter we provide a brief outline of the structure of
the book as it addresses each of these questions. Before doing this, we
point out what is special about our study. Given the signifcant revival of
the study of religion and politics, in general, and of religion and world
politics, in particular, it is incumbent on any new study such as ours to
explain how it difers from, and how it contributes to the literature on
these topics. We argue that the present study innovates on at least six
dimensions. 
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1. Scope. Te scope of the current study is considerably wider than
virtually all previous studies analyzing religion and world poli-
tics. Te same applies to the combination of issues the study
covers. While many studies address specifc questions similar to
those listed above, we know of no study that covers all of these
questions. Tis makes the present study the most comprehen-
sive empirical work on religion and world politics that exists to
date. We have cast a wide net of issues connecting religion to
various aspects of international and domestic politics because
many of these issues are linked. Tey are connected by common
theoretical arguments on how religion afects politics. Tey are
also joined by the fact that international and internal confict
are connected, and by the notion that international confict and
cooperation are interrelated. All these factors also afect human
security and social welfare. Because these issues are inherently
connected, they may all be afected by religious factors and
structures. 
2. Teory. We ofer a novel and integrative theoretical framework
for studying the relationship between religion and politics. We
integrate diferent theoretical approaches that address the inter-
relations between religion and world politics. Our theoretical
framework builds on existing theories but also reinterprets them
in a way that enables us to develop a more sophisticated under-
standing of the manner in which religion operates as an identity
marker of societies and states, and of the ways in which political
elites manipulate religion to advance their aims. 
3. Methodology. We believe—and will document in the coming 
chapters—that many of the empirical analyses that address the 
above topics are methodologically fawed. Tis raises serious 
questions about the validity of their substantive inferences. Tis 
book is not about political methodology. We relegate the more 
complex methodological presentations to appendices at the end 
of the relevant chapters so that readers who wish to focus on 
the substance can do so without getting bogged down by techni-
cal details. Nevertheless, given the complexity of the issues cov-
ered in the book, we innovate on a number of levels. First, we 
employ methods that enable us to overcome the problems that 
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have plagued existing empirical studies of religion and politics. 
Second, we rely on network analytic approaches—some of the 
more sophisticated and innovative methodologies that deal with 
social interactions—to develop new and more sensitive mea-
sures of religious similarity. Tird, network analysis allows us to 
detect and analyze new units of analysis that have not been inves-
tigated in previous research on these topics. We refer to these 
units as “endogenous groups.” An endogenous group is an emer-
gent social grouping characterized by highly dense within-group 
interactions, and by sparse between-group interactions. Tese 
groups are “emergent” in the sense that their size, numbers, and 
memberships are determined by the degree and nature of interac-
tions, not by some—more or less arbitrary—assignment of exter-
nal observers. Fourth, we conduct an extensive set of robustness 
checks. Robustness checks are analyses that examine the degree 
to which substantive inferences from these analyses are sensitive 
to variations in measures, methods, or specifc control variables. 
Accordingly, such analyses employ diferent variations of mea-
sures, methods, and combinations of variables. Taken together, 
these methodological innovations help establish far more nuanced 
and far more reliable inferences about the interrelations between 
religious factors and political processes. 
4. Multiple Relational Domains. In contrast to many other studies that
cover snippets of the possible linkages between religion and world
politics, we ofer a more general set of analyses that cover (a) the
relationship between religion and international confict, (b)  the
relationship between religion and international cooperation—
across diferent cooperative domains, (c) the relationship between
religion and domestic confict, and—an aspect that has not been
studied extensively—(d) the relationship between religion, human
security, and quality of life in societies. In this respect, the empiri-
cal evidence presented in this study goes well beyond most of what
has been reported in the speculative or scientifc literature on these
topics. 
5. Generalizability. Our analysis covers the entire globe and extends
over a period of nearly seventy years. Here, too, we go well beyond
what has been studied in much of the literature. Such a broad scope
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is possible due to the comprehensive dataset on world religions that
we collected. We discuss this dataset in chapter 3. Our study also
employs several other datasets on the international relations side of
the equation, some of which have been collected by us, and some
by other scholars. Tese datasets enable us to generalize about the
various linkages between religion and world politics well beyond
what others have done in the past. In this sense, we may be able
to provide a broader empirical picture of trends, relationships, and
implications than has been available before. 
6. Multiple Levels of Analysis. One of the difculties of providing gen-
eral insights about the interrelations between religion and various
aspects of world politics has been the partial nature and limited
scope of most empirical studies on these topics. One aspect of this
limited scope has been that diferent studies focused on difer-
ent units of analysis: some examining the behavior of individual
states, others focusing on relationships between pairs of states
(dyadic analyses), and very few going beyond this level of analysis.
By contrast, we study multiple levels of analysis. Specifcally, we
consider the behavior, external and internal, of individual states;
we examine dyadic interactions; and we study emergent groups
(e.g., cooperative communities) and regional politics as well as
characteristics of the international system as a whole. Tis mul-
tilevel perspective enables us to examine whether and to what
extent empirical results that are observed at one level of analysis
generalize to other levels of analysis. Tis is an important contri-
bution because it provides an assessment of the robustness of the
empirical results across levels of analysis. 
Tese innovations enable us to provide a more general, rich, and reliable
understanding of how religious factors and processes afect domestic and
international political interactions. Te picture that emerges from the inte-
grated theoretical perspective and the empirical analyses is far more nuanced
but also more interesting than some of the more simplistic approaches that
have captured the headlines—in both popular discourses and scholarly
journals—thus far. We hope that the combination of theoretical, empiri-
cal, and methodological innovations will add an important layer to this
discourse. We now turn to a brief overview of the book. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
19
Religion and World Politics—Teory and Evidence 19 
4. Overview of the Book 
Chapter 2. Tis chapter provides a critical review of the literature on reli-
gion and world politics. It discusses the key critiques of students of reli-
gion and politics. Tese critiques are aimed primarily at modernization and
secularization theories. More broadly, however, students of religion and
politics criticize the key paradigms of IR, tying these paradigms to secular
conceptions of politics. Our focus in this review is on the key theoreti-
cal arguments of the extant literature, linking religious factors to various
aspects of politics. Te modern literature on religion and international rela-
tions has some interesting and innovative ideas. At the same time, however,
this literature is marred by controversy, vague conceptions, logical conun-
drums, and methodological problems. It is also plagued by a disconnect
between the more general arguments it makes and the empirical work that
builds on it. We fnd that the ratio of polemical to analytical work in this
feld is very high. Moreover, the more analytical work—much of which we
review in the empirical chapters that follow—is limited in scope, focuses
on a restricted set of units, and rests on diferent theoretical foundations in
diferent contexts. Tis suggests a need for a more coherent and unifying
analytical framework that could yield testable propositions about religion
and politics. 
Chapter 3. In this chapter we outline the theoretical framework that
guides this study. Tis framework builds on several perspectives that are
prevalent in the literature, but it ofers a broader set of ideas covering the
issues addressed in the key research questions. Our framework focuses on
two key elements that link religion to domestic and international politi-
cal processes:  the religious structure of society, and the relations between
religious and political institutions. We ofer a causal mechanism that links
religion to various processes of confict and cooperation within and among
states. Tis causal mechanism, in our view, is based on the ability and will-
ingness of political elites to use religious values and ideas as political weap-
ons and key instruments of social mobilization. We suggest that political
elites seek to maximize political survival—to attain political power if they
do not have it (or do not have enough), and to retain their leadership posi-
tion if they have one. To accomplish this goal, they need to put together
and sustain a winning coalition that helps them fend of or defeat internal
or external opposition. One of the key tools of political mobilization is the
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use of religious ideas in support of some policies or in opposition to some
enemies. 
We argue that political elites will use religion as a tool of political mobi-
lization when they need to and if they can. Te manipulation of religious
ideas as a strategy of political mobilization is more feasible in some societ-
ies, under certain circumstances, and against some enemies. Our theory
attempts to spell out the contexts in which such manipulation is more fea-
sible, and under which structural or situational conditions political elites
may not be able to use religion to attract support or fend of enemies. 
Chapter 4. In this chapter we provide a systematic description of the
religious characteristics of the international system since the end of World
War II. Tis draws on our major data collection project, the World Religion
Project (WRP). We discuss the underlying logic of this project, starting
with the search for a defnition of religion and a set of observable indicators
and criteria for classifying religions. We then discuss the religious taxonomy
that serves as a foundation for the data collection process and explain how
we validated this taxonomy before discussing various challenges during the
data collection process. 
Tese data allow us to provide systematic evidence on changes in the
characteristics of the international system in terms of the rise and decline of
religious adherence since 1945. Tis discussion is all the more important in
light of various theories and speculation about trends toward or away from
secularization. We provide data on regional distributions of the major world
religions and religious families. And, as a prelude to the more analytical dis-
cussions in subsequent chapters, we provide some preliminary data on reli-
gious similarity across regions and in the international system as a whole. 
Chapter 5.Tis chapter explores the interrelations between religion and
international confict. Our theory suggests that political leaders can—and
usually do—use religious factors and identities to mobilize support for for-
eign adventures. However, the use of religion to support dangerous confict
initiatives is done selectively. Leaders of states that are characterized by high
religious homogeneity can and typically do use religion to support confict
against religiously dissimilar adversaries. Tis is even more common in cases
where the political survival of leaders is at risk. 
Consequently, the argument that drives the empirical analyses in this
chapter centers on several factors. First, the key to understanding the link-
age between religious characteristics and confict rests with the degree of
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similarity between and among states. At the national level of analysis, the
similarity between the religious makeup of the state and its politically rel-
evant environment—the potential or actual enemies of the state—has a
signifcant impact on its confict behavior. Specifcally, states surrounded
by religiously similar states are less likely to engage in international con-
ficts than states that are surrounded by religiously diferent states. Likewise,
religiously similar states are less likely to fght each other than religiously
dissimilar states. Further, the level of confict in religiously heterogeneous
regions is signifcantly higher than in religiously homogeneous ones. 
Second, the efect of similarity on confict is mediated by the relation-
ship between political institutions and religious institutions. We suggest
that religion has little or no efect on the confict behavior of states that sep-
arate religious from political institutions. By contrast, we expect religious
factors to play a signifcant role in shaping the confict behavior of states in
which religious and political institutions are closely linked. 
We conduct multiple analyses using diferent specifcations of religious
attributes and diferent specifcations of confict behavior. We examine the
religion-confict linkages at diferent levels of analysis, covering individual
state behavior, dyadic confict, and regional patterns. Te results of these
analyses ofer a nuanced picture of the relationship between religious factors
and international confict behavior. 
Chapter 6. Given that states cooperate across a wide array of issue areas,
in this chapter we focus on three general dimensions of international coop-
eration: security, economic, institutional. Our theory suggests that the reli-
gious foundations of international cooperation difer signifcantly across
domains. Specifcally, states that are religiously similar are more likely to
cooperate in security afairs—principally through formal alliances and
international security institutions. However, religious similarity plays little
or no role in economic transactions across states. We also suggest that there
may be fundamental diferences between the cooperative choices of “new”
states, that is, states that have just gained their independence, and “old”
states, that is, states that have been independent for much longer. 
Tis chapter ofers a general argument about international cooperation
that expands considerably on existing theories on the subject. We develop
the concept of “endogenous cooperative communities,” that is, emer-
gent groups of highly cooperative states. We show that these communi-
ties have a number of structural determinants, and that religious factors
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play an important role in their emergence and persistence. Te results of
these analyses enable us to make some interesting—and in some cases,
counterintuitive—points about the factors that serve to increase or impede
international cooperation in security, economic, and institutional afairs. 
Chapter 7. Tis chapter focuses on the relationship between religious
factors and domestic political confict. It examines the efects of the reli-
gious structure of a society on political stability and instability. Our argu-
ment is that religious factors play an important role in political stability
and instability, but the causal mechanism that determines when, why, and
how they do so is more complicated than the notions profered in previous
academic forays into this subject. 
Studies of civil violence have focused on religious (or ethnic, which typi-
cally subsumes religious, ethnic, racial, and linguistic characteristics) faction-
alism. Religious factionalism plays an important role in political instability,
but not in isolation. Rather, societies that are religiously diverse tend to
exhibit instability when religious minorities are discriminated against by
the regime, and when they anticipate support from outside groups. Tis is
more likely when neighboring countries are composed of religiously similar
groups, and it suggests a link between domestic instability and international
confict. Here, too, we ofer a range of evidence based on a large number of
empirical analyses supporting these arguments. 
Chapter 8. Tis chapter examines the efects of the religious structure of
a society on the quality of life enjoyed by citizens within the state. Tere is
a growing literature on human security. Human security typically refers to
the degree to which individuals are free from risks to their lives, property,
and welfare, and the extent to which they enjoy fundamental individual and
collective liberties. Tere are diferent ways to measure human security, and
we focus on a modifcation of the UN Human Development Index (HDI). 
Human security encompasses a number of factors ranging from the eco-
nomic and physical to the spiritual and social. Taken together these factors
facilitate and sustain efective and self-fulflling functioning of individuals in
society, and promote efcient social and political institutions. Since religion
is a communal institution, and since all religions contain prescriptions for
moral and righteous behavior, it is reasonable to expect religion to be one of
the factors that promotes and sustains the quality of life. 
We argue that it is not religion per se that helps improve or reduce
the quality of life in societies. Rather, it is the interaction between religion
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and politics that is at work. Both religiously heterogeneous and religiously
homogeneous societies in which governments place severe restrictions on
religious freedoms and activities tend to have far lower levels of quality of
life than states in which religious freedom is an important norm. Religious
freedom, which includes the freedom not to practice religion, is part of a
broader range of values that embraces diversity, tolerance, and pluralism.
Religious freedom allows people to act in a relatively free and egalitarian
fashion as members of society, hence promoting the general quality of life.
In contrast, restrictions on religious beliefs and practices tend to be a source
of discontent and frustration, leading to protest and violence or alienation.
Tis tends to have dampening efects on the quality of life. Here, too, we
ofer original evidence that emerges from a wide range of analyses in sup-
port of these arguments. 
Chapter 9. Tis chapter reviews the empirical results and discusses the
implications of our analysis for future research and policy. We emphasize
the nuanced and complex nature of the relationship between religion and
world politics. Te relationship between religion and international behavior
is not simple and straightforward as anticipated by some of the more central
theories on these subjects. We suggest that the religious impact on world
politics is neither linear nor simple. Tis impact is clearly inconsistent with
many simplistic notions about religion and international confict and coop-
eration that have been propagated in some scholarly and popular writings
on these subjects. 
For example, we fnd consistently that religiously similar states are less
likely to fght each other while religiously dissimilar ones are more likely
to, but that these relationships hold across time and are not more salient in
the post–Cold War era as they were during the Cold War era. Tus, we also
argue with some degree of confdence that most empirical results challenge
the key expectations of the CoC thesis. We also fnd only weak evidence
supporting the hypotheses derived from the primordialist and instrumen-
talist perspectives, and even more limited evidence for the hypotheses
derived from the constructivist perspective. 
Perhaps the most salient empirical result across all the empirical analyses
of international and internal confict, international cooperation, and human
security is that many notions about the bellicose nature of specifc religions and
about the cooperative nature of others are misplaced and fawed. Our results sug-
gest quite decisively that there is no relationship between a specifc religion or religious
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group and confict or violence. Nor is there any evidence linking a specifc religion
or religious group to cooperation. For example, Huntington’s popular notion that
“Islam has bloody borders” is patently untrue. 
We fnd more concrete and general evidence for the hypotheses derived
from our integrative theory of religion and politics. Specifcally, we fnd
support for the argument linking social structure and the political circum-
stances to the ability and willingness of political leaders to use religious
factors as an instrument of political mobilization. Tis combination of
social structure, political circumstances, and the manipulation of religion
by political leaders applies both to confict and cooperation. We also fnd
a consistent relationship between religious freedom and human security.
Finally, we fnd that, with a few exceptions, the linkages between religious
factors and world politics has not changed substantially over time. Te
post–Cold War era is not “God’s Century,” as some authors have claimed. 
We believe that some of the negative results—particularly those that chal-
lenge the notion of a linkage between a specifc religion and confict, whether
external or internal, and between a specifc religion and cooperation—ofer
some policy insights. Tese, unfortunately, but unsurprisingly, challenge the
policy orientation of some key actors in the international system—including
those of the United States and some NATO members as well as other states
in the Middle East that treat each other as friendly or hostile due to their
religious afliations. We also challenge the false attribution of confictual or
cooperative orientations to states based on the level of religiosity or secular-
ism that characterizes their policies—for both democratic and nondemocratic
states. However, most importantly, our key policy recommendation is that
policy makers need to be circumspect when it comes to devising policies on
presumed linkages between religion and international relations. It is not that
such linkages do not exist; rather, it is that they are all but simple and straight-
forward. On a more general level, attentive publics need to be aware that reli-
gion can and often is manipulated by political leaders, sincerely or in a strategic
fashion, to advance goals that may have little to do with the content and values
of such religions or their adherents. 
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Chapter 2 
Scholarship on Religion and World Politics: 
A Critical Review of the Literature 
1. Introduction 
Tis chapter provides a critical review of some of the more central stud-
ies connecting religious factors to international confict and cooperation as
well as to matters of domestic political confict and stability. Much of this
literature is quite recent; the study of religion and world politics was a fairly
marginal topic in the mainstream IR literature up to the early 1990s. Te
focus on cultural factors, in general, and on religious factors, in particular,
as explanatory variables in the study of confict, cooperation, and internal
political processes did not attract much attention during the Cold War era. 
Studies using religion as an explanatory variable of international and
domestic processes in the post–Cold War era produced many important
insights. However, as is the case with any emerging trend in the study of
complex issues, this literature involves multiple polemical and theoretical
debates, a great deal of diversity in terms of scope, quality, and rigor, and—
as we demonstrate in the following chapters—largely mixed results. Our
focus here is on the central theoretical insights into the linkages between
religion and international political processes. We discuss the key ideas and
identify some logical and methodological weaknesses that characterize this
literature. More focused reviews of specifc aspects of these linkages—for
example, the linkage between religion and international or internal confict,
and between religion and international cooperation—are provided in the
analytical chapters on these topics. 
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Before we go into the substance of this literature, we point out some of
its more general features. First, it is important to note that the proliferation
of the religion and politics literature has yielded a large number of writ-
ings, many of them polemical or works of advocacy. Tere are numerous
calls to introduce more religion-related concepts, theories, and empirical
works into the study of IR (Fox and Sandler 2004, Sandal and James 2011,
Snyder 2011 and several of the articles in that volume). Other publica-
tions debate whether religion infuenced the writings of various IR scholars,
whether religious factors were missing or present from key paradigms of
IR, or whether they could be integrated into one or more of the existing
paradigms (e.g., the writings of the authors in Troy 2014, Sandal and James
2011, Snyder 2011). Tese are useful but do not really add to our knowl-
edge about when, how, and why religious factors help explain key aspects
of world politics. Tey tell us where to look, but they do not tell us how
to fnd what we are looking for. Tese writings lack a clear theory of the
linkages between religious factors and international or domestic political
behavior. Nor do they contain empirical results concerning such linkages. 
Still other treatises question whether religion can be classifed or quan-
tifed (Fitzgerald 2011), criticizing both empirical and more philosophi-
cal writings on religion and international relations. Other studies question
whether it is possible to generalize the concepts of secularism, religiosity,
and the relations between religion and state (Hurd 2008), casting them in
a postmodernist context where everything is blurred and socially manipu-
lated in a hierarchical power structure. Some may think such polemics are
useful and enlightening; we do not. Logically, one cannot use terms like
Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, political institutions, power, or state with-
out defning them. Once these terms are defned, the boundaries of such
concepts are set. Tere are things that fall into the parametric structure of
the defnition, and things that do not. Tis is inherent in defnitions. Such
defnitions may not establish a metric that has lower and upper bounds (or
left and right ends of a continuum), and units of measurement that divide
this continuum into parts. Tey do, however, include a conceptualization
that allows distinguishing genders, individuals by family name or school
enrollment, streets by street names, and so forth. Logically, one cannot deny
something can be done, and at the same time do that very thing one asserts
cannot be done simply by using the concepts that one says cannot be used. 
Another class of “theories” of religion and politics entails general argu-
ments about how religion enters local, national, regional, and global politics
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(Hanson 2006). Te general argument is that religion infuences politics
and societies at all these levels, and that, moreover, religion interacts with
four diferent systems that characterize global politics: the political system,
the economic system, the military system, and the communications system.
Tis is an interesting “grand” paradigm. Te problem is that it does not
allow meaningful deduction of testable propositions about how exactly reli-
gion interacts in each of these contexts. Tere is a sense that the only aspect
of religion that allows it to infuence those levels of analysis and operate
within each of the four systems is identity. Tis is an important observation,
but hardly a novel or surprising one. We will discuss religion as an identity
marker at greater length in the next chapter. 
Given this discussion of quasi-theoretical polemics in the literature, our
biases are rather clear. Our approach is decidedly positivist. We wish to
understand if, how, when, and why religious factors afect specifc types of
international and domestic political processes. We seek guidance in the lit-
erature about these issues. If the literature ofers some guidance—even if we
think there are problems and faws in certain arguments—then it is useful
from a scientifc point of view. Tis principle guides our review. Terefore,
we focus in this chapter on theories of religion and international relations
that yield testable statements—statements which can be verifed or refuted
by facts. Such testable statements specify whether, how, when, and why
religious factors afect the behavior of states, of groups within states, and of
groups of state and nonstate actors. 
2. Straw Men in the Religion and Politics Literature—
Modernization and the Classical Paradigms of IR 
Te received wisdom is that IR theory discounted the role of religion as an
independent factor in world politics. Tere is more than a little merit to
this claim. Te focus in the key theories that dominated the study of IR in
the frst half of the twentieth century was on concepts such as national self-
determination, transparency, and governance through international institu-
tions (idealism), or power, interest, and balance (realism). Tese ideas were,
in many respects, extensions of Enlightenment philosophy—and often had
religious justifcations and rationales subsumed under considerations of
the imperialist project of “Western civilization,” which connoted Western
Christendom. Idealist and realist approaches contain empirical and analyti-
cal adaptations of diferent philosophical ideas to the realities of the frst
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and second half of the twentieth century (Waltz 1958, 1979), but religious
rationales were at times just below the surface (Guilhot 2010). 
Te second half of the twentieth century was dominated by realist, neo-
realist, and Marxist theories on the one hand, and by liberal and neoliberal
theories on the other. Neorealist theories continued the tradition of clas-
sical realism with their focus on power, survival, and top-down systemic
approaches that left little room for presumably nonsystemic forces such
as culture or religion. Marxist approaches were avowedly non-religious or
even anti-religious, and except for Gramscian approaches (e.g., Gill 1993)
were largely dismissive of cultural factors even with the emergence of cul-
tural theses of anticolonial struggles epitomized in Cabral’s (1972) analy-
ses. Mainstream liberal theorists also marginalized the cultural dimension
of world politics, focusing on economic interests and institutional struc-
tures (Keohane 1984). When they did talk about culture, this was typically
restricted to democratic values and norms (Maoz and Russett 1993, Russett
and Oneal 2001, Doyle 1986). As Shah and Philpott (2011) argue, modern
IR theory was (and still is) fundamentally secular.1 
Even more to the point, the claim of widespread acceptance of mod-
ernization arguments among IR theorists prophesizing a secular decline in
religion in world politics is overstated at minimum. Tis point is typically
accompanied by the ubiquitous allusion in the literature to Berger’s (1968)
contention in a New York Times article that by “the twenty-frst century,
religious believers are likely to be found in small sects, huddled together
to resist a worldwide secular culture.” His renunciation of this view thirty
years later, presumably demonstrates the “resurgence” of religion as a fac-
tor in IR (Philpott 2002, Shah and Philpott 2011, Toft, Philpott, and
Shah 2011, Fox 2015). Shah and Philpott (2011, 24) are hardly alone
among scholars of religion and politics in asserting that Berger’s original
contention “spoke for intellectuals across the West.” Absent from many
of these analyses is consideration that even as modernization became
prominent, a rival “modernization revisionism” (Huntington 1971,
293) emerged from arguments of Samuel Huntington, Reinhard Bendix,
S. N. Eisenstadt, Joseph Gusfeld, Milton Singer, and Lloyd and Suzanne
Rudolph, among others. 
Randall (1999, 45) notes that “it was modernization theory, or a par-
ticularly crass version of it, which encouraged expectations that the general
salience of religion in our lives and more specifcally its place in politics
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would diminish with progressive modernization and notably with secu-
larization and rationalization.” However, modernization revisionists chal-
lenged or rejected such claims. For example, they rejected the simplistic
dichotomy between “tradition” and modernity, which suggested a zero-sum
relationship between the two, recognizing that “traditional institutions
adapt to and co-exist with modern institutions, specifcally the nation-
state,” while “the process of modernization may actually revitalize dormant
traditional institutions and practices” (Randall and Teobald 1985, 35). 
Revisionist scholars challenged the teleological assumptions of the mod-
ernization literature that assumed “underdeveloped” states were compelled
to “modernize” to a Western ideal. Haynes (2008, 24) agrees that “mod-
ernization revisionism not only exposed early modernization theorists’
simplistic and ethnocentric assumption about tradition and modernity but
also underlined that various so-called ‘traditional’ phenomena,” including
religion, “continued to have developmental salience over time.” In fact, “the
impact of modernization has been uneven; in more remote and traditional
communities religious feelings and practice continue largely unchanged.”
In some cases “rather than straightforwardly undermining religion, mod-
ernization has served in some ways to enhance its relevance” (Randall 1999,
48–49). 
Generally, the modernization/secularization view of religious decline
was often inattentive to the multidimensionality of religious adherence.
Predicting a decline in the infuence of religious institutions does not neces-
sitate decline in the cognitive, normative, or experiential dimensions of reli-
gion. Tese informal dimensions of religion allowed religious infuence to
persist in “modern” societies (Ireland 1988). No later than 1971, political
scientists such as Huntington (1971, 297) were asserting that “each of the
assumptions which underlay the original, simple image of modernization
could also be called into question,” yet the view persists among many schol-
ars of religion and IR that modernization/secularization arguments held
sway over the feld. 
Despite the challenges to modernization/secularization theories in the
sociological, political development, and dependency theories, moderniza-
tion theory has become a favorite straw man of the religion and politics
literature in the last two decades. Almost any recent study that seeks to
establish a connection between religion and political processes challenges
the modernization thesis. A typical example is Shah’s (2012, 3) argument: 
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Much classical thinking and practice [in politics] is . . .  concerned
with policing and strengthening the fence between two worlds. Te
frst world is the “secular” and “public” world in which international
actors . . . are presumed to make rational choices in the pursuit of
political and economic power. Te second world is the “spiritual”
and “private” world in which religious actors—everything from
church hierarches to clerical councils to violent organizations such as
Al Qaeda and Hizbollah—are presumed to make faith-based choices
in the pursuit of nonrational or irrational goals. . . .  [T]he factual
assumption about these two worlds is that they are two separate uni-
verses, with little or no mutual contact or interaction. 
Fox and Sandler (2004, 12) make an even more radical claim about mod-
ernization and religion: 
Ironically, this reassessment of the role of religion in society has
resulted in an argument that is nearly exactly opposed to the argu-
ment made by modernization and secularization theory:  mod-
ernization, rather than causing religion’s demise, is responsible for its
resurgence. . . . While modernization and secularization theorists pos-
ited that modernity had made religion a primordial remnant that
was fading away as an important social and political factor, the cen-
tral argument of this reassessment is that modernity is increasing the
role of religion in society and politics. [Italics added for emphasis.] 
Fox and Sandler argue that peoples’ expectations emanating from modern-
ization processes toward greater welfare, peace, and security were largely
unfulflled. Tis disappointment with modernization was particularly acute
in the third world. In these countries, unfulflled expectations were con-
verted into basic—or even fundamentalist—religious beliefs and practices.
Te growing opposition to colonialism and imperialism—and its replace-
ment by authoritarianism and oppression—also led people to return to
their religious roots. Western secular ideas were associated with imperial-
ism, while religious beliefs were again associated with tribal, national, or
communal roots. Finally, modernization has “allowed both the state and
religious institutions to increase their spheres of infuence, thus resulting in
more clashes between the two” (p. 12). 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
31
Scholarship on Religion and World Politics 31 
Similarly, Philpott (2007) and Toft, Philpott, and Shah (2011, 9–19)
also make far-reaching claims about the role of religion in politics. Philpott
(2007, 505) argues that “religion has waxed in its political infuence over
the past generation in every region of the globe except perhaps Western
Europe.” Toft, Philpott, and Shah (2011, 3)  contend:  “Earlier confned
to the home, the family, the village, the mosque, synagogue, temple, and
church, religion has come to exert its infuence in parliaments, presidential
palaces, lobbyist ofces, campaigns, militant training camps, negotiation
rooms, protest rallies, city squares, and dissident jail cells.” 
Hurd (2008, 134) also argues that secularism has failed, and that reli-
gion has experienced a signifcant resurgence over the past few years. 
For at least three reasons, it has now become impossible to maintain
that religion is irrelevant to international outcomes, as most conven-
tional accounts would have it. First, the United States and others have
had a hard time imposing their vision of secular democracy around
the world. Second, there has been the advent of a U.S. foreign policy
model in the George W. Bush administration that is ofcially secular
but inspired by a kind of Christianity. Tird, over the past several
decades there has been a rise in religious movements and organiza-
tions with broad bases of national and transnational infuence. 
Several things can be deduced from these statements. First, they rest on
a temporal view of the role of religion in politics. Tese arguments sug-
gest that religious factors became more important in both international
and domestic politics—as well as in modern theories of IR—recently much
more than they had been in the past. Several authors who have suggested
that religious actors and religious matters can be relegated to the private or
subpolitical domains, have come to recant their previous arguments (e.g.,
Henir 2012). Others (e.g., Hurd 2008, 2012) claim that secularism was a
social construction of a political and intellectual elite that dominated both
the practice and study of world politics in the Western world. In fact, this
dominant view of world politics was always contested and challenged in
other parts of the world and in other scholarships, but these latter chal-
lenges became prominent only in the post–Cold War era. 
Second, another assertion is that religious factors and religious actors
have always played an important role in practical world politics. Yet, the
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key scholarly paradigms of IR (and consequent empirical investigations)
have largely ignored them. Even key proponents of these paradigms
seem to acknowledge this point. Robert Keohane, a central theoreti-
cian of neoliberalism, argued:  “Te attacks of September 11 [2001]
reveal that all mainstream theories of world politics are relentlessly secular
with respect to motivation. Tey ignore the impact of religion despite the
fact that world-shaking political movements have so often been fueled
by religious fervor.”2 Snyder (2011), a realist theorist, makes a similar
argument. 
Tird, some argue that IR theories have acknowledged the role of
religious factors in shaping politics, but this was buried or rather not
taken seriously in approaches such as classical realism (Henne and
Nexon 2014, 165–66). In the same volume, Mollov (2014) suggests
that Morgenthau’s “liberal” realism was infuenced by his Jewish her-
itage. Likewise, Carlson (2014) points out the “Christian” nature of
Reinhold Niebuhr’s realism. Te common thread of these arguments
is that even when a theory is presented as fundamentally secular, its
insights are infuenced by the religious beliefs of its authors. A related
argument asserts that mainstream IR of the postwar era was heavily
infuenced by and attentive to issues related to religion. Guilhot (2010,
224) argues that “while nobody would deny that international relations
theory is a secular social science . . . the search for a theory of inter-
national relations was permeated by theological themes.” Not only do
a number of IR scholars employ “religious metaphors” and “eschato-
logical or theological references” in analyzing “core features” of world
politics (e.g., “Wizards of Armageddon,” “Teologians of War,” “New
Leviathan”) but also such “references are too pervasive, too ubiquitous
to be treated as mere coincidences. Tey point at a theological substra-
tum that once provided an explicit background against which a number
of central concepts of IR theory resonated” (p. 224). 
As a result, the scholarship on religion and international relations holds
to the view that IR ignored the role of religion in world afairs, but this is
more apparent than real. Nonetheless, there is a persistent view that secular-
ization was a largely unquestioned “sacred canopy” over postwar IR.3 While
this may have been evident in sociology, it was much less evident in IR, and
even less in the subfeld of comparative politics, which was home to the
modernization arguments in political science. 
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On another plane, the prevalence of religious infuences in interna-
tional afairs was evident among policy makers and analysts even if their
language often adopted the more ideological and basic force arguments of
the national security regimes in Western states and their Cold War adversar-
ies. Preston (2012, 7) asserts that religion is the “missing link, a vital but
unrecognized, even undiscovered,” aspect of US foreign relations. It was
not the only factor, but at times “it was a critically important factor; other
times, it played a relatively minor role.” Religion “acted as the conscience
of American foreign relations;” and popular religious pressure led foreign
policy elites to “merge the moralism and progressivism of religion with the
normally realist mindset of international politics.” Moreover, “Protestant
exceptionalism helped breed American exceptionalism and led to a con-
sistent belief in America as a chosen nation and Americans as a chosen
people” (p. 13), which inspired and served to justify American imperialism
and interventions abroad. Similarly, Muehlenback (2012, viii) asserts that
“religion played a signifcant role in determining the scope and stratagems
of the Global Cold War,” though he is careful to add that “it was a factor in
the Cold War, not the factor.” [emphasis added] 
We do not seek to adjudicate among these interpretations of the clash
between modernization theories and studies on religion and politics. We
agree, as we showed in chapter 1, that the role of religion in accounts of
modern world politics took of after the end of the Cold War and peaked
following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Our focus is not on
this debate, but rather, we focus on the extent that the extant literature on
religion and world politics challenges the key assumptions of the central
paradigms of IR. 
First, religious “theories” challenge the notion that states are the prin-
cipal actors in world politics. Tis notion is basic to realism, but liberal-
ism and constructivism abandoned it long ago. Te key point of religious
theories is that—in addition to the type of nonstate actors that are the
focus of liberal or constructivist approaches—such as international organi-
zations, multinational corporations, or nongovernmental organizations—
we should focus on religious actors. Tese actors can be formal institutions
such as the Catholic Church, or informal and difuse transnational groups
like Al Qaeda, local religious leaders, or cults. Tese actors can act within or
across states. Ignoring them and their impact on politics comes, according
to these theories, at great cost. 
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Second, religious theorists share the constructivist criticism of the
“materialist” focus of the realist and liberal paradigms. Te argument that
national and international processes are driven by material interests is
empirically and theoretically tenuous. Constructivists focus on ideational
factors and identity without always specifying the exact nature of these fac-
tors. By contrast, scholars of religious politics emphasize the role of religion
as an identity marker of groups, communities, and even nations. Religion is
also seen as a socially constructed phenomenon that defnes individual and
collective belief systems (Fox and Sandler 2004, 176–77; Sandal and James
2011, 6–7; Hurd 2008, 149–50).4 Te idea that both constructivist and
religionist scholars advance is that individuals, communities, and political
organizations, such as states, are driven by their belief systems. Religion,
according to this conception forms a central, ideational factor distinct from
material factors such as power, interests, or wealth. 
Tird, some religious scholars challenge the distinction (or dichotomy)
between religion and secularism (Hurd 2008; Fitzgerald 2011). Such
a distinction, attributed primarily to secularist theories, creates a false
impression that religious actors and political actors are separate entities,
or, alternatively, that secularists imply that religion is inexorably detached
from politics. Tis may be the case in some places and it may be true for
some periods. However, in a more general sense this is a fawed dichotomy.
It helped sustain paradigms in IR that focused on secular, material, and
“objective” factors rather than on subjective (or intersubjective) ideational
sources of national and international behavior. 
Tese criticisms seem quite fair. Most of the targets of such critiques are
the central paradigms of IR. Yet similar arguments can be leveled against
key theories of domestic politics, like various versions of political develop-
ment, theories of regime change and regime persistence, and so forth. But
this raises several questions. If we are to account for religious actors, incor-
porate religious ideas, and we are to avoid the religious-secular dichotomy
in explaining international phenomena and processes, then what theoreti-
cal ideas follow? How do religious actors operate? How do religious ideas
and identities infuence diferent aspects of world politics? What is the rela-
tionship between religious actors, religious ideas, and religion-state conti-
nua and international relations? Here is where the essence of religion and
politics theories needs to be examined. 
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3. Central Themes of the Religion and IR Literature 
Most of the studies reviewed in this chapter make a key substantive argu-
ment: religious factors have a profound impact on world politics. What that
impact is and how it works are less clearly specifed, however. Most impor-
tantly, as we argue below, very few of these studies ofer a coherent theory
of religion and international relations. Tis is evident when we compare the
polemics about religion and politics in the literature to the more systematic
arguments that are derived from the theoretical writings. In particular, it is
hard to fnd a comprehensive framework that contains a body of specifc
and refutable propositions about such things as the relationship between
(a) religion and international confict, (b) religion and international coop-
eration, (c) religion and internal political order, and (d) religion and human
security. 
In most cases, when scholars attempt to articulate some potentially
testable arguments about the relationship among religious actors, religious
ideas, and domestic or international relations, the evidence they provide for
these arguments is primarily anecdotal. Tese anecdotal pieces of evidence
focus on an important but selective sample of cases, mostly from the so-
called third world. Little systematic quantitative evidence exists, and that
which does sufers from signifcant methodological problems. And when
we fnd examples of quantitative “tests” of such hypotheses, these often
are based on truncated and biased samples, and/or on tenuous empirical
assumptions. 
We document these arguments by discussing some of the central themes
of this literature. Fox and Sandler (2004) ofer a comprehensive argument for
the incorporation of religion into the study of world politics. Tey suggest
that religion can serve three principal functions in international relations.
First, it can provide ideational legitimacy for certain foreign policy actions.
It allows policy elites to “legitimate” both violent actions and peaceful ones.
Second, religion is a communal identity marker. Specifcally, within a pri-
mordial context, religion can provide a communal raison d’être—a reason
for being. It can justify the claim of a community to territory, resources,
and holy spaces by uniting individuals into defned communities. Tird,
it can provide the key foundations and elements of political belief systems,
thus afording both policy makers and mass movements normative justif-
cations for action or inaction. People—whether they are political leaders
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or followers—may choose actions because they are consistent with their
religious beliefs, or refrain from those that contradict the normative dictates
of their religion. 
Fox and Sandler provide numerous examples to support their claim,
including references to empirical studies of inter-ethnic confict and a
detailed case study of the Israeli–Palestinian confict. However, we are left
with a general argument of the underlying importance of religion, but we
do not get from this study a set of specifc hypotheses about how, when, and
under what conditions these forms of linkage between religion and politics
translate into specifc actions, processes, and outcomes. Te discussion of
the Israeli–Palestinian confict is illuminating, but it could be presented in
alternative terms couched in secular theories of nationalism, and the result
would be equally convincing. 
Another theoretical treatment that addresses multiple aspects of the rela-
tionship between religion and politics is provided by Toft, Philpott, and
Shah. Philpott (2007) focuses on the relationship between religion and
democratization. In the broader work, Toft, Philpott, and Shah (2011)
apply similar ideas to a wider array of political processes including civil war
and terrorism. 
Te puzzle that these authors address concerns the dual role of religion
in domestic confict and cooperation. Religious actors can be a powerful
force in the struggle for democratization. But religious actors can also be a
powerful force pushing theocracy or authoritarianism. Likewise, religious
actors can have a strong pacifying presence, but there are, at the same time,
religious actors that advocate violence and practice terrorism. 
Teir theory of religion and politics is based on two principal fac-
tors: religious ideology (or what Philpott [2007, 507] calls “political the-
ology”) and the relationship between religious and political institutions
(“diferentiation”). Te political theology of a given religion can be more or
less active, or an infuential part of the religion. In some cases, the political
theology requires religious principles to infuence legal, social, political, and
economic afairs. In other cases, the political theology may be minimalist
in nature—requiring basic liberties or spaces for religious practice. When
the political theology focuses on moderation and openness, religion can be
a force for democratization, civil liberties, and cooperation. However, when
the political theology is introverted, legitimizing violent behavior to pro-
mote religious values, and when it preaches the domination and supremacy
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of religious principles over civil ones, then religion can be a force for autoc-
racy, terrorism, and violence. 
Te relationship between religion and politics can also vary consider-
ably, according to this framework. On one end of this continuum, religion
and politics can be one and the same, or very closely linked. On the other
end, these two sets of institutions represent diferent and largely separate
realms. In the real world, however, relations between religious and political
institutions are distributed widely along this continuum. Tis relationship
also can be diferentiated in terms of the extent to which religious and
political actors accept an existing level of separation/integration between
religious and political or legal institutions. At one extreme, this relation-
ship can be consensual; both religious actors and political actors are per-
fectly happy with the existing state of afairs. At the other extreme, this
state of afairs may be confictual. Either religious actors want to change
the existing degree of independence (that is, to exert more infuence on
political processes), or political actors want to increase the separation
between religion and politics. Consensual relations typically sustain the
political status quo. Confictual relations induce pressure for change that
may involve instability and violence (Toft, Philpott, and Shah 2011, 39–
47). Te combined efect of political theology and the independence of
religious actors from political institutions infuences the religious actors’
activities and political outcomes (Toft, Philpott, and Shah 2011, 46). 
Nexon’s (2009) study of the role of religion in the Reformation and the
Tirty Years’ War ofers a slightly diferent theoretical perspective on the
role of religion in international relations. Nexon argues that religion can
become a transnational movement that sweeps both public and political
leaders into processes that revolutionize politics. Specifcally, in the context
of the medieval structure of power, the Reformation triggered several pro-
cesses that undermined the existing social and political structure of Europe.
Specifcally, the transnational nature of the religious revival during the
Reformation 
1. converted localized resistance into a cross-local force for rebellious
mass mobilization; 
2. undermined the ability of rulers to use discrete identities of local
communities as a mechanism of support and loyalty; 
3. created new opportunities for intermediaries to enhance their
autonomy vis-à-vis dynastic rulers; 
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4. introduced new trade-ofs (or conficts) between political and reli-
gious objectives; and 
5. created new channels for the “internationalization” of domestic
disputes. 
Te interplay between religious actors and political actors—that can range
from confict to close collaboration—defnes the structure of relations
between and within political units. Tis relationship is a central aspect of
the causal mechanism that drives political processes. Te role of religious
actors—as transnational movements—in Philpott (2007), Toft, Philpott,
and Shah (2011) and Nexon’s (2009) theses—is central to political pro-
cesses such as confict and cooperation. Te irony is, of course, that while
Protestantism posed a transnational challenge not only to the Catholic
Church but also to diferent local rulers in Europe, the emergent structure
from the Reformation was a state system dominated by political elites, not a
group of theocratic states (arguably with the prominent exception of Henry
VIII’s establishment and rulership of the Church of England). 
Tere are some insightful ideas in these frameworks. Tey ofer a lens into
the goals and belief systems of religious actors and into the ways they man-
age (accept or challenge) relations with political institutions. Yet, politicians
do not play a key role in their theory. Religious actors are certainly impor-
tant, and religion-state interactions feature as a key component in most
theories of religion and politics. However, they provide little evidence that
the leading actors are religious groups or institutions. Tey largely ignore
the power of political actors. Some religious actors with a militant theology
who are oppressed by states may want to act forcefully to change the status
quo. However, even though they may have a great deal of legitimacy and
infuence at the grassroots level—such as the Muslim Brotherhood had and
(possibly) continues to have in Egypt—the ability to convert their will to
action is rather limited if political elites control efective means of coercion
and monopolize the use of force. 
When religious actors have taken over political institutions and politi-
cal power, they have become—for all practical purposes—political actors.
Such actors, ostensibly guided by religious beliefs, are no diferent from
other political actors. Tey are eager to retain power, deal with internal
and external constraints on the exercise of power, and tolerate or nego-
tiate with enemies. Like all other non-religious political actors, they use
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whatever instruments they have at their disposal, religious or non-religious,
to accomplish their goals. Te behavior of Iranian leaders is a prime exam-
ple of this process. Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran incited Iraqi Shi’ites to rise
up against the “infdel” regime of Saddam Hussein. It labeled the United
States the “Big Satan” and Israel the “Little Satan.” However, once the
Iran–Iraq war broke out, it had no compunction about reaching a deal
with both “Satans” to purchase TOW antitank missiles, to help it fght the
Iraqis. Te current Iranian regime—still an Islamic Republic, unofcially
run by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—again reached an agreement with
the United States and other powers that was supposed to limit (or suspend)
its ability to develop a nuclear weapon system, thus enabling a host of eco-
nomic interactions with the Western world. 
Te focus on religious actors also discounts the importance of non-
religious actors outside formal political institutions. Organized groups can
take on a wide array of forms. People may be bound together by economic
interests, political ideologies, geographic attachments, and so forth. Tese
bonds may overlap or trump religious afnities. Regardless of the politi-
cal theology or independence of religious actors, non-religious actors may
compete not only with political actors but also with other social groups and
institutions. Political elites facing internal or external threats may manipu-
late such competitions to ft their own goals. Here, too, Egyptian politics
following the ouster of Hosni Mubarak are a case in point. Te electoral vic-
tory of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salaf party in the parliamentary
and presidential elections of 2011 and 2012 resulted in a confict between
these religious parties, liberal groups, and the military. Te military took
advantage of large-scale demonstrations by liberal groups opposing the
imposition of Sharia law as part of the Egyptian constitution to reestablish
an authoritarian system (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015). 
Te focus on religious actors also obscures the fact that many states
are religiously diverse, with a multitude of religious actors. In some cases
these actors may work in harmony, but in many other cases they actually
compete with one another. Religious competition often becomes zero-sum,
especially in diverse societies where each group wants to impose its rules,
norms, and beliefs on others. Tis is the essence of the work on religious
discrimination (Fox 2016; Grimm and Finke 2011). 
An important approach that actually addresses these issues is the reli-
gious economy model (Innaccone 1990, 1998; Gill 2001, 2007, 2013).
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Tis model analogizes religious activity to economic activity. Religious
institutions are seen as equivalent to economic frms, and their activity as
principally self-interested activity. From the perspective of individuals, reli-
gion fulflls some fundamental needs. It ofers answers to basic philosophi-
cal questions and dilemmas, and it also ofers communal participation and
association. Tis explains why individuals (a) allocate time and resources to
religious activity—sometimes at the expense of activities that can produce
material benefts, and (b) follow religious regulations. 
Religious institutions are also utility-maximizing organizations. Te
function of these institutions is to provide adherents with responses to basic
philosophical (but also practical) questions and dilemmas. But these insti-
tutions must also sustain themselves. Teir well-being and prosperity is a
function of the willingness of adherents to contribute funds and to follow
their directives. Religious institutions use rules, rituals, and principles as
mobilization devices, and as strategies to overcome free-riding dilemmas
(in which people beneft from “free” public goods, without contributing
to the maintenance of these goods). Strict rules and regulations, and strin-
gent religious rituals “dissuade free-riders from joining the organization and
diluting its resources. Moreover, because strict religions tend to dissuade
participants from partaking in activities outside the religious organization,
more time and monetary resources can be directed toward the group goal”
(Gill 2001, 131). 
Te religious economy model treats religion as a market and focuses
on the relationship between religious freedom and political, social, and
economic development (Gill 2007, 2013). By operating within a com-
petitive market structure, religious groups and religious organizations
work to attract membership and sustain their social and economic posi-
tion. However, governments are also actors in that market. Tey can work
with or against certain religious institutions. Tey can allow the religious
market to be open and competitive by guaranteeing and safeguarding
religious freedom; they can regulate religious activity so that they can
monitor it more efciently; they can display favoritism toward a sub-
set of religions or religious organizations and discriminate against others;
or they can curtail religious activity across the board. Gill (2007, 2013)
argues that the key motivation of political leaders is to ensure, extend, and
safeguard their political survival. Religious actors and politicians play in
the same marketplace—both try to mobilize, infuence, and serve people.
Tey can cooperate, or they can compete. Gill (2007, 53–57) suggests
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some conditions that afect the degree of religious freedoms or restrictions
in a political and religious competitive market. Te relationship between
political institutions and religious groups therefore defnes the ability
of these groups to operate, and, as Philpott and his associates (Philpott
2007; Toft, Shah, and Philpott 2011) argue, determine to a large extent
the cooperative or confictual relations between religion and state. 
Te central argument of the religious economy model is that a com-
petitive religious marketplace—aided by high levels of religious freedom—
contributes to general aspects of the quality of life. It has a positive efect
on economic development, democracy, and, indirectly, on other aspects
of human development such as health indicators, education, and gender
equality. By contrast, religious hegemony aided by government discrimina-
tion and a high level of cooperation between religious and political institu-
tions typically reduces the level of human development. Specifcally, Gill
(2007) argues that religious hegemony typically drives religious actors to
strive for high levels of government regulation, whereas religiously diverse
societies will strive toward religious freedom. 
Te focus of the religious economy model is on the relations between
religion and state; therefore it has little to ofer when it comes to IR.
However, it has important implications for theories of religion and poli-
tics. We return to some of these ideas in the next chapter. Nevertheless,
the focus on the relationship between religion and state is at the center of
Jonathan Fox’s work on religion and politics. Based on a comprehensive
dataset on religion discrimination—which explores a wide array of rela-
tionships between political and legal institutions, on the one hand, and
religious groups, on the other hand—his work explores systematically the
causes and consequences of such relations. Te principal importance of this
work lies in the descriptive aspects of the data. From a more analytical per-
spective, the studies focusing on the relations between religious discrimina-
tion and civil war are methodologically problematic, and any inferences
drawn from these studies are dubious. We discuss these studies in more
detail in chapter 7. Here, however, we point out the general ideas driving
these analyses. 
Fox (2004a, 2012c) lists several factors that afect the relationship
between religion and civil war. Te frst is a primordial argument. Religion
is an integral part of a community’s identity. As such, communities defne
friends and foes on the basis of religious similarities or diferences. Groups
that reside within the same region that difer signifcantly in terms of their
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religion are likely to view each other with suspicion and mistrust. Te pres-
sure to separate and govern themselves is apt to increase. Tis becomes all
the more important if one group feels discriminated against by the political
elites. Such discrimination fuels its suspicion and sense of frustration and
drives it to rebel. 
Te second element of this religion and civil war model centers on the
notion of religion as a belief system. It is not clear how this argument is
diferent from the basic primordial argument, but Fox (2004a, 18–22)
argues that perceptions of threat to religious values (including threats to
holy places, Hassner 2009)—threats to certain rituals and practices, or gen-
eral threats to religion emanating from secularization, modernization, or
globalization trends) can afect group mobilization around this common
threat. If this threat is seen as associated with government policies, rebellion
may arise. 
Tird, Fox (2004a, 2012a), like Toft, Philpott, and Shah (2011) (as well
as the sources he cites therein as specifc examples), argues that religious
institutions ofer a source of legitimacy and mobilization, but this can work
both as an engine for change (e.g., via rebellion) or for sustaining a status
quo that may be authoritarian, exploitative, and abusive. Tere is no clear
indication when religious institutions inspire mobilization for change and
when they legitimize a given political, social, or economic status quo. 
Finally, fundamentalism is typically a source of confict. Religious fun-
damentalism is a particular source of violence because fundamentalists
typically embrace violence as a legitimate method, both against diferent
religious groups and against moderates of their own religious group. Also,
the distinction between combatant and noncombatant does not pose a
moral dilemma to fundamentalists. Tus, with the rise of fundamentalist
elements among religious groups—typically inspired by religious leaders
or religious institutions—the likelihood of a resort to violence of any kind
increases. 
Tese ideas ofer interesting insights into possible linkages between reli-
gion and civil war, but, as Fox (2004a) shows, religious factors (e.g., religious
grievances) do not have an independent efect on the attributes of civil wars.
Rather, it is only the combination of religious grievances and demands for
separatism—which may be due to economic causes (not included in his
models)—that have a signifcant impact on rebellion (not clearly defned
in any meaningful operational manner). Tat, on top of some fairly serious
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methodological issues with Fox’s statistical analyses (which we discuss in
chapter 7), casts serious doubt on the validity of this argument. 
Treats to belief systems as a cause of civil uprising might be important if
there were a clear way of separating religious grievances from political and/
or economic grievances. Tese combinations are often prevalent in societ-
ies characterized by substantial communal inequalities, and it is unclear
whether the spark that ignites a civil uprising is religious, social, economic,
or a combination of these. Hassner’s (2009) insightful analysis of sacred
spaces suggests that threat to control of such spaces may be a critical issue
and can cause punctuated mobilization as certain policies and events pose a
threat to the ability of a community to worship via a certain holy site. Tere
are two problems with these insights, however. First, the generalizability of
these concepts beyond a few—well-selected—cases is quite limited. What
constitutes a threat in these terms is rather subjective, typically mediated by
other factors (for example, how religious leaders interpret a given policy or
act), and varies from one case to another, from one religion to another, and
from one policy to another. 
For example, Hassner (2009) argues persuasively that both the
Palestinians and the Israelis have reacted violently to threats to their holy
sites due to actions of the other side. Jerusalem has been a hotbed of trouble
in this regard. However, Jerusalem is not only the third-holiest site in Islam
and the holiest site to Judaism but also contains some of the holiest sites to
Christians. However, the Christian world did not display any kind of signif-
icant religious reaction to the transfer of power in Jerusalem after the 1967
war. Nor did the Christian world have any religious reaction to the various
ideas about partitioning Jerusalem in the context of an Israeli–Palestinian
peace settlement. 
Consequently, the likelihood of fnding a common denominator of
“threats to religious values” across situations, religions, governments, or pol-
icies is rather low. But without such a common denominator, measurement
and systematic analysis may be difcult to carry out. Tus, credible insights
about how groups react to threats to religious values are rather limited. 
Second, the theoretical argument is rather specifc to domestic confict.
When diverse religious communities are governed by political leaders or
institutions afliated with a specifc religion, competition over religious
laws, religious customs, and sovereignty over holy places is apt to arise.
However, how does this generalize to relations among states? How does it
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afect international confict and cooperation? How do threats to religious
beliefs afect confict and cooperation among diferent states? Tese writ-
ings do not ofer meaningful answers to these questions. 
Perhaps the most interesting efort to provide a theory of religion and
world politics is the work of Sandal and Fox (2013). In this research, the
authors suggest a strategy for integrating religious factors into the tradi-
tional paradigms of world politics. Tey discuss several avenues by which
religion afects international relations. Tey also tie these to more conven-
tional ideas about the way international politics operate. Teir list includes
several issues: 
1. Religious worldviews. A worldview constitutes a set of principles
consisting of a descriptive theory of how the world works and of
normative principles that guide the believer’s behavior given such
a theory. Religious worldviews are grounded in beliefs about the
role divine authority has granted to a certain individual and com-
munity. Tis role defnes what such an individual or community
seeks to accomplish and the strategies and behaviors they can and
should pursue to accomplish that goal. A religious worldview can
be part (or the whole) of a leader’s belief system or a collective
socially constructed belief system of one or more community. 
2. Religious legitimacy. Following Hurd (1   ), they defne legitimacy
as “the normative belief by an actor that a rule or an institution
ought to be obeyed.” Tey argue that religion is a principal source
of legitimacy for actions in the international system. Principles
that defne permissible or unacceptable international behavior are
often derived from basic religious directives. Hence, they serve to
defne both internal and international norms. 
3. Religious states. States ruled by religious principles and doctrines
structure their internal legal and political system according to theo-
logical dictates. Tey also fashion their foreign policy according
to those dictates. Religious states identify friends or foes in terms
of whether or not these actors follow similar or diferent religious
dictates. Tey act to protect or support religious communities that
share the same beliefs in other states. And they often seek to spread
their religious beliefs and practices beyond their borders. 
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4. Nonstate religious actors. Religious institutions may have global or
regional reach capacity, and serve as a source of mass mobiliza-
tion for certain policies or ideas. As such they serve to support
or constrain political behavior beyond a single state or region.
Substate religious actors such as religious terrorist organizations
have engaged in both mobilization and action across international
borders. In the post–September 11, 2001 period they have substan-
tially infuenced the international behavior of both nation-states
and international organizations. 
5. Local religious issues that propagate across borders. Tese involve
internal conficts with a religious bent in one country that spill
over to the relations of that country with other countries or com-
munities. Tese religious issues may also spill over to other types
of issues—social, political, or economic—whereby religious-based
confict may have economic, political, or social implications. 
6. Transnational religious movements. Religious fundamentalism can
form movements and actors that spread across multiple borders.
Te same may apply to religious discourses on matters of human
rights, the management of sites that are holy to several religions
or religious groups within a single religion, and missionary action
across international borders and communities. 
7. Religious identity. Identity defnes an actor’s (person, community,
or country) inherent nature with respect to its religious beliefs
(both the type of religion and the degree or strength of religious
adherence). But it also defnes the relative position of that actor
vis-à-vis other actors. As such, it defnes the afnity or suspicion
that an actor harbors towards other actors in terms of religious
similarity or dissimilarity. 
Tese are interesting and important ideas about religion’s infuence on
international relations. Sandal and Fox also do a creditable job in tying
these factors to key elements in a number of central IR theories, includ-
ing classical realism and neorealism, neoliberalism, the English School,
and constructivism. In some cases these eforts are insightful and sur-
prisingly successful. In other cases, especially with respect to classical
realism, neorealism, and neoliberalism, these eforts seem forced and
superfcial. Nevertheless, this work is an important, albeit undercited,
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efort to integrate religious issues and themes into the more traditional
IR discourse. 
Tere are several problems with this work that limit its usefulness as a
foundation for theorizing about religion and international behavior. First,
like other studies that seek to insert religion into largely “secular” theories,
their focus is on religious issues, actors, and beliefs. As such they tend to dis-
count the role of religion as a political instrument, and the manipulation of
religious ideas and beliefs by both political and religious actors. Clearly, reli-
gion is an important ideational glue, binding together people into cohesive
communities. However, it is not an autonomous one. Religion has always
been an instrument of power and mobilization. 
In some cases, political and religious leaders are guided by beliefs based
on scriptures, religious dictates, fatwas, and the like. Tese beliefs, as Sandal
and Fox (2013) argue persuasively, shape their treatment of their own peo-
ple and of other people, institutions, or countries. At the same time, many
political or religious leaders manipulate religious beliefs and ideas to mobi-
lize support for actions that are designed to serve rather “secular” goals, such
as ensuring security, acquiring or sustaining power, accumulating wealth, or
eliminating enemies. A key question arises as to when international behav-
iors, norms, or institutions are motivated by genuine religious beliefs, and
when religion is an instrument that serves to advance “secular” goals. Not
only do Sandal and Fox (2013) ofer little insight into this cardinal ques-
tion, but they sidestep it completely. 
Second, religion is discussed in terms that almost black box it com-
pletely. Religious worldviews, identities, legitimacies, and state or nonstate
actors are certainly important factors. Tey need to be considered as impor-
tant factors in both domestic and international discourses and interactions.
Yet, almost each religion, and almost at each stage of its history, is a hub of
multifaceted ideas and debates. For example, what constitutes a Christian
worldview is highly debatable. Is it the creationist theory embedded in evan-
gelical Protestantism that the world was formed by God some 5,700 years
ago, or is it the allegorical interpretation of creation of Catholicism that
afords some acceptance of Darwinian evolution? 
Which interpretation of Islam is the right one? Is it one advocated by
groups such as ISIS and Al Qaeda that views concepts of jihad as a holy
war that legitimizes any form of violence against infdels and internal
enemies? Or is jihad taken to be a concept of cultural war in which Islam
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is spread and implemented through education, persuasion, and charity?
As we discuss in chapter 4, one of the observable features of all religions
has to do with their historical evolution. Tis history often involves con-
ficts between communities that belong to the same (macro) religion.
Such communities derive their principles from the same scriptures and
practice similar prayers, ceremonies, holidays, and rituals. Yet, they often
view the other religious group or denomination with suspicion or disdain. 
Te interaction between religious ideas, institutions, and actors, on the
one hand, and political actors and behavior, on the other, is a two-way
street. Moreover, religion interacts with other processes: changes in social
norms, technological advances, and economic changes (Hanson 2006).
In some cases, religion infuences social processes. In other cases, politics,
science, and technology infuence religion. Te debate between Galileo
Galilei and the Catholic Church about the position of the earth and the
sun is the historical incarnation of contemporary debates about abortion,
gay marriage, science (e.g., evolution), and religion (creationism) in educa-
tion. Tese have become issues in the discourse between religious actors and
secular or political ones as a result of the infuence of medical technology,
social norms, and scientifc advances. Tey have forced religious leaders and
institutions to delve into questions that had not been part of the religious
discourses of the past. 
Many scholars who advance the idea that religious factors have a signif-
cant infuence on international relations, and who criticize modernization
and secularization ideas or “traditional” IR paradigms for ignoring them,
commit the very same sin they attribute to their straw men. Specifcally,
they minimize or discount the role and efect of “secular” factors on reli-
gion. Religious actors, religious states, and religious worldviews and identi-
ties are taken to be important independent variables in the contemporary
literature on religion and politics. Tese also are outcomes of other social
processes. 
Finally, integrating religious factors into the more traditional IR para-
digms does not do much beyond suggesting some general concepts that
should be considered when examining contemporary aspects of inter-
national politics. Tere are no clear testable propositions we can infer
from such concepts on the causes and consequences of international or
internal conficts, patterns of international cooperation, or human secu-
rity. Sandal and Fox (2013) suggest some general ways in which religious
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factors afect political processes, but they do not ofer a clearly articu-
lated theory. 
4. Empirical Evidence on Religion and Politics 
We discuss some of the empirical evidence in support of the role of religion
in international relations in more detail in the coming chapters. Here we
focus on some examples illustrating our point that much of this evidence is
based on questionable inferences from fawed methodologies. 
For example, Ellingsen (2006) examines several hypotheses related to
religion’s resurgence. Using the World Values Survey (WVS) data and the
PRIO armed confict data, she asks several questions about the signifcance
of religion in politics. First, she analyzes the WVS responses at the country
level, inferring that religion has always been important, and that this has
not changed fundamentally over the period of 1981–96. Ten she analyzes
the factors that afect national religiosity levels. She fnds that gross domes-
tic produce (GDP) per capita has a signifcant negative impact on religios-
ity, while certain regions tend to have higher levels of religiosity than others.
Likewise, she fnds that Islamic and African (not clear how she classifes this
category) “civilizations” tend to be more religious than others. Tis raises a
number of fundamental issues. 
First, this is a classic case of the ecological fallacy. Survey results are
based on individual responses; aggregating them into national averages
and correlating these averages with macro—national or “civilizational”—
characteristics leads to the fawed inference that countries that have a higher
per-capita GDP tend to have lower levels of religiosity. While this may be
the case, the level of religiosity in a society ignores the variance in societies.
A society that has 15 percent of its population defned as “religious” may
have the remaining 85 percent still believe in God, pray occasionally, and
consider religion as an important guide to their lives. Another country with
15 percent religious may have all the other 85 percent as atheists. More seri-
ous is the omission of religious diversity in societies. Two societies with the
same level of religiosity may be fundamentally diferent in that one is reli-
giously homogeneous, that is, virtually all of its citizens practice the same
religion (albeit with varying levels of commitment), while another society
may be evenly split among several religions. 
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Second, the partition into “civilizations” is arbitrary, lacking any clear
classifcation criteria, and therefore appears to be ad hoc. How is “African”
civilization membership determined, and what makes it “African” as
opposed to the major cultures on the continent and its diaspora (Mazrui
1988)? What is a Latin American “civilization” and how does it difer from
European civilizations in countries such as Spain, Portugal, and Italy, also
relatively homogeneous Catholic states? 
More disturbing are mathematical puzzles in the results. For example,
Ellingsen (2006) uses the natural log of the Polity score. However, as noted
in the footnote, this score varies between −10 and +10. Unfortunately, there
are no base-two logarithms for negative numbers. So it is not clear how to
interpret the lack of relationship between regime score and religiosity. 
In another set of analyses, she examines temporal variations in “identity”
confict using the Uppsala Confict Data Program (UCDP) domestic and
international confict data. A confict in the UCDP dataset is defned as
a set of engagements between two or more actors—at least one of them
a government of a state—that results in a minimum of 25 battle-related
deaths per year. Focusing on intrastate conficts, she points out that “since
the 1960s identity conficts have been the dominant form of conficts in
the world” (p. 29). Again, while this may be true, it tells us little about
religious resurgence. Tere are several problems with such inferences. For
one, identity conficts (even if their coding is credible—in itself a question-
able issue), include ethnic, racial, religious, linguistic, and other types of
identity issues. Religious issues may be a small fraction of what constitutes
“identity” groups. Second, there is an inherent assumption that “identity”
conficts involve a group with one type of identity fghting a group with
another type of identity. Again, this may be the case, but the data do not
allow such an inference—especially in terms of religion.5 
Te most important inferential issue there has to do with the fact that
these fgures do not control for “identity interaction opportunities.” What
we mean by that is that the expansion in identity confict may be simply
because there are more interaction opportunities between diferent ethnic
groups in the post-1960s era than before. Several factors and processes
account for such an inference. First, the 1960s, and again the late 1980s
and early 1990s, witnessed two major waves of state formation. Te frst
wave was dominated by independence for multiple African (and a few
Middle Eastern) formerly colonial states, most of whom were characterized
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by signifcant ethnic diversity. Te second wave occurred primarily in
Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and Central Asia following the dissolution of
the Soviet Bloc. Many of these new countries were ethnically diverse as well.
Terefore, it is quite possible that structural causes rather than religious
resurgence are responsible for the rise in the frequency of identity conficts. 
Another set of analyses focuses on the outbreak of intrastate confict. 
Two key religious factors are included in an attempt to explain such con-
ficts: religious diferences and level of religiosity. Ellingsen (2006) codes 
religious diferences as a binary variable that is assigned a score of one if 
the country is split among two or more religious groups and zero other-
wise. Of course, this immediately suggests that the number of religious 
groups and the distribution of adherents in a society do not matter, which 
really defeats the whole notion of diferences. Second, and more impor-
tant, once her analyses control for time dependence, the efect of these 
religious factors on intrastate confict becomes statistically insignifcant. 
Tis contrasts with her argument that “religious diferences again indicate 
a positive—and this time signifcant—efect on the probability of armed 
confict incidence” (p. 23) (italics in original). Tis is true only if one is 
willing to accept a p = 0.066 given a sample of N = 1,193, but with such 
a large N, any efect that has a type I error probability of higher than 0.05 
suggests that the lower end of the 95 percent confdence interval is below 
zero. Te implication is that the marginal efect of religious diferences 
on intrastate confict (that is, the diference in the probability of confict 
between a religiously homogeneous and a religiously heterogeneous soci-
ety) is negligible. 
In the same volume, Pearce (2006; also see Pearce 2005) examines the
intensity of religious confict, using the UCDP dataset of armed (domestic
and international) conficts. She concludes her papers with the statement
“Based on the statistical analysis of 278 interstate and intrastate territorial
confict phases occurring worldwide between 1946 and 2001, the evidence
indicates that conficts involving religion are signifcantly more intense than
other types of confict, though the evidence is much weaker than expected”
(p. 55). Her defnition of religious confict is a confict involving two states
or two groups that belong to diferent religions. We discuss the problem
in identifying a confict as “religious” below. For now, we do not challenge
this defnition, but merely examine the methodological problems of this
analysis. 
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A careful examination of the results suggests that the empirical analysis
does not show any signifcant relationship between religion and intensity,
and the inferences of a relationship between “religious confict” and inten-
sity are fundamentally fawed. Some of the points we made above with
regard to Ellingsen’s work apply here as well, albeit even more. First and
foremost, since this analysis includes only confict that actually took place,
it is impossible to infer how the opportunity for confict was distributed
between religious and non-religious groups. Terefore, it is impossible to
infer whether the actual occurrence of confict of any type—religious or
non-religious—was more likely. For example, the key evidence for her argu-
ment is shown in her Table 1 (Pearce 2006, 48) that tabulates the level of
intensity of the confict by its type (religious or non-religious, where the
former is observed when the actors on both sides of the confict share a
diferent religious afliation). Below is the table drawn from her essay (we
present frequencies rather than percentages for reasons discussed below). 
Te top number in each cell provides the actual number of conficts
(rather than the percentages presented in her Table 1). Te bottom row in
each cell is the expected number of conficts by chance alone. When cal-
culating the chi-square statistic with actual frequencies (as opposed to per-
centages, which is not a proper way to calculate this), the statistic is actually
higher than reported: 8.428, which, with 4 degrees of freedom is signifcant
at the p = 0.06 level, slightly above the 0.05 level accepted as signifcant in
the social sciences. A few issues arise. First, the actual association between
confict intensity and religious/non-religious confict type is quite low. Te
more permissive coefcient of ordinal association, gamma is 0.09, just mar-
ginally higher than zero. 
Second, when examining the relationship between observed and expected
frequencies, we confront a signifcant problem of inference. For example, if
there is a positive relationship between religious confict and intensity, then
we should see that at the low/somewhat low intensity categories, the actual
frequencies of religious confict should be lower than the expected frequencies
(and the actual frequencies of non-religious confict should be higher than the
expected frequencies). Likewise, at the higher levels of confict intensity, the
actual frequency of religious conficts should be higher than the expected fre-
quency (and the actual frequency of the non-religious confict should be lower
than the expected frequency). In some of the cells this is the case. However, as
the bolded cells indicate, it is not so in the more extreme cases. And these may
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Table 2.1. Intensity of religious and non-religious conficts, 1946–2001 (Pearce 2006, 48) 
Confict Intensity Non-religious Religious Total Row 
Low Intensity 22 44 66 
(Expected Frequency) (15.91) (50.09) 
Somewhat Low Intensity 14 53 67 
(Expected Frequency) (16.15) (50.85) 
Moderate Intensity 15 72 87 
(Expected Frequency) (20.97) (66.03) 
Somewhat High Intensity 10 34 44 
(10.60) (33.40) 
High Intensity 6 8 14 
(3.37) (10.63) 
Total Column 67 211 278 
account for the chi-square statistic. In fact, using a statistic mb  that controls
for the extent to which a given diference between actual and expected fre-
quencies is consistent with the test hypothesis, we get a score of mb = 0 006 ,. 
which is not signifcantly diferent from zero. 
As noted, the defnition of a confict as “religious” is fundamentally
problematic. Related to Ellingsen’s (2006) defnition of a confict as “reli-
gious,” we have the work of Toft (2007; Toft, Philpott and Shah 2011,
Ch. 6). Toft (2007, 97) defnes a religious civil war as 
a war in which religious belief or practice is either a central or periph-
eral issue in the confict. For religion to count as “central,” combat-
ants had to be fghting over whether the state or a region of the
state would be ruled according to a specifc religious tradition—as
in the cases of Afghanistan, Chad, and Sudan. For religion to count
as “peripheral,” combatants had to identify with a specifc religious
tradition and group themselves accordingly, but the rule of a spe-
cifc religious tradition could not be the object of contention. An
example would be the confict in the former Yugoslavia, which
involved Bosnian Muslims (Islam), Croats (Catholicism), and Serbs
(Orthodox Christianity). 
Toft should be credited for being transparent about (a) the possible confa-
tion of religious and ethnic issues and, more importantly, (b) the actual civil
wars that she characterizes as religious (see Table 1, 2007, 114). In each of
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
53
Scholarship on Religion and World Politics 53 
these cases one can judge whether religion played an important or “periph-
eral” role in the confict. Several problems are evident in these defnitions,
however. First, it is possible that two diferent religious groups would fght
each other but the confict might not be religious. It might be over tan-
gible goods: territory, resources, distribution of wealth, or taxes. Terefore,
while the confict may be between diferent religious groups, calling it
a “religious” confict may well be misleading. Second, a confict may be
highly religious even when the groups fghting each other have the same
religious afliation. Consider, for example, the confict between fundamen-
talist Islamic groups such as Al Qaeda and ISIS and Saudi Arabia. Both the
nonstate actors and the Saudi monarchy are staunch Sunni afliates—even
jointly Salafsts. Still, the confict centers heavily on religious interpreta-
tion and the policies suggested by them. Likewise, the confict between the
Muslim Brotherhood and the liberal opposition (ultimately decided by the
Egyptian military in 2013) had a lot to do with the role of religious laws
and practices in Egyptian politics. Calling some of these cases “religious”
and others non-religious is potentially misleading. 
While Toft (2007) is transparent about the list of “religious” civil wars,
she is less transparent about the “non-religious” civil wars. Terefore, it is
difcult to evaluate her hypothesis tests. Nevertheless, even without having
an idea of the population of “non-religious” civil wars, the fundamental
problems in Toft’s analyses are the same as in Ellingsen’s. Te probability of
the occurrence of a civil war that is “religious” compared to the probability
of the occurrence of a civil war that is “non-religious” is left unspecifed.
Terefore we do not know if the chi-square tests reported in Toft’s study
(2007, 116) mean anything in the absence of a test for a priori opportuni-
ties for civil war outbreak. 
Svensson’s (2007, 2013) studies of religion and civil confict ofer an
important perspective on the role of religion in confict resolution. We dis-
cuss this work at greater length in chapter 7. Briefy, Svensson fnds that
civil conficts that have religious claims are more difcult to resolve and
less likely to end in a negotiated settlement. Te reason for that is pri-
marily that the issues at stake in such conficts are perceived as indivis-
ible. However, religious issues can be more or less central in a civil confict;
therefore, the degree to which the issues at stake are seen as religious is a
function of the centrality of religious claims. Te key to resolving religious
conficts lies in their “desacralisation,” namely “a political or societal process
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of removing the religious status or signifcance from an armed confict”
(Svensson 2013, 5). 
Te key problem is not that it may be difcult to distinguish between
a “religious” and a “non-religious” confict—in fact, one may applaud
eforts such as Toft’s or Svensson’s attempt to weigh the importance of
religious issues in confict. Rather, the problem involves biased sampling
due to the truncation of data inherent in research designs that rely on
conceptualizations and analyses of “religious wars.” Focusing only on
conficts—interstate or intrastate—that occurred truncates the population
of cases, because it does not account for “dogs that didn’t bark,” that is,
for conficts that could have occurred but did not. Specifcally, to study
any factor that may or may not impact confict, one needs to account for
the nonconfict instances, specifcally for the opportunities for confict
to occur. We need to have some sense of the states, or the periods during
which states “select” themselves into civil confict. If it is indeed the case
that states that are characterized by religious contentions (either interreli-
gious tensions or tensions between religious and political institutions) are
more likely to “select themselves” into civil confict than states that do not
have such tensions, then the results of studies such as Toft’s or Svensson’s,
while potentially illuminating, may be systematically biased, resulting in
Type 1 errors. However, if religious tensions are no more likely to cause
conficts than economic, political, or social tensions, then it is possible
that religious tensions can be resolved without entering into civil confict
in the frst place, but such cases are not accounted for in these types of
research designs. 
Without accounting for nonevents, we do not know the probability of
two groups confronting each other in the frst place. Nor can we tell what
proportion of the interaction opportunities between groups of diferent reli-
gious afliations was actually converted into confict. Without accounting
for confict opportunities of religious and non-religious dyads, no meaning-
ful inference on the relationship between religious confict and intensity is
possible. Tese are fundamental methodological issues. Te arguments that
“religious” conficts are more severe than “non-religious” ones, or that the
former are more likely to recur and less likely to be resolved than the latter,
create an impression that religious violence is fundamentally diferent from
other types of violence. However, we claim that without controlling for
the opportunity of each type of violence to emerge in the frst place, these
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results are potentially misleading. We will have more to say about these
analyses in chapter 7.6 
Methodological issues emerge even when the claims are based on descrip-
tive evidence. First, consider the argument about religious resurgence that
we reviewed above. In many cases, no evidence is provided to substantiate
this far-reaching claim. In other cases, quantitative evidence is provided, but
a close inspection reveals that it is quite misleading. For example, Jonathan
Fox—one of the targets of the anti-quantifcation literature (e.g. Fitzgerald
2011)—has collected a valuable dataset on religion–state relations, and we
use this dataset along with several others throughout this book. However,
Fox (2015, 232) claims that “states have been heavily involved in religion,
and this trend has been consistently increasing in strength between 1990
and 2008. Te increasing ubiquity of government involvement in religion
is perhaps the most obvious and incontrovertible result that emerges from
this analysis.” One of the fgures he provides shows a consistent rise in the
levels of religious discrimination, religious regulation, and religious legisla-
tion over this period. However, as Figure 2.1 shows, this trend is meaning-
ful only if one does not control for the number of states in the international
system. 
Over the period 1989–2008, the number of states in the international
system increased by 19.9 percent (from 161 to 193). Tese data show a
change in the number of states in his sample from 173 to 174 over the same
period. If we control for the number of states—and there is no telling what
kind of religious policy occurred in the missing states—then the patterns
are quite diferent from what Fox suggests. For example, the clear upward
trend (an increase of 18.6 percent) in religious discrimination we see given
the absolute fgures (those ignoring the change in system size) is basically
nullifed when we examine the relative rate of religious discrimination.
Specifcally, the 2008 level of relative religious discrimination is slightly
lower than the same level in 1989. Te relative level of religious legisla-
tion has actually gone down between 1989 and 2008. Te only consistent
upward trend is in religion regulation. So Fox’s strong claim is actually not
clearly supported by his own data.7 
Another way of examining the question of religious resurgence in politics
involves a study of religion-state relations as refected in national constitu-
tions. A  dataset on national constitutions is based on a systematic con-
tent analysis of national constitutions that were legislated over the period
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
     
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
56
56 Scriptures, Shrines, Scapegoats, and World Politics 
A
bs
ol
ut
e 
R
el
ig
io
us
 L
eg
isl
at
io
n 
8.
2 
8.
4 
8.
6 
8.
8 
9 
Absolute and Relative Religious Legislation 
.0
44
 
.0
46
 
.0
48
 
.0
5 
.0
52
 
R
el
at
iv
e 
R
el
ig
io
us
 L
eg
isl
at
io
n 
˜990 ˜995 2000 2005 20˜0 
Year 
Absolute Relative 
Absolute and Relative Religious Regulation 
A
bs
ol
ut
e 
R
el
ig
io
us
 R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
7 
7.
5 
8 
8.
5 
9 
˜990 ˜995 2000 2005 20˜0 
Year 
Absolute Relative 
.0
42
 
.0
44
 
.0
46
 
.0
48
 
.0
5 
.0
52
 
R
el
at
iv
e 
R
el
ig
io
us
 R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
Absolute and Relative Religious Discrimination 
˜990 ˜995 2000 2005 20˜0 
Year 
Absolute Relative 
A
bs
ol
ut
e 
R
el
ig
io
us
 D
isc
rim
in
at
io
n 
9 
9.
5 
˜0
 
˜0
.5
 
˜˜
 
.0
5 
.0
52
 
.0
54
 
.0
56
 
.0
58
 
R
el
at
iv
e 
R
el
ig
io
us
 D
isc
rim
in
at
io
n 
Fig. 2.1. Religious policy 1989–2008 (Fox 2015, 232) 
1789–2013. It contains data on whether the constitution identifes an
ofcial religion (or accords one or more religions a special status), as well
on whether a given constitution contains an explicit stipulation about the
freedom of religion. We focus on the post–World War II period. Tis
dataset afords a much longer time span to analyze than the religion and
state dataset. Te downside of this dataset is that it covers only states
that had or drafted and approved a constitution over this time span.
It excludes states that did not have a constitution, which in some years
accounts for more than 50 percent of the states in the system. Even when
we control for the number of states whose constitutions contain clauses
of religious freedom, separation of religion from state, noninclusion of
an ofcial religion, and civil laws as a proportion of all states in the sys-
tem, we see a volatile period in the 1950s through the 1970s, but a clear
upward trend of greater religious freedom after 1980 (see Figure 2.2).
So, it is not clear what kind of evidence supports the notion of religious
resurgence. 
Tere is one area where religious factors and religious actors seem to
have been on the rise:  international terrorism (Toft, Philpott, and Shah
2011, Ch. 5; Saya and Scime 2015; Saiya 2016). Tis is an important topic,
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but one that we do not cover in this study. However, the data on the iden-
tity of perpetrators of terrorism and their religious nature are problematic.
For example, the Global Terrorism Dataset (START 2017) lists marginal
acts with no clear political motive as possible terrorist attacks. In addition,
many actions by religiously motivated groups such as Al Qaeda, Hamas,
or Hizballah against the United States in Iraq or Afghanistan and Israel
in Lebanon and the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza can
be classifed as nationalist rather than “religious.” Te fact that religious
groups have taken on nationalist causes is important, but it is not clear that
the driving force is a religious belief system (which may be more visible in
suicide bombings) or a nationalist ideology vis-à-vis a foreign power occu-
pying one’s land. 
We do not deny that religious forces have infuenced world poli-
tics during the last few decades. However, we should be more cautious
about asserting the rising infuence of religion on political processes.
Specifcally, religious factors have operated in world politics for a long
time. Further, religious factors and religious actors interact with other
political actors and processes. Te nature of this interaction may provide
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Fig. 2.2. Separation of religion and state in national constitutions, 1946–2013 
Source: Zachary, Ginsburg, and Melton 2014. Measure discussed in chapter 4. 
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a more nuanced view of the role of religion and politics, rather than the
exclusive emphasis on religion or the infation of its signifcance relative
to other factors. 
5. Conclusion 
We have not covered many polemical and descriptive accounts of religion
and world politics in this chapter. We have also not discussed some foun-
dational studies that will serve as the basis for the theoretical framework
we present in the next chapter. Some of these were mentioned in passing,
but we will provide a more coherent focus on these ideas in chapter 3. Tat
said, however, this brief review is fairly representative of the burgeoning
literature on religion and politics. Several common denominators underlie
much of this literature. 
1. Polemical writings. Almost any book or article on religion and pol-
itics starts with the argument that religion is an important force in
world politics. Some argue this has always been the case, but the
mainstream theories and paradigms—deliberately or due to sheer
negligence—ignored this plain fact. Tis may be an important
argument, but we view it more as an empirical question. To us,
the puzzle concerns the role of religion—relative to other factors
commonly associated with traditional theories of IR—in central
phenomena such as international and internal confict, interna-
tional cooperation, and human security. 
Another characteristic of this literature is that most studies launch
a sustained attack on straw men such as modernization and secu-
larization theories or the more central paradigms of realism, lib-
eralism, and even constructivism. Such attacks often come at the
expense of original thinking about how to understand the role
of religion in such processes. Prominent among these writings
are debates regarding the possibility of quantifcation of religion
or religious factors, or of the possibility of positivist theorizing
about religion and politics. Tese debates, while intellectually
interesting (and sometimes challenging), do not really add to our
understanding of the topic. As is the case with the emergence of
a new theoretical and empirical area of interest, these debates are
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unavoidable, especially in a discipline that is ideologically, theo-
retically, and methodologically diverse as is IR. At the same time,
after nearly three decades that witnessed a signifcant surge of
studies on religion and politics, it is high time we realized these
debates do not advance knowledge. Tis is why we attempt to
pose specifc questions about the role of religion in politics, and
to provide systematic answers to these questions—even if these
answers may not be simply yes or no. 
2. Overemphasis on Religious Factors and Religious Actors. A character-
istic of the literature we have reviewed herein is that, in its efort
to emphasize the role of religion in politics, it may well exaggerate
the role of religious factors and religious actors in afecting major
political outcomes, largely at the expense of other factors. Many
of the reviewed studies acknowledge the interaction/competition
between religious and secular or non-religious actors.8 Where they
fail is in recognizing that sometimes religious actors are manipu-
lated by non-religious ones in ways that serve to advance the goals
of the latter. Religion can, and sometimes is, a powerful motivat-
ing force of political action. However, because it is such a moti-
vating force, it can be used for non-religious reasons by political
actors. Tis aspect of the linkage between religion and politics is
missing from most writings on the subject. It is one of the core
arguments of our theory on religion and international relations. 
3. Critical Omission:  Religion and International Cooperation. One
of the interesting aspects of our review concerns what is missing
in the plethora of arguments and polemics. Specifcally, a lot of
ink has been spilled—quite understandably—on the relationship
between religion and confict, interstate and intrastate. However,
just as Blainey (1 88, 3) argued that “for every one thousand pages
written on the causes of war, there is less than one page on the
causes of peace,” we note that a similar ratio exists in the writ-
ings on religion and international cooperation. Te literature on
religion and international cooperation is even more scant than the
literature on religion and domestic order, democracy, and stability.
Shah, Stephan, and Toft (2012) contains a collection of essays enti-
tled Rethinking Religion and World Afairs. Tis collection contains
chapters about religion and democracy, human rights, religion and
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transnational justice, and religion and development, among oth-
ers. Beyond the fact that many of these chapters are polemical and
normative rather than analytical and descriptive, none discusses
the relationship between religion and international cooperation.
Tis is even more puzzling because the few studies that contain an
analytical statement about the relationship between religion and
world politics focus on the confict-promoting aspect of religion,
yet the very same causal mechanisms that they invoke may explain
cooperation between or among religious actors and among states. 
4. Methodological Issues. Tere exist some methodologically sophisti-
cated works on religion and world politics, especially on the link-
ages between religion and international and intrastate confict,
as well as on the linkages between religion and human security.
We review these in the relevant chapters. However, the sample of
studies we reviewed herein suggests some major problems. Failure
to recognize these problems may well lead to serious inferential
biases even when the quantitative data are merely descriptive. We
also discuss the fact that most empirical studies of religion and
various aspects of world politics are limited in scope, focusing on
specifc elements and selective units of analysis. Terefore, the
generalizability of these studies is quite limited. Our study seeks
not only to fx some of the methodological issues of previous stud-
ies but also to provide a broader array of analyses than existing
scholarship on religion and world politics. 
5. Disaggregated Empirical Evidence. Tere is a general discon-
nect between the theoretical arguments about religion and
world politics and the empirical examinations of these linkages.
Teories of religion and politics tend to be general and provide
concepts, arguments, and ideas that cover a general array of
linkages between religion and various aspects of domestic and
international relations. Most empirical studies that attempt to
provide a more scientifc perspective on the relations between
religion and world politics focus on one limited aspect of these
linkages. Te typical empirical analysis focuses on a very lim-
ited argument. For example, as we point out in chapter 5, most
empirical studies of religion and international confict test the
clash of civilizations thesis in one form or another. And as we
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point out in chapter 7, so do most empirical studies of religion
and intrastate confict. Importantly, there is no general causal
mechanism that seems to drive the empirical studies of confict,
and there is little empirical work on religion and international
cooperation. 
What is the sum total of the many studies on religion and international
relations? Tere are several compelling arguments in the literature on reli-
gion and politics. One is the interesting dualism argument: religion can be a
force for confict and a force for cooperation. It depends on the circumstances
and the specifc groups involved. Another argument that we fnd meaning-
ful as a basis for a theory of religion and world politics is the competition/
collusion argument focusing on the relations between political actors and
religious actors. On the whole, this literature is rich and diverse in terms of
arguments, approaches, methodology, and scope. 
Having said all that about the theoretical literature on religion and
world politics, we fnd that much of it is not very useful in terms of usable
knowledge. Despite the claim of some authors on the progress made in the
understanding of the relationship between religion and politics, we argue
that the theoretical foundations of these linkages are quite weak. Tere is
some promising empirical work on the linkages between religion and inter-
national confict, between religion and intrastate confict, and between reli-
gion and human security. However, even in these areas, our knowledge of
these linkages is weak, and the empirical feld of these topics is fraught with
debates, conficting fndings, and results of limited generalizability. Tis is
where our study enters the picture. 
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Chapter 3 
Religion and World Politics: An Integrated
Theoretical Perspective 
1. Introduction 
Tis chapter ofers an integrated theoretical framework of the role of
religion in world politics. Tis framework builds upon, integrates, and
expands existing theoretical perspectives that have addressed this topic. Te
approaches that we fnd most useful and relevant to the subject at hand—
for example, primordialism, instrumentalism, and constructivism—do not
focus exclusively (or even explicitly) on religion. However, they do high-
light concepts and ideas that suggest relevant and compelling inferences
about religion and world politics. 
As we noted in the literature review, several theories link religion to vari-
ous aspects of world politics. Some of these theories are complementary;
some are competitive; and some are contradictory. Moreover, some theories
are more compelling than others, primarily on logical grounds. We focus
on the central and persistent ideas linking religion to politics in general, and
to international politics in particular. We examine these major approaches
and evaluate their internal logic, pointing out the strength and weaknesses
of their key arguments. We then ofer an integrated approach that builds
on the salient arguments of each. We go on to present our own integrative
theory of religion and world politics and explain the relationship between
our theory and other leading theories on the subject. In order to facilitate a
coherent discussion of and comparison among these theories, we focus on
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several questions, which also guide the fundamental logic of our integrative
framework: 
1. What is the role of religion in the social and political life of a state? 
2. Is there a diference between religiously heterogeneous and reli-
giously homogeneous societies in terms of the roles played by reli-
gion in social and political life? 
3. How does religion afect the rise, survival, and downfall of politi-
cal elites? 
4. Under what circumstances can political elites utilize religious
beliefs in order to advance their goals? 
5. Under what circumstances are religious groups willing to mobilize
politically in support of, or in opposition to, government policies? 
6. Under what conditions does religion afect perceptions of afn-
ity or enmity between and among societies across national
borders? 
7. Is there a link between specifc religions and confict? Is there a
link between specifc religion(s) and cooperation? 
2. Primordialism 
We discussed briefy the notion of religion as a communal institution in
chapter 1. Te primordialist perspective of religion ofers a compelling
explanation of the way in which religion has defned various communi-
ties in both ancient and modern times. It is also a potentially compelling
explanation for the alleged resurgence of religious-based politics in the
post–Cold War era. According to this conception, religion is a defning
marker of individual and group identity. It contains a set of directives for
moral behavior at the individual and communal levels. Many religions
also involve collective rituals, such as prayers, sacred holidays, and pil-
grimages to holy sites. Religions involve worshiping and idolizing indi-
viduals who are attributed with special—often superhuman—powers.
Many religions assign to some places—shrines, graves, and even cities—
a sacred status. Sacred sites attract pilgrims from distant places, but
more importantly, they are controlled and managed by religious insti-
tutions. More generally, religion is a collective belief system, one that
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identifes virtuous behavior and distinguishes it from amoral behavior.
Such belief systems also identify communities of believers and sharply
distinguish these communities from communities of “infdels,” “goyim,”
or “nonbelievers.” 
Tis distinction between members of a religious community and non-
members is sometimes based on biological foundations, for example, the
Jewish principle that a Jewish person is one who was born to a Jewish
mother1; sometimes on an article of faith, for example, the requirement
in Islam that a Muslim is a person who has stated the shahada that “there
is no God but Allah and Muhammad is His Messenger”; and sometimes
on a ritual, for example, the christening in Catholicism. In Buddhism,
the criteria are to believe in the principles of Buddhism and to practice
meditation. Te primordialist conception of religion is that of a funda-
mental common denominator of a community based on shared beliefs.
Tese include belief in one or more deities and the principles, rules, and
rituals associated with the dictates of this/these diety/ies. Tis distinc-
tion between believers and nonbelievers is central to the primordialist
approach. 
Primordialism is often associated with superiority complexes. Believers—
those who know the “true mind of God” (Juergensmeyer 2003)—often
try to impose their religious beliefs and way of life on nonbelievers. Tis
superiority complex induces perceptions of power and righteousness, which
are often accompanied by discrimination against and repression of reli-
gious minorities in multicultural societies. In international contexts they
are instrumental in processes of colonizing and subduing other peoples.
Te forced conversion of pagan communities into Islam during the Islamic
expansion era (Cleveland and Bunton 2012) is a clear example of these con-
ceptions of the superiority of Islam over paganism. Taking up the “White
Man’s Burden” was the rationalization for Christian Europe’s colonization
of African, Asian, and Native American lands (Abernethy 2000; Anievas,
Manchanda, and Shilliam 2015; Du Bois 1915). At the same time, religion
may afect perceptions of afnity and shared values among groups within
a state, or between states, whose citizens share the same religion. Tis is
evident in the role of the pope in moderating disputes among Catholics in
Europe as well as the Americas. Te Crusades of 1096–1291 represent a
period of transnational “religious wars” mobilizing “believers” in the faith
against “infdels.” 
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Te general idea of religion as a force in international politics is closely
linked to the notion of communal identity markers. Simply put, the poli-
cies of states are afected by religion to the extent that religion becomes an
important element in the defnition of national identity. Tus, exploring
the extent to which religion helps defne national identity requires us to
examine the circumstances under which a nation’s identity is linked to the
religious afliation of its citizens. Te answer to this question lies in the
intersection of two factors: the relationship between political and religious
institutions and the religious homogeneity/heterogeneity of the society. 
As we noted in our literature review, one of the more compelling foci
of existing theories linking religion to politics concerns the relationship
between religious and political institutions. Tis relationship has an impor-
tant efect on the ways in which religious factors afect domestic and inter-
national politics (Philpott 2007; Toft, Philpott, and Shah 2011; Fox and
Sandler 2004; Gill 2007). Te primordialist perspective accepts this argu-
ment. However, it interprets it in a diferent way than those discussed in the
other theoretical perspectives. 
In some societies, religious institutions and political institutions are one
and the same. In other societies, they are closely linked. However, many
modern societies separate religion from politics and from political institu-
tions. In such states, religion—according to the primordialist perspective—
has little impact on politics. Separation between the religious sphere and
the political one suggests that factors other than religion defne domestic
or foreign policies. Such non-religious factors feature prominently in secu-
lar political theory:  interests, power, rationality, or other aspects of civic
nationalism based on political, ethnic, or linguistic rather than religious
identity. 
On the other hand, when religious and political institutions are closely
allied, primordialism suggests a close relationship between religion and
politics. In such countries, religion becomes integral to the state’s political
identity and of the national ethos, its history, and its vision of the future. It
is a marker that defnes the self-portrayed character of the state as well as the
character other peoples and nations attribute to that state. Tis character-
ization afects the relations between the state and other actors in its external
environment. It creates attachment to certain territories—holy places—or
symbols that become a bone of contention between societies that belong to
diferent religions.2 
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Religious homogeneity/heterogeneity refects the distribution of reli-
gious beliefs and practices in a given society. Most societies lie somewhere
on the religious homogeneity/heterogeneity continuum; only a few are
fully homogeneous (all members practice the same religion) or fully het-
erogeneous (members are evenly split among several religious groups). In
homogeneous societies, religion is more likely to become a visible marker of
national identity. Religious adherence may be viewed as a principal deter-
minant of individual loyalty to the community. It afects individual will-
ingness to contribute to the public good and risk one’s life in defense of,
or for the purpose of spreading, the values of the dominant religion. In
religiously heterogeneous societies, religion can be a powerful divisive force.
Religious diversity creates loyalties to subgroups. Tere is potential friction
among groups when religious loyalty supersedes other loyalties—even to
the state. Te prevalence of religious diversity makes these fssures particu-
larly pronounced, threatening the cohesion of the larger community, that
is, the state, as a whole. Leaders of religiously diverse states may fnd ways
to overcome the primordial sources of tension among religious groups, for
example, by separating the religious and political spheres and promoting
religious freedom. However, where political and religious leaders in reli-
giously diverse states are reluctant or otherwise unwilling to pursue policies
that overcome such divisions, the likelihood of political and social strife
increases substantially. 
Tose two factors—the degree of separation between religious and
political afairs and the degree of religious homogeneity/heterogeneity—
help determine the kind of political processes that afect the domestic and
international politics of a given society. Tis conception is captured in
Table  3.1 below. Te top-left cell represents homogeneous societies that
lack separation between religion and politics. For convenience, we label
Table 3.1 Social characteristics and primordial infuences 
Religious structure of Separation between Religion and State 
society No Yes 
Homogeneous 
Heterogeneous 
Primordial politics—Type I states 
(Iran, Saudi Arabia) 
Primordial politics, coupled with 
discriminatory practices—Type III 
states (Israel, Myanmar, Atheism in 
communist states) 
Informal primordialism—Type II 
states (Brazil, Ecuador) 
Nationalism, rationalism—Type 
IV states (United States, United 
Kingdom, most Western European 
democracies) 
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those states as Type I states. Te Islamic Republic of Iran and the Wahhabi
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are prime examples of this type. Religion plays a
prominent role in the domestic and international politics of these societies.
It afects leader selection: political leaders need to be acceptable to religious
institutions and religious leaders. Even if—as in the case of Iran over the
last three-plus decades—there are competitive elections for the ofce of
president, candidates are screened by the supreme (religious) leader, and
those who are not considered acceptable are prohibited from competing.
Religious laws play a dominant role in the legal system. Loyalty to the state
and loyalty to the prevailing religion are one and the same. Secularism is
either disallowed or marginalized. Externally, international afnities and
animosities—especially in security afairs, but also in other domains such as
cultural and institutional interactions—are defned by religious similarity
or diferences. Tis afects both cooperation and confict behavior. 
Te defnition of religious homogeneity in these examples goes beyond
the broad categories of religion and includes religious families within a given
religion. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia are Muslim states. Sha’ria law is the
foundation of the legal system of both states. In both states, religious and
political institutions are closely aligned. However, both consider each other
a potential enemy because Saudi Arabia is predominantly Sunni, whereas
Iran is predominantly Shi’ite. Tis afects, for example, their conficting
interests in the civil wars in Syria and Yemen. 
Examples of religiously homogeneous societies that have separated reli-
gion from state (Type II states) include states such as Brazil or Ecuador.
Tese states practice a high separation between the Catholic Church (the
dominant religion) and the state. Type II states tend to minimize the for-
mal role of religion in politics via a constitution or a civil legal system.
However, religious beliefs and practices of candidates for political ofce
often play a (typically informal) role in their election or selection. Attitudes
toward religious minorities are often mixed, if not outright suspicious, even
though legally these societies practice constitutional religious freedom.
Attitudes toward other states often correlate with religious similarity or dis-
similarity. Religion is not formally invoked as a determinant of confict or
cooperation, but seems to lurk beneath the surface. An example of this is
the attitude of the European Union toward Turkey. Whereas the European
Union (EU) has admitted many of the Eastern European states that had
democratized only recently, it has continued to reject Turkey’s application.
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Te formal reasons provided by the EU are just feeble excuses; it is Turkey’s
Muslim identity that prevents its admittance to a predominantly Christian
identifed community. 
Religiously heterogeneous societies that do not separate religion from
state (Type III states) often refect a situation wherein one religious group’s
rules, principles, and legal values dominate those of other groups. Religious
discrimination is often coupled with economic, social, and political dis-
crimination. Tese discriminatory practices are guided by a narrow sense of
religious identity wherein one religious group imposes its values on other
groups. Religious freedom may be etched as a formal legal or constitutional
principle. However, such states practice political, economic, and social
discrimination against religious groups that do not represent the “state’s”
religion. Leaders are selected exclusively from the religious group that
dominates the political system; members of “outside” religions are excluded
from positions of infuence. Likewise, religious similarity between excluded
religious groups and other states is often a source of both domestic and
international tensions. Examples of this case include the imposition of athe-
ism in communist societies, and the systematic discrimination against non-
Jewish communities in Israel. In both cases, the formal legal system decreed
freedom of religion. In practice, discriminatory policies are rampant and
systematic. 
Te last quadrant consists of religiously heterogeneous societies in which
the separation between religion and state is embedded in the constitution
or the legal system (Type IV states). In such societies, national identity is
formed around non-religious symbols and afnities. Type IV states may still
refect some tensions between diferent religious communities—as has been
the case with respect to American attitudes toward Muslims in the United
States since September 2001—but the role of religious factors in political
discourses is minimal. Likewise, the degree of afnity or hostility such a state
exhibits toward other actors in the international system is hardly infuenced
by religious afnities or dissimilarities. Interests or shared values in terms of
secular ideological similarities defne the foreign policies of such states. Most
Western democracies ofer examples of such states. 
Tis framework illuminates how primordialism conceives the impact of
religion on the domestic politics of states. It also suggests some general ideas
about the international implications of a state’s religious structure for its for-
eign policy orientations and possible behaviors. We interpret the principal
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operative factors in the primordialist perspective diferently from the more
traditional theories of religion and politics we have discussed in the previ-
ous chapter. We accept that the relationship between religious and political
institutions is a key variable in determining the extent and manner in which
religion afects politics. We argue, however, that the notion of “political
theology,” while important, is not an independent condition. Rather, it is
a function of state-religion relations, and is typically determined by the
ability and willingness of political institutions to allow religious beliefs to
infuence major political practices. A political theology, if one exists, can
shape national politics only if it can unify society around it, and only if the
political leadership is willing or capable to employ it as a unifying symbol. 
What are the factors that defne relations among states according to the
primordialist perspective? As noted, the notion of religion as an identity
marker shapes not only the perception of leaders and followers about who
they are but also their perceptions of other political actors outside their
borders. Tis applies in particular to the attitudes that leaders and followers
develop toward neighbors or other actors that are relevant to the state’s secu-
rity and well-being. Much of the interaction in international relations—
especially of the confictual variety—takes place among contiguous states.
Primordialism suggests that the religious similarity between a state and its
neighbors has a powerful efect on the nature of this interaction. Here too,
we can use the above scheme to explain how domestic structure and inter-
national politics afect each other. 
Religiously similar states that border each other are likely to share val-
ues and identities. Te political boundaries that separate one state from
another may be formal and legally binding, but the people in these societ-
ies feel a strong afnity for each other. Consequently, ceteris paribus, the
primordialist perspective expects little confict between such states. Te
international relations of such states should be marked by various forms of
cooperative interactions. Shared religious values serve as important trust-
inducing mechanisms; they can cement contracts that form the foundation
of international cooperation and international institutions. 
On the other hand, religious diferences between contiguous states may
be a source of friction, both due to ideational divergence and potential
religious confict, and to competing claims for holy shrines, or the afnity
of one state with a persecuted religious minority in another state. Religious
diferences imply diferences in basic values, vocabulary, and priorities.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
70 
70 Scriptures, Shrines, Scapegoats, and World Politics 
Tey are a source of miscommunication and misunderstandings, thereby
impeding cooperative arrangements (Cohen 1997). Consequently, primor-
dialism suggests that the degree of cooperation across cultures should be
much lower than within cultures. 
According to the primordialist perspective, religiously homogeneous
states are less likely to experience internal strife. Tis is so because religion
makes for a strong social bond. Tis is especially true in Type I  states,
because the leadership is seen as legitimated by God and supported by
religious institutions. In Type II and Type IV states, the primordialist
approach also expects relatively little internal strife. Whether or not the
society is homogeneous—religious beliefs can be freely expressed, and
religious practices are separate from political ones. Civil confict, to the
extent that it exists, may well be on issues that are more related to eco-
nomic or social conditions than to religious freedoms. On the other hand,
Type III states are expected to be highly prone to civil strife. Te cohabi-
tation of political and religious institutions tends to favor one religious
group over others. Tis favoritism often causes grievances due to religious
oppression. Such grievances often translate to violent opposition to the
regime. 
We are less likely to observe outside intervention in domestic politics
of religiously homogeneous societies. Such societies build ideational walls
to defend themselves against outside infuence—ideological, economic, or
political. By contrast, religiously diverse states are more prone to internal
instability, often due to tensions among religious subgroups jockeying for
position or patronage within the society. Afnity between religious minori-
ties and neighbors of such states tends to increase the likelihood of external
intervention in episodes of internal strife (Gartzke and Gleditsch 2006,
San-Akca 2016). 
In sum, the primordial perspective suggests several important themes
about religion and world politics. First, religion can be—but is not
always—an inherent marker of national identity. Tis depends on the reli-
gious homogeneity of the society and on the relationships between religious
institutions and political institutions. Second, when religion becomes an
important marker of identity, it afects the degree of internal political and
social stability of states. It also afects the degree of confict and coopera-
tion between a given state and its external environment. Consequently, the
interaction among these factors: the religious homogeneity of the state, the
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
71 
Religion and World Politics 71 
degree of separation between religion and politics, and the similarity/dis-
similarity between the religious makeup of the state, its neighbors, and its
more extensive international environment is what afects the patterns of
confict and cooperation in world politics. 
Te primordialist perspective is time invariant. Tat is, it does not tell us
why religious factors increase or decrease in importance in a given society
at diferent points in time. Accordingly, it has problems explaining when
religious factors have a higher or lower efect on domestic and interna-
tional politics. What it does tell us is which societies, which pairs of states,
and which regions are more or less likely to exhibit internal strife, interna-
tional confict, or international cooperation. Te lack of dynamics in this
framework is a source of weakness because it cannot tell us of the changing
importance of religion as a political force over time. Nevertheless, it does
ofer an important explanation of a more permanent connection between
religion and political structures and processes. 
3. Instrumentalism 
Instrumentalism, a theory in the Machiavellian tradition, focuses on the
uses of symbols, ideas, identities, or incentives as tools for political mobili-
zation in the service of political elites. Political elites’ interests may or may
not be commensurate with those of ordinary citizens. However, this theory
asserts that political elites are the principal drivers of political and social
processes. Te conception is that of trickle-down politics, but such politics
requires resources and support. Te question here is why, how, and when
political elites would use religious ideas, symbols, and institutions, and
what kind of interests such usages are supposed to serve. 
Instrumentalism is rationalistic in nature. It assumes that political lead-
ers have well-defned goals and pursue optimal strategies to accomplish
those goals. Te use of religious symbols, ideas, and institutions is seen in
this context. It is helpful to explicate the general logic of this theory via one
of its most important recent expositions in the work of Bueno de Mesquita,
Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (1999, 2003), appropriately labeled the polit-
ical survival theory. 
Briefy stated, this theory relies on two fundamental assumptions. First,
political elites seek to ascend into ofce and, once there, to retain their
posts. Second, to accomplish their goals, they have to put together and
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sustain a “winning coalition,” a group of people who support them and
are capable of defeating any opposition that stands in their way. A strik-
ingly simple but compelling theory follows from these assumptions. Tis
theory applies to a wide spectrum of states, political leaders, and substantive
issue areas—including international confict, trade, and domestic political
processes. 
Te political survival theory defnes two central concepts or popula-
tions: the selectorate (S) is the population that is capable of seating or unseat-
ing political leaders. Tis population is generally the same across all states: it
is typically the group of adults that has a stake in the domestic and foreign
policies of the state. In democracies, this is a well-defned population—the
eligible voters—who can decide the fate of political leadership via elections.
In autocracies it may not be as well defned legally, but it is typically the
population that can—via either legal or more commonly extralegal pro-
cesses such as civil uprisings—potentially unseat an incumbent leadership. 
Te winning coalition (W) is the subset of the selectorate that is required
to ensure the leadership’s survival in ofce (or bring about a leadership
change). Tis subset varies widely in size across diferent political regimes.
In democracies, W typically accounts for 51 percent of the selectorate (given
varying turnout rates and election rules, it may be smaller). In autocracies,
this fgure is considerably smaller; it is typically measured in qualitative
terms (e.g., the size of the military and security apparatuses, the size of an
aristocratic class, an economic elite, an ethnic group, etc.). At any rate,
autocratic leaders need a small but highly capable group to fght and resist
a potentially large section of the selectorate that might resist the autocrats’
policies. 
Te key argument of the political survival theory is that the ratio of
W to S—the ratio of the winning coalition to the selectorate—determines
the kind of domestic and foreign policies political leaders pursue. In gen-
eral terms, if the W-to-S ratio is relatively large, which is the case in most
democracies, political leaders pursue policies designed to provide public
goods, that is, goods that would serve a large number of people. Tis is so,
because a leader’s ability to stay in power requires that voters would be satis-
fed with her policies. So leaders who seek to retain their post must pursue
policies that provide the kind of goods that would satisfy a large number
of people. 
By contrast, an autocrat’s concern is with policies that provide private
goods, that is, benefts that would satisfy and beneft a small group of people
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(the small W) who protect the regime. Tis is the fundamental institutional
diference between democratic and autocratic politics. Te implication is
that political leaders seek diferent instruments that would keep them in
ofce, given the constraints (the W-to-S ratio and the nature of the winning
coalition) under which they operate. Tis is the fundamental idea of the
instrumentalist perspective of religion: the conditions and the manner in
which political leaders use religion as an instrument for retaining or acquir-
ing political power. 
Tere are two versions of the instrumentalist perspective as it applies
to the relationship between religion and world politics. Te frst version,
collective instrumentalism, does not distinguish between leaders and follow-
ers. It views religion as a collective good that benefts the entire body of
believers, those who work for the survival, preservation, and expansion of
this good. It is also supposed to make nonbelievers worse of for lacking a
religion or for adhering to a diferent one, thereby afording a religiously
cohesive community some evolutionary advantage over ones that lack this
spiritual cohesiveness. Te second version, elite instrumentalism, separates
political elites from naive believers. For political leaders, religion is a politi-
cal tool that can be used to further their goals. For followers, religion is a
fundamental and all-encompassing guide to life and behavior. Elite instru-
mentalism builds on such elite-related policy manipulations as those pos-
ited by the political survival theory. 
Collective instrumentalism is predicated on a utilitarian conception of 
religion as a collective good. Religion unites a community, creating a col-
lective entity that is capable of providing its members with such benefts as 
common defense, laws that facilitate social order, and a set of institutions 
that are legitimized by religious beliefs. Tese institutions enforce laws 
and otherwise regulate behavior within the community. Clearly, religion is 
not the only community-forming and community-regulating philosophy. 
Secular philosophies based on rational logic of collective choice (such as 
social contract theories that emerged during the Enlightenment period) 
are ideological underpinnings of many modern societies.3 Absolutist polit-
ical doctrines such as Marxism and fascism serve a similar function. But 
in some places, and for some cultures, religion is the only encompassing 
logic that orients a community’s survival and functioning. Te principles 
that guide normative behavior in such communities are rooted in religious 
guidelines. Tey also defne principles of dealing with other communities, 
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depending on whether these other communities are religiously similar or 
diferent. 
In some cases, and according to some interpretations of a specifc reli-
gion, a community can thrive only if it (a) unites or cooperates with other
communities that share the same religion, and (b) eliminates threats ema-
nating from communities of nonbelievers or communities subscribing to
other religions. Here too the defnition of friends and foes is based on reli-
gious characteristics. However, in contrast to primordialist theories, collec-
tive instrumentalism is based on utilitarian principles of cost and beneft.
Te belief in collective virtue, or the threat of divine collective punishment,
forges communal cohesion. Such beliefs, rooted in many religions, unite
people through common feelings of righteousness or a common fear of
collective punishment. Tese beliefs also tend to provide such communities
a competitive advantage vis-à-vis communities that lack common religious
bonds. Tis helps explain the rise of monotheistic Abrahamic religions and
their ability to convert into imperial forces either locally (Judaism and the
Israelites in antiquity) or globally (Christianity and Islam following the
Council of Nicea, and the earliest caliphates, respectively). 
Te early histories of Judaism and Islam exemplify the ideas of col-
lective instrumentalist conceptions of religion. In many ways both reli-
gions share similar histories. Both emerged in pagan tribal communities. 
Judaism, as related in the Old Testament (Kitchen 2003), emerged from 
a tribe that relocated from the Iraqi desert to Palestine. It did not really 
become a collective religion until this tribal community experienced demo-
graphic expansion in Egypt and then relocated to Palestine.4 Tis process 
of “relocation” involved a historical occupation of major parts of Palestine 
from pagan communities, and the establishment of a set of religious and 
political institutions that have coexisted for several millennia. Te modern 
nationalist version of the Jewish state of Israel also suggests that religion 
can be a powerful instrument of nation-building and social mobilization.5 
Until the emergence of Islam, the various pagan communities in the
Arabian Peninsula were weak, disparate, and engaged in frequent infghting
and raiding. Mecca, the holy site of the Ka’ba, was a place of gathering of
pagan groups, each worshiping a diferent God. Te only meaningful central
government in the Middle East—with very loose control over the Western
parts of the Fertile Crescent (Palestine, parts of Egypt)—was the Byzantine
Empire with its center in Anatolia and a regional capital in Damascus.
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North Africa, most of Egypt, the Jordanian and Syrian deserts, and most
of the Arabian Peninsula were the domain of diferent pagan tribes, mostly
nomads living of their cattle, without any central organization or control.
Cities like Mecca, Yathrib (later Medina), Cairo, Beirut, Amman, Acre,
and Jerusalem were merely local trading posts, resting places for caravans
going between Asia and Europe, or local residences of Byzantine aristoc-
racy (Aslan 2011, 3–22). Muhammad, the founder of Islam, used religious
rhetoric to unite several tribes, fend of attacks by pagans against Medina,
occupy Mecca, and expand the rule of the Islamic protostate across much
of the Arabian Peninsula. Tis new religion was instrumental in forging a
new structure of centralized military and economic institutions, governed
by Muhammad’s charismatic personality. His successors defeated Byzantine
rule in most of the Middle East, and within 100 years after Muhammad’s
death, the Islamic empire extended its rule to the entire Middle East, North
Africa, and parts of Spain (Cleveland and Bunton 2012, 13–18, 33–35). 
As these examples suggest, collective instrumentalism fails to explain
why communities cling to their religious beliefs even when it is costly
and even dangerous to do so. Jews adhered to their religion and main-
tained cohesive communities for nearly two millennia after the kingdom
of Judea was destroyed by the Romans in the year 70 ce (and again in
136 ce). Unlike many other peoples in the Middle East and North Africa,
Jews refused to convert to Islam during the Islamic expansion period, and
again resisted conversion to Christianity during the Middle Ages. Large-
scale expulsion of Jews on religious grounds took place in Spain (1492 ce),
and the concentration of Jewish communities in restricted areas in Russia
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries failed to dissolve these com-
munities. If collective instrumentalism were at work, the fate of the Jewish
religion would have been the same as the fate of pagan religions in the
Middle East, North Africa, and Europe.6 Likewise, the survival of substan-
tial Islamic communities in Palestine during the Crusades also indicates the
tendency of communities to cling to their religious beliefs even at great cost
to themselves. 
Tis qualifcation notwithstanding, collective instrumentalism views
the principal utility of common religious and moral beliefs as commu-
nity building and community preservation, especially in light of external
threats to the community. Even when a religious community is persecuted
or experiences rampant discrimination, religious beliefs and practices help
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it overcome hardships that may or may not be due to the distinct character
of such communities. 
Te interpretation of the causal mechanism that connects people to a
religion is somewhat diferent in the instrumentalist conception compared
to the primordialist one. According to the primordialist conception, religion
has an ideational role; it defnes a relationship between people and a belief
system, regardless of whether such a relationship serves a utilitarian func-
tion. Primordialism does not account for the collective nature of religion,
nor does it explain why some religions establish highly hierarchical institu-
tions, while others survive with very few or with a very loose institutional
structure. On the other hand, the primordialist conception of religion as a
system of belief that induces a collective identity is general and covers both
institutionalized and less formal types of religions and religious groups. 
Te collective instrumentalist conception of religion views religion as an
overarching mechanism that forges communal cohesion and creates indi-
vidual commitment and loyalty to a group. As such, religion is designed,
according to this conception, to provide evolutionary advantage to societies
and other political organizations in a competitive system, be it a nonstate
tribal system or a state system. Te conception of religion as a political force
does not attempt to account for all versions of religions; however, it does
attempt to account for the more structured and institutionalized forms of
religious organizations and communities. In the case of pagan religions and
some of the nontheistic Asian religions (Buddhism, Jainism), the collective
instrumentalist perspective does not ofer a clear explanation of why they
exist and how they afect politics. However, it does ofer a relatively compel-
ling explanation of the rise of monotheistic religions, especially those that
have a well-established institutional structure and belief system. 
For example, the Reformation and the rise of Protestantism represent
not only a spiritual rebellion against the interpretation of Christianity by
the Catholic Church and the papacy but also a way of organizing a rebellion
against a political and economic empire that suppressed much of Europe
during the Middle Ages. Tere was a need to form a collective culture that
would mobilize both feudal aristocrats and vassals around a set of ideas
that could combat Catholic orthodoxy and its political and economic sup-
porters (Buck and Zophy 1972). As we discussed above, with regard to
the rise of the Abrahamic religions, their growth and expansion vis-à-vis
pagan societies characterized by difuse religious belief systems (or in the
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case of Judaism, its survival despite persistent persecution and discrimi-
nation by other religions) suggests the adaptive power of religion in such
communities. 
Collective instrumentalism does not claim that religion can always
serve as a mobilizing and community-sustaining force; it does suggest that
religion may form a tool of social mobilization and communal function-
ing and survival. It also suggests that this tool can emerge as a grassroots
movement or as an elite-driven instrument. Indeed, the origin of many reli-
gions, including Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and Confucianism, refect
a grassroots process that was only later adopted by political elites. Te aban-
donment of one (typically pagan) religion in favor of a monotheistic one
refects the community-building power of certain religious beliefs, some-
times led by charismatic “community organizers” such as Moses in Judaism,
Jesus and Saint Paul in Christianity, Muhammad in Islam, or Siddhārtha
Gautama (the Buddha) in Buddhism. Adoption of religions by political
elites, however, is what gave a major push to these and other religions. And
this adoption came typically when political leaders were convinced of the
potential political power and legitimacy that such conversion would allow. 
Elite instrumentalism makes a very simple statement. Political elites
employ religious values, symbols, and manipulate religious institutions to
advance their personal political goals and ambitions, which are often—as
the political survival theory suggests—to retain power. Tese goals may
have little or nothing to do with religious values. Religion is employed to
motivate people into taking actions that are individually costly and dan-
gerous. Elites require resources to accomplish their goals. Some of these
resources are fnancial and require people to pay taxes. Other goals may
require them to induce people to risk their lives for their country (or for the
things that those elites wish to accomplish through violence). Both taxation
and military mobilization are costly and risky endeavors. Political and social
elites need either to coerce or induce citizens into giving away parts of their
income or to risk their lives for their country or community. 
In many cases, elites employ coercive mechanisms to induce compliance.
However, coercion is both expensive and risky. Coercion requires deploy-
ment of military and security forces, which necessitate funding; these funds
are typically extracted from the masses, which creates an even greater public
opposition to elite policies. Moreover, security forces can be turned against
their leaders. For that reason, elites opt for other, less coercive, means of
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inducing popular compliance such as persuasion through legislation, public
opinion, or rational argumentation. But sometimes, and in some societies,
such methods are not expected to work. In such cases, religious symbols
and moral values dictated by religious beliefs can be efective instruments
of mass mobilization. In certain societies, and with respect to certain issues,
religion can be a powerful motivator of costly and risky collective action.
It can be used as a tool for mitigating free riding—a common problem of
costly collective action. 
What makes elite instrumentalism diferent from collective instru-
mentalism is the idea that the goals of political elites may difer quite
substantially from those of the masses. Tis divergence of goals creates a
potential source of friction between what the elites and the masses want.
A mass mobilization strategy is required when the goals of elites and
masses diverge and the burden of accomplishing national goals is not
shared equally. Religion can become an efective bridge between the goals
of the elites and the willingness of the masses to pay the cost of accom-
plishing them. Elites’ use of religion as a mobilization strategy can also be
construed in terms of Marx’s notion of an “opiate of the masses,” where
religion is used to divert attention from the failure of political elites to
provide collective goods. In some cases, political elites actually share the
values of their constituencies. Nevertheless, they consciously manipulate
religious ideas to motivate people into costly action and overcome collec-
tive action problems. 
Tere are numerous examples of how this theory has worked. Te
Crusades can be seen as a ploy by the Catholic Church to increase its power
and control. By invoking the idea of Christian control of the holy places in
Palestine, the religious establishment sought to strengthen allegiance to the
Church and to dampen opposition to the Church’s economic exploitation
of poor European communities. It could also be viewed as a cynical attempt
to weaken the various feudal lords who could challenge the Church’s eco-
nomic practices, by diverting their military resources to remote lands. 
Te modern call to jihad by political Islamic groups is also a case of
instrumental mobilization of people to such extreme actions as suicide
bombings through religious sanctioning. Te use of fatwas (religious opin-
ions) by ulema (Islamic scholars and religious authorities) sanctifying cer-
tain acts of violence, including against civilians, in the name of Islam is also
a case of elite instrumentalism. Individual acts of terrorism—as large in
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scope as the September 11, 2001 attacks, let alone more limited ones such
as the Boston Marathon bombing of April 2013—have no direct efect on
the broader Islamic communities. In many cases such terrorist attacks actu-
ally worsen the conditions of the communities whose religious authorities
endorse or encourage such actions. But this is precisely the idea of elite
instrumentalism—the utility that the elites derive from the use of religious
values to mobilize the masses is often diferent from (or even the inverse of )
the utility that the masses derive from it. 
When are political elites more likely to use religion to advance their goals?
Te simple answer is: when they feel they need to do so and if they believe
they can. Tis implies several things. First, elites can efectively invoke reli-
gion to induce action when the level of religious belief in a society (or a
signifcant group within society) is high. Second, religion is an efective
instrument of mobilization when the society (or group) being mobilized
is religiously cohesive. In a religiously diverse society, invoking religion to
mobilize people for costly action may be much more difcult, because it
requires elites to invoke several (sometimes contradictory) religious values
simultaneously. Tird, religion is often invoked to induce violence, and not
so much to induce cooperation. 
Te religious economy model relies on similar ideas. As noted above,
the focus of this model is on the relations between political elites, whose
prime concern is political survival, and religious actors, who are also utility-
maximizing entities (Gill 2007). Under certain social conditions—the
degree of religious diversity—elites may be inclined to support religious
freedom and allow for free competition among religious actors. Under such
conditions, political elites focus on ensuring an open market for religion,
which typically promotes economic development and political stability.
On the other hand, a dominant religion—religious hegemony—is more
likely to prompt political elites to form alliances with religious elites, largely
through the regulation of religion, the restricting of religious competition,
and discrimination against religious minorities. Tis is apt to invoke griev-
ances, slow down economic and political development, and adversely afect
political stability. As noted in chapter 2, these ideas are compelling as far
as they touch upon the relations between political and religious institu-
tions and some of the implications of these relations. However, we need
to extrapolate from the foundations of this theory to the linkages between
religious factors and international relations 
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In domestic settings, we can examine how and when leaders of dif-
ferent groups use religion to mobilize members to participate in political
strife. In heterogeneous societies, religion can be, and is often used by
leading fgures to incite animosity and strife on the part of one group
against other—religiously diferent—groups. In religiously homoge-
neous societies, religion is not an efective instrument to organize dissent
against the regime or other political and social groups, because the latter
are not religiously diferent.7 In international settings, we can examine
how national elites invoke religion to get people involved in interna-
tional conficts. 
Linking domestic to international politics, elites of a faction within a
society who wish to initiate action against other groups within that society
are more likely to do so when they believe that they can rely on external
support for such actions. If other states share a religious afnity with the
focal group, it is more likely that leaders of that group will invoke religion
as a central cause of confict. In the absence of the prospect of outside help,
especially when the balance of power between competing groups in a soci-
ety is not favorable to the focal group, elites will try to downplay the role of
religion, so as not to polarize the confict even more. 
Tese ideas highlight both the compelling aspects of the instrumental-
ist perspective as well as its limitations. Instrumentalism allows not only 
a way of distinguishing between societies in terms of when and under 
what structural social conditions religion is likely to be invoked as a tool 
of social mobilization. It also enables us to trace the dynamics of religious 
mobilization over time. Changes in social or international circumstances 
alter the conditions that enable elites to invoke religion to mobilize masses. 
Changes in the character of outsiders and their relation to the focal society 
afect elites’ ability or willingness to use religion as a tool of social mobi-
lization. Finally, changes in the goals of the elites, their perception of job 
security, or the religious afnity between the elites and masses may alter 
the instrumental use of religion within a society or between states. 
Te weakness of this approach is that it ofers little insight into the reli-
gious sources of domestic and international cooperation. Inducing coop-
eration within a religiously homogeneous state that experiences political
instability or social unrest by invoking religious values is likely to be dif-
fcult. If mobilizing for cooperation via religion were efective, such insta-
bility would not have emerged in the frst place. Likewise, in a religiously
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diverse society, using religion is more likely to deepen existing diferences,
tensions, and suspicion among social groups. In international settings, reli-
gion can be used to help forge low-cost international cooperation such as
forming and sustaining international cultural institutions. But it is not very
efective as a tool of social mobilization for costly international coopera-
tion such as trade agreements that open domestic markets to international
competition. 
Clearly, the instrumentalist perspective is a more dynamic theory of reli-
gion and politics than the primordialist perspective. Identity markers are
fairly constant for a given society over time; if they change, this takes place
over many years. By contrast, the conditions that allow, induce, or compel
political elites to manipulate religious symbols fuctuate signifcantly, often
from leader to leader within the same state. And even under the tenure of
a specifc leader or group, the conditions that afect their ability or willing-
ness to use religion as an instrument of social mobilization might change
signifcantly. 
Primordialism suggests that there are signifcant diferences between
societies in the ways religion afects the choice of enemies or partners for
cooperative ventures. However, there is little variation in the way religion
afects the politics of a given society or state over time. Tis is so as long as
the relations between religious and state institutions remain unchanged. By
contrast, instrumentalism suggests a potential dynamic factor that afects
the tendency of political leaders to manipulate religious factors as a tool of
social mobilization over time. Specifcally, the argument is that changes in
the level of perceived job security of political leaders afect the tendency to
use religion as an instrument of political mobilization and support. Political
leaders at risk of losing their jobs are more likely to invoke religion as a tool
of political mobilization than political leaders who feel secure in their posts.
Several mechanisms account for this expectation. First, leaders may have
an incentive to use religion in a diversionary context. When they feel that
their winning coalition is crumbling, they may invoke religious symbols or
issues to divert attention from their problems. If they rely on a religiously
or ethnically cohesive coalition (for example, in autocracies that relied on
the support of certain ethnoreligious groups such as in Saddam Hussein’s
Iraq or Bashar al-Assad’s Syria), invoking religious symbols may become a
powerful politically expedient strategy. Invoking real or imaginary threats
to these values by an internal or external enemy that is religiously diferent
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can unite the winning coalition around the leader and divert the attention
of those members who had considered defection to issues that unite them
and compel them to support the leader. 
Political instability that threatens the leadership’s survival prospects can
also emerge due to the rising power of the opposition relative to that of the
winning coalition. In such cases, the leaders’ goal is to divert the attention
of broader elements of the selectorate—beyond the winning coalition—so
as to relieve pressure on themselves. Here, too, when they can (that is, when
the society is sufciently cohesive), they may invoke religion so as to unite
the selectorate against external or internal threats. Such threats are apt to be
framed by the leadership as states, groups, or policies that place important
religious values at risk (e.g., holy places, religious rituals, religious practices,
dress codes, women’s rights, etc.). 
Second, it is possible that some of the threats to the leadership’s survival
or to the state’s security emanate from groups or states that are religiously
diferent from those of the focal state or of the leader’s winning coalition.
However, the issues at stake may have little or nothing to do with religion.
Tese may be politico-economic issues or territorial issues. Nevertheless,
the leader’s need to mobilize human and material resources to face these
material challenges may require her to invoke religious factors to ensure
consent. 
For example, many consider the Arab–Israeli or Palestinian–Israeli
confict as a religious confict (e.g., Reuther and Reuther 2002, Fox and
Sandler 2004, 137–62). Tere are certain religious aspects to this confict;
it is about control of holy places to Judaism and Islam; it is between two
distinct religious groups. However, the confict is also—and, from some
perspectives, mostly—a confict between competing national movements,
and about territory, independence, and prestige (which also explains some
of the less noticeable intra-Arab, intra-Palestinian, and intra-Jewish con-
ficts embedded within the larger contestation). Fox and Sandler (2004)
provide a brief but insightful review of the Israeli–Palestinian confict and
show that (a)  religious factors took prominence during some periods of
the confict, but were of secondary or even marginal importance during
other periods of the confict, and (b) the political leadership of both the
Palestinian national movement and the Zionist movement found it expedi-
ent to promote religious factors during some periods of the confict and to
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suppress such factors during other periods. Tey conclude their analysis
by arguing that religion played an important but not dominant role in the
evolution of the Israeli–Palestinian confict, implicitly suggesting that its
resolution may depend on reducing the religious (and ethnic) framing of
the issues and elevating rational and secular factors that make the issues at
stake divisible and thus subject to compromise. 
Importantly, in such seemingly religious rivalries such as the Arab–
Israeli, Indo–Pakistani, Greek–Turkish cases, or in domestic conficts such
as those branded as “religious civil wars” by Toft, Philpott, and Shah (2011,
160–71), religion can be seen as one, but not necessarily the dominant issue
driving the confict. It is, however, an important mobilizing instrument of
national or quasi-national movements. For the instrumentalist approach,
religion is a political weapon, part of the arsenal of political elites (and
counterelites), that can be turned on or of based on political calculations
regarding its utility and associated risks. Te same leader, group, or regime
may invoke religious symbols to mobilize support under one set of cir-
cumstances and avoid using such symbols under diferent circumstances, or
with respect to diferent political challenges. 
4. Constructivism 
As noted above, constructivism does not assign an explicit role to religion
in the ebb and fow of world politics. Snyder (2011, 2) points out that
Wendt’s feld-defning book does not have a single index entry for religion.
However, Snyder acknowledges—correctly—that there is ample implicit
reference to religion as a fundamental ideational factor in the constructivist
paradigm. Religion can play an important role in the constructivist para-
digm’s ideas about confict and cooperation in world politics. Tus, we can
derive propositions about the role of religious factors in world politics from
constructivist ideas about the way politics function. In particular, these
inferences rest upon the constructivist focus on the relationship among
identity, ideas, and action. To derive such inferences, we start by outlining
the fundamental assumptions that drive the constructivist paradigm. 
1. What I do depends on who I am (or who I believe I am). States (or
social groups within states) operate on the basis of their subjective
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understanding of their internal and external environment. Tis
contrasts with the materialist conception of states’ motives (e.g.,
power and interests). 
2. Subjective perceptions of reality are socially constructed. Te ways
by which states defne who they are and how they relate to their
environment are “constructed” by a set of factors. Some of these
factors are fairly constant; others are subject to change. 
3. States have corporate identities. A corporate identity is “a property
that generates motivational and behavioral dispositions” (Wendt
1   , 224). Tis assumption can be extended to social groups
within states. 
4. National identity is defned largely by cultural factors. Te relatively
stable factors that determine national identity are its cultural char-
acteristics, such as the linguistic, religious, racial, gender, and eth-
nic composition of its population. 
5. States’ experience in the international system defnes the manner in
which they construct their reality. States’ identities are not neces-
sarily static. Rather, important aspects of the perceived identity
of states are shaped by their interaction with their international
environment and by their perception of the characteristics of this
environment. Consequently, states may change and redefne their
perception of the environment, and determine whom they per-
ceive as friends and whom they perceive as foes. Tis, in turn,
afects their behavior. 
Te frst assumption about the efect of identity on behavior is perhaps the
most important one in terms of a meaningful connection between religion
and behavior according to this perspective. What it implies is that identity
shapes behavior. It also implies that people, groups, and states, act and react
not on the basis of some “objective” factors or stimuli; rather, they react to
the way in which they understand these factors or stimuli (“anarchy is what
states make of it,” to use Wendt’s [1992] famous title). 
Te fundamental idea in constructivism is that seemingly tangible factors,
which appear to shape behavior in “materialist” paradigms of world politics
(i.e., realism and liberalism)—interest, power, or international anarchy—are
not exogenous. Rather, these are socially constructed concepts—ideas that
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people, organizations, or states accept as “given.” Tese concepts can defne
the goals of units and help predict how they will act in certain circumstances
as long as such units cling to these ideas. So, what we consider the central
“objective” factors, are in fact an outgrowth of a set of common beliefs and
ideas. When these ideas change, so does the world. 
What constructivists mean by the social construction of ideas (or iden-
tities) is that a group of people comes to assign a common meaning to a
certain concept. Tat common meaning serves as a foundation for com-
munication and action within that group. Te most obvious example of
“social construction” is the concept of money. Money can have no value
unless a lot of people believe that they can trade paper (or metal) for goods
and services. Likewise, political power would have no meaning unless peo-
ple who hold public ofce could command obedience from subordinates.
Obedience would not take place unless subordinates believed that people in
public ofce have the right to issue directives, or that they possess the ability
to punish disobedience. 
Te notion that states (or specifc groups within states) can have a corpo-
rate identity implies that being part of a collective entity and the responsi-
bilities that follow from that association have a meaningful interpretation in
international politics. Tis is particularly relevant here because religion may
be one of the markers of this group or national identity. Given that corporate
identity is indeed a property that generates “motivational or behavioral dis-
positions,” then we can meaningfully incorporate religion into constructivist
theories of national behavior and international structures. 
One may deduce from constructivism a causal mechanism that con-
nects religion to cooperation given the paradigm’s focus on identity and
ideational convergence. For example, constructivism maintains that a state’s
interests are a function of its identity, which is derived from its culture
(Wendt 1992, Finnemore 1996). It follows that national identity and ide-
ational convergence/divergence shape a state’s international interactions,
and that interactive experiences shape and alter national identities as well.
In new states that lack interactive experience, identities are shaped by shared
cultural attributes that bind their populations. 
Two issues arise from these deductions, which connect the constructivist
paradigm to primordialist or instrumentalist approaches (Lynch 2009, Fox
and Sandler 2004, Hasenclever and Rittberger 2003). Te primordialist
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element is that religion forms a natural common ground among people,
causing them to share a set of common beliefs. Such beliefs encompass
notions of right or wrong and shared commitments to collective values.
Tis is what religion is all about. Moreover, political leaders who wish to
establish a sense of loyalty to a new “state” concept, often manipulate reli-
gion as a unifying symbol. Tis symbol can defne in-groups and out-groups
within the state, between states, and between states and other actors in their
external environment (e.g., alliances and intergovernmental organizations
[IGOs]). 
Religion helps shape not only the state’s self-image but also its percep-
tion of its external environment. Religious similarity is presumed to foster
an initial cooperative atmosphere between states. To the extent that such
cooperation is not disrupted by other contentious issues, it reinforces shared
ideational convergence due to interaction-related efects. Clearly, there are
other determinants of the national identity of newly founded states. Tese
may also afect perceptions of afnity or suspicion between states. A shared
heritage of colonial domination may be one such factor. For example, shared
colonial experience was the major means of socialization for the newly inde-
pendent states in the post–World War II era. Te socialization process took
place on two levels, one reinforcing the other (Henderson 2015). On one
level, there was the homogenizing efect of the international relations of the
Cold War era, which Waltz (1979) largely describes. In this context, the for-
mer colonies in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and Oceania assumed the role
of recognized independent states with clearly demarcated borders and the
rights and responsibilities of sovereignty—although these were often vio-
lated by former colonial powers and the superpowers. Internationally, these
postcolonial regimes competed with other states and, to a large degree, imi-
tated practices that had proved successful in pursuing their political inter-
ests. Tese practices were evident with respect to the postcolonial states’
international diplomacy, trade relations, membership in international orga-
nizations, and compliance with international law, as well as their economic
development plans and pursuit of their national security. Most newly estab-
lished states typically situated themselves within the respective blocs of the
Cold War era. A few other new states pursued a “third way” through the
Non-Aligned Movement. But in each of these initiatives they were condi-
tioned and constrained by the homogenizing impact of the prevalent prac-
tices in that sphere of their international relations. 
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On another level, there was the homogenizing efect of the domestic
relations of many of these postcolonial states, circumscribed as they were by
the institutional apparatus established during the colonial era. For example,
many of the postcolonial states retained the repressive military apparatus
of the colonial state, which was more attuned to domestic repression than
foreign war. Most new states kept intact, or with only marginal reforms, the
colonial economy. Such economies focused less on internal industrial devel-
opment and more on the often brutal extraction of resources and exploita-
tion of labor. Tese economic policies maintained dependent relations in
international trade by orienting their domestic markets for export to ben-
eft the metropole and its domestic agents. In general, postcolonial states
had their initial foreign and domestic policies constrained by the processes
associated with European colonialism. As a result, their patterns of initial
interactions and their relationship with other postcolonial states converged
in several ways.8 
Ethnic kinship or a history of racial persecution may also afect percep-
tions of afnity or suspicion between states; however, such factors may often
play a less consistent role than shared religion because they ofer a set of
norms and behavioral directives that are fuid given the changing concep-
tions of ethnicity over time and the specious nature of race as a concept,
which makes it amenable to redefnitions as well. By contrast, religious afn-
ity implies shared beliefs in norms, institutions, and behavioral principles at
the individual and communal level that are more time invariant. 
Assumption 5 suggests that as the state matures and acquires experience
in dealing with other actors in its external environment, interaction-based
experience becomes increasingly important in defning both the self-image
of the state and its attitude toward other states. Tis implies that we should
expect a lowered impact of religious afnities on international interactions
over time, as opposed to a growing impact of interaction-based experience,
such as the efects of past cooperation and confict on both national identity
and on perception of the state’s environment. 
One result is that the more we focus on—and in our systematic analyses,
control for—the confict and cooperation histories of our cases, the less
impact religious factors should evince in the outcomes of interest. Tis is
not a “secularization” argument per se but a “socialization” one. It suggests
that the socialization process of international relations conditions state and
nonstate actors to draw from an array of political, economic, and social
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practices, institutions, and policies that do not strictly or predominantly
privilege religious identities and interests. 
Tere is another way to view the manner in which religious identity and
interaction-based identities shape behavior according to the constructivist
paradigm. According to the constructivist paradigm, identity afects per-
ceptions of afnity and those, in turn, afect the initial interactions among
states. Tis implies that initial interactions in dyads that have at least one
“young” member are likely to be shaped by religious afnities or diferences.
However, these initial interactions may establish a pattern, which, in turn,
shapes subsequent perceptions of identity such that religion may have an
indirect impact on confict and cooperation beyond the initial period of
interaction between states. 
Just like primordialism, constructivism views religion as an important
identity marker. Terefore, we can apply the matrix describing the condi-
tions under which religion afects domestic and foreign policies of states
here as well (Table 3.1). Religiously homogeneous states that lack a clear
separation between religion and politics (Type I states) are likely to defne
their identity in terms of religion (e.g., the Islamic Republic of Iran, or the
Islamic Republic of Saudi Arabia). Domestic conficts, especially ones with
religious undertones, are less likely in these states. Likewise Type I states are
likely to defne their attitudes toward other states in terms of religious simi-
larity or dissimilarity. Type II states are more likely to be politically stable
than Type III states, but their relations with other states are also likely to be
based on perceptions of religious similarity or dissimilarity. 
Religiously diverse societies without clear separation between political
and religious spheres (Type III states) are apt to be politically unstable.
Internal instability in such states is likely characterized by religious con-
ficts. Teir relations with other states are not as likely to be afected by
religious similarity or dissimilarity as Types I or II states. However, one key
issue that connects internal and external confict in Type III states is the
relationship between disadvantaged religious groups in these states and the
dominant religious groups in neighboring states. Afnities between states
whose dominant religious group shares an afnity with disadvantaged or
persecuted religious groups in a Type III state increase the risk of external
intervention in domestic conficts in Type III states or the risk of exter-
nal support for insurgent groups operating in Type III states (Gartzke and
Gleditsch 2006, San-Akca 2016). 
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Both Type II—but even more so Type IV—states are apt to display
the highest level of political stability domestically. Tese states are likely
to defne their identity in terms that are based on other shared values such
as democracy, free trade, globalization, and so forth. Tese factors play a
far more important role in the identifcation of partners for cooperation
or potential rivals in the international system than religious similarity or
dissimilarity. 
In short, the ideas of the constructivist paradigm are quite similar to 
those of the primordialist perspective. Te constructivist ideas provide, 
however, an important dynamism to the static primordialist perspective. 
Specifcally, the importance of religion is not fxed over time; rather, reli-
gious elements of identity interact with other—experience-based—factors. 
Tese latter factors act to shape and reshape perceptions of self and of the 
environment along with the more basic and static cultural factors. 
5. The Clash of Civilizations 
Huntington (1993, 24)  defnes a civilization in terms of both objective
elements such as “language, history, religion, customs, institutions,” and
subjective elements of self-identifcation. For Huntington (1996, 43),
a civilization is “the highest cultural grouping of people and the broad-
est level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes
humans from other species.” He maintains that a civilization “is a culture
writ large” (p.  41), and that it is “the biggest ‘we’ within which we feel
culturally at home as distinguished from all the other ‘thems’ out there”
(p. 43). Civilizations are quite diverse in composition and may “involve a
large number of people, such as Chinese civilization, or a very small number
of people such as the Anglophone Caribbean” (p. 43). Te “central defning
characteristic” of a civilization is its religion (p. 47); hence, “the major civili-
zations in human history have been closely identifed with the world’s great
religions” (p. 42). Tese civilizations include the Sinic, Japanese, Hindu,
Islamic, Orthodox, Western, Latin American, (apparently) Buddhist, and
“possibly African” civilizations (pp.  47–48). Since shared religion is the
single most important indicator of a civilization, Huntington maintains
that intercivilizational clashes are usually conficts “between peoples of dif-
ferent religions” (p. 253). Tat religious diference should be the fulcrum
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on which the CoC thesis rests stems from Huntington’s view that religion
is “possibly the most profound diference that can exist between people.”
Terefore, he contends that warfare between states of diferent civilizations
is “greatly enhanced by beliefs in diferent gods” (p. 254). 
Te argument of the CoC thesis is simple: the conficts of the last sev-
eral centuries—especially those that characterized world politics during
the Cold War era—are likely to be replaced by conficts between diferent
civilizations in the post–Cold War era. Huntington (1993, 25–28; 1996)
points out several reasons for this. First, civilizational divides are funda-
mental. Tey have always been there and are unlikely to disappear in the
future. Second, growing contact between civilizations deepens the divide
and increases mutual hostilities. Tis is in sharp contrast to liberal notions
that contact increases interdependence and peace. Tird, economic mod-
ernization reduces the state as a source of identity, and the vacuum left by
declining nationalism is replaced by religion. Fourth, the growing power of
the West leads to growing feelings of self-identifcation in terms of “roots”
among non-Westerners. Fifth, cultural diferences do not lend themselves
to compromise and peaceful resolutions as do economic or political difer-
ences. Te economic and political divides that characterized world politics
during the Cold War era enabled the major powers and their allies to peace-
fully coexist and even display some degree of cooperation despite difer-
ent ideologies. Tis is no longer the case in the post–Cold War era. Sixth,
growing economic regionalism creates growing intracivilizational integra-
tion on the one hand, and a higher level of regional—and thus cultural—
diferentiation, on the other. 
Inherent in the CoC thesis is that primordial currents were ever present
in world politics. However, they have been modifed and overshadowed by
the politics of nationalism, in general, and Cold War politics, in particular.
Now that nationalism is in decline and the Cold War is over, paradoxi-
cally, in this view, the economic dominance of the West is apt to invoke
resentment from other civilizations. Tis resentment cannot be mitigated
with politics of negotiation and compromise because the issues at stake are
indivisible. So the result is a confict among civilizations, but in particular,
the West against “the Rest.” 
While the general prediction of the CoC thesis is similar to that of the
constructivist paradigm, its logic is quite diferent. Constructivism views
identity in general and national identity as evolving with experience. One
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of the key factors that afect change in the social construction of national
identities—especially in relation to other states—is what Wendt (1999)
calls “international cultures.” An international culture consists of a set of
commonly accepted principles of international conduct. Such international
cultures may undergo long-term shifts as some norms arise and become
widespread and other norms decline or disappear. 
Wendt (2003), for example, claims that both micro- and macrolevel forces
drive the international system toward a world state. At the microlevel, the
drive of individuals and groups to recognize their “subjectivity,” that is, their
right to be diferent, leads to a process whereby individuals get to have their
rights protected beyond a single state boundary. At the macrolevel, there are
several forces that drive the system toward a unifying authority. Tese include
the logic of anarchy, accompanied by the growing destructiveness of war.
However, Wendt ofers a long-term prediction, claiming that this process will
take between 100 and 200 years. In contrast, for Huntington, cultural factors
are permanent. However, they surface when globalization spreads and global
hierarchies become increasingly steep. Te end result is that the world—from
the end of the Cold War and into the foreseeable future—is moving into a
period where civilizations engage in violent clashes. As intercivilizational con-
fict increases, by implication, intracivilizational cooperation increases. 
Tere are several issues with the CoC thesis. First, as noted above, it does
not rest on a set of propositions deduced from well-defned assumptions
about the world. It does not ofer a clear causal mechanism that explains
why there was no clash of civilization during the Cold War era or other
nationalist periods beyond his assertion that the superpower standof of
the former kept a lid on such clashes. Nor does it provide a logical causal
mechanism that explains why civilizations would clash rather than cooper-
ate for the mutual beneft of all. 
Second, Huntington assumes that civilizations are cohesive entities. In
practice, civilizations may be far more diverse than what would be expected
given his classifcation. Tis is particularly so when we take for granted his
claim that religion is a central defning feature of a civilization. Islam, for
example, is characterized by an often bitter animosity and mistrust between
its two major religious families: Sunnism and Shi’ism. Less conspicuous,
but no less severe, is the tension between these two religious families and
other Islamic families, such as the Yazidis, Alawites, and Sufs. Te wars
of the Reformation within Christendom were not less violent and intense
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than the wars during the Crusades between Christians and Muslims.
Huntington’s argument implicitly suggests that the sense of common threat
from other civilizations has a unifying power beyond the centrifugal forces
within civilizations. 
Tird, the CoC thesis has at best a hazy conditional claim about why
there is a high potential for confict between some civilizations (e.g.,
between the Western civilization and the Islamic or the Asian—i.e.,
Confucian or Japanese), but not between others. Tis claim is rooted in a
modifed balance-of-power argument resting on whether the civilization
has a core state to coordinate the activities of civilization members (e.g.,
the United States is the core state of the West) or does not (e.g., Islam
lacks a core state, which contributes to its proclivity to violence, accord-
ing to Huntington). Nor does it have a specifc explanation of what these
conficts will be about—will they be about resources, territory, ideas? 
Fourth, the CoC conception does not ofer a clear classifcation of civili-
zation. Te characterization of the interaction among several characteristics
that make up a “civilization” is vague and preoperational. Consequently,
Huntington’s classifcation of civilizations is quite idiosyncratic: it is a mix
of religious, racial, ethnic, geographic, and political-economic attributes of
societies. More importantly, Huntington wavers as to the role of religion
in defning a civilization, most of the time focusing on it as the key deter-
minant, and other times combining it with other factors. His classifcation
of civilizations is also based on religion in some cases and on racial and
geographical factors in others. 
Nevertheless, the CoC thesis ofers an interesting juxtaposition of cul-
tural and political factors. It provides a clear and somber prediction about
the structure of confict in a post–Cold War world. Terefore it deserves
serious treatment in any analysis of the relationship between religion and
world politics. 
6. Comparing the Different Perspectives 
At the core, these perspectives have a great deal in common. First, they view
religion as an independent—perhaps not unique but certainly important—
factor in driving domestic and foreign policies. Consequently, all of these
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perspectives suggest a powerful connection between religion and politics.
Second, at a general level, all of these perspectives have similar predic-
tions about how religion afects domestic and international confict and
international cooperation. For example, they all expect to see more politi-
cal tension in religiously diverse societies compared to homogeneous ones.
Likewise, they expect some tension between religiously divergent states
and some degree of amity between religiously similar states. Tird, these
perspectives are bottom-up approaches. Teir focus is on the process by
which individual and communal belief systems are converted into collective
actions of groups and of states. Consequently, the aggregate—systemic—
consequences of these processes are “emergent,” that is, a complex and often
unintended result of the convergence and divergence of beliefs and actions
of multiple actors. Tis contrasts rather sharply with “top-down” perspec-
tives of international relations, which emphasize the impact of external fac-
tors, principally the structure of the international system. Te exception is
the CoC thesis, which suggests an interaction between “bottom-up” forces,
that is, cultural factors that drive human action, and top-down forces, that
is, changes in the structure of the international system. 
Both the primordialist and the instrumentalist perspectives assign a great
deal of importance to the relations between religious and political institu-
tions. Both approaches suggest that it is the interaction between religious
diversity and the state-religion relations that produces the most marked
efect on political processes. Tis interaction creates the context in which
religion makes for a signifcant factor in a state’s policies. It distinguishes
between states whose domestic and foreign policies are strongly infuenced
by religion and those whose policies are infuenced by other factors: power,
prestige, political culture, and economics. By contrast, the constructivist
approach and the CoC thesis do not accord a great deal of importance to
the interaction between political and religious institutions; their key focus is
on the religious structure of societies. Te CoC thesis does not accord much
signifcance to the religious diversity/homogeneity of societies; its focus is
on broad defnitions of civilizational divides and the manner in which they
afect structural systemic processes. 
Tere are, however, some marked diferences in terms of when, how,
and under what conditions religious factors infuence political processes.
Tese diferences are due to the specifc causal mechanisms that drive
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these relations between religion and politics. Te primordialist perspec-
tive treats religion as an ever-present guide to individual and communal
behavior. Religion matters more or less depending on the structure of spe-
cifc communities—their level of religions cohesiveness or diversity and the
degree to which religion and politics are separated or intermeshed. Tese
variables are also important aspects of the instrumentalist perspective.
However, for instrumentalists, the interaction between religion’s cohesion
and religion/state relations provides the context within which leaders may
manipulate religious feelings for national or international goals. While pri-
mordialism treats the relations between political and religious institutions
as relatively fxed, the instrumentalist approach suggests that political elites
can manipulate state-religious ties to advance their goals, just as they can
invoke religious values if these serve their prospects of political survival. 
Both instrumentalism and constructivism suggest that the importance
of religious factors as motivating political forces may change over time. In
the former perspective, this variation is a function of elite priorities and
goals, and especially their perception of job security. In the latter perspec-
tive, it is a function of the experiential evolution of a given community: as
states mature, their national identity is increasingly shaped by their interac-
tive experiences with other states or nonstate actors rather than by social
and cultural factors. 
What are the key expectations of these approaches with respect to the
efect of religious factors on the domestic and foreign policies of states?
Table 3.2 summarizes the key propositions deduced from these perspectives
with respect to matters of international confict, international cooperation,
and internal political confict and quality of life. 
Some explanation of the contents of this table is in order. First, we
pointed out some general expectations about domestic and foreign policy
that are consistent with the logic of each of these perspectives. In some
cases, these expectations are rather explicit (e.g., the CoC argument about
intercivilizational confict in the post–Cold War era). In other cases, they
are implicit in the logic of the approach (e.g., the constructivist implica-
tion that cultural identity matters during the formative years of a state,
but interaction-based identity matters more during later periods). In either
case, the expectations listed in the table are logical consequences of the key
claims of these perspectives. Second, we are careful to point out when a
given perspective does not allow deduction of a clear answer to a question
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
   
 
95
Religion and World Politics 95 
concerning the relationship between religious factors and a specifc type of
behavior. 
Tird, and very important, we derive some implications from these
perspectives with respect to an issue that has not received sufcient atten-
tion in the literature on religion and politics:  the relationship between
religious factors and human security or quality of life in various states.
Tese expectations are also implicit in these perspectives. We elaborate
on each of these predictions in the relevant chapters. We now ofer some
of the key theoretical ideas that guide our analyses in the subsequent
chapters. 
7. An Integrative Theory of Religion and World Politics 
Our theory does not attempt to reinvent the wheel. It builds on these theo-
retical perspectives as well as on the vast literature on religion and politics.
What we attempt below is to integrate the key insights of the various per-
spectives, taking into account (a) the areas where their predictions overlap,
(b) the relative strengths and weaknesses of each of these perspectives, and
(c) areas that they do not cover explicitly. In the areas where the predictions
of one of these perspectives difer from those of the other perspectives, we
adjudicate and explain why we prefer one explanation to the others. Using
Table 3.2 as a general guide, we ofer an integrative theory of religion and
political behavior. 
Our theory rests on several key premises. First, there is a great deal of
variation in terms of the relationship between states and societies. Some
states are formed around homogeneous societal characteristics, encompass-
ing a cohesive set of ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups. Other states are
made up of patches of multiple ethnicities, religious groups, with people
communicating via a multitude of languages. Tis is what Miller (2007)
calls the state-to-nation balance. A  high state-to-nation balance indicates
a convergence of political sovereignty with social cohesion.9 An imbal-
ance exists when the political boundaries and institutions of a state do not
match the social characteristics of the population within it. Tis variation,
expressed not only—but quite often—in terms of religious homogeneity or
diversity, plays an important role in shaping the state’s domestic structure
and its international outlook. 
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Second, another source of variation in terms of domestic political struc-
ture and international outlook stems from the fact that we start our inves-
tigation at an admittedly important—but from a historical point of view
quite arbitrary—time point:  the end of World War II. At that particular
time point, only a quarter of the contemporary international system con-
sisted of sovereign and independent states (accounting for only two-thirds
of the world’s population). Most of these states had a fairly long political
tradition, as well as substantial experience in international interactions—
both cooperative and confictual. However, over 140 new states formed
since 1945. Most of these states emerged in territories that had been under
colonial rule for many decades or centuries. As several authors (e.g., Maoz
1996, Robinson 2014, Henderson 2015) pointed out, these newly formed
states’ boundaries were charted out by representatives of colonial powers
drawing lines on maps without regard to any ethnic, religious, linguistic,
or communal ties between the people on both sides of the lines or within
them. Te lack of a tradition of political independence and the absence of a
meaningful international experience of these newly established states com-
pounded the typically diverse composition of their societies. Tese charac-
teristics account for some fundamental diferences between these new states
and the pre-1945 states. 
Our theory builds on the combined notions of religion as an identity 
marker and of religion as a political instrument. We also rely heavily on the 
political survival theory. In particular, we build on the idea that political 
leaders’ main goal is to ensure their political survival. Accordingly, they are 
constantly engaged in fguring out how to build (if they are out of power) 
or sustain (if they are incumbents) a winning coalition. Tey design their 
domestic and foreign policies in a manner that would make an actual or 
potential winning coalition happy and thus supportive of their tenure. 
Consequently, our theory combines the structural features of societies 
as a fundamental reality with the political preferences and strategies of lead-
ers and of potential contenders to power. We also focus on the institutional 
structure of states—in particular on the relationship between political and 
religious institutions. In that sense, we adopt the categorization of the 
social and institutional structure of societies, presented in Table 3.1 above. 
We do not diminish the role of religious actors, emphasized by such
authors as Philpott (2007); Toft, Philpott, and Shah (2011); and Fox and
Sandler (2004). However, we believe that the power of religious actors
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shifts from a spiritual to a political level when they are either employed
by the state (as in most cases concerning foreign policy) or when they
confront the state (which then becomes a key aspect of domestic poli-
tics). Tis shifts the center of attention to the manner in which political
leaders can or are willing to use religious ideas, values, institutions, and
principles. 
Our theory separates the manner in which religious factors operate
in foreign policy-related matters compared to the way in which religious
factors afect domestic politics. Te foreign policy of states is almost
exclusively under the control of political leaders and the foreign policy
and security establishments. Following the political survival theory, we
argue that the selection of diplomatic, economic, or military instruments
serves to provide public or private goods to the leaders’ winning coali-
tion. Accordingly, the manipulation of religious symbols, institutions,
and rhetoric in order to mobilize resources for certain policies is also an
instrument that the leadership can use if and when conditions are right.
By contrast, domestic politics refect a constant competition between the
leader and her coalition against some counterelite (or several countere-
lites) that seeks to replace them. In that context, the use of religion may
also be part of that competitive struggle. Te leader may be able to use
religion in some contexts, but the opposition may also be able to use reli-
gion to advance its claims. 
Our theory focuses both on fairly stable characteristics of states and
societies, on the international environment in which states operate, and
on more dynamic factors that afect the propensity to apply religion to for-
eign and domestic afairs. In particular, we emphasize several key variables:
(a) social structure—defned in terms of religious homogeneity or diversity;
(b) institutional structure—defned in terms of the relations between politi-
cal and religious institutions; (c) the structure of the state’s relevant external
environment—defned in terms of the degree of similarity between the reli-
gious composition of the state’s society and that of its politically relevant
international environment. Tese three variables are fairly structural and
stable. Tey tend to exhibit limited change for a given state over time. By
contrast, the fourth variable provides a more dynamic dimension to our
theory. It is (d) the circumstantial incentives to use religion—defned primar-
ily in terms of the degree of political stability of a given state. We discuss
each of these variables in turn. 
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7.1 Social Structure 
Political leaders come to power in a society whose social, religious, eth-
nic, racial and linguistic characteristics are established. Some leaders can
attempt to fundamentally change some aspects of this structure. For
example, they remove existing legal and institutional barriers limiting
integration among social or religious groups, or impose new barriers on
cross-community ties.10 But many, if not most, leaders operate within
the constraints imposed on them by that structure, because fundamental
changes of this structure are either too difcult or too risky. At the same
time, most political actors, as well as religious or spiritual leaders, work
within the political order of the day. In many cases, they cooperate with
the political and legal system enacted by political institutions. Here too,
there are notable exceptions, whereby political actors become actively
involved in political change. Our theory does not—at least not directly—
attempt to account for the attempt of political leaders or religious actors
to change existing social structures or the relationship between religious
institutions and political ones. Tis is a topic better left to other studies.
We are interested in the ways political leaders (and in the case of civil
confict—political opposition) use religion as a political instrument. 
Two principal factors collectively determine the constraints on, or
opportunities aforded to, political leaders’ manipulation of religion in
foreign afairs. First, we consider social structure in terms of the degree
of religious homogeneity in a state. Clearly, there are quite a few other
characteristics of social structure, for example, economic classes, racial and
non-religious ethnic divisions, or ideological diferences among individuals
and groups. We attempt to control for those factors in the coming analyses.
Our focus here, however, is on the religious structure of the society in terms
of religious homogeneity or diversity. 
Second, we examine, to the extent that our data permit, the structure of
institutional and legal relations between politics and religion. Te complex-
ity of this relationship may well surpass the manner in which we operation-
alize state-religious relations. For example, we do not have a direct way to
measure or estimate the degree of religiosity in society. Yet we do need to
examine how the degree to which people take religion seriously—in both
day-to-day matters and high-level political interactions among states—
afects the outcomes of interest in our study. Terefore, we do not proxy
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religiosity directly; rather, we capture its obverse: the proportion of secu-
larists in the society, which is measured as the percentage of people in the
society who do not claim to practice any religion (or who are proclaimed
atheists or agnostics). Tis is clearly not an ideal measure of secularism (as
the opposite of religiosity), but this is the limit of what our data permit if we
wish to examine long-term efects of religious factors on politics.11 
In our view, secularism—as a contrast to “religiosity”—is part of the
religious homogeneity/diversity of a society. We consider nonbelievers—
atheists, agnostics, and general nonbelievers—to be part and parcel of the
religious structure of a society. In many ways, these groups are not diferent
from religious groups insofar as they often fght for or support certain val-
ues, practices, and norms—religious freedom, separation between religion
and politics, economics, education, and social activities. Just as one reli-
gious group distinguishes itself from other religious groups by virtue of its
unique characteristics, non-religious groups may have similar institutional,
legal, and political characteristics. 
Tese assumptions set the stage for the key ideas of our integrative
theory of religion and politics. We start with a discussion of how reli-
gious factors may operate in foreign policy. Political leaders who con-
template mobilizing support for external confict using religious symbols
and values face two types of constraints:  the social structure and the
relationship between political and religious institutions. When a soci-
ety is religiously diverse, it is much more difcult to use religion as a
mobilization strategy than when society is religiously homogeneous. In
a religiously diverse society it is especially dangerous to use religion as a
mobilization strategy when some segments of the society are religiously
similar to actual or potential enemies. Likewise, mobilizing support for
cooperative ventures via religious commitments in a diverse society can
backfre for the same reasons. By contrast, when a society is religiously
homogeneous and when enemies are religiously dissimilar, political lead-
ers feel more comfortable invoking the protection or acquisition of holy
sites (in territorial disputes), treatment of religious minorities (in policy
or regime-related disputes), or general ideas of fghting against infdels.
In the same vein, costly cooperation with religiously similar states against
potentially dissimilar common enemies becomes a more expedient and
acceptable policy when a society is religiously homogeneous. 
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On the other hand, cooperative ventures that rely on more rational
calculations and involve win-win beneft structures, such as international
trade, are not as easily justifed on religious grounds. Terefore, it is less
likely that political elites would use religious ideas to justify trade agree-
ments or more general trade policies. Tis is so even when certain reli-
gious principles impose constraints on the kind of deals (e.g., interest-based
loans in Islam) or encourage them (e.g., “prosperity Gospel” among some
Christians). 
We expect that the religious structure of a society afects internal con-
fict in similar ways to those in which religious structure afects external
confict and/or cooperation. In religiously homogeneous societies, lead-
ers may be reluctant to use religious mobilization strategies, especially if
those are aimed at confronting a religiously similar opposition. Under
such conditions, religious leaders may actually join the opposition, mak-
ing it more difcult to eliminate or mollify it. By contrast, in religiously
diverse societies, the use of religious mobilization by elites tends to be
an expedient strategy. Opposition groups are likely to have a diferent
religious afliation than those of political elites. Tis may happen when
opposition groups constitute the majority of the society and the political
elites are afliated with a minority religious group. Syria is a good exam-
ple of this structure, with the Alawites, who constitute about 17 percent
to 20 percent of the Syrian population, controlling the government and
military, and fghting a primarily Sunni opposition. It may also happen
when the political elite is afliated with a religious group that constitutes
a majority of the population, and the opposition group is a minority.
Tis is the case, for example, in Israel where the Jewish majority controls
the government and is in overt or covert confict with both the Israeli–
Palestinian citizens within Israel and with the Palestinian noncitizens in
the occupied territories. 
Terefore, we summarize our expectations about the efect of a reli-
gious social structure on foreign and domestic politics by the following
propositions. 
1. Te religious homogeneity of a state increases the incentives and
ability of political leaders to manipulate religious values and sym-
bols as a mobilization strategy for 
a. confictual ventures against religiously dissimilar enemies, 
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b. costly cooperative ventures such as security alliances with reli-
giously similar states, and 
c. cultural cooperation with religiously similar states. 
However, we do not expect the degree of religious homogeneity of a society
to afect win-win cooperative ventures such as international trade or trade
agreements. 
In domestic politics, religious homogeneity is expected to have a posi-
tive efect on political stability. Internal conficts, to the extent they occur,
typically will be related to issues that are not immediately related to reli-
gion. However, 
2. Te religious diversity of a state increases 
a. the frequency, severity, and duration of internal conficts, and 
b. the likelihood of political elites using a religious mobilization
strategy. 
7.2 Relations between Political and Religious Institutions 
We now turn to a discussion of the second constraint that afects the use
of religious factors as a political instrument by political elites. Before going
into the analysis of this issue, we need to consider an important litera-
ture on religious freedom and religious repression that highlights the inter-
play between religious and political actors. We have already discussed the
work of Gill in the context of economic theories of religion. However, the
work of scholars like Gill (2007, 2013), Sarkissian (2015), and Grim and
Finke (2011) ofer important insights into the conditions under which
political leaders use various techniques—some of them oppressive, others
more cooperative—to deal with religious groups and religious actors. Tis
research ofers a window into the complex relations between political and
religious actors. While Phillpot (2007) and Toft, Philpott, and Shah (2011)
take this relationship to be exogenous to accounts of religious activity and
political stability, Gill, Sarkissian, and Grim and Finke examine this vari-
able as endogenous, and as a function of the calculations of both political
elites and of religious actors. 
Religious groups and organizations can be both potent allies and pow-
erful enemies of political elites. Religious groups ofer an organizational 
setting for large communities. Te beliefs and values they nurture and 
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disseminate may help overcome the collective action problem, that is, the 
reluctance of individuals to participate in risky behavior. Because of that, 
leaders may view some or all religious groups as potential allies under some 
circumstances, and as potential enemies—threatening their job security—
under diferent circumstances. Sarkissian (2015) suggests the degree of 
religious repression in authoritarian states is a function of political com-
petitiveness and the number of religious groups. He provides both quan-
titative evidence and a number of in-depth case studies to support this 
argument. 
When the society is religiously diverse, the incentive of the regime to 
align with any single group declines, because it opens itself to criticism 
and opposition from other religious groups. When there exists a domi-
nant religious group, the regime may form an alliance with this group, or 
directly emanate from this group (e.g., states like Iran or Saudi Arabia). 
Alternatively, it may engage in oppressive behavior against religious groups 
(e.g., Syria before the civil war of 2011; Myanmar versus the Rohinyga). 
If no dominant religious group exists, political elites do not, for the most 
part, see any single group either as an ominous threat or as a sole ally. 
Given any type of social structure, political leaders need to consider the
formal or informal constraints imposed on the use of religious values for
political purposes by the structure of political-religious institutions. In a
society that has formal restrictions on the relations between religion and
politics, a strategy relying on religious symbols may cause more problems
than it can resolve. It may mobilize groups that support this separation
against the regime, and it may risk an existing balance that relies on this
separation, especially in a religiously diverse society. Terefore, our general
expectation is that, in foreign afairs, political elites of states that have a
formal mechanism separating religious from political afairs would be less
prone to use religious mobilization strategies than elites in states practic-
ing a close formal relation between religious and political institutions. Tis
seems to be most pervasive in the confict behavior of states, and less perva-
sive in economic interactions. 
By contrast, we do not expect to fnd any meaningful efect of state-
religion relations on civil confict. Te relationship between political and 
religious institutions may serve both as an impetus of civil confict and a 
check on political violence. Political, social, and religious groups may be 
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on both sides of the fence in terms of their attitudes toward an existing 
formal or informal structure of the state-religion relations. Tis may be 
the case regardless of whether the state exercises freedom of religion and 
separation of religion from politics, or whether there is an institutional-
ized alliance between political and religious institutions. In the frst case, 
groups and organizations that wish to impose religious restrictions and 
laws on political, social, and economic afairs would oppose the existing 
institutional freedom and separation between religious and political afairs. 
Tis may serve as a motivation for opposing the regime. Likewise, groups 
and communities that support such an arrangement would then support 
the regime’s position on these matters. Freedom of religion and separa-
tion between religious and political afairs may also be a cause of political 
stability. Such an arrangement allows religious groups to operate freely in 
communal, educational, or social afairs, hence pacifying them. Such an 
arrangement may also please non-religious communities. So if civil con-
fict breaks out in such societies, it is more likely due to factors other than 
the institutionalized arrangements between politics and religion. 
Te same applies to states that practice an institutionalized alliance
between religious and political afairs, embedded in legal and political
structures. In such a case, the institutionalized state-religion alliance may
favor a particular religion and discriminate against other religions. Even if
such an alliance allows for religious freedom, this may still invoke opposi-
tion from groups that support separation of religion and state. By contrast,
in societies where this institutionalized state-religion alliance pleases the
dominant religious group, and allows some freedom of religious practice
to other religious groups, such a reality may pacify an otherwise militant
religious elite. Te following propositions emerge 
3. Political elites in states that practice a formal separation of reli-
gious from political afairs 
a. are less likely to use religious factors to mobilize support for
international confict involvement, especially against religiously
dissimilar enemies; 
b. are less likely to use religious factors to mobilize support for
costly cooperative ventures (e.g., security alliance), especially in
support of religiously dissimilar states; and 
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c. are no more or less likely to use religious mobilization strategies
in international economic afairs than states in which religious
and political afairs are closely aligned. 
4. State-religious relations do not have a meaningful efect on the
outbreak, intensity, or duration of civil confict. 
7.3 The Effect of the International Environment 
Te social, political, and economic environment of states is composed of
state and nonstate actors whose structure and behavior often afect these
nations’ external and internal afairs. Te ability of political elites to mobi-
lize support for their policies by using religious symbols and values can
be efective under some conditions and counterproductive under difer-
ent ones. We now include in these contingencies questions concerning the
external targets of such manipulations. 
When we focus on mobilization strategies used by political elites to sup-
port actions in foreign afairs, we need to ask about the targets of these
actions. We discuss frst the general structure of the state’s environment,
and then focus on particular targets of foreign policy behavior. First, and
most important, we need to understand what constitutes a “politically rele-
vant international environment.” Tis concept was frst developed by Maoz
and Russett (1992, 1993). It was elaborated by Maoz (1996, 2010) and
applied repeatedly, primarily in studies of confict behavior (Lemke and
Reed 2001, Bennett and Stam 2004, Benson 2005, Quackenbush 2006,
Goertz 2006). Conceptually, the politically relevant international environ-
ment of a state (PRIE, Maoz 1996, 136–42) is defned as “the set of politi-
cal units (state and nonstate units) whose structure, behavior, and policies
have a direct impact on the focal state’s political and strategic calculus. Tis
is the environment upon which decision makers, intelligence agencies, the
media and the public focus their attention on an almost daily basis. Tese
units are deemed to deserve persistent and systematic attention . . . because
developments in these units are perceived to have direct, immediate, and
profound impact on one’s own state” (Maoz 1996, 138). Operationally, the
PRIE of a given state consists of 
(i) states that are directly or indirectly (through colonial posses-
sions) contiguous to the focal state; 
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(ii) regional powers with regional reach capacity, that is, a capacity
of projecting force within the focal state’s region; and 
(iii) global powers with global reach capacity, that is, a capacity
of force projection anywhere around the globe (Maoz 1  6,
138–3 ).12 
In our context, we focus on the religious characteristics of a state’s PRIE—
in particular, on the degree of similarity between the focal state and mem-
bers of its PRIE. When a state’s PRIE is composed of primarily religiously
similar states, the ability of political elites to mobilize support against mem-
bers of its PRIE is limited. If political leaders of a state contemplate confict
against a religiously similar member of their PRIE, they need to mobilize
support via other mechanisms. For example, when Iraq became a target of
members of the Arab League after its invasion of Kuwait in 1990, political
elites in Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states faced public opposi-
tion when it came to joining the US- led coalition. Tey had to justify their
involvement in the anti-Iraq coalition by invoking political norms (Arab
League charter, universal nonaggression norms, etc.) rather than religious
diferences. Likewise, Saddam Hussein tried to incite resistance in the Arab
world not as a struggle of Islam versus the infdels but rather as a struggle
of Arab nationalism against neoimperialist ambitions (Freedman and Karsh
1995, Karsh and Rautsi 2007). 
By contrast, a state situated in a religiously dissimilar environment can 
use religious factors as a powerful tool of social mobilization. Political elites 
can portray this environment as a constant security threat simply because 
of the religious diferences between the state and its environment. Tey 
can thus justify investment of human and material resources in either reac-
tive (defensive) measures or in proactive (ofensive) initiatives. Moreover, a 
religiously dissimilar environment may constitute a real security threat that 
justifes mobilization of resources, because members of such an environ-
ment may view the focal state as a threat or a potential target, regardless of 
the actual intentions of the focal state. Tis adds a religious dimension to 
the security dilemma (Jervis 1978) under international anarchy. 
Tis heightened security dilemma may push states toward security
cooperation despite the risks associated with such cooperation (Maoz
2000, 2002; Morrow 2000). Te choice of allies depends on an assess-
ment of their reliability. A potential ally’s reliability depends on the answer
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to two questions: (1) what are the chances that my ally will support me
if I get into confict with a third party? and (2) what are the chances that
my ally will entrap me in wars that are not in my interest (Snyder 1991)?
We suggest that the assessment of credibility may depend on the absence
or presence of shared values and beliefs, as well as on shared interests (i.e.,
common enemies, Gowa 1995, Maoz et al. 2007, Maoz 2010). 
Tese ideas translate into the selection of specifc targets (or expected tar-
gets) of confict and of specifc candidates for security cooperation. If the
political leaders of a given state view another state as a potential and/or actual
enemy, the ability to use a religion-based strategy to mobilize domestic sup-
port for confict against that enemy depends on the degree of religious simi-
larity between the focal state and that enemy. By contrast, when a would-be
ally is religiously similar to the focal state, political leaders can comfortably
use common religious values as an indicator of mutual interests or reliability. 
Te religious structure of the focal state’s PRIE also has an important
efect on its level of internal confict. When actual or potential opposi-
tion groups expect external support from members of the state’s PRIE,
they are more likely to resort to active opposition—using both violent
and nonviolent strategies—against the incumbent government (San-Akca
2016; Jackson, San-Akca, and Maoz 2020). By contrast, if actual or poten-
tial resistance groups expect that the government will receive signifcant
support from members of its PRIE, they are less likely to resort to active
resistance strategies, even if they have signifcant grievances against their
government. Te incentives of opposition groups to rebel increase when
their religious identity is similar to most members of the state’s PRIE and
when the religious identity of the government and its winning coalition is
diferent from that of PRIE members. 
Tis leads us to the following propositions regarding the efect of the reli-
gious structure of a state’s environment on its foreign and domestic policies 
6. Te greater the religious similarity between the focal state and
its PRIE, 
a. the less likely are political elites to mobilize support for confict
by invoking religious aspects of the state’s identity, and 
b. the more likely are political elites to use religious factors as a
mobilization strategy for security cooperation with religiously
similar states. 
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7. Te greater the religious similarity between actual or potential
opposition groups and the states composing the focal state’s PRIE, 
a. the more likely is civil confict to break out; 
b. the more intensely violent are such civil conficts; 
c. the higher the likelihood of external intervention in internal 
conficts. 
7.4 The Dynamics of Religious Infuences on Foreign and Domestic Policy 
Social structure, state-religion relations, and the religious structure of the
state’s international environment are relatively stable factors:  they change
very slowly over time. However, our theory emphasizes the idea that reli-
gion is an instrument of political control and is subject to manipulation
by political and religious elites. In the previous sections, we focused on
the structural conditions that make religion a more or less efective politi-
cal weapon. Yet, religious factors are not always used as a political weapon
even in homogeneous societies where there is a close collaboration between
religious and political elites. And even in societies where there is a constitu-
tional separation between religion and politics, some political leaders may
fnd it expedient to invoke religious values to justify some foreign adven-
ture or to advance a certain domestic policy. Te key question, therefore, is
when and under what circumstances political elites are more likely to use
religion to advance their agendas? 
We argue that the answer lies in the perception of job security by political
elites. When political leaders feel secure in their job, their general tendency
to use religious rhetoric and values to mobilize support is not particularly
high. Tey can justify their policies and actions by rational concepts such as
the expected utilities—due to the relative costs and benefts—associated with
such policies. If they seek to acquire (or retain) territory by means of violent
confict with other countries, they can mobilize support by pointing out the
intrinsic values of such territories (natural resources, strategic defense needs,
etc.). Tey do not feel the need to invoke the religious beliefs of the enemies
controlling or attempting to grab such territories. If the confict of interests
is over policies, leaders can obtain domestic support by pointing out the ben-
efts associated with their country’s policies and the risks associated with their
opponent’s policies. Te same applies to cooperative international ventures.
Forming an alliance with another state could be justifed by explaining the
relative benefts and risks associated with such an alliance in terms of strategic
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values. Te religious identity of the would-be ally does not need to become a
prime criterion in assessing the value of such an alliance. 
Domestically, “safe” leaders do not need to invoke religion to pit one
group against others; they can rely on either legitimate support or on
oppressive power to secure their political survival. In this context, too, lead-
ers can mobilize support for their policies by pointing out the utilities asso-
ciated with such policies for the winning coalition. 
Religious ideas and symbols become a political weapon when the lead-
ership is at risk. In such cases, the tendency to use diversionary tactics in
foreign afairs increases. Enemy selection becomes more based on the politi-
cal value of a confict in terms of a leader’s survival, and less on the strategic
benefts or costs associated with such conficts. Te enemy must be of a type
that it invokes support to a degree that it diverts the opposition’s attention
from their domestic predicament to the foreign enemy. Religious diferences
become expedient political weapons in diversionary campaigns. 
Likewise, in domestic politics, leaders at risk need to boost their winning
coalition, prevent defections, or mobilize more supporters (or more “quality”
supporters—that is, supporters with capacity to oppress the opposition) to
secure their political survival. In such cases, rational defense of one’s policies
may not be seen as efective. Calls based on religious afnities or on religiously
based animosities against domestic enemies may be seen as more efective.
Te framing of the struggle as one between religious groups enables the leader
to use oppressive measures against the opposition. Tis, of course, is difcult
if the opposition groups practice the same religion as the leader’s coalition.
However, in diverse societies, whether the leader represents the majority reli-
gious group or a minority one, framing this as an ideational struggle between
religious groups may be perceived as an efective mobilization strategy. 
Te dynamic aspects of our theory of religion and politics suggest the
following propositions: 
8. Te higher the actual or potential risk to political leaders’ tenure
of power, the more likely they are 
a. to initiate interstate confict against religiously dissimilar
states and 
b. to use religious values, symbols, and institutions to oppress
political opposition. 
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All these propositions are quite general. We ofer more precise discussions
of each of the relevant domains that these propositions address in the spe-
cifc chapters dealing with international confict, international cooperation,
domestic confict, and quality of life. 
Te following fgure provides a graphic representation of our integrative
theory of religion and world politics. 
It is instructive to represent our ideas in a dyadic context. Tese can be
easily generalized into a more complex relationship between a focal state
and its international environment. Consider two states. Each has a charac-
teristic social structure. Tis structure may be defned by many attributes,
but for our purposes, we focus on two variables—the degree of religious
homogeneity or diversity of the society, and the nature of relations between
religious and political institutions. We argue that in societies that are reli-
giously homogeneous and in which there is a closely cooperative relation-
ship between religious and political institutions, religious factors can be
more readily mobilized to advance political goals. However, the conditions
under which, and against or in support of which religion is used as a mobi-
lization strategy depends on the degree of political stability. When political
leaders feel that their tenure is guaranteed, they are less inclined to use
religion as an instrument of national mobilization than when they feel that
their job is at risk. Taken together, these structural and situational condi-
tions defne when and how religion may be used to advance national (or
personal political) goals. 
Religious 
Homogeneity 
Leadership 
Job Security 
Religious 
Similarity 
Religious 
Mobilization 
+ + 
– 
– 
– 
+ + 
+ 
Religion-State 
Relations 
Religious 
Homogeneity 
Leadership 
Job Security 
Religious 
Mobilization 
Religion-State 
Relations 
State A State B 
Con˜ict Cooperation 
Fig. 3.1. The integrative theory of religion and world politics 
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Yet, the internal attributes of states are not sufcient to explain interna-
tional interactions. We need to account for the ways in which states select
targets for cooperative or confictual interactions. What defnes which state/s
are selected for certain behaviors is the degree of similarity or dissimilarity
between state A and state B. When the two states are similar, leaders in
one state may fnd it difcult to mobilize support on religious grounds for
confictual policies against the other state. We can expect, however, that
religion would be invoked in support of costly cooperative ventures, such
as alliances against common enemies. 
Internally, we expect that leaders at risk would invoke religious ideas
to oppress potential foes in states that are relatively homogeneous, in
which a dominant religious group exists that is also privileged economi-
cally and politically. In such societies, religion would be more likely to
emerge as a mobilizing weapon against religious minorities to the extent
that religious institutions and political institutions are closely aligned,
but otherwise religion would not serve as a basis to address dissent in
religiously homogeneous societies in which religious and political institu-
tions are imbricated. 
Te integrative nature of our theory is therefore evident in this struc-
ture:  it builds on both the primordialist perspective by emphasizing
structural factors as underlying conditions that determine confict and
cooperation. It also builds on the instrumentalist perspective by using its
ideas to defne the conditions under which political leaders may invoke
religious factors to mobilize support for foreign adventures. 
Finally, this perspective ofers a novel aspect that focuses on the structure
of religious connections—defned by the degree of religious similarity—
between and among states. Tis aspect explains target selection for both
cooperative and confictual ventures. It also suggests targets and conditions
for domestic political confict and cooperation. 
8. Conclusion 
In this chapter we explored several central perspectives that inform our
theory of religion and world politics:  primordialism, instrumentalism,
constructivism, and the CoC thesis. Each of these perspectives has some
compelling arguments about the types of linkages between religion and
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politics, and about the conditions under which religion becomes an impor-
tant factor in shaping the foreign and domestic politics of states. Each of
these perspectives also has some notable weaknesses that limit our ability
to assess them empirically. Tey contain some ambiguous and incomplete
testable propositions. Tese are not the only theories concerning religion
and politics. However, in many ways, they encapsulate much of the knowl-
edge we have on these matters. Taken together, these perspectives form the
basic foundation of our theory, which builds on their logical and empirical
strengths and attempts to overcome the weaknesses of each. 
In brief, our theory suggests that to understand how, why, and when reli-
gious factors afect foreign and domestic politics, we must consider a com-
bination of variables. Tese variables include structural constraints: social
structure, relations between political and religious institutions, and the
structure of the focal state’s politically relevant international environment.
Tey also include more dynamic political conditions: changes in the level
of perceived job security of political leaders. Te latter variables determine,
given these structural constraints, when and how religion can and is manip-
ulated by political elites. 
Unlike other theories of religion and politics (e.g., Philpott 2007; Toft,
Philpott, and Shah 2011), we do not accord a signifcant role to religious
actors. Tis is not to suggest that such actors are unimportant. Rather, we
believe that the role of such actors is captured in the structural constraints
that afect the willingness and ability of political leaders to manipulate reli-
gious identity markers to advance their goals. Moreover, we believe that
religious actors—spiritual leaders, religious institutions, informal religious
communities and organizations—may be both a source of legitimacy to
political leaders and a source of opposition. Te theories that emphasize
the role of religious actors in shaping political processes are extremely vague
about when, where, why, and how these actors operate in concert with or
opposition to non-religious political elites. It is difcult to derive generaliz-
able and testable propositions from these theories with respect to the issues
under study. We can learn, of course, about the type of role that religious
actors take if we study individual cases of confict or cooperation. Tis is
a legitimate approach; however, it is not the one we follow in the com-
ing pages. Our goal is to generate generalizable and reproducible knowl-
edge about these issues. For that, we need a theory that provides testable
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propositions about the relationship(s) between religion and politics across
substantive domains of international and domestic interactions. Tis is
what our theory attempts to do. 
In the following chapters, we subject the key ideas of our theory, as well
as those of the various perspectives discussed in this chapter, to a set of
rigorous empirical tests. In the last chapter we evaluate the theory and its
components in light of these empirical results. 
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Chapter 4 
The Religious Landscape of the World, 
1945–20101 
1. Introduction 
Tis chapter ofers a systematic overview of the World Religion Project
(WRP) that provides the informational baseline for the empirical study of
religion and world politics. We discuss the underlying logic of coding data
on religious adherence over a long period of time and across the globe.
We explain how data were generated, the kind of problems we confronted
in generating the dataset, and the solutions we devised. Finally, we ofer
a systematic description of religious adherence in the post–World War II
era on a global scale. Te purpose of a review of the WRP is to provide a
transparent and replicable report on the dataset that we use for analyzing
the role of religion in world politics. Tis will provide information about
the advantages and shortcomings of our approach. 
2. Measuring Religion: The General Logic of the World
Religions Project 
In this section, we provide a brief discussion of the general rationale of the
WRP, and some details about the data collection and management process.
A more detailed methodological exposition may be found in the appendix
at the end of the chapter. 
Te empirical study of religion and various aspects of world politics
has been based on a number of datasets that examine religion in specifc
115 
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domestic political contexts (e.g., Putnam and Campbell 2012) or in inter-
national contexts (Vanhanen 1999a b; Pearce 2005; Fox 2016). Other
datasets ofer a cross-national and longitudinal perspective on the distribu-
tion of religious adherents across time and space. Tese datasets formed the
basis for many of the empirical studies discussed previously. Te Correlates
of War (COW) cultural dataset (Singer 1997) includes decennial obser-
vations on religious groups for states, but the observations end at 1990.
Te criteria for classifying and diferentiating among major religions, reli-
gious families, and religious denominations are not clear in these datasets.
Ellingsen (2000) provides annual estimates of the religious characteristics
of states based on averaging values from three sources (i.e., Te CIA World
Factbook, Britannica Book of the Year, and the Demographic Yearbook) and
interpolating missing years. Tese data go to 2000; they identify the larg-
est and the second-largest religious groups in the country; and they have a
straightforward list of nine major religions (Animism, Atheism, Buddhism,
Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, Christianity, Shintoism, and Syncretism). 
Te WRP provides data at fve-year intervals from 1945 to 2010 on the
religious adherents of states coded for fourteen major religions, and also
data on religious families within some of the major religions. It draws from
multiple sources and also provides novel measures of the religious charac-
teristics of states in terms of religious diversity and religious similarity. Te
WRP builds on existing datasets but improves on them in several impor-
tant ways. We document these below. As such, it opens new and expanded
opportunities for the study of the role of religion in world politics. 
One of the distinguishing characteristics of the WRP is that our 
approach to the process of data collection was deductive in nature. Before 
collecting data on world religions, we had to come up with satisfactory 
answers to basic questions about the nature of religion and the classifca-
tion of world religions. Tese answers were crucial in developing a “religion 
tree,” that is, a systematic classifcation of major world religions and of 
religious families within each of these major religions. Tis, as we quickly 
noticed, was in stark contrast to the common practice in the scholarly 
disciplines that deal with these matters. Tese generally lack an explicit 
set of principles for deciding what constitutes a religion or for classifying 
religions and religious families. 
Te frst step was to develop a defnition of religion that is both consis-
tent across disciplines and also is most relevant to the process of generating a
world religions dataset. Te defnition of religion has been a focus of intense
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debate not only among theologians and religious studies scholars but also
among sociologists, anthropologists, and philosophers. We had no preten-
sion of developing yet another defnition. Consequently, we conducted a
comprehensive literature review designed to answer several questions that
were essential to our enterprise. 
1. What is a religion? 
2. Can we fnd observable or tangible indicators that facilitate the
systematic identifcation of religions? 
3. Are there tangible indicators that allow us to distinguish among
diferent religions, and among religious families/denominations
within a given religion? 
4. How can we validate our criteria for a religion and/or religious
families within a given religion? 
Without going into too much detail, our literature review covered multiple
felds of scholarship that focus on the study of religion such as history, reli-
gious studies, anthropology, sociology, law, political science, and philoso-
phy as well as specifc regional studies.2 Te upshot of this review was that
we could not fnd a consensus on any of the issues listed above. Te defni-
tion of religion we adopted (Alston, 1967, 142) was one whose elements
appeared most often in other defnitions of religion, and which ofered the
clearest indications of tangible elements of religions.3 Tis defnition states
that a religion is a belief system held by an individual or a group that contains
the following elements: 
• belief in supernatural being/s (god/s) 
• a distinction between sacred and profane objects 
• ritual acts focused on sacred objects 
• a moral code believed to be sanctioned by the supernatural being/s
(god/s) 
• characteristically religious feelings (awe, sense of mystery, sense of
guilt, obligation, duty, adoration), which tend to be aroused in the
presence of sacred objects and during the practice of rituals, and
which are connected in idea with the gods 
• prayer and other forms of communication with gods 
• a worldview or a general picture of the world as a whole and
the place of the individual therein; this picture contains some
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specifcation of an overall purpose or point of the world and an
indication of how the individual fts into it 
• a more or less total organization of one’s life based on the worldview 
• a social group bound together by the above 
Clearly, this is a very general, but also quite vague, defnition of religion.
Other defnitions are equally focused on beliefs, moral codes, and rituals.
Empirically, one of the most important and commonly mentioned criteria
for the classifcation of religions and religious families or denominations is
self-identifcation. Tis, however, has limited application in the context of
our project. Since we had to trace religions across time, surveys or census data
were not available for most states and for most time points. Even when such
data were available, the religious categories from which respondents had to
select varied from one survey/census to another. In order to create a spatially
and longitudinally stable defnition of religion, we had to develop observable
or tangible criteria that can guide data collection. Tis required heavy reli-
ance on secondary data. Given this state of the literature, our next objective
was to derive a set of fairly tangible criteria that defne religions and religious
families independent of subjective identifcation of people with a given belief
system. Te review yielded a defnition of religion as a belief system shared by a
community of people that is identifed by the following set of criteria. 
a. Scriptures. A  central text or a set of texts that—as a whole—
encapsulate the general principles of the belief system of a given
religion. Te existence or type of scriptures is a key identifer of
some but not all religions. Some religions do not have major
scriptures; others incorporate scriptures from other religions with
scriptures that are exclusive to a particular belief system. But the
absence of central scriptures is also an important distinguishing
feature of a religion, provided it possesses the other characteristics. 
b. Institutions. A  set of formal or semiformal institutions that are
responsible for interpreting the basic beliefs for adherents, modi-
fying them or changing them over time, training and ordaining
spiritual leaders of their communities—and determining who is a
believer and who is not. Te nature, size, and formality of institu-
tions vary a great deal across religions. However, virtually every
religion has a set of institutions or a group of individuals who
interpret beliefs for adherents. In many cases, these institutions or
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priests have primary responsibility for leading the practice of col-
lective rituals. Tis set of institutions must be unique to that belief
system and distinct from the institutions of other belief systems. 
c. Historical development. It is possible to trace the origin, develop-
ment, and difusion of religions in terms of historical turning points
and/or identifable processes. At these turning points or processes,
an individual or a group has formed the basic principles of a new
religion. Tis individual or group is also responsible for forming
certain institutions that guide religious practices, ordain spiritual
leaders, and defne principles for inclusion or exclusion of believers.
Tis criterion is an important identifer not only of major religions
but also of religious families and denominations. Since many reli-
gions developed in connection with other religions, the historical
context in which religions were formed helps identify their origins.4 
d. A common class of beliefs, rituals, and practices. Tis criterion allows
identifcation of a broad set of religions that is characterized by
polytheism. It also characterizes religions that contain identifable
rituals, which are followed without a clear set of institutions or
historical evidence of how they were formed. Because such reli-
gions have developed or existed in areas that are geographically
distinct and noncontiguous, they cover a wide variety of ritualistic
elements. Yet there are some basic commonalities in the (rather
weak) institutional structure of such religions and their rituals.
Tese allow the grouping of such religions into a separate cat-
egory. However, this criterion does not ofer a simple way of divid-
ing such religions into denominations and subdenominations. 
Tese criteria provide a foundation for an operational defnition of reli-
gion. A belief system with these four characteristics is clearly identifed as
a religion. As noted, there are religions that lack a major scripture. But the
acceptance of a common scripture as a central guide of beliefs, rituals, and
practices is almost a sufcient—though not necessary—identifer of a reli-
gion. Te same applies to a set of institutions that defnes the ethical and
ritualistic codes for the community. Note that the key elements of Alston’s
defnition do not apply to nontheistic religions or nontheistic versions of
such religions as Buddhism, Hinduism, Jainism, and Confucianism. Nor
does the last item in his defnition tell us what that group or community is
or what exactly binds such a community together. 
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Te operational defnition we ofer allows us to identify religions empir-
ically. Using these criteria we scanned the literature identifying major reli-
gions, religious families within major religions, and denominations within
the religious families, which resulted in a three-level structure of the reli-
gion tree: major religions, religious families, and denominations. For exam-
ple, Christianity contains several religious families such as Catholicism,
Protestantism, Eastern Orthodox, and Anglicanism. Protestantism contains
a number of denominations such as Presbyterian, Methodist, Mennonite,
and so on. It became clear very quickly that it would be unlikely to obtain
systematic, consistent, and reliable data going back in time on the denomi-
national level. Terefore, our project contains data only on the frst two
levels of the religion tree: major religions and religious families. 
Once the structure of the religion tree was set, we surveyed multiple
classifcations of religions, focusing in particular on those that were con-
sistent with our observable criteria. Tis process was challenging due to
the substantial variation in religious classifcations in diferent sources and
disciplines. Some classifcations were fne-tuned, going down to the level of
ethnically or “tribally” specifc rituals unique to some regions (or within a
given country). Other classifcations were quite general, subsuming broad
categories of religious groups. Given this state of afairs, we developed a
“candidate” religion tree of the most plausible lists of religions/religious
families in the literature. 
Next, we formulated a questionnaire with several groups of questions. 
One group requested that experts assess the validity of the criteria for 
identifying religions and religious families. Te other group asked about 
whether a given candidate religion qualifes as one of the major world 
religions. Likewise, for each candidate for a major world religion that was 
derived from the literature search, we asked whether respondents consider 
this to be a “proper” religious family. Te survey also contained a set of 
open questions that asked respondents to specify additional criteria for 
identifying major religions or religious families, and for adding or deleting 
religions or religious families. We surveyed noted religion scholars from 
various disciplines as a way of validating or modifying our religion tree. 
Table A1 (in the appendix) provides a summary of the survey responses to 
the key questions. 
Te survey yielded a number of results. First, we received strong con-
frmation of four of the fve criteria we had thought to use in identifying 
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major religions and religious families. In the open questions asking whether 
we had omitted any important criteria, we found no signifcant responses 
that would cause us to reconsider these criteria. Second, two-thirds of the 
twenty-one candidates to the position of “major world religion” received 
a validity score of six or higher. With respect to the remaining candidates, 
answers to open questions suggested collapsing them with the “surviving” 
candidates. Respondents also mentioned a very low number of adherents 
as an alternative reason for entering a low validity rank for certain reli-
gions. Some of the candidate religions were collapsed into a broader group. 
For example, various animistic religions were collapsed into the animist 
group. Syncretic religions represent a wide array of belief systems, but they 
have some common underlying characteristics, so we decided to group 
them together. Also, the “other religions” category is a residual category 
that refects either religions with relatively few adherents, religions that did 
not make it into the list, or a complement of a population that is known to 
practice some religion but there is no information about which religion/s
they do practice (more below). 
Tird, with respect to religious families, we also found a substantial degree
of agreement for most of the candidate families. In this case, low-validity
religious families were grouped into “other” (e.g., “other Christians,” “other
Muslims,” etc.). Fourth, we found no relationship between the degrees of
agreement across diferent disciplines of respondents. Finally, the number
of responses to some questions varied signifcantly (range = 30−67), because
many of the respondents had expertise that covered a specifc region or a
specifc religion. Tis made some respondents hesitant to respond to ques-
tions or items that were outside of their professional purview. 
Table A4.1 in the appendix to this chapter presents the major world reli-
gions and religious families included in the dataset. It also includes infor-
mation regarding the rate of agreement among experts in our expert poll
regarding the validity of a given religion/religious family. Te experts were
asked to rate on a scale of 1–10 the degree to which they believe a given cat-
egory constitutes a major religion or a religious family within a given religion.
In general, we used a rule of thumb of an agreement rate of six or above for a
given religion. Te only exception was the non-religious category, which was
rated lower. Tis category includes atheists, agnostics, and people who stated
(or were estimated) as having no particular religion. Te low ratings for this
category were due to low response rates and (possibly) a confusing defnition
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of this category in the questionnaire. Nevertheless, virtually every source we
used provided data for this category. We also used a residual (other religions)
category, but did not include this in the survey. Tis category includes adher-
ents of religions that did not make it into the fnal religion tree as well as data
reported by most sources under the same (other) label. 
3. Trends in World Religions, 1945–20105 
Before presenting the data, some caveats about trends within nations and
within religions over time are in order. First, our approach is state-reliant. We
started our data collection of the distribution of religious adherents within a
given territory when this territory became an independent state, following the
COW defnition of system membership. Tis means that the interpretation
of the data presented below should refect the changes in the size and char-
acter of the interstate system over the period 1945–2010. Second, the avail-
ability and reliability of data have improved considerably over time. We have
more sources and fewer missing data for later years compared to previous
periods.6 Terefore, the fgures provided below may refect some temporal
bias. Tird, domestic political changes may have also afected reporting on
religious afliations. With these caveats in mind, we turn to a discussion of
some major trends in religious adherence from 1945 to 2010. 
3.1 Global Patterns 
Figure 4.1 describes the distribution of adherents of some of the key religions
over time. For convenience of presentation, the fgure does not include all of
the major world religions in the dataset. However, the discussion covers all of
them. Several points are noteworthy. First, the proportion of religious adher-
ents has increased over time from a low of about 63.5 percent of the world’s
population in 1945 to a high of about 88.9 percent in 2010. Non-religious
percentages varied between 9 percent and 16 percent of the world’s population
over the same period, with the highest percent of non-religious people reported
in 1975: 16.6 percent. Tis refects two statistical artifacts rather than a major
trend of increased religiosity. One concern, as noted above, is that a signifcant
proportion (30 percent) of the world’s population did not live in independent
states in 1945. In contrast, by 2010, 99.9 percent of the world’s population
resided within independent states. Terefore, the increased trend in religiosity
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Fig. 4.1. The distribution of major world religions, 1945–2010 
refects the fact that many of the new states that emerged over the 1945–2010
period have an especially high proportion of religious adherents. Improved
data quality over time may also afect these trends. One can argue, however,
that since the mid-1970s, the changes in the size of the international system
have been relatively marginal, and that these changes refect a rearrangement of
the system (secessions and partitions of multiethnic entities—e.g., the Soviet
Union, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Yugoslavia) into more ethnically homoge-
neous states. So at least some of the increase in religiosity refects an actual
trend rather than a combination of statistical artifacts. We leave this question
open to future investigations. 
Second, once we consider changes in the composition of the interstate 
system, Muslims are the only religious group that shows a consistent and 
signifcant upward trend relative to the world population. Hindus also 
have exhibited a growth trend, but this has been more modest. Te other 
major religious groups capture a relatively stable proportion of the world’s 
population (e.g., Christians, non-religious) or display a declining trend 
(e.g., Jews, animists, syncretics). Figure 4.2 provides two important items 
of information. Te frst (top panel) shows percent changes in the pro-
portion of some of the major world religions over time. Each area in the 
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left panel refects changes in the share of world population practicing a 
given religion compared to the baseline share of the adherents of the same 
religion in 1950. Expanding areas suggest a change in the growth of the 
number of religious adherents of that particular religion compared to the 
baseline population. 
Te second fgure (bottom panel) shows the share of each religion in 
the total world population over the same period. Each area in the right 
panel shows the percent of the world’s population practicing a given reli-
gion. Te trends in these fgures are quite interesting. First, the number of 
Christians grew at a very moderate rate compared to their 1950 share: by 
2010 the Christian population was roughly 13  percent larger than the 
1950 population. By contrast, the world population grew by 268 percent 
over the same period. However, Christians in 2010 captured roughly the 
same percentage (about 30 percent) of the world’s population as they did 
in 1950. Te fastest expanding religion was Islam. Te number of Muslims 
almost doubled compared to their 1950 share. Tis is also refected in the 
right panel. Muslims accounted for roughly 10 percent of the world’s pop-
ulation residing in independent states in 1950. In 2010, they accounted 
for over 23 percent of the world’s population. Te non-religious popula-
tion underwent changes upward from the 1960s to the late 1980s, expand-
ing to twice the size of the 1950 baseline. However, this trend was reversed 
in the 1990s and beyond, shrinking to slightly 150 percent of the 1950 
baseline by 2010. Te share of the non-religious group in the world’s pop-
ulation in the right-hand panel shows a similar trend. Te non-religious 
population accounted for roughly 7 percent of the world’s total in 1945 
and 1950, and increased to over 15 percent by 1985. However, this trend 
was reversed, and by 2010 the non-religious population accounted for 
slightly more than 11 percent of the world’s total. 
Two important reasons might account for these changes. First, changes
in the political composition of the world—the growth of the world’s pop-
ulation living in independent states—is a key factor. In 1945–50, only
67 percent of the world population lived in independent states. By 1970,
all of the world’s population was accounted for by independent states.
Most of the newly added states during this period emerged in Asia, the
Middle East, and Africa. Many of them had a substantial Muslim popu-
lation; fewer of these states had Christian populations. Also, the share
of animist and syncretic populations shrunk signifcantly, from about
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20 percent to less than 11 percent of the world’s population. Since our
data only cover populations residing in independent states, a substantial
part of the world’s population is omitted prior to the early 1970s. 
Second, the collapse of the communist system in Eastern Europe and 
Russia created an artifcial revival of religiosity in these countries. Much 
of the swelling in secularism during the period 1950–90 might be due to 
overreporting of secularism in the communist states. Many people pro-
claimed themselves atheists or agnostics under communism, or worse, of-
cial statistics reported high percentages of non-religious citizens in such 
countries. Tis was reversed following the demise of communism, with 
many people either reporting a specifc religious afliation or with more 
accurate reporting of religious adherence statistics in most postcommunist 
countries. Nevertheless, the trend of secularism is evident given that non-
religious people captured a signifcantly higher share (as much as 50 per-
cent more) in 2010 than in 1945. 
Te WRP disaggregates the major world religions into religious fami-
lies. However, at this stage of the project we have a detailed and relatively 
reliable breakdown only for Christianity and somewhat less reliable data 
for the Islamic religious families. Te data for the other major religions that 
are divided into identifable religious families: Judaism and Buddhism lack 
for the most part a detailed breakdown into religious families. Currently, 
however, it is useful to examine the distribution of religious families within 
the two religions for which we have fairly reliable data. Tis is done in 
Figure 4.3. 
With respect to Christianity, several things stand out. First, the distri-
bution of Christian religious families is highly stable over time. However,
the proportion of Catholics has dropped from a high of almost 58 per-
cent of Christians in 1975 to a low of 49.7 percent in 2010. Second, the
Eastern Orthodox family represents an interesting cycle due to global
political trends: the proportion of Orthodox drops consistently over the
1945–90 period (from a high of 15 percent of all Christians in 1950 to
a low of 8.7 percent in 1990). Te collapse of communism in Eastern
Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union led to a steady rise in the
percentage of Orthodox Christians up to about 12.7 percent in 2010. 
Tis is a result of two factors. First, conducting fairly reliable censuses
was one of the frst things that most East European postcommunist states
did after they democratized. In most of these countries questions about
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religion were asked. So we have far better information about the religious
adherence of roughly 500 million people following the end of the Cold
War. Second, during the communist era, many people in those countries
(and in the Soviet Union) declared themselves atheists or nonafliated with
any religion. Democracy brought about a growing tendency to identify
with a religion. Since various Eastern Orthodox denominations have tra-
ditionally dominated these countries, we have a surge in the proportion of
Eastern Orthodox believers after the end of the Cold War. Tis is probably
the single most important factor that accounts for the desecularization that
we have witnessed over the same period. 
Tird, the proportion of Christians not afliated with any religious
family has increased from 2 percent to roughly 8 percent of all Christians.
Tis seems to be due to two factors. One factor concerns information
quality. Unlike the case of data on Eastern Orthodox Christians, which
have improved markedly over time, data on other Christian families have
improved sparingly and in some cases have become more problematic to
acquire. In the 1950s, most independent countries were in the Western
Hemisphere, Europe (predominantly Catholic, Protestant, and Eastern
Orthodox), the Middle East (predominantly Muslim), and Asia (predomi-
nantly Eastern religions and Islam). Te 1960s and 1970s witnessed a surge
in the number of independent African states. Tose states exhibit a mixture
of religions, including a substantial Christian population. However, data
on the distribution of these religious families are scarce and not well docu-
mented. Another factor may well be a growing tendency in Latin America
and Europe by Catholics to identify themselves increasingly as unafli-
ated. Tis has been a growing concern of the Roman Catholic Church in
recent years. 
We turn now to Figure 4.3.2 documenting religious families in Islam.
Note, however, that data on religious families in Islam are quite problem-
atic. Over the period 1945–95 we have data on Islamic religious families
for only a fraction of the states with substantial Muslim populations. Tis
is refected in the proportion of the “others” category. Te proportion of
Shi’ites during these years also refects a rough estimate. From 2000 on, we
have fairly reliable estimates of the distribution of religious families in Islam,
although this does not include all religious families. However, two things
are evident. First, the ratio of Sunni to Shia believers is roughly 7:1. Second,
the only other noticeable religious family in Islam on which we have data is
the Alawite community that accounts for roughly 1 percent of all Muslims.
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Te “other Muslims” group is composed of people who have not identifed
themselves with any specifc religious family, or is based on estimates of (or
self-proclaimed) Muslims without a breakdown to the religious family level. 
3.2 Regional Patterns 
We turn next to a regional distribution of religious adherence. Tis is given
in Figure 4.4. Te data here are relatively self-explanatory. Christians con-
stitute the vast majority of the population of the Western Hemisphere,
averaging 87 percent of the region’s population over the period 1945–
2010. Te dominant religious family was Catholicism, averaging 60 per-
cent of the region’s population. Christians were also by far the modal
category in Europe, averaging 70 percent of the region’s population over
the same period. European Catholics were still the modal Christian cat-
egory, but they accounted only for a third of the region’s population. Te
other two categories: Protestants and Eastern Orthodox accounted jointly
for a similar proportion of the region’s population. Te second-largest
group in Europe is the non-religious group that reached over 27 percent
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of the region’s population in 1990 and declined to 17 percent in 2010,
again, as a result of the political trends discussed above. 
Tere is a great deal of discussion of the growing Islamic infuence in
Europe. However, the share of Muslims in the European population has not
changed signifcantly over time: the share of Muslims in the region’s popu-
lation increased from about 5 percent in 1945 to over 6.7 percent in 2010. 
In Africa, Christians have averaged about 55  percent of the region’s
population, distributed rather equally among Catholics, Protestants, and
“other” Christians (lacking reliable data on religious family breakdown).
Te Christian population has been increasing steadily since 1975, but this
might be due to improved data during the latter period rather than to an
increase in the actual number of Christians. Islam is the fastest-growing
religion in Africa. Muslims’ share in the regional population increased from
17 percent in 1945 to 29 percent in 2010. Both the moderate increase in
the share of Christians and the steep increase in the share of Muslims in
Africa came at the expense of sharp drops in other religions, primarily syn-
cretic and animistic religions. 
Te Middle East is clearly dominated by Islam, with over 92 percent of
the region’s population. Within Islam, the 7:1 ratios between Sunnis and
Shi’ites that we observe in the world’s Muslim population does not apply to
the Middle East. Here we observe an average ratio of about 3:1. Te larg-
est Shi’ite population is in Iran, which alone accounts for over a third of
the world’s Shi’a population and over 70 percent of the Middle East Shi’a
population. Iraq has the second-largest Shi’a population, accounting for
roughly 10 percent of the world’s Shi’a population and 19 percent of the
Middle East Shi’a population. 
Jews account for roughly 1 percent of the Middle East population and 
are almost all concentrated in Israel. Israeli Jews account, however, for 
40 percent of the world’s Jewish population (with the highest percentage 
of Jews actually concentrated in the United States: 42 percent).7 
In Asia, four categories capture nearly 80  percent of the popula-
tion: these include Hindus (who account for an average of 22 percent of
the region’s population), Muslims (accounting for an average of 18 percent
of the region’s population), Buddhists (accounting for roughly 12 percent
of the region’s population), and others (mainly syncretic folk religions
that account for about 20 percent of the region’s population). If we ignore
the distribution of religious groups in 1945—prior to the independence
of India and several other East and South Asian states, where most of the
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Buddhist and Hindu population resides—the only group that exhibited
signifcant growth over time were the Asian Muslims who have increased
their share in the region’s population from 14 percent to 20 percent. 
Interestingly, the trend of the non-religious Asian population is simi-
lar to that of European non-religionists: a marked increase between 1945 
and 1990, and a signifcant decline in their share of the regional popula-
tion since 1990. Here there was not as much retreat from communism 
as in Europe, so we cannot clearly explain this decline by some political 
shock. More research is required to explain the desecularization of Asian 
populations. 
Te fnal aspect of our global analysis focuses on the degree of reli-
gious diversity in the international system. We use the index of qualita-
tive variation (IQV) to measure religious diversity. Tis index is given by: 
2 k 1 − 
k 
pi ( ˆ i = ) IQV = 1 
k − 1 
where k indexes the number of religious groups and pi is the percent of
the state’s population that practices a given religion. IQV varies from zero
when a given state’s population practices a single religion, to 1 when the
population of a state is uniformly split among k religions such that the
percentage of adherents of any given religion is exactly 1/k. For example,
consider three states:  State A has three religious groups each accounting
for 33 percent of the population. State B has fve religious groups distrib-
uted as follows: Group I has 80 percent of the population, and each of the
other groups has 4 percent of the population. State C involves two religious
groups: one with 80 percent of the population and one with 20 percent. In
the frst state, we get an
( − ×  . )3 1  3 0 333 2 
IQV = = . .  1 00 
2 
Tat means that the variation among groups is maximal; each group has
exactly the same share of the population as every other group. In the second
case, we get an 
2 2  ( 4 0 04 5 1  − 0 8. + × . ) IQV = = . 0 442 . 
4 
Tis suggests that there is a signifcant concentration of religious
adherents but this concentration is not perfect; there is some religious
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heterogeneity that emanates both from the number of religious groups and
from their relative share in the population. In the third case, we get an
 2 2 2 1  − ( 0 8. + 0 2. )  IQV = = . .  0 64 
1 
Here, too, we have a 80/20 percent domination of one religion over the
other. However, the fact that there are only two groups elevates the degree
of variation in this society compared to the case exemplifed by State B.8 
We employ four versions of IQV. Te frst defnes k (k = 15 for all
states) as the number of all possible major religions. Te second defnes
k (k = 24) both by major religions, for those religions that are not bro-
ken down into religious groups (e.g., Shintoism, Sikhism, etc.) and reli-
gious families, for those religions where we have family breakdowns (e.g.,
Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism). Te two others apply a vari-
able k, such that for each state k represents the number of religious groups
that actually exist in that state. Figure 4.5 shows the IQV scores in the
system over time. We use only the versions of religious diversity based on
all possible religions. Patterns of religious diversity are virtually identical
whether we focus on major religions or on religious families. Correlations
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are in the 0.92–0.99 range (and this applies to the other two versions of
the religious diversity indices based only on comparison of valid religions
in each state). 
We fnd two signifcant increases in global levels of religious diver-
sity: between 1960 and 1970, and between 1995 and 2000. Tis is also where
the gap between religious diversity based on only major religious groups, and
religious diversity based on religious families is signifcant. We also fnd that
religious diversity based on religious families—especially when the IQV is
measured on the basis of valid religions and religious families in states—
shows a marked upward trend over time. Much of this trend is accounted
for by the growth in the size of the international system. But clearly religious
diversity is afected also by migration patterns. Tis can be better seen when
we examine regional patterns of religious similarity over time. 
Figure 4.6 below shows regional levels of religious similarity over time.9 
Note that we use the cross-regional category as a baseline of religious simi-
larity between states that belong to diferent regions. Te frst impression
we have here is that of substantial cross-regional diferences. Te Western
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Hemisphere, Europe, and the Middle East show high levels of religious
similarity among member states in these regions. On the other hand, Africa
and Asia display very low levels of dyadic religious similarities. Second, we
fnd a downward trend of religious similarity in the Western Hemisphere
and in Europe, and an upward trend of religious similarity in Africa and
Asia. Te Middle East displays a fairly constant level of religious similarity
between its members. 
4. Conclusion 
Tis chapter documents trends in national, regional, and global religious
afliations since the end of World War II, based on a new dataset on
religion in the international system. Te WRP dataset ofers several inno-
vations. First, it is based on a systematic classifcation of world religions
and religious families. Second, we drew on a large number of sources to
generate the dataset. Tird, we used a number of methods to reconcile
diferences between sources and interpolated missing data. Fourth, the
resultant dataset provides higher-resolution data, including data on the
major world religions as well as on the religious families of the major
world religions. Several points mark this systematic description of world
religions: 
1. Te changes in the world’s population over the period covered
in this study have not, in general, been accompanied by major
changes in the distribution of religious adherents within states.
Some exceptions do exist, however. Tese include former Soviet
republics (e.g., Kyrgyzstan, whose Muslim population increased
by 37 percent between 1  1 and 2010, and Kazakhstan, whose
Muslim population increased by 42.5  percent over the same
period).10 Nor have these changes resulted in dramatic changes in
the distribution of major religions across the international system
as a whole. 
2. Te most dramatic changes in the distribution of religious adher-
ents globally were due to two factors. First, the growth in the
number of states in the international system. Tis refects an arti-
fact in our dataset—the focus on religion within independent
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states—rather than a demographic trend or changes in the distri-
bution of religious beliefs in the system. Second, political changes
in states—primarily, the postcommunist transition in the 1  0s—
caused a large number of people in these states to reclaim religious
afliation instead of atheism. 
3. Islam is the only major religion that has captured an increasingly
larger share of the world’s population over time. Other religions
exhibited either signifcant fuctuations or a constant decline in
terms of the relative share of their adherents from the world’s
population. 
4. Te impact of the growth of the Islamic population was notice-
able primarily in Africa and Asia. In Europe, the migration from
Islamic countries to primarily Christian countries has had an
important efect on the religious diversity of European societies.
In both Africa and Asia we see an upward trend in the number
of Muslims, capturing an increasingly large proportion of those
regions’ population. 
5. Te proportion of the non-religious population has shown a
modest increase over time on a global level. However, this group
increased its size in Europe and Oceania, largely a refection of the
modernization and secularization trends in these regions. 
6. Religious diversity increased in the two decades following World
War II, largely due to the dramatic changes in the composition of
the state system. Since the mid-1 60s, the pace of growth in reli-
gious diversity has decelerated, and further changes in the size and
composition of the state system have had only marginal efects on
this diversity. 
Tese trends mesh with other political, economic, and social changes that
have taken place over the same period. Tis leads us directly into the sub-
stantive analysis of the role of religious factors in major facets of world
politics. 
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Appendix to Chapter 4 
Tis appendix discusses the methods and procedures we used to collect
the data and to deal with several challenges of data collection and data
management. 
1. Detailed Questionnaire Responses 
As mentioned in the chapter, we submitted the criteria for identifying major
religions and religious families, as well as the candidate religions/religious
families, to a panel of experts on global and regional religions. Te results
of the survey are given below (Table A4.1.) 
Table A.4.2 provides the fnal religion tree used in the WRP. 
2. Data Collection and Data Aggregation 
We started the data collection project by forming a religion data bibliogra-
phy.11 Tese sources varied from census-based data to various estimates of
religious groups, or sources that focused on a given religion in a longitudi-
nal manner (either within a given country or for several countries). Some
of the sources contained multiple data points on global or regional levels,
but most contained scattered data on specifc countries at discrete points
in time. 
Our coding manual refected the kind of issues that we anticipated, given
the literature review and a general review of source content and quality.
Te coding instructions presented several dilemmas. First, we had to ensure
that denominational level data would be aggregated into the appropriate
religious families. Second, in many cases or sources—even census data—
mentioned only the number (or percent) of adherents of major religions
but provided no reliable religion family data. In other cases, religion family
data existed for only some of the families but not of others. Te coding
instructions were not always sufciently specifc to handle the diversity of
categories provided by diferent sources; hence, we had to resolve multiple
ambiguities in these sources. 
Our initial strategy was to collect data from each source on a difer-
ent record. We did that even if a given source listed only the number (or
percent) of adherents for a single religion. Each data point (or a set of data
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points) was identifed by the source from which it was taken, the date of
the data, and the date these data were coded within the given source. We
ran a number of tests on the data collected from each of the sources (such as
consistency over time; source of the data coded in each source, e.g., census,
secondary data, etc.; and comprehensiveness of coverage of diferent reli-
gions). We distributed a questionnaire among Association of Religion Data
Archives (ARDA) members to solicit reliability estimates for each of the
sources used. We then ranked sources according to an estimate of reliability. 
Before aggregating the data, we had to deal with a number of problems: 
1. Adjusting source data to the categories of the religion tree. In quite a
few cases, the religious categories reported in a given source were
not consistent with our religion tree. Here we had to make deci-
sions about which specifcally labeled religious group matched
which of the religions or religious families in our religion tree. Tis
proved to be a major challenge, especially within the Christian
Protestant family. For example, some sources coded Anglicans as
Protestants. Other included multiple Protestant denominations,
sometimes under diferent labels. A  related problem concerned
aggregating the various Christian Orthodox denominations under
the Eastern Orthodox family. Islamic denominations also pre-
sented a signifcant challenge. 
2. Eliminating the double counting of religious categories. Several
sources double counted religious groups. For example, some
sources with data down to the denominational level counted
Protestant adherents frst by the number of Protestants and then
by Protestant denomination. We had to make sure that the sum
of the denominations matched the total number of Protestants.
When discrepancies were observed, specifc adjustments had to
be made. 
3. Resolving categories such as “doubly afliated” Christian groups (e.g.,
Protestants and Roman Catholics). Since we view these religious
families as mutually exclusive, we had to decide how to allocate
doubly afliated adherents into religious families. 
4. Addressing adherents of religions not under our religion tree categories. 
We had to distinguish between religious groups that were labeled
diferently but in practice were within our religion tree, and those
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Table A4.1 Survey of major world religions—validity scores N = 67 
Question Category Response Response Comments 
range (SD) 
Importance Scriptures 1-6 5.13 (0.93) Categories eliminated: 
of criteria for Institutions 1-6 4.83 (1.12) Holidays 
identifying major Historical Evolution 1-6 5.06 (0.91) 
world religions Beliefs, Practices, Rituals 1-6 5.06 (0.99) 
Importance Scriptures 1-6 4.95 (0.94) 
of criteria for Institutions 1-6 5.08 (0.86) 
identifying Historical Evolution 1-6 5.27 (1.02) 
religious families Beliefs, Practices, Rituals 1-6 5.10 (0.93) 
Rank order Scriptures 1-8 2.91 (1.61) 1 = highest rank 
of criteria for Institutions 1-8 3.40 (1.55) 5 = lowest rank 
identifying major Historical Evolution 1-8 3.55 (1.75) 
world religions Beliefs, Practices, Rituals 1-8 2.63 (1.80) 
Validity of Religion Judaism 1-10 9.45 (1.79) 1 = completely 
Christianity 1-10 9.51 (1.82) disagree; 
Islam 
Bahá’i 
Zoroastrianism 
Hinduism 
Buddhism 
1-10 
1-10 
1-10 
1-10 
1-10 
9.52 (1.82) 
7.34 (2.75) 
7.83 (2.82) 
9.43 (1.95) 
9.21 (2.26) 
10 = completely 
agree. Validity scores 
below 6 were deleted 
or combined with 
other categories. 
Sikhism 1-10 8.53 (1.87) 
Shintoism 1-10 8.24 (2.26) 
Taoism 1-10 8.71 (1.61) 
Confucianism 1-10 8.27 (2.43) 
Jainism 1-10 8.14 (2.14) 
Syncretism Afro/Christian 1-10 6.08 (3.02) 
Religions of Latin 
America—Santeria 
Animism 1-10 6.00 (3.60) 
Non-religious13 1-10 4.68 (3.68) 
Validity of religious Judaism—Orthodox 1-10 8.93 (2.43) Categories with 
families Judaism—Conservative 1-10 8.93 (2.32) validity rank below 
Judaism—Reform 
Christianity—Roman 
Catholic 
1-10 
1-10 
8.38 (2.37) 
8.95 (2.62) 
7 were eliminated or 
grouped together as 
“other” 
Christianity—Orthodox 1-10 8.78 (2.70) 
Christianity—Protestant 1-10 8.88 (2.38) 
Christianity—Anglican 1-10 8.00 (3.02) 
Islam—Sunni 1-10 9.56 (1.39) 
Islam—Shi’a/Shiite 1-10 9.54 (1.39) 
Islam—Ibadhi (Abāḍiyya) 1-10 7.91 (2.56) 
Islam—Nation of Islam 1-10 7.24 (2.97) 
Islam—Alawites (Nusayris) 1-10 7.00 (3.09) 
Islam—Ahmadiyya 1-10 7.31 (2.93) 
Buddhism—Mahayana 1-10 9.08 (2.16) 
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Question Category Response Response Comments 
range (SD) 
Buddhism—Teravada 1-10 9.20 (2.07) 
Discipline of Humanities 77.6 percent 
respondent14 Social Sciences 40.3 
Physical Sciences 1.5 
Biological Sciences 1.5 
Other Academic 14.9 
Non-academic Religion 19.4 
Non-academic Other 7.46 
World Religions 1-5 1.92 (1.15) 1= defnitely; 
Scholar? 5 = not at all 
religions that had been candidate religions but that we had delib-
erately grouped into other categories (e.g., a variety of animist or
syncretic religions). 
5. Dealing with religious practice of noncitizens. In several nations,
a large number of noncitizens exist who might be adherents of
diferent religions than the citizens of the state, for example, the
population of noncitizens in some of the Persian Gulf states (e.g.,
the population of the United Arab Emirates consists of 20 percent
citizens and 80 percent noncitizens). In some cases, especially when
using secondary sources, there is no distinction between citizens
and noncitizens. In general, we attempted to collect data only for
citizens and, if available, for permanent residents. However, this was
not always possible. In such cases we downgraded the estimate of
data quality. 
Tis required us to review multiple sources and specifc data points, and make
decisions about how to deal with these problems. We documented our deci-
sions in the raw data fles, with specifc comments. Tese are available upon
request. 
Reconciling data points from multiple sources. We sorted the data by state,
year, and source. Tere were two types of cases in which data existed in two or
more sources for the same state and year. One was a case where two or more
sources contained complete or near-complete data for all major religions or
religious groups within the state. Te second consisted of cases where one
source provided partial data on some of the religions and another source pro-
vided partial data that covered other religions, which were not documented
in the previous source. 
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Table A4.2 Major world religions and religious families in theWRP 
Major Religion Religious Family Pct. Agreement in Comments 
Expert Poll (Std. Dev.) 
Christianity 9.51 (1.82) 
Protestants 8.88 (2.38) 
Roman Catholics 8.95 (2.62) 
Orthodox 8.78 (2.70) Tis includes all the 
Orthodox families (Greek, 
Russian, etc.) 
Anglican 8.00 (3.02) 
Other Christians Residual category 
Judaism 9.45 (1.79) 
Orthodox 8.93 (2.43) 
Conservative 8.93 (2.32) 
Reform 8.38 (2.37) 
Other Residual category 
Islam 9.52 (1.82) 
Sunni 9.56 (1.39) 
Shi’a 9.54 (1.39) 
Ibadhi 7.91 (2.56) 
Nation of Islam 7.24 (2.97) 
Alawite 7.00 (3.09) 
Ahmadiyya 7.31 (2.93) 
Other Muslims Residual category 
Buddhism 9.21 (2.26) 
Mahayana 9.08 (2.16) 
Teravada 9.20 (2.07) 
Other Buddhists Residual category 
Zoroastrianism 7.83 (2.82) 
Hinduism 9.43 (1.95) 
Bahá’i 7.34 (2.75) 
Sikhism 8.53 (1.87) 
Shintoism 8.24 (2.26) 
Taoism 8.71 (1.61) 
Confucianisn 8.27 (2.43) 
Jainism 8.14 (2.14) 
Syncretism 6.08 (3.02) Afro/Christian Religions of 
Latin America—Santeria 
Animism 6.00 (3.60) 
Non-religious 4.68 (3.68) 
When two sources provided relatively comprehensive coverage of all
or most religions and these data were very similar or identical, this did
not present a major problem. Te problem emerged when there were sub-
stantial diferences across sources in terms of the number (or percentages)
of adherents of certain religions. Te strategy we applied for reconcilia-
tion was threefold. First, we checked for within-source consistency over
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time. Te assumption here is that—unless a dramatic political or natural
event occurred between two time points (e.g., a major population transfer,
a genocide that eliminated a signifcant proportion of a religious group)—
the percentage of a state’s population that practiced a given religion did
not change dramatically within a given fve-year interval. If a given source
indicated dramatic shifts in the distribution of religious adherents without
evidence of an event that would have caused such a shift, we concluded
that there was a reliability problem. Second, if we had information about
the source for this specifc data point (e.g., census, survey, estimate), we
assigned a specifc reliability score to this data point. Tis enabled us to
make aggregation decisions later on. 
When a given source contained only partial data on one or more religious
groups, we compared these data to data on those religious groups from other
sources. We checked for consistency over time as well as the origin of the data
for this source. Source reliability information is given in the dataset. 
Te general strategy for all cases that were covered by multiple sources
was to generate single records of religious groups via a reliability-weighted
mean of all sources. 
Interpolating missing data. Missing data were a more serious and more
common problem. We confronted four types of missing data issues: 
1. missing data on the frst data point12 
2. missing data on a specifc fve-year point, but with data existing
for adjacent years (e.g., no data on 1 55 but existing data on 1 56
and 1 57) 
3. missing data on a specifc fve-year point but with data existing for
previous and subsequent fve-year points (e.g., no data for 1 55
but data available for 1 50 and 1 60) 
4. missing data for 2010 
In the case of missing data on the frst or last time point, we applied trend
interpolation. We calculated a moving average rate of change coefcient for
the series of that particular state and applied it to the frst or last data point.
In the case of missing data with adjacent data points available, we applied
a two-step process. First, if we had data for more than one adjacent year
before or after the data point for which data were missing, we calculated
an expected distribution of religious groups based on the trend for these
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two or more years for which data were available. Second, we calculated an
expected trend between the two time points for which data were available
before and after the date for which we needed data. Tird, we calculated the
average between the expected distribution of religious groups and the trend
distribution. For cases included in #3, we interpolated a yearly distribution
from the two time points in which data were available, and applied it to the
year where data were needed. 
In order to ensure that users know how we obtained the data for a
specifc record, we created a variable labeled “DATA TYPE” that specifes
whether the data for that country-year are from a single source or multiple
sources, and whether they are interpolated or trend based. 
Dual Religions. In general, religious adherence forms mutually exclusive
groups. People typically practice one type of religion or do not practice any
religion at all. Tis means that when summing across all religious groups in
a given state (including “non-religious” and “other religion” categories), the
total should equal the state’s population—and the percentages of religious
groups should sum up to 100 percent. Tere are, however, a few states in
which dual religion is a common practice. In such cases, the sum of reli-
gious adherents exceeds the population, sometime by a wide margin. We
therefore introduced a code for dual religions. 
Final Cleaning of Data.We applied two additional tests in the process of
fnal data cleaning: population adjustment and trend adjustment. 
Te frst test was meant to ensure that—with the exception of states
with dual religions—the sum of the religious groups equaled the state’s
population. We used the COW (2008) total population data as the bench-
mark. Tere were, however, a few cases where population adjustments
had to be made. In some cases, the sources we used included data on total
population that were dramatically diferent from those of COW (e.g., one
of the sources, Barrett et al. 2011, lists Afghanistan’s population in 2005
at 27 million, whereas COW’s total population for Afghanistan is only
24.86 million). In that case, we adjusted the number of religious adherents
in that state to ft COW’s total population, by frst calculating the percent-
age adherents for each group based on the original source’s population, and
then remultiplying the percentages by the COW total population to get the
adjusted raw fgures of adherents for each religious group. 
Tird, there were a few cases where the COW population fgures
refected some break points over time. Specifcally, there were some cases
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of signifcant dips in population fgures for the same state over a single
year period (for example, COW’s data indicate that Jordan’s population
dipped by over 33 percent—from 6.669 million in 2000 to 4.978 million
in 2001). Some of these cases are due to political changes. For example, the
dissolution of Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1999, or of Pakistan in 1971
explains dramatic declines in population. Tus, for each case of population
decline, we investigated frst whether any political shifts explain this trend.
If we could not fnd such an explanation, we informed the COW data host
of these changes and adjusted religion groups accordingly, while maintain-
ing consistency with the COW data. Tese caused some breaks in the dis-
tribution of religious groups over time within a given country, as is evident
in the signifcant downward trend in the Bulgarian population since 1991
and its efect on the distribution of Christians in the country. 
Te trend adjustment was designed to ensure that—barring major
events that caused dramatic population changes in a given state—the rates
of change in the relative size of any given religious group in a state would
not exhibit dramatic changes from one fve-year point to another. Tis
proved to be difcult to ensure, as data for specifc fve-year points were
derived from diferent sources. However, whenever necessary, we applied an
adjustment rule to ensure that rates of change in the relative sizes of various
religious groups are fairly smooth. Tis was the case especially if the data
for a given fve-year time point exhibited a dramatic diference between a
preceding set of fve-year points and a subsequent set of fve-year points.
However, in quite a few cases, such a smoothing operation was not possible
because we lacked sufcient information enabling us to carry out a smooth-
ing operation. In particular, this was the case when the data for that specifc
time point were drawn from a high-reliability source. Tis implies that in
several cases, there are signifcant changes in percent adherents of a given
religious group’s across fve-year time points. Tis is the case in particular
with respect to two groups: “non-religious” and “other religion.” Both of
these groups represent residual categories in many of the sources. We used
the latter as an adjustment category to ensure that the total number of
adherents matched that of the total population. 
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Chapter 5 
Religion and International Confict 
1. Introduction 
Chapter 2 reviewed some of the writings on religion and confict. We argued
that the attempt to use religious factors to explain “religious confict” is
both logically tautological and empirically misleading. Consequently, our
focus in this chapter is on general forms of international confict, regard-
less of precipitating issue(s). Te questions we pose do not concern when a
confict becomes “religious” but rather what kind of factors afect the pro-
pensity of states to engage in confict with other states, what kind of factors
increase or decrease the propensity of states to fght each other, and what
factors increase or decrease the level of regional conficts. 
Specifcally, this chapter addresses the following questions: 
1. Which particular characteristics of states determine their propen-
sity to engage in international conficts? Specifcally, how do the
religious characteristics of states and their environment afect the
scope, timing, and nature of their involvement in international
conficts? 
2. How do the religious characteristics of states determine whom
they fght? Specifcally, which religious characteristics of states
determine how they select enemies? 
3. How do the religious characteristics of regions afect the confict
levels in them? 
4. Do religious factors afect the characteristics of confict, such as
their duration, the likelihood of escalation, and their outcomes? 
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In chapter 3 we discussed in rather general terms the ways in which var-
ious theories address the relationship between religious factors and inter-
national confict. In this chapter we provide a more in-depth theoretical 
and empirical focus on this linkage. Empirical research on the relationship 
between religion and international confict was minimal for many years. 
Te emergence of the CoC thesis, and even more so the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001, stimulated a signifcant number of empirical studies 
on these issues. Results, however, have been mixed, at best, refecting sub-
stantial disagreement on whether and to what extent religious factors afect 
the outbreak and characteristics of international conficts. 
We believe that such disagreements are due to weaknesses of the case-
study and quantitative literatures on the subject. Accordingly, we employ
several alternative approaches and data that help us provide a clearer picture
of this linkage. We also build on recent empirical research on the relation-
ship between religious factors and international confict. We aim to inno-
vate in several important respects. 
First, we draw upon a broader range of perspectives and ideas than pre-
vious studies. Much of the empirical literature on the linkages between reli-
gious factors and international confict focused on the arguments of the
CoC thesis. Our approach relies on more nuanced ideas concerning the
possible efects that religion may exert on international confict. Some of
the propositions we derive from the theories articulated in chapter 3 are
diferent from, and broader than those that have been examined in previ-
ous studies. Tests of these hypotheses enable us to provide a more nuanced
and balanced assessment of various theories linking religion to international
confict. 
Second, we base our analyses on far more comprehensive and nuanced
data than previous studies on both the factors that afect international
confict and on the characteristics of such conficts. Our data contain
high-resolution information on religion, international confict, and a set
of control variables related to our theory. On religion, the WRP dataset
enables us to develop sophisticated measures of the religious characteristics
of states, dyads, and entire regions. It allows us to quantify the degree of
religious similarity and diversity within societies and between societies with
a wide range of measures, some of them of very high resolution, and some
of them more generic and coarse. Tese data that measure the religious
demography of states, dyads, and regions are supplemented by additional
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data on the relationship between political institutions and states, and by
data concerning the political stability of regimes, adapted from other data
sources. Tese data lead to a wide range of analyses assessing the empirical
support for various hypotheses that are derived from our theory, as well
as from the other perspectives we discussed in chapter 3. On the confict
side of the equation, we build on a newly expanded, cleaned, and updated
dataset on militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) (Maoz et al. 2018) that
allows a set of systematic analyses covering more states, dyads, and regions
than most previous empirical forays into the relationship between religion
and international confict. 
Tird, the scope of the current study is signifcantly wider and the prob-
ing of the possible religion-confict linkages is signifcantly deeper than
previous forays into this subject. We examine multiple units of analysis,
including the state-year, the state-history, the dyad-year, the dyad-history,
and the regional level. At each level we examine diferent aspects of religion-
confict relations. As we show below, the theoretical perspectives we dis-
cussed in chapter 3 have diferent predictions about which specifc aspects
of the religious characteristics of states, dyads, or regions afect which types
of confict behavior. Tese multilevel analyses of the religion-confict nexus
enable a more nuanced assessment of the relative validity of the diferent
theoretical perspectives with respect to the efect of religion on interna-
tional confict. 
Fourth, we ofer several methodological innovations that help overcome
biases, problems, and errors that pervaded many of the previous studies
on the subject. Here, too, we believe that our results enable more cred-
ible inferences regarding the questions under study. Taken together, these
analyses move the empirical study of religion and international confict well
beyond what was done and known in the past. 
Tis chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we review the
empirical literature that addresses the efect of religious factors on interna-
tional confict. We provide a critical appraisal of this literature and identify
some of the theoretical and methodological difculties associated with it.
In the third section, we outline the hypotheses derived from the various
perspectives discussed in chapter 3 with respect to the religion-confict link-
ages. Section 4 discusses the research design in general and nontechnical
terms. A more detailed methodological exposition of the research design is
provided in the appendix at the end of the chapter. Section 5 discusses the
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results of the empirical analyses. In section 6 we provide a general assess-
ment of the linkages between religion and confict across levels of analysis. 
2. Religion and International Confict: A Review of the
Empirical Literature 
Much of the empirical study of religion and international confict was
revived in the post–Cold War era, and much of it was due to the CoC
thesis. While there were a few studies of the religion-international confict
linkage in the preceding periods—and we discuss them below—not sur-
prisingly, many recent empirical analyses have focused on testing the CoC
thesis. Since we have reviewed the more general theoretical (and polemical)
studies of religion and politics in previous chapters, this review focuses on
empirical studies of religion and international confict. 
Perhaps the frst systematic treatment of this subject was a set of studies
by Lewis F. Richardson during the 1920s and 1930s. Tese studies were
published posthumously in 1960. Analyzing more than 300 wars and dis-
putes from 1820 to 1929, Richardson (1960) found that, in general, com-
mon religion did not have a dampening efect on the incidence of war.
Tere appeared to be a relationship between religious dissimilarity and
confict in the case of Christianity versus Islam (p.  245), but Christians
were also very likely to fght each other (pp. 235–39). Te problem with
the Richardson study has to do with its truncation of the population of
cases. Like other studies of religion and confict—discussed in chapter 2—
Richardson ignored the opportunities for confict, that is, those cases in
which confict did not occur. 
Building on Richardson’s work, Henderson (1997, 1998) studied the
relationship between religious, linguistic, and ethnic similarity for all state
dyads and their involvement in international war from 1820 to 1989.
Utilizing the Cultural Composition of Interstate System Members dataset
from COW (Singer 1997),1 he found, inter alia, that religiously similar
states were less likely to fght interstate wars against each other than reli-
giously dissimilar states. Tese studies supported the view that “religion
matters” in international confict—and over a long period of time extend-
ing back to the early post-Napoleonic era. But given that the religious char-
acteristics of states are similar to but not synonymous with Huntington’s
civilizations, then they could go no further in either supporting or refuting
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Huntington’s claims.2 Moreover, these studies showed that while religious
similarity exerted a confict-dampening impact on international war, eth-
nic and linguistic similarity was found to increase the likelihood of war.
Terefore, with respect to international war, the impact of religion was
opposite that of ethnicity and language, demonstrating that they did not
operate as part of the cultural monolith suggested by Huntington’s termi-
nology of “civilizations.” 
Gartzke and Gleditsch (2006) provided an extensive analysis of the 
relationship between religion and international confict for the period 
1950–2001. Teir analysis drew on a diferent dataset (Ellingsen 2000) 
and examined a broader range of international conficts, including MIDs, 
MIDs incurring battle deaths, and international wars. Teir results repli-
cated Henderson’s main fndings regarding the role of religious similarity 
in international conficts. Tey also found that religious similarity exhibits 
opposite directional efects on international confict compared to ethnic 
and linguistic similarity. Finally, Gartzke and Gleditsch also found that 
dyads in which a religious majority in one state shared religious identity 
with a minority in another state were more likely to experience MIDs. Like 
the previous studies, these fndings converged with Huntington’s claims 
that religion was an important factor in world politics, but diverged from 
them by showing that this impact transcended the post–Cold War era. 
In a study of the impact of religion on international war over the broad-
est spatial temporal domain yet examined systematically (i.e., the period
1816–2001), Maoz (2006) found that religious polarization had a signif-
cant impact on systemic confict, although the direction of its impact was
not consistent across time and with respect to diferent measures of con-
fict. Religious polarization was positively and signifcantly associated with
MIDs in both the nineteenth and the twentieth century. Yet, it was posi-
tively associated with wars during the nineteenth century but negatively
associated with wars during the twentieth century. Religious polarization
also had a positive efect on the duration of international confict during the
nineteenth century, but was negatively associated with it in the twentieth.
In his fndings of a two-century impact of religion on international confict,
Maoz’s (2006) fndings, like those of Richardson, Henderson, and Gartzke
and Gleditsch, revealed that religion matters in world politics—and that it
has for at least the last two centuries and into the present, but not in the
way Huntington envisions it. 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
15 
Religion and International Confict 151 
Additional studies that empirically test the CoC thesis on international
conficts include Russett et al.’s (2000) study of MIDs from 1950 to 1992,
and Henderson and Tucker’s (2001) analysis of international wars over the
1816–1992 period. Both studies found little if any support for the main
claims of the CoC thesis. Similar disconfrming results emerged from sub-
sequent systematic analyses of the CoC thesis (e.g., Chiozza 2002, Bolks
and Stoll 2003), although there were a few exceptions (e.g. Tusicisny 2004,
Charron 2010).3 Tus, while IR scholars have demonstrated an empiri-
cal relationship between religion and international war, the main empirical
claims of the CoC thesis—which these studies attempted to test—have not
been consistently supported. 
A somewhat diferent approach is used by Johns and Davies (2012).
Tese authors employ an experimental design to test the—seemingly
competing—claims of the democratic peace and the CoC theses. Tey
examine the attitudes of subjects toward hypothetical confict situations
involving enemies that represent diferent regime types and diferent reli-
gious afnities. Tey fnd that British respondents are more likely to sup-
port the use of force against a dictatorship compared to a democracy, and
that they are more likely to support the use of force against an Islamic
enemy than against a Christian one. By contrast, American respondents’
attitude is driven entirely by Christianity. Non-religious and non-Christian
American respondents are no more likely to endorse the use of force against
Islamic enemies than against Christian ones. Tis ofers an interesting,
albeit limited, take on the CoC thesis in that two largely similar publics
in terms of religion and political culture show signifcantly diferent pro-
pensities toward confict with religiously dissimilar enemies. However, the
generalizability of an experimental study of this sort to real-world decision-
making settings, or to broader cross-national settings is extremely limited. 
Neumayer and Plümper (2009) test CoC-related hypotheses on inter-
national terrorism. Tey argue that the CoC thesis suggests a greater pro-
pensity for terrorism by Islamic perpetrators against non-Islamic targets.
An alternative explanation for Islamic terrorism is that target selection is
based on the strategic value of Western states, in particular, their support of
the home regimes of terrorists (or of groups within those home countries).
Tey fnd that the strategic model of international terrorism provides a bet-
ter explanation of terrorists’ choice of targets than the CoC thesis. However,
they do fnd some support for the argument that the Islam versus the West
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hypothesis is better supported in the post–Cold War era than during the
Cold War period. 
Te record of empirical investigations testing the CoC thesis is decid-
edly mixed. On the one hand, the results suggesting that confict between
religiously dissimilar states (Henderson 1997, 1998; Gartzke and Gleditsch
2006) may be seen as supportive evidence of this thesis. On the other hand,
more direct analyses of the CoC thesis (Russett et  al. 2000, Henderson
and Tucker 2001, Chiozza 2002, Henderson 2005) suggest that there is
not much evidence to support this thesis. Studies such as Neumayer and
Plümper (2009) and Johns and Davies (2012) show that there is some over-
lap between hypotheses deduced from the CoC argument and alternative
explanations for target selection by terrorists, or public support for the use
of force against religiously dissimilar states. Consequently, we have yet to
establish with a sufcient degree of reliability whether the world has gone
from a Cold War superpower ideological standof to a post–Cold War clash
of civilizations. It may be that the answer to this question is neither defnite
nor simple. However, another possibility is that the empirical research on
the religion-confict nexus is marred by some signifcant theoretical and
methodological problems. In fact, several issues with the empirical research
of the CoC thesis stand out. 
First, religious similarity is largely a function of how we measure reli-
gion and of the level of aggregation at which this concept is measured. For
example, European states would be coded as religiously similar if similarity
is measured in terms of major religions, such as Christianity; however, dif-
ferentiating among Christian religious families (e.g., Catholic, Protestant,
Anglican, or Orthodox) reveals much greater religious diversity. Te same
applies to confict between various religious families in Islam. 
Second, the studies we reviewed do not provide a consistent categoriza-
tion scheme to determine the variability within and similarity across the
worlds’ major religions. For example, Richardson’s (1960) analysis included
thirteen religious groups. Te COW data (Singer 1997) included sixty
religious groups, ranging from major religions to minor denominations.
Gartzke and Gleditsch’s (2006) study focused on six of the nine religious
groups in Ellingsen’s (2000) data. Te range of empirical results suggests
that we need a standard and systematic classifcation of religious groupings. 
Tird, most studies focus on the dyadic level of aggregation. At this level
of analysis we can provide answers to the question who fghts whom, when,
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and (perhaps) why (Singer 1971: 63-4, Bremer 1992). Tis is an impor-
tant level, but it is not clear that this level captures the various theoretical
perspectives that claim a relationship between religious factors and interna-
tional confict. Important arguments on the relationship between religious
adherence, religious diversity, and religious identity, respectively, and the
confict behavior of states, have rarely been systematically examined. For
example, are religiously homogeneous states more or less confict prone
than religiously heterogeneous states? Are states in which there is signif-
cant religious discrimination more confict prone than states that practice
formal freedom of religion and separation between religious and political
institutions? Are states wherein the vast majority of the population practices
a given religion (e.g., Christianity, Islam, Hinduism) more confict prone
than states of other religious majorities? 
Importantly, the CoC thesis’s focus is on changes in the pattern of major
armed conficts during and after the Cold War. It is not evident that the
dyadic level of analysis captures the logical import of this thesis. While
dyadic analyses answer the question of who fghts whom and when, it
focuses on the trees rather than on the forest, and the CoC thesis is about
forests not just pairs of trees. 
Fourth, the research design of most previous studies on the subject is 
marred by signifcant methodological problems. Tese may lead to biased 
inferences. Several issues are apparent. One, the religious characteristics of 
states and dyads are stable over time.4 Tis suggests that most studies that 
focus on a time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) design sufer from stationar-
ity bias because the religious characteristics of states and dyads typically 
vary little over time.5 By repeatedly analyzing the same dyads over time, 
analyses stack time invariant covariates on highly fuctuating outcome 
variables. Tis is likely to bias the resulting estimates and pose a major 
threat to inference. Another problem concerns the size of the population 
analyzed. With a very large number of cases, even a moderate or weak 
relationship becomes statistically signifcant. Even when some studies have 
used theoretical flters to reduce sample size,6 the resulting samples are in 
the tens of thousands of observations. Finally, the dependent variables (the 
outbreak or occurrence of conficts and wars) are extremely skewed: a small 
group of states or dyads are responsible for the vast majority of confict, 
and many states/dyads have experienced no confict involvement. Tis is 
also a source of bias in the results. We discuss these methodological issues at 
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greater length in the appendix to this chapter. Te general point, however, 
is that we need to fnd a way to fx these methodological problems in order 
to derive more reliable inferences regarding the relationship between reli-
gion and international confict. And we need multiple robustness checks 
in order to have greater trust in our fndings and assessments of them. 
Importantly, the focus of this literature on religion and international
confict is quite narrow. Most of the empirical studies use the CoC thesis
either as a source of their argument or as a foil. Tis often results in a lack
of or rather superfcial specifcation of the causal mechanisms that link reli-
gious factors to international confict. In this context, Henne’s (2012) study
ofers a major advance. Henne argues that the relationship between religion
and state has an important efect on the state’s behavior. Specifcally, close
ties between religious and state institutions suggest that the state can use or
is inclined to use religious ideas, values, and symbols when it confronts a
“secular” enemy. His analysis of MIDs over the period 1990–2000 suggests
that, while religious-secular dyads do not exhibit a higher risk of confict,
these MIDs tend to be more severe than MIDs between secular-secular or
religious-religious dyads. His analysis ofers a window into more refned
arguments that are related to the major theoretical perspectives discussed
in chapter 3. 
As noted above, with few exceptions, the theoretical (and in several
cases, the empirical) focus of these studies is rather limited. Te central
question underlying these analyses is rather simplistic:  are religiously
similar states less likely to fght each other than religiously dissimilar
ones? Te “why” issue is asserted, explicitly or implicitly, in the CoC the-
sis. Huntington’s argument is certainly no more sophisticated than the
underlying ideas behind these analyses: it is fundamentally primordialist.
However, Huntington’s (2000) response to the critical empirical tests of
the thesis is simply:  the CoC is a child of the post–Cold War era that
was born out of the decline of the bipolar Cold War system. Te collapse
of the bipolar system brought to the fore underlying intercivilizational
divides that had been overshadowed by the struggle between the com-
munist and capitalist blocs. Tis, too, is not a sophisticated theory of
religion (or culture) and confict. It does not answer the question of why
the superpower rivalry suppressed the intercivilizational tensions prior to
the end of the Cold War. Nor does it provide a clear explanation of why
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civilizational factors rather than national, territorial, economic, or tech-
nological issues emerged as the defning characteristic of post–Cold War
conficts. 
Te poor specifcation of causal mechanisms underlying religious fac-
tors as potential determinants of international confict is perhaps the most
glaring problem with the empirical analyses reviewed above. Tis goes
beyond the narrow focus on CoC-related investigations. Accordingly, we
need a broader perspective that addresses the key questions motivating
this inquiry. Before explaining how our approach addresses these ques-
tions, however, we turn to a more detailed specifcation of the causal
mechanisms that connect religion to confict according to the various per-
spectives we reviewed in chapter 3. Tis is the focus of the next section. 
3. Theory: Religion and International Confict 
We discuss below how each of the theoretical perspectives discussed in
chapter 3 envisions the relationship between religion and confict across
levels of aggregation. We then compare these predictions. Tis comparison
guides and may help us interpret the empirical results. 
3.1 Primordialist Propositions on Religion and International Confict 
Te primordialist perspective views religion as a permanent political force.
Tis force is not equally powerful in all societies, however. It depends on
two principal variables: the religious homogeneity/diversity of the society
and the degree of separation between religious and political institutions.
We also noted that this interaction between religious homogeneity and
state-religious relations ofers a way of distinguishing between and among
societies in terms of the efects of religious variables on their external and
internal behavior. It does not ofer, however, a way of assessing variations
in the foreign policy behavior of a given society over time. Te predic-
tion of this perspective with respect to the efects of religious factors on
the confict behavior of a given state can be summarized by the follow-
ing propositions. We number these hypotheses as P# (where P represents
Primordialism). 
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P1. Te efect of religious factors on the confict behavior of states is
a function of the interaction between the religious homogeneity
of the society and the embeddedness of religion in the political
institutions of the state (i.e. the degree of state-religion sepa-
ration): the more religiously homogeneous the society and the
more intwined its  religious and political institutions the greater
its level of confict involvement. 
P2. Religious similarity between a focal state and its politically rel-
evant international environment (PRIE) has a negative impact
on the state’s confict proneness: the more similar the focal state
to members of its strategic reference group, the lower its level of
confict involvement. 
Te frst proposition follows from the classifcation of religious homogene-
ity and state-religion relations specifed in Table 3.1 (chapter 3). Specifcally,
religiously homogeneous states that have a close association between reli-
gious and political institutions (Type I states) are signifcantly more likely
to engage in confict than religiously diverse states that have a clear separa-
tion between religion and state. Te former types of states are more likely
to use identity factors to motivate their external relations. Religious leaders
are more likely to be in concert with political leaders when it comes to
identifying national interests, delineating friends and foes, and deciding on
the conditions that justify using force. By contrast, religiously diverse states
that practice separation between religion and politics (Type IV states) are
more likely to defne their national interests and treat their environment in
political and strategic terms. Tus, to the extent that they engage in con-
fict, the underlying motivations are not likely to be couched in religious
logic or imperatives. 
To clarify the causal mechanism behind P2, we reiterate the signifcance
of the concept of politically relevant international environment (PRIE,
Maoz 1996). Recall that we discussed in chapter 3 that each state has an
environment it considers highly relevant for its national security. Tis envi-
ronment is composed of a set of neighboring states and of states that have
the capacity to project a signifcant number of troops and military equip-
ment across distances. Te focal state considers the actions and behavior of,
or processes taking place within, the states in that environment to have an
immediate and profound impact on its own national security. It has been
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shown (Maoz and Russett 1993, Lemke and Reed 2001, Maoz et al. 2018)
that if we examine only dyads that are in each other’s PRIE, this accounts
for over 84 percent of the militarized interstate disputes over the period
1816–2010. 
P2 ofers a dynamic dimension of the primordialist perspective. Te
degree of religious homogeneity of a society is unlikely to change dramati-
cally over time, at least not over short time spans.7 However, the size and
composition of the group of actors making up a state’s relevant environ-
ment might change considerably from one point in time to another. For
example, the size of the interstate system changed from 64 states in 1945
to 194 in 2010. Consequently, a state’s neighborhood may change signif-
cantly over time as new states are added, other states secede from previous
states (e.g., the secession of Slovakia from the former Czechoslovakia), and
other multinational states collapse into smaller national units (the breakup
of the Soviet Union, the breakup of Yugoslavia). Global and regional pow-
ers rise, fall, or move up the status ladder.8 Te second proposition sug-
gests that a state’s tendency to fght depends on the degree to which the
focal state is religiously similar to or diferent from its actual or potential
enemies. Because the primordialist perspective asserts that states’ identities
are strongly infuenced by their religion, their attitude toward other states
in their environment is predicated on comparing such identities. A state
surrounded by religiously diferent neighbors, therefore, is likely to view its
PRIE as hostile, while a state surrounded by religiously similar enemies is
less likely to attribute to them hostile intentions. Te behavioral implica-
tions specifed in P2 logically follow this perceptual structure. 
Tese ideas can be extended to the dyadic level. At this level we attempt
to determine enemy selection, that is, to answer the question of who fghts
whom and when. Specifcally, the likelihood of confict according to the
primordial perspective is determined by the religious identity of societies
and by the degree of separation between religion and politics. Specifcally, 
P3. Te higher the religious similarity between two states, the lower
the probability of confict between them. 
P3.1. Te probability of confict between two states is signif-
cantly lower when the two states share the same major reli-
gious group than when they share diferent modal religious
groups. 
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P3.2. Te probability of confict between two states increases
when the largest religious group in one state is the same as
the largest minority religious group in another. 
P.3.3. Te emergence of a strategic rivalry between religiously
dissimilar states is signifcantly higher than between reli-
giously similar states. 
P.3.4. Strategic rivalries between religiously dissimilar states last
signifcantly longer than between religiously similar states. 
P4. Conficts between religiously similar states are likely to be
(a)  shorter, (b)  less violent, and (c) more likely to end in an
agreement than conficts between religiously dissimilar states. 
P5. Te higher the degree of religious homogeneity of one or both
societies—controlling for religious dissimilarity—the more
likely is confict to break out between them. 
P6. Te probability of confict between two states increases with the
degree to which one or both of them is/are characterized by lack
of separation between religion and politics—controlling for reli-
gious dissimilarity. 
Proposition P3 is predicated on the assumption that religion is an ever-
present factor in the politics of states. Terefore, ceteris paribus, religious
similarities between states are said to attract (see next chapter), and religious
diferences are a fundamental source of suspicion, mistrust, and animosity.
Hence, the likelihood of confict increases with the level of religious dissim-
ilarity, and the likelihood of confict diminishes with the level of religious
similarity between dyad members. Te subpropositions P3.1 and P3.2 fol-
low from the general logic spelled out in P3. 
Proposition P3.1 captures a coarser notion of religion similarity based
on the identity of the dominant religious groups in both societies. Tis
proposition assumes that majority religious groups in religiously diverse
societies typically drive the identity of these societies. Terefore when
two states—each of which is composed of a number of religious groups—
share the same majority groups, they would be less likely to fght than
if they shared diferent majority groups. Likewise, P3.2 suggests that
there is a natural tension in dyads composed of members wherein the
majority religious group in one state is the same as the largest minority
religious group in the other state. In these cases, the likelihood of confict
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increases because the majority group in the frst state shares a spiritual
afnity with the minority group in the other state. When the latter group
sufers from discrimination or otherwise has grievances toward the rul-
ing elites, the likelihood of its seeking (and getting) military help from
the former group increases. Tis serves as a frequent cause of confict
between states. 
It is worth spending some time on propositions P3.3 and P3.4 given
their focus on the concept of strategic rivalries and its association with
similar terms used in the literature, such as protracted conficts, or endur-
ing rivalries (Diehl and Goertz, 2000, Tompson 2001, Maoz and Mor
2002, Colaresi, Tompson, and Rasler 2008). Strategic rivalry describes
a long-term disputatious relationship between two states, characterized
by repeated conficts that extend over a long time. Most of these repeated
conficts involve the same issues. Even when confict is not actively tak-
ing place, these states view each other as competitors or enemies. Te
relationship between strategic rivals is laden with suspicion and mistrust.
Nonconfict periods are often used to prepare for future confict by their
arming against each other, using propaganda within their own societies that
stigmatizes the rival, and attempting to form alliances or other measures to
presumably contain the rival and prevent it from accomplishing its goals
(Senese and Vasquez 2008). Prominent strategic rivalries in the post–World
War II era include the US–Soviet rivalry, the Indo–Pakistani rivalry, and
the various dyads of the Arab–Israeli confict (Egypt–Israel, Syria–Israel,
Jordan–Israel). In the post–Cold War era some of the previous rivalries have
continued, some have disappeared, and some new ones (e.g., Israel–Iran,
China–Japan) have reemerged. 
Propositions P3.3 and P3.4 suggest that a protracted state of confict is
more likely to arise between religiously dissimilar and homogeneous states
than between religiously similar or diverse states. Moreover, Proposition
P4 suggests that the characteristics of both isolated conficts and long-term
strategic rivalries between religiously dissimilar states have fundamentally
diferent characteristics compared to conficts or rivalries between reli-
giously similar states. Specifcally, conficts between religiously dissimilar
states are expected to be more violent, last longer, and end in some form of
stalemate or one-sided victory (rather than in a negotiated settlement) than
those involving religiously similar states. Te underlying reasons should be
obvious and are stated numerous times in the relevant literature: conficts
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involving religious diferences are more likely to be over indivisible issues
and values. Religious diferences may induce value confict that can form
an independent reason for confict, but more often, religious diferences
exacerbate or become superimposed on other factors such as territory, natu-
ral resources, or political ideology that often serve as more direct causes of
disputes. 
Religious factors may not only ignite sporadic fghts between states
but also contribute to  entrenchment when such conficts arise. An
added aspect in several such religious divides involves confict over holy
places (Hassner 2009). Such conficts add an element of indivisibility
to other factors that fuel the confict and render it zero-sum in nature,
making them more violent, durable, and less susceptible to negotiated
settlements. 
Proposition P5 is predicated on the notion that religion can serve as an
increasingly important cause of confict when a society is religiously homo-
geneous. Consequently, when dyad members are both religiously homo-
geneous and religiously dissimilar, they are more likely to fght each other.
Proposition P6 presents a similar idea, except that here the leading factor is
the comingling of religious and political institutions. In such cases religion
can be more prominent as an identity marker. Tus, two dissimilar states
that do not separate religion from politics are more likely to fght each other
than states that establish a clear separation between religion and politics. 
Finally, on a regional level, primordialism suggests that we should expect
fewer conficts in religiously homogeneous regions than in religiously
diverse ones. Tis is refected in P7. 
P7. Te likelihood and severity of confict in a given region is neg-
atively related to the degree of religious homogeneity in the
region. 
P7. is a natural extension of the monadic and dyadic hypotheses to the
regional level. Because most of the conficts are between geographically con-
tiguous states, this directly follows. When regions are religiously homoge-
neous (e.g., Catholicism in Latin America, Catholicism and Protestantism
in Europe, or Islam in the Middle East), religious bases of confict are less
likely to prevail. 
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3.2 Instrumentalist Propositions about Religion and International Confict 
As noted in chapter 3, the instrumentalist perspective shares many ideas
with the primordialist approach. In particular, instrumentalists agree that
religion can become an attractive tool of social mobilization for foreign
policy adventures when the society is religiously homogeneous and when
religious and political institutions are closely related. Consequently,
instrumentalism concurs with most of the propositions derived from
primordialism. For example, political elites can more reliably mobilize
religious symbols to secure the support of their constituents for foreign
adventures against religiously diferent societies. By contrast, leaders may
fnd it difcult to depict the opponent as infdels or as posing a threat to
one’s basic religious values if the opponent practices the same religion.
In such cases other identity issues need to be invoked in lieu of religious
symbols to justify risking people’s lives for their country. 
What is unique to the instrumentalist approach, however, is the focus
on the specifc circumstances in which elites are likely to employ religious
symbols as a mobilizing tool. Specifcally, instrumentalists view both the
reliance on religious symbols and the resort to external confict as tools
in the arsenal of political elites. Political elites may invoke either of these
tools or both depending on the specifc goals they have and depending
on the circumstances. One of the most popular theories of confict sug-
gests that political elites often use international confict as a diversionary
tool (Levy 1989). Specifcally, political elites often resort to confict as a
diversionary tactic when they face internal problems and their political
tenure is at risk. Under such circumstances political leaders seek to rally
the population around the fag, thereby having constituents forget or push
aside their domestic grievances and concerns. Tis connects nicely with the
instrumentalist use of religion. Political leaders—especially when religion
and politics cohabitate—can manipulate threats to religious values or holy
places as a cause of confict. Such ideas often serve as tools of mass mobili-
zation. Given the “right” enemy and the “right” causes, religious fervor can
be a powerful motivator for people to risk their lives and properties. 
By contrast, religious values are not useful when trying to mobilize the
society against an enemy that shares religious beliefs. In that case, elites need
to resort to other ideas to mobilize support. Such ideas tend to be more tan-
gible, for example, national security, territory, political values, and so on. 
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Accordingly, the following propositions address the efect of reli-
gious variables on national confict behavior. (Te I# labels are for 
Instrumentalism.) 
I1. Religious factors are more likely to afect the confict behavior of
politically unstable states than politically stable ones. 
I2. Politically unstable states are more likely than politically stable
states to engage in confict against religiously dissimilar states. 
I3. Religious variables are more likely to afect confict levels in
politically unstable than politically stable regions. 
Te causal mechanisms driving these hypotheses are straightforward. 
Political leaders whose political survival is at risk are more likely to use 
confict as a diversionary tool in order to fend of their internal opposition. 
Under such circumstances leaders tend to manipulate threats to basic val-
ues, or lay meaningful claims to assets held by other states. In other words, 
political elites must motivate people so as to make them forget their daily 
problems and risk their lives for their country. Religious values can serve as 
a powerful mobilizer under such circumstances. However, the enemy must 
be the “right” enemy. Terefore, proposition I2 follows, implying diver-
sion. Given that religion is the mobilizing instrument, the enemy must 
be depicted as threatening or challenging religious values, which is more 
convincing when the enemy is religiously diferent. 
Te regional implication also follows. When most countries in the
region are politically unstable, diversionary conficts based on religious dif-
ferences between states are likely to be more prevalent. In stable regions,
although confict may be frequent, the efect of religious variables—such as
the degree of religious similarity in the region—on confict is expected to
be marginal or insignifcant. 
3.3 Constructivist Propositions about Religion and International Confict 
Te constructivist contribution to theorizing the religious-confict nexus
is straightforward as well. Constructivists—as we have seen in chapter 3—
concur with the primordialist notion that religion is an important identity
marker. Tey also view religion as particularly prominent in homoge-
neous societies that lack separation between religion and state. However,
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constructivists suggest that there is variation over time in terms of the
impact of religion as a central identity marker. Religion—as well as other
cultural characteristics such as language, race and ethnicity—competes
with the state’s interactive experience. Constructivists suggest that iden-
tity is shaped both by constant (e.g., cultural) factors and by experien-
tial factors, which change as a function of the interaction between the
focal state and its external environment. Experiential elements of national
identity are also a function of socially constructed ideas on the inter-
national level such as democracy, interdependence, or anarchy. Tus, as
states accumulate more interactive experience, the signifcance of religion
as a predominant identity marker diminishes. Tis implies the following
propositions: 
C1. Religious factors are more likely to afect the confict behavior of
states at their early stages of national independence than at latter
stages. 
C2.Religiously similar states are less likely to engage in confict if one
or both states are newly formed than if both have been indepen-
dent for a long time. 
C3.Religious factors are more likely to afect confict levels in newly
formed regions than in regions in which most states have been
independent for a long time. 
Again, the intuition here is straightforward. Consider C1. State forma-
tion has typically taken one of two forms: the nation-state model and the 
state-nation model. Te nation-state model is largely predicated on social 
contract theories. Tis process involves, frst, the presence of a community 
within a defned territory, whose members share cultural or civic charac-
teristics, historical experience, and a common vision of the future. Second, 
this community forges political institutions that are designed to safeguard 
individuals’ basic rights and protect the community from outside preda-
tors. In the nation-state model, the nation precedes the state, and the state 
is defned in terms of an existing set of identity markers that bind members 
of this community together. 
Te state-nation model is one where a community (that might be more
or less diverse culturally) is governed by an outside colonial power. Tat
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colonial power chooses to pull out from that territory (or is forced to do so
by indigenous resistance) and transfers power to a local elite. Te key task
of elites in the newly established state is to forge—often from scratch—a
national identity. In most cases, postcolonial communities did not have
prior experience of self-governance as an integrated political unit. Te pri-
mary loyalty of individuals may be to tribes, clans, nations preceding the
colonial era, or other traditional institutions other than the post-colonial
state. In such cases, to the extent that common religion dominates other
cultural, ethnic, racial or ideological characteristics as a common denomi-
nator of a sufciently large portion of the new state’s population, religion
can become a key element of national identity. 
Tus, the nation-state model emphasizes religion as a primordial aspect
of the community’s identity. By contrast, the state-nation model suggests
that religion may be used instrumentally by the elites of the new states as a
way of forging national identity where none exists. In either case, religion is
a key determinant of identity and citizenship in new states. Once such states
acquire interactional experience, however, they afect the religious aspects
of identity. In some cases such interactive experience may in fact boost the
importance of religion as a prism through which elites and masses in states
identify friends and foes. In other cases, however, elements of national iden-
tity change as a function of the interaction between the state and other states
in the system so that religion plays a less prominent role in the identifcation
of friends and foes or the defnition of interests. Tese ideas extend to the
dyadic and regional level as well, and this is expressed in hypotheses C.2 and
C.3, which expands the vision of the constructivist paradigm to larger levels
of analysis. C3 also accounts for the historical formation of regions and the
evolution of dyadic relations over time. 
3.4 The Clash of Civilizations and International Confict 
Te CoC thesis suggests a diferent breakdown of the linkages between
religion and confict. As we have seen in chapter 3, the key argument of the
CoC thesis is that intercivilizational confict has been simmering below the
surface for a long time, but during the Cold War era it was overshadowed by
the struggle between the superpowers and their satellite states. Importantly,
as the Cold War ended, these underlying intercivilizational tensions resur-
faced. Currently, these tensions defne the key divides in world politics.
Accordingly, we deduce the following proposition: 
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CoC1. Te likelihood of confict between religiously dissimilar
states increased during the post–Cold War era compared to
the Cold War era. 
CoC1.1. Tis diference can be seen across levels of analysis. 
3.5 The Integrative Theory of Religion and International Confict 
We pointed out in chapter 3 that these perspectives share some features in
common, but also difer in some important respects. Our theory builds on
the strengths of the various arguments. We agree with the primordialist per-
spective that religion is an important identity marker and helps defne not
only the nation’s character but also some fundamental attitudes of the state’s
leaders and general population toward their environment. We also agree
that religion becomes a more important political instrument when religious
institutions and political institutions are closely aligned than when they are
formally or informally separated. We agree as well with the instrumentalist
perspective that political leaders are more likely to invoke religious mobi-
lization strategies when they feel that their political survival is at risk than
when they feel a high degree of job security. 
However, our theory structures these arguments within a more coher-
ent framework. We distinguish between the structural constraints under
which political leaders operate, and the needs/opportunities they have to
build or consolidate their winning coalition so as to ensure their political
survival. We adopt therefore the structural arguments of the primordialist
perspective about the interaction between (a) the religious homogeneity of
the state’s population and (b) the relations between political and religious
institutions. We also consider the structure of the state’s PRIE to impose
constraints (or incentives) on the use of religious factors to motivate con-
fict. At the same time, our theory supports the more dynamic aspect of the
instrumentalist perspective suggesting that the use of religious factors as
motivators of confict mobilization increases as the leadership’s job security
is at risk. With respect to international confict involvement this implies
the following: 
IT1. A state is likely to engage in confict when its leader’s job secu-
rity is at risk and it is 
a. religiously homogeneous, 
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b. characterized by close relations between political and reli-
gious institutions, and 
c. surrounded by religiously dissimilar states in its PRIE. 
IT2. Te probability of confict between two states increases with
the degree of instability in one or both states when 
a. they are religiously dissimilar, 
b. the major religious group in one state is the same as the
second-largest religious group in the other state, and 
c. one or both maintain close relations between religious and
political institutions. 
IT3. Conficts between states characterized by the aforementioned
structural and situational conditions tend to be (a) more vio-
lent, (b) last longer, (c) less likely to end in a negotiated settle-
ment, and (d) evolve into strategic rivalries than those that lack
some or all of these conditions. 
In short, the integrative theory posits that religious homogeneity, religion-
state relations, and the religious structure of the state’s PRIE by themselves
do not account for national or dyadic confict. Rather, it is the interaction
between leaders’ job security, the religious structure of the society and the
state, and the structure of the state’s PRIE that combine to account for such
behavior. 
4. Research Design 
Tis section provides a general and intuitive discussion of the methodology
we employ in this chapter. A detailed explication of the data, measures, and
methods we use in our analyses is given in the appendix to this chapter.
Readers who are not well versed (or interested) in technical details about the
research design can skip the appendix without much loss. 
4.1 Units of Analysis: Who and What Are We Studying? 
Our analyses progress along several levels of analysis (or levels of aggrega-
tion): national, dyadic, and regional. We discuss briefy the type of analyses
we conduct at each level. A  level of analysis contextualizes the key unit
that is the focus of research. Typically, it identifes a type of actor or set of
actors that we wish to study, such as an individual, a group of people, an
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institution, or, in our case, states or groups of states. It also identifes an
interval of time during which we observe that unit, such as a day, a month,
a year, or a number of years. Here we use several levels of analysis (aggrega-
tion) to examine the linkages between religion and confict. 
At the national level of analysis we focus on the behavior of all states in
the international system over the period 1945–2010. For a more restricted
period (1990–2010), we examine whether the relationship between politi-
cal and religious institutions within a state afects its propensity to engage
in confict (this is due to data limitations on the key variable of interest). In
this set of analyses, we control for other factors that are known to afect a
state’s confict behavior. 
At the national level of analysis, we focus on two types of observa-
tions: the nation-year and the nation-history. Te nation-year unit relies on
observations consisting of each state’s behavior for each year during which
it existed as an independent system member. Te nation-history level allows
us to examine general tendencies of states over their entire history (within
the period 1945–2010). As we explain in the appendix, this unit of analysis,
which is not commonly used in studies of international confict and coop-
eration, ofers another layer of understanding of the relationship between
national attributes—including religious characteristics of societies—and
national behavior. 
At the dyadic level we focus on all politically relevant dyads over the
period 1945–2010. A politically relevant dyad (Maoz and Russet 1993) is
a pair of states that satisfes one of the following three conditions: (a) it
is contiguous through direct land or maritime border, or through colo-
nial possessions of one of the states, (b) one of them is a major power,
or (c) one is a regional power and the other is any state within the same
region. We focus only on politically relevant dyads because these are
theoretically and empirically the most likely dyads to engage in confict.
At the dyadic level we conduct additional analyses that test propositions
P4 and IT3. Tese analyses include all possible dyads due to some meth-
odological considerations, which we discuss below. 
Here, too, we examine a dyad-year unit of observation, meaning that we
observe each dyad during each year of its existence. We also study the dyad
history by aggregating all relationships over the entire period of the dyad’s
existence. Tis allows us again to investigate general propensities of dyadic
conficts rather than specifc fuctuations over time. As was the case for the
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national level of analysis, we examine diferences between “new” and “old”
dyads, between “stable” and “unstable” dyads, and between the Cold War
and post–Cold War periods in terms of the efect of religious variables on
dyadic confict. 
Finally, at the regional level, our unit of analysis is the region-year,
using the COW project’s regional classifcation. We examine patterns
within given regions and between regions in terms of the efects of regional
characteristics—including the degree of religious cohesion within the
region as a whole, or the average religious similarity of region members—
on levels of regional confict. 
4.2 Key Measures 
Dependent variables. 
MID occurrence. Using the dyadic militarized interstate dispute
(DYMID, Maoz et al. 2018), we defne the following occurrence vari-
ables. First, at the nation-year level, a MID occurrence variable is assigned
a value of one if the focal state was involved in at least one dyadic MID
during the given year, and zero otherwise. Likewise, at the  dyad-year
level, we assign a value of one to the MID occurrence if the states fought
at least one MID against each other during that year, and zero otherwise. 
War occurrence. Tis variable is defned the same way as the MID occur-
rence variable if the MID involvement of the state or if the MID between
dyad members reached the level of war (as defned in Maoz et al. 2018),
and zero otherwise. 
Hostility score. Using Maoz’s (1982) hostility scale, we sum the level of
hostility across all dyadic MIDs in which a state was involved in a given
year. Tis measure takes into account both the number of MID dyads of a
given state and the level of hostility of each. 
Escalation. Tis analysis focuses only on MIDs that actually occurred.
Escalation receives a score of one if a given MID escalated to an interstate
war, and zero otherwise. 
Agreement. Maoz et  al. (2018) coded the outcome and settlement of
each dyadic confict. Tere are several categories of MID settlement. We
assign a value of one to a MID that ended in a negotiated settlement, and
zero otherwise. 
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Duration. Duration of MID in days. 
Strategic rivalry. We use the strategic rivalry dataset (Tompson and
Dreyer 2011). A strategic rivalry receives a score of one in its frst year of
outbreak, and zero otherwise. We consider each year of a rivalry as missing
for the analysis of rivalry outbreak. 
Rivalry duration. Number of years during which rivalry was underway. 
Independent Variables 
Te hypotheses discussed above involve several independent variables.
We discuss them briefy by level of analysis. 
Level of religious homogeneity. Te data for religious homogeneity, as well
as for percentages of specifc religious groups within states are all drawn
from the WRP dataset (Maoz and Henderson 2013). We use several mea-
sures of religious homogeneity. Tese are discussed in greater detail in the
appendix to this chapter. Te one we employ in the presentation of the
results in the next section is the level of religious homogeneity. Recall the
Index of Qualitative Variation (IQV) we discussed in the previous chapter.
Tis index varies between zero, if the entire state’s population practices a
single religion (or belongs to a single religious family within that religion),
and one, if there are two or more religious groups (say k religious groups),
and each of these religious groups accounts for 1/k of the state’s popula-
tion. In other words, religious diversity is maximal if the state’s population
is distributed equally among several religious groups. For convenience, we
break down this index into three levels so that high homogeneity (i.e. low
diversity) accounts for IQV values of 0.25 or lower, moderate homogeneity
(i.e. moderate diversity) accounts for IQV values of above 0.25 and below
0.66, and low homogeneity (i.e. high diversity) accounts for IQV values
0.66 and above. We show analyses based on actual IQV values in the book’s
website (Table A5.1). 
Religion-State relations. We use two separate datasets to generate this
index; both were mentioned in previous chapters. Te frst is the religion
and state (RS) dataset (Fox 2016). As noted, this dataset covers most states
during the period 1988–2008, and it contains signifcant information
about various forms of religious discrimination, religious regulation, and
religious legislation. Te shortcoming of this dataset is that, while it is spa-
tially general—including most states during that period—it covers only a
limited time span compared to the longer period we are interested in. Tis
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is particularly problematic if we wish to get a sense of the efect of religion-
state relations during the Cold War era. 
Second, we use the comparative constitution (CCS) dataset (Elkins,
Ginsburg, and Melton 2014). Te advantage of this dataset is that it covers a
long temporal span. Te downside of this dataset is that it covers only states
that have constitutional documentation. Nevertheless, this dataset allows
us to examine two variables that gauge the relations between religion and
state. First, does the constitution contain a freedom of religion clause? If it
does, this provides evidence of relative religious freedom, which suggests
some degree of potential or actual separation between religious and politi-
cal institutions. Second, the dataset contains information about the status
of religious law in the constitution. In some cases, religious law is deemed
superior to non-religious law. Tat is, laws contrary to religious laws are
deemed void. In other cases, religious law is a basis for general law. And in
still other cases, religious law has no special standing in the constitution. 
We use a combination of the religion and state variables on religious
discrimination, religious legislation, and religious regulation, as well as the
religious freedom and religious legislation variables from the CCS dataset
to generate a three-level variable of religion-state relations. Tis variable gets
a value of 1 = separate, when either or both the RS and the CCS suggest
that the state practices a relative independence of religious and state institu-
tions. It assumes a value of 2 = some relationship, if there is indication of
some level of religious discrimination, regulation, or legislation in either
the RS and the CCS dataset or both. Finally, the religion and state variable
assumes a value of 3 = cohabitation, if the state’s constitution or its laws and
practices indicate high levels of religion legislation, discrimination, and/or
regulation. We discuss the generation of this variable in greater detail in the
chapter’s appendix.9 
Religious similarity state-PRIE. Te data for this variable are drawn from
(a) the WRP dataset, and (b) the defnition of PRIE adapted from Maoz
(1996, 2010). We expand on this measure in the appendix, along with sev-
eral examples. Here, however, we describe the intuition for this measure. As
noted, the PRIE of a state consists of (a) its immediate neighbors, (b) all the
states in the focal state’s region designated as regional powers (states in the
region that are capable of projecting force in the region), and (c) all global
powers (states that are capable of projecting power across the globe). We
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code the degree of religious similarity between the focal state and each state
in its PRIE separately. Te degree of religious similarity between two states
is based on the degree to which the distribution of the religious adherents in
one state is similar to or diferent from the distribution of religious adher-
ence of the other. 
For example, two states that have both a Christian–Catholic majority of
0.8 and a Muslim–Sunni minority of 0.2 will receive a religious similarity
score of 1; their populations are exactly alike in terms of religious adher-
ence. By contrast when we compare a state that has a Christian–Catholic
majority of 0.8 and a Muslim–Sunni minority of 0.2 with a state that has a
Muslim–Sunni majority of 0.8 and a Christian–Catholic minority of 0.2,
we get a religious similarity score of 0.32. Tese two states have the same
religious groups, but the distribution of adherents in these groups is dra-
matically diferent. In general, the religious similarity score varies between
zero, if the two states have dramatically diferent religious groups (for exam-
ple, one state has all of its population practicing Sunni Islam and the other
state has its entire population practicing Protestant-Christianity), and 1, if
the states have the same religious groups and the distribution of adherents
over these groups is the same in both states. 
Once we calculate the dyadic religious similarity between a focal state 
and each of the states that constitutes a member of its PRIE, we average 
the religious similarity score over the PRIE membership. Tus, a high sim-
ilarity value means that the state’s PRIE is composed of states that are reli-
giously similar to itself; a low similarity value suggests a signifcant religious 
diference between the focal state’s population and its PRIE membership. 
Percent adherents. In some of the analyses we examine whether states
dominated or populated by specifc religious groups are more or less con-
fict prone than states dominated or populated by other religious groups.
Accordingly, we use the percent adherents of certain religions in a given
state. For example, we use the percent Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, and
Secular (atheists, agnostics, or people with no religious afliation) as a pos-
sible predictor of confict proneness. 
Coup risk. To measure the degree of political leaders’ job security—a cen-
tral variable in the integrated theory—we use the coup risk measure devel-
oped by Sudduth (2017). Tis variable relies on the Powell and Tyne (2011)
coup dataset that lists all instances of irregular and extralegal government
and political changes or attempted changes over the period 1945–2010.
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Sudduth developed a Bayesian method of calculating the potential risk of a
coup in a given state at a given time point. Tis method combines the his-
tory of coups in that state, per-capita GDP, democracy score, and whether
the current regime is a military regime. Using a logit model, he calculates
the expected probability of a coup in a given state. Replicating his analysis
allows us to generate a similar index (which in our case ranges from three
hundredth of 1 percent to about 20 percent). We partition this variable into
two levels: the low-risk level has a coup risk of 5 percent or lower and the
high-risk level has a coup risk of above 5 percent.10 
Control variables. 
We use a number of control variables commonly employed in empiri-
cal studies of international confict, including regime score (or democracy/
nondemocracy variable), national capabilities, reputational status (minor
power, regional power, major power), number of allies, log trade (imports
and exports), number of IGO memberships, and the past confict expe-
rience of the focal state. We discuss these variables in more detail in the
appendix. For the nation-history level of analysis, we average the depen-
dent, independent, and control variables over the state’s history. Again, we
demonstrate this in the appendix. Te dyad-year level of analysis involves
largely the same variables, but their measurement is based on dyadic values. 
In terms of independent variables, we employ the following measures. 
Religious homogeneity. We use the individual religious homogeneity
variables of dyad members to generate a combined religious homogeneity
index. Specifcally, this index has a value of low homogeneity if both dyad
members have low individual homogeneity scores (both are religiously
diverse), and it has a value of high religious homogeneity if both dyad
members have a high religious homogeneity (i.e. both have low diversity
scores) scores. Medium levels of religious homogeneity are mixes of low
and medium religious homogeneity scores of individual members. 
Religion and state. We use a similar strategy as in the case of religious
homogeneity to generate a dyadic religion-state classifcation given individ-
ual religion-state classifcations. Specifcally dyads composed of states that
have a separation of religion and state are designated as “separate” dyads;
dyads composed of members both of which exhibit a strong association
between religion and state are designated as “cohabitation” dyads; other
dyads are in the “some relation” category. 
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Coup risk. We combine the coup-risk measures of both states in the
following way: 

0 if couprisk i 0 and couprisk 0 = = j 
couprisk ij = 1 if couprisk 1 or cou prisk j 1 = = i  2 if couprisk i 1 and couprisk 1 = = j 
Control variables are the same as in most dyadic analyses of interstate
confict and include joint democracy, alliance, reputational status, distance,
trade dependence, IGO comembership, and past confict/enmity relations.
Tese are discussed in the appendix. 
Te dyad-history level of analysis is also based on averaging dyad-year
fgures over the common history of dyad members. At the region-year level
of analysis, we average both dependent, independent, and control variables
over all states in a given region for a given year. A more detailed explanation
is provided in the appendix. 
4.3 Estimation Methods 
Several issues are covered here. A more detailed discussion underlying the
modeling decisions is given in the appendix. First, our analyses are based
on methods that have been employed in many previous studies of interna-
tional confict. However, we also make some methodological modifcations
in order to mitigate some inferential problems associated with the more
traditional methods. Tese methodological modifcations help shed a more
reliable light on the complex relationship between religion and confict. In
particular, we note that the values of the religious variables do not change
much over time for a given state, dyad, or even region. Tis applies as well
to other control variables that are used in the more traditional analyses.
Terefore, analyses that are based on the entire population of cases are sub-
ject to what is commonly referred to as “stationarity bias.” What that means,
in laymen’s terms, is that while the level of confict a state experiences may
fuctuate quite considerably from one year to another, its religious com-
position changes very slowly—if at all—over short time spans. Terefore,
inferences drawn from analyses where each state appears repeatedly at each
year, are apt to be biased. 
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In order to overcome this bias as well as other biases inherent in the
data, we use a repeated sampling process known as “bootstrapping.”
Bootstrapping involves drawing a random sample from the population of
cases, running a specifc analysis on this sample, and repeating this process
a large number of times. Te cumulative results of these repeated analyses
are then evaluated statistically, to remove any biases that may characterize
results drawn directly from the entire population (e.g., efects of outliers on
the results). Our inferences are based both on this strategy and on the more
conventional strategy of analyzing all observations. We consider as mean-
ingful only those results that are consistent across strategies of data analyses. 
Second, in order to enable a meaningful test of the integrative theory,
we need to focus on the interaction between the anticipated level of regime/
leadership insecurity—as measured by the coup-risk variable—and the
probability of confict between the focal state and religiously dissimilar
states. Specifcally, the theory anticipates that political leaders at risk are
likely to use religious values and symbols to mobilize support for the initia-
tion or escalation of confict. Such a strategy can be efective if the “enemy”
is diferent, if it threatens or violates important religious values held by
the focal state’s population. Hence, we would expect to fnd a signifcant
interaction between coup risk and confict against religiously dissimilar
states. So, the key to testing our theory is not only in fnding a relationship
between the more static elements of religious similarity or religion-state
relations and confict propensity. It is also this dynamic interaction between
the leadership’s job security and its willingness and ability to use religion as
a mobilization weapon that forms the core of the theory. 
Tird, when analyzing the characteristics of conficts (duration, pro-
pensity for escalation, outcomes), we need to take into account the pos-
sibility that states select themselves into MIDs in a nonrandom fashion.
Specifcally, the factors that afect states’ decisions about initiating a MID,
or responding forcefully to a challenge by an opponent, may have an
impact on the characteristics and outcomes of these MIDs. Consequently,
we need to control for “selection bias.” Accordingly, in the analysis of MID
and rivalry characteristics, we use Heckman selection models (Heckman
1976, Newey 2009), which frst use MID outbreak as the selection vari-
able and then use the specifc MID characteristic as the dependent variable.
For example, when we test whether a dyadic MID escalated to war, we use
dyadic MID outbreak as a selection variable. Te key independent variables
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that we believe afect states’ selection into MIDs include PRIE member-
ship and joint democracy. We then use the selection equation as a basis for
estimating those MIDs that escalated to war, given that a MID broke out. 
5. Results 
We provide herein a summary of the multiple empirical analyses we have
conducted. Te book’s website contains a detailed outline of the results.
Also, in order to enable readers who are not versed in the intricacies of
complex statistical analyses to understand the results we focus on graphi-
cal presentation and intuitive interpretation of the results. As noted, the
appendix provides detailed information about the things contained “under
the hood” of these inferences, and the mechanics of the various analyses. 
5.1 National Level of Analysis 
Table 5.1 provides the summary results of this set of analyses. We focus our
discussion on the religious characteristics of states and of their PRIE. Te
most robust result concerns the efect of the similarity between the focal
state and its PRIE on the probability and magnitude of the state’s confict
involvement. As the degree of similarity between the religious makeup of
the focal state and that of its PRIE increases, its level of confict involve-
ment declines. Te degree of the focal state’s religious homogeneity has a
positive efect on the probability of MID outbreak and on the hostility
score the state applies during these MIDs. However, religious homogeneity
does not signifcantly raise the risk of escalation. 
Secularism increases the risk of MID outbreak, but it reduces the level of
hostility of such MIDs. Secularism does not seem to afect the probability
of dispute escalation to war. Te relations between religious and political
institutions in states do not seem to afect confict involvement, regardless
of the measure of confict used. 
However, the focus of our theory is not on the independent efects
of these factors on confict propensity. Rather, we explore the conditions
under which religious factors are apt to be used by political elites as tools
for mobilization—in this case for confict-related mobilization. Our expec-
tation was that leaders in politically unstable systems—those perceiving
a high level of job insecurity—are more likely to invoke religious issues
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Table 5.1 The effects of religious characteristics of states on confict behavior, 1945–
2010: nation-year unit of analysis 
MIDs Escalation Hostility 
Religious Homogeneity 0.098* 0.06 18.537** 
(0.048) (0.112) (4.728) 
Pct. Nonreligious 1.157** 0.21 -430.58** 
(0.257) (0.513) (45.37) 
Religious Similarity State-PRIE -2.34** -5.803** -84.094* 
(0.673) (1.438) (36.253) 
Religion-State Relations 0.12 -0.22 4.29 
(0.113) (0.247) (6.955) 
Rel. Sim. State-PRIE#Coup Risk -1.456** 1.94+ -61.827* 
(0.481) (1.049) (25.984) 
Rel. Sim. State-PRIE#Relig.-State Relations 1.598** 2.718* 6.64 
(0.528) (1.256) (28.932) 
Cohabitation 2.414* 0.29 136.18* 
(0.947) (2.842) (54.574) 
Coup Risk Level 0.983** -0.19 22.346** 
(0.129) (0.272) (7.924) 
Constant -1.167** -0.57 58.597** 
(0.259) (0.514) (20.615) 
N 6,707 2,311 6,707 
Chi-Square/F-statistic 701.144 107.410 15.967 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.1645 0.061 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. Control variables are omitted to conserve 
space. Full results are given in the book’s appendix 
# Indicates an interaction term 
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 
as pretexts to launch diversionary conficts. Tis is more likely to happen
when the environment can be seen as “religiously hostile,” that is, when
there is a sharp diference between the religious makeup of the focal state
and that of states in its environment. Likewise, when there is a close rela-
tionship between religious and political institutions, political leaders are
more likely to invoke religion as a cause of the rift between themselves and
the environment. 
To assist the interpretation of the numerical results, we show graphi-
cally how the interaction between the focal state’s political situation and the
structure of its environment afects the focal state’s propensity for confict.
Tis is given in Figure 5.1. 
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Te top-left panel of this fgure (5.1.1) shows that the probability of
confict involvement of a state declines as the degree of religious similarity
between itself and its PRIE increases. Tis is true for both low coup-risk
states and high coup-risk states. However, the probability of MID involve-
ment of high-coup risk states is nearly twice that of low-coup risk states
when the religious makeup of the focal state is markedly diferent from that
of its PRIE. Tis diference between the confict propensity of low and high
coup-risk states diminishes as such states’ religious makeup is similar to
their PRIE. In such cases, political leaders in trouble, and political leaders
who feel “safe,” behave in pretty much the same manner. 
Te top-right panel (Fig.  5.1.2) suggests the probability of confict
involvement of states decreases as a function of religious similarity between
the focal state and its PRIE. However, the decline seems to be marginally
sharper for states that practice separation of religion from politics com-
pared to states that maintain a close relation between religious and political
institutions. 
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Note: vertical lines are 95% confdence intervals. 
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Fig. 5.1.3 suggests stark diferences between states that practice separa-
tion of religious and political institutions and those that have close religion-
state relations. Te confict propensity of states that practice religion-politics
separation is not afected by coup risk. By contrast, the combined efect
of coup-risk and religion-state relations is signifcant for states that have a
moderate or close relationship between religion and politics. Tese results
lend support to our argument that it is not only the degree of dissimilarity
between the focal state and its environment that makes the state more prone
to fght but also the combination of specifc political conditions within the
state and the structure of its environment that interact to produce a higher
or lower propensity to fght other states. 
Figure 5.1.4 addresses the interaction between religious homogeneity
and state-religion relations and its efect on confict behavior. Te most
important result in this fgure is the diference between states that practice
separation of religion and state and those that have a moderate or close
relationship between these institutions. States practicing religion-state sepa-
ration tend to reduce their involvement in interstate confict when their
societies are increasingly homogeneous in terms of religion. By contrast,
states that have a moderate or close association between religious and politi-
cal institutions tend to increase their confict involvement as their societies
are increasingly homogeneous in terms of religion. Tis provides support
for P1. 
We fnd no consistent statistical relationship between any specifc reli-
gion and confict proneness (see appendix). Te notion that a specifc
religion (e.g., “Islam has bloody borders,” Huntington, 1996, 35) is more
likely associated with confict behavior does not appear to hold. However,
several results in the table above seem to indicate some support for CoC
claims. In particular, the negative efect of state-PRIE religious similarity on
confict suggests that states are more likely to fght with religiously difer-
ent enemies than with religiously similar ones. We will return to this point
when we explore dyadic-level confict propensities. 
Te most important prediction of the CoC thesis, however, is given
in proposition CoC1 above, which suggests that the efect of religious
variables on confict has become more pronounced since the end of the
Cold War. To test this proposition, we examine how diferent religious fac-
tors afect national confict involvement patterns during the Cold War era
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compared to the post–Cold War era. Te results of these analyses are shown
in Figure 5.2. 
Te results reported in Figure 5.2.1 uniformly and conclusively con-
trast the expectations of the CoC thesis: the efect of religious factors on 
interstate confict was signifcantly more pronounced during the Cold War 
era compared to the post–Cold War era. First, the negative relationship 
between religious similarity state-to-PRIE and confict that characterized 
the Cold War era is reversed during the post–Cold War era. Specifcally, dur-
ing the post–Cold War era, states are more likely to get involved in confict 
when they face a similar politically relevant environment than when they 
face a dissimilar environment (Fig. 5.2.1). Second, we also fnd a reversal 
of the relationship when we examine the efect of religious homogeneity 
on confict over time. During the Cold War era, religiously homogeneous 
states were more likely to engage in confict than religiously heterogeneous 
states, but during the post–Cold War era, the inverse is happening: reli-
giously heterogeneous states are more likely to engage in confict than reli-
giously homogeneous ones (Figure 5.2.2). 
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When we test more complex interactions that follow from our inte-
grative theory, we fnd interesting temporal diferences. In general, states
that practice a close relationship between religious and political institutions
(Type I or Type III states in Table 3.1) are generally more likely to engage
in confict than states that separate religion from politics (Type II or Type
IV states). Tis is true for both the Cold War and the post–Cold War era.
However, once we take into account the religious similarity between the
focal state and its PRIE, we fnd again a relationship reversal. During the
Cold War era, the likelihood of confict involvement declined as a func-
tion of religious similarity between the focal state and its PRIE, whereas in
the post–Cold War era, this relationship became positive and signifcant
(Figure 5.2.3). We fnd a similar pattern when we take into account the
efect of coup risk and religious similarity state-PRIE on national confict
involvement (Figure 5.2.4). 
With regard to the propositions deduced from constructivism we 
fnd—in the results reported in the appendix—that the efect of religious 
factors on the confict behavior of “new” states is not signifcantly diferent 
from the efects of these factors on the confict behavior of more mature 
states. Tus, our results so far do not seem to lend support to the claim 
that religious factors afect “new” states more than they afect more mature 
ones. What is more likely is that factors superseding religious identity, 
but central to the socialization of new states into the political, economic, 
and social—as well as cultural—status quo practices and institutions that 
obtain in the global system, have a much greater infuence on new states. 
For example, Maoz (1989, 1996) demonstrated that new states emerging 
from a revolutionary process are more likely to become involved in inter-
national confict than those that emerge from an evolutionary process. 
Such impacts seem more infuential on the confict propensities of new 
states than religious factors. Further, given our temporal focus on the post-
WWII era, and the reality that the lion’s share of new states emerged from 
Western colonialism in Africa and Asia, then processes related to decolo-
nization are more likely to infuence the socialization of the new states of 
the era (Henderson 2015). 
We now turn to an analysis of the nation-history unit of analysis.
Table 5.2 provides the results of these analyses. Te results of the nation-
history analysis largely confrm those of the nation-year analyses. Te degree
of religious similarity between the focal state and its PRIE is the only reli-
gious characteristic that consistently dampens national confict proneness.
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In addition, states that practice a close association between religious insti-
tutions and political institutions tend to have more MIDs and display a
higher average level of hostility than states that are characterized by a sepa-
ration of religion and state. However, the former types of states have been
no more war prone than the latter type of states. In contrast to the expecta-
tions of the primordialist perspective, religious homogeneity does not have
a signifcant efect on confict proneness. Finally, in this case too, we do
not fnd support for arguments linking any particular religion to higher
or lower levels of confict involvement over national histories. It does not
appear that states with a majority practicing a specifc religion tend to be
more or less confict prone than states with other religious characteristics. 
Te national history level ofers a good test regarding the efects of the
more permanent characteristics of states—those that exhibit little variation
over states’ history, such as religious homogeneity. At the same time, this
type of analysis does not permit meaningful tests of interaction efects that
emphasize dynamic aspects of religion. Tis prevents testing the hypoth-
eses linking regime stability to the tendency to invoke religious factors as a
mobilization tool for confict. 
Table 5.2 Effect of religious factors on confict history of nations 
MIDs Hostility War 
Religious Homogeneity 0.01 2.78 -0.28 
(0.035) (8.855) (0.321) 
Secularism -0.09 11.05 1.911* 
(0.14) (38.717) (0.831) 
Religious Similarity State-PRIE -0.23* -33.15* -1.915* 
(0.098) (15.966) (0.898) 
Religion-State Relations 0.351** 64.95* 1.20 
(0.103) (28.354) (0.611) 
Coup Risk 0.05 5.00 -0.01 
(0.029) (6.724) (0.29) 
State-Rel Relations # Relig. Sim- State-PRIE -0.41* -64.44 -1.25 
(0.166) (47.633) (1.157) 
Constant 0.18 43.118** 1.474* 
(0.1) (16.684) (0.587) 
N 185 185 185 
F/Chi-Squared 23.616 121.637 143.579 
R-Squared 0.482 0.606 0.402 
Notes: Control variables omitted to conserve space. Full results are reported in the book’s website. 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
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5.2 Dyadic Level of Analysis 
Table 5.3 provides the key results of the relationships between the religious
characteristics of dyads and the probability/severity of confict between
their members. Figure  5.4.1 shows the efects of religious similarity on
dyadic confict, controlling for the intervening variables of regime instabil-
ity, dyad years, and Cold War/post–Cold War periods. 
As was the case with the nation-level analysis, religious similarity has a
robust negative efect on the probability and magnitude of dyadic confict.
When we measure religious similarity in coarser terms—that is, whether
dyad members share the same majority religion—we fnd a similar result.
Dyads that share the same largest religious group are signifcantly less likely
to fght than dyads that do not share the same major religious group (results
Table 5.3 Religion and dyadic confict—Dyad-year unit bootstrapping results (except for 
Escalation) 
Independent Variable MIDs Escalation Hostility Strategic 
Rivals 
Religious Similarity -1.07** -0.66 -1.602** -0.381** 
(0.308) (0.743) (0.61) (0.107) 
Religious Homogeneity 
Medium 0.066 0.191 0.638* -0.234 
(0.116) (0.231) (0.251) (0.132) 
High 0.041 0.151 0.506 0.587** 
(0.208) (0.472) (0.44) (0.216) 
Religion-State Relations 
Some Relation 0.301** 0.984** 0.665** 0.742** 
(0.117) (0.229) (0.183) (0.138) 
Cohabitation 0.087 -0.151 0.342 0.813** 
(0.146) (0.359) (0.233) (0.163) 
Coup Risk#Religious Similarity 1.181** -1.188 0.106 1.363** 
(0.349) (0.76) (0.451) (0.359) 
Coup Risk -0.162 1.437** -0.033 -0.087 
(0.165) (0.317) (0.231) (0.181) 
N 56,150 56,150 56,150 504,551 
Chi-Square 624.966 545.486 2694.257 2719.056 
R-Squared 0.196 0.297 0.078 0.939 
Notes: 
1. Results are based on 300 bootstrapped samples (with replacement) of size 15,000 each. Escalation 
analyses based on entire dataset. 
2. Control variables omitted to conserve space; full results are shown on the book’s website 
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reported on book website). Te efect of religious homogeneity on dyadic
confict is positive, as expected, but this efect is less robust than the reli-
gious similarity variable. 
As was the case with the nation-level analyses, we did not fnd any
religious combination to be more confict prone than another. In particu-
lar, we did not fnd a West versus Rest efect, nor did we fnd that dyads
composed of one member who is predominantly Christian and another
member predominantly Muslim were more confict prone than any other
dyad combination. However, we did fnd that the likelihood of confict
between Christian states is signifcantly lower than expected by chance. We
also found that Muslim dyads are less likely to be involved in conficts than
what we would expect by chance alone. (Tese results are also reported in
the book website.) 
A more demanding test of our own theory focuses on the relationship
between political instability and the tendency to invoke religious factors as
instruments of social mobilization for diversionary purposes. Specifcally,
we examine the interaction between dyadic instability and religious similar-
ity and the way it afects MID outbreak and MID escalation to war. Te
results are reported in Figure 5.3. 
Figure 5.3.1 shows that both low-coup-risk states and high-coup-risk
states are more likely to fght religiously dissimilar enemies. A similar result
is given in Figure 5.3.2 that focuses on the probability that a MID between
two states would escalate into all-out war. However, the tendency of high-
risk states to fght dissimilar enemies, or to escalate confict with dissimilar
enemies to an all-out war, is signifcantly higher than that of low-coup-risk
states. 
Related to this are the results reported in Figures 5.3.3 and 5.3.4, respec-
tively. Figure 5.3.3 shows that states that separate religious institutions from
political institutions are signifcantly less likely to fght when facing either
low or high coup risk than states in which religious and political institu-
tions are closely linked. Likewise, in Figure 5.3.4 we fnd that religiously
homogeneous states are more likely to fght each other when they face high
levels of political instability (high coup risk). Taken together, these results
provide additional support for our argument that the interaction of politi-
cal instability and religious factors infuence dyadic confict outbreak and
escalation. 
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Fig. 5.3. Effect of religious similarity on dyadic confict: intervening variables 
Note: Lines are marginal effects of religious similarity (horizontal axis) on the probability
of dyadic MID outbreak (vertical axis). Separate lines indicate effects by level of
intervening variable (e.g., religious homogeneity, religion-state relations, era). Error bars
are 95% confdence intervals.The effect of religious similarity on confict at one level of
the intervening variable is signifcantly different from the effect of religious similarity on
confict at another level of the dependent variable if the confdence intervals associated
with these two lines do not overlap. 
Figure  5.4 refects tests of the CoC thesis that religious confict has
become more prominent since the end of the Cold War, and of the con-
structivist claim that the importance of religious factors is greater for new
dyads than for established ones. As we can see in Figure 5.4.1, the CoC
expectation that the post–Cold War era would exhibit higher levels of con-
fict between religiously dissimilar states is refuted by our data. In fact, just
the opposite is the case: religiously dissimilar states were signifcantly more
likely to clash with each other during the Cold War era than after the end
of the Cold War. 
Te constructivist expectation that religious identity would be more
instrumental as a predictor of confict in dyads involving one or more “new”
states than between “mature” dyads is also soundly refuted. In fact, confict
between religiously similar “new” dyads is more likely, while “mature” dyads
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Fig. 5.4. Period, dyad age, and dyadic confict 
match the general expectation that religious similarity reduces the prob-
ability of dyadic confict. 
Tere are several key takeaways from these analyses. Te frst is that
religious similarity does tend to dampen confict within dyads; states with
similar types of religious adherents are signifcantly less likely to fght each
other than those with diferent types of religious adherents. Tis also applies
to dyads that share the same major religious groups. However, this does
not imply that specifc religious combinations induce a higher propensity
to fght than other religious combinations. Our results clearly refute such
claims. 
Second, the probability of confict between religiously dissimilar states
increases with the level of domestic instability in one or both. Political
instability also increases the risk of confict involving dyads composed
of religiously homogeneous states (probably of diferent religions).
Likewise, dyads made up of members that have close links between reli-
gious and political institutions are signifcantly more likely to experience
confict when one or both members are politically unstable than either
dyads of states that practice separation of religion from politics, and/or
stable dyads. 
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Finally, the argument that religious similarity reduces the risk of confict
may seem to provide support for the CoC thesis. However, the CoC thesis
makes a clear distinction between the Cold War era and the post–Cold
War era. Te clash of civilizations, according to Huntington, is supposed
to be evident in the latter period, primarily. Our results disconfrm this
argument. Our results also disconfrm the constructivist expectation that
the dampening efect of religious similarity on confict is a feature of newly
formed dyads. In fact, newly formed dyads are more likely to clash when
they are composed of religiously similar states than when they are com-
posed of religiously dissimilar ones. 
Do these results hold when we examine the entire history of dyads?
Te answer to that is given in Table 5.4. Te results in Table 5.4 generally
corroborate the results of the dyad-year analyses. First, religious similar-
ity has a dampening efect on the dyadic propensity for confict. Second,
regime instability and state-religion cohabitation also afect the history of
dyadic confict. Concomitantly, the conclusion that there is no signifcant
relationship between specifc religious combinations and dyadic confict is
also retained. We also do not fnd support for the assertion of a propen-
sity for confict between Western Christendom and the rest of the world’s
Table 5.4 Effect of religious variables on confict—dyad history unit of analysis (politically 
relevant dyads only) 
Variable No. MIDs No Wars Escalation Hostility 
Religious Homogeneity -0.001 -0.001* -0.002** 0.07 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.14) 
Avg. Religious Similarity -0.021** -0.005** -0.007** -1.612** 
(0.007) (0.001) (0.002) (0.551) 
Avg. Rel-State Relations 0.003 0.001* 0.002* 0.185 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.183) 
Avg. Coup Risk 0.112* 0.009 -0.009 8.095* 
(0.048) (0.008) (0.009) (3.612) 
Constant 0.337** 0.045** 0.065** 25.461** 
(0.048) (0.014) (0.014) (3.75) 
N 4074 4074 4074 4074 
F 20.405 7.102 11.323 18.440 
r2 0.095 0.039 0.078 0.088 
Note: ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. 
Control variables are omitted to conserve space. Full results are presented in the book’s website. 
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civilizations as Huntington opines. However, the signifcant relationship
between religious homogeneity and confict we observed at the dyad-year
unit of analysis is not retained at the general dyad-history level. 
Figure 5.5.1 examines the key hypothesis of our integrative theory on
the dyad-history unit of analysis. Here, too, the results support our expecta-
tion: dyads made up of unstable states are signifcantly more likely to invoke
religious factors against dissimilar enemies than dyads that are made up of
stable member states. Likewise, in Figure 5.5.2, we fnd that the greater
degree of confict between religiously similar states is a key feature of the
post–Cold War era, in direct contradiction of what the CoC thesis would
have us expect. 
Turning to the regional analysis, the results are given in Table 5.5 and sug-
gest clearly that the average level of religious similarity in a region has a con-
sistent dampening impact on confict across the diferent outcomes. Tese
results are consistent with the results at the other units of analysis. Religious
homogeneity has a signifcant positive impact on the number of MIDs and
their level of hostility, but does not signifcantly impact either the number
of wars or the probability of escalation in various regions. Likewise, the
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average regional level of institutionalized relations between religious and
political structures has a positive impact on the number of MIDs and their
levels of hostility. However, this relationship does not afect the number of
wars or the probability of escalation of regional conficts. 
All in all, we fnd that the degree of religious similarity—measured in
more precise terms as the similarity in the distribution of specifc religious
groups between one society and another (or relevant other societies)—
reduces the probability of confict, the severity of confict, and the duration
of confict. Tis result is consistent across levels of analysis and across units
of analysis within a given level. Other religious characteristics also tend to
afect confict indicators, but the results there are less robust. 
In Figure 5.6, we examine some of the interactions between regional
religious similarity and various intervening variables and their impact on
MID outbreak across regions. 
Table 5.5 Determinants of international confict—region-year unit of analysis 
MIDs Escalation Hostility 
Religious Similarity -0.107** -0.02** -7.963** 
(0.018) (0.005) (1.357) 
Avg. Coup Risk 0.05 0.124** 8.252 
(0.083) (0.025) (6.308) 
Religious Homogeneity 
Moderate 0.035** 0.003 2.742** 
(0.007) (0.002) (0.532) 
High 0.055** 0.003 4.169** 
(0.007) (0.002) (0.547) 
Religion-State Relations 
Some Relations 0.005 0.001 0.37 
(0.004) (0.001) (0.315) 
Cohabitation 0.02** -0.002 1.348** 
(0.007) (0.002) (0.509) 
Constant 3.59 0.86 351.848 
(6.365) (1.913) (484.393) 
N 297 297 297 
Chi-Square 238.807 75.498 237.151 
R-Squared 0.458 0.211 0.456 
Key: ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05 
Control variables are omitted to conserve space. Full results are presented in the book’s website 
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Tis fgure suggests that regions composed of religiously homogeneous
dyads experience a greater level of confict across levels of religious similar-
ity than religiously diverse regions. Likewise, regions that are characterized
by a high proportion of states that have close ties between religious and
political institutions are more likely to exhibit confict—primarily between
religiously dissimilar dyads. By contrast, regions composed of states that
practice separation between religion and state are typically less confict
prone. Moreover, the level of confict in the region is not afected by the
degree of regional religious similarity. 
We did not fnd supporting evidence that religious dissimilarity had
more pronounced efects on confict in the post–Cold War era compared to
the Cold War era, as Huntington’s thesis would have us expect. In fact, the
efect of religious dissimilarity on confict was more pronounced during the
Cold War era than during the post–Cold War era, again, in contradiction
of the CoC’s expectation. 
We also did not fnd signifcant diferences between the confict behav-
ior of new dyads and that of established dyads. Tis result challenges the
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constructivist proposition focusing on the presumed heightened impact
of cultural factors on behavior at early stages of states’ independence and
the reduced (but still signifcant) impact of religious factors on behavior at
more advanced stages of states’ involvement in the international system. 
6. Conclusion 
Tis chapter is the most comprehensive analysis to date of the relationship
between religious factors and international confict in the post–World
War II era. It ofers several key contributions with respect to (a) the range
of measures of religious adherence, religious diversity and religious simi-
larity employed; (b) the diferent levels of aggregation examined; (c) the
datasets analyzed; and especially (d) the robustness checks we introduced. 
Confict is a risky venture. Te best-laid plans in starting a confict can
result in a catastrophe. Consider the German detailed plan to invade the Soviet
Union in June 1941 or Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in December of the
same year. Because confict is risky, it requires leaders to mobilize resources
from their societies, including troops for warfare and materials for supporting
and supplying the military machine. Political leaders contemplating confict
use diferent tactics to get their followers to risk their lives in those violent ven-
tures. Tey also need to have those citizens who do not directly engage in war-
fare to provide material and political support for the conduct of confict. We
fnd that religion and religious factors play an important role in such processes.
However, the ways such religious factors relate to these processes depends on
particular political circumstances within the state and specifc characteristics of
the society. Not all leaders can mobilize religious ideas to attract support for
confict. Even those leaders who live in societies wherein religious elements are
an important part of the national identity, need to choose the “right” timing
and the “right” enemies if they wish to use religion as a mobilization tool. 
Our analyses suggest several key ideas about the linkage between reli-
gion and international confict. 
1. Religious similarity decreases confict propensity, while religious dissim-
ilarity increases it. Tis result is robust across diferent measures of
confict and diferent levels of analysis. Note the signifcance of these
results: they are consistent with three of the four perspectives that
connect religion to international confict. On the latter point, while
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the dampening efect of religious similarity on confict may suggest
support for the CoC thesis, the results actually disconfrm it. In
contrast to what the CoC thesis would have us expect (Huntington
2000), we fnd that intercivilizational conficts were far more preva-
lent during the Cold War era than during the post–Cold War era. 
2. Religious similarity dampens confict at the level of major religions and
at the level of religious families. Religious similarity has a dampen-
ing impact on confict whether we use coarse measures of similar-
ity based only on major religions (or on the similarity between the
largest religious group in a given state/dyad/region), or whether
we use higher-resolution measures of religious similarity (that is,
if we break up Christianity, Judaism, Islam, and Buddhism into
religious families). Tese results are shown on the book’s website. 
3. Unstable regimes are signifcantly more likely to fght against reli-
giously dissimilar states. It is not only that similarities assuage and
dissimilarities aggravate international relations but also that the
combination of religious dissimilarities and political instability
makes for a fatal brew. Religious diferences and religious values
are more likely to be invoked by unstable leaders—those who face
a high probability of losing their seats of power—and used as a
tool to mobilize support for confict. Tis result holds across levels
of analysis and across diferent measures of confict. 
4. Religious homogeneity generally increases the probability and severity
of confict. Tis result holds at the nation-year unit and the region-
year unit. However, the relationship between religious homogene-
ity is less robust at the nation-history, dyad-year, and dyad-history
levels of analysis. 
5. Te interaction between political instability and religion-state relations
seems to afect confict propensities across levels of analysis. Note that
the temporal span of the data concerning the relations between
religious and political institutions in the religion-state dataset (Fox
2016) is quite short (about twenty years as opposed to sixty-six
years for most other variables). Te addition of observations from
the Comparative Constitution Project is also incomplete, as it
covers only about 45 percent of the states with constitutions or
constitution-like legislation. Tis restricts to some extent the gener-
alizability of these results. Nevertheless, we do fnd fairly consistent
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efects across levels of analysis. Generally speaking, states, dyads, or
regions that have a higher degree of cohabitation between political
and religious institutions tend to experience higher levels of inter-
national confict than actors that separate the religious from the
political spheres. Tis is even more pronounced if the former types
of units are politically unstable than if they are politically stable.
Tis result also corroborates one of the key arguments of our inte-
grative theory of religion and politics. 
6. Secularism is not a signifcant factor. States with a high proportion of
secular populations are neither more nor less likely to fght, nor are
they more or less likely to fght each other than less secular states. 
7. We do not fnd robust support for the constructivist argument that reli-
gious factors have a stronger efect on the confict behavior of new states
as opposed to more mature states. Te behavior of new states or new
dyads is not signifcantly diferent from that of established states and
dyads in terms of the efect of religious factors on their behavior. 
8. CoC conficts are not more prevalent in the post–Cold War era, again
in contradiction of the expectations of the CoC thesis. Te evi-
dence for this point is overwhelming. We fnd that, in fact, wars
between religiously similar states were more common in the post–
Cold War era than during the Cold War period (see Tables A5.6
and A5.7 in the appendix). 
. Tere is no evidence that specifc religions are more confict prone than
others. Our results clearly refute the notion that states that are domi-
nated by a specifc religion are more or less confict prone than those
of another religion. Te notion of “Islam having bloody borders”
(Huntington 1  6) is not supported in our results. Confict between
specifc religious combinations is not more likely (or more severe)
than confict between other religious combinations. In fact, we fnd
that the likelihood of conficts between Christian and Muslim states
is signifcantly less likely than what would be expected by chance
alone. We also fnd consistent lack of support for the argument that
the West versus Rest conficts are more likely either during the Cold
War or in the post–Cold War era.11 
10. Implications: there is a need for caution when making claims about the
relationship between religious factors and international confict. Te
results connecting religion to international confict are consistent,
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with a range of often contrasting theses, and this advises caution
in asserting a singular role for religion in international afairs.
To be sure, religion has and continues to have a clear impact on
international confict. Yet, in contrast to prominent notions of
the post–Cold War “clashes of civilizations” or “God’s Century”
(Toft, Philpott, and Shah 2011), this relationship is neither new, all-
encompassing, or simple. Religious factors have a signifcant efect
on confict, but this efect is most pronounced when considered
in conjunction with the political conditions—specifcally, with the
level of political stability—in states or in various regions. 
What is the evidence for or against the various theoretical argu-
ments about religion and international confict put forth in this chapter?
Generally speaking, the fact that we fnd religious similarity to have a
consistently dampening efect on confict suggests support for both pri-
mordialist and instrumentalist perspectives. Te same applies to the—less
robust but nonetheless visible—aggravating efect of religious homogene-
ity on confict. At the same time, the similarity between the predictions
that may be deduced from both of these perspectives prevent us from
reliably assessing which one is more closely tied to the results. We do fnd,
however, consistent evidence of the more dynamic aspects of religion-
regime instability-confict that are associated with our integrative theory
of religion and politics. Tis supports the notion that political elites ele-
vate the religious “causes” of confict when they feel that their regime
is under risk. Using religion as a tactic to mobilize support for foreign
adventures appears to be particularly attractive under such circumstances. 
Te general takeaway from this chapter is that religion plays an impor-
tant role in international confict, but not in the simpleminded manner we
may think about religious confict. Religious factors interact with other ide-
ational and material factors in ways that are rather complex. At the national
level, religious similarity serves to dampen animosities that are based on
territorial and other material claims. States that have enmities grounded in
or amplifed by religious diferences are more likely to use force to resolve
their claims than states that have religiously similar adversaries. At the dyadic
level, religious similarities consistently reduce the risk of confict. It remains
to be seen if religious factors play a role in the practice of peaceful coopera-
tion. Tis is what we explore in the next chapter. 
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Appendix to Chapter 5: Religion and 
International Confict 
1. Introduction 
Tis appendix provides a detailed discussion of the research design used in
chapter 5. It covers discussion of data sources, provides operational defni-
tions of all the variables used, and details the methods used to estimate the
models analyzed. Because this appendix covers many issues that are com-
mon to several chapters in the book, it is quite detailed. Subsequent chapter
appendices rely on the information provided herein. 
2. Datasets 
Table A5.1 provides a detailed review of the datasets used in the various
analyses of chapter 5. 
3. Units of Analysis 
We frst distinguish between a level of analysis and a unit of analysis. A level
of analysis is defned by the identity of the actor or actors that is the focus
of the investigation. A unit of analysis combines the level of analysis and the
time-related aggregation used to defne individual observations/cases. In
addition, a unit of analysis may impose some spatial or conceptual restric-
tion on the actors selected for analysis at each level. We demonstrate this
distinction below. 
National level of analysis. At this level, the actors selected for analysis are
all states in the international system that existed at any given time point
during the period 1945–2010. We focus here on two units of analysis: the
state-year unit and the state-history unit. 
a. State-year unit of analysis. Each observation in this set of analyses
consists of a given state at a given year. Each state is observed for
each year during which it existed as a member of the interstate
system. Tus, the United States, which existed during the entire
period, appears in sixty-six observations. On the other hand,
Kosovo, which gained independence in 2008, appears in only
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Table A5.1 Datasets 
Dataset Name Years Covered Variables Used Source Comments 
World Religion 
Project (WRP) 
Religion and State 
Dataset (RSD) 
Comparative 
Constitutions Project 
(CCP) 
Coup attempts 
Dyadic MID dataset 
(MID) 
Alliance Treaties and 
Obligations Provisions 
(ATOP) 
Alliance Dataset 
(COWALLY) 
Trade Datasets 
IGO data 
National Capabilities 
1945–2010 
1990–2010 
1800–2010 
1950–2010 
1945–2010 
1945–2003 
1945–2010 
1945–2010 
1945–2004 
1945–2007 
Secularism; 
Religious diversity; 
Religious similarity 
with PRIE; 
Dyadic religious 
similarity; 
Major and Minor 
religions; 
Major religions/
religious families 
Religious 
discrimination; 
Religious regulation; 
Religious legislation 
Ofcial Religion, 
Clause on religious 
freedom 
Attempted and 
successful coups 
MIDs, Wars, Hostility 
Levels (monadic, 
dyadic, regional levels) 
No. of Allies; 
Dyadic Alliance; 
Regional Alliances 
Same as above 
No. trading partners; 
total trade; 
dyadic trade; 
regional trade 
No. of IGO 
memberships; joint 
IGO membership 
(dyad); 
No. regional IGOs 
National capability 
score; dyadic 
capability ratio; 
Regional power 
concentration 
Maoz and Original data 
Henderson measured in 
(2013) 5-year intervals; 
interpolated 
to yearly 
observations 
for purpose of 
analyses 
Fox (2010) Combined with 
CCP (below) 
to generate a 
religion and state 
variable 
Elkins, Combined with 
Ginsburg, RSD to generate 
and Melton a religion and 
(2014) state variable 
Powell and Used to calculate 
Tyne (2011) coup-risk 
Maoz et al. 
(2018) 
Leeds (2005) 
Gibler (2007) ATOP data 
expanded to 
2010 using 
COWALLY 
Gleditsch Both datasets 
(2002); are combined 
Barbieri, to cover missing 
Keshk, cases 
and Pollins 
(2009) 
Nordstrom, 
Pevehouse, 
and Wrenke 
(2004) 
Singer 
(1990); 
COW (2016) 
(Continued) 
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Table A5.1 (Continued) 
Dataset Name Years Covered Variables Used Source Comments 
Polity IV Dataset 1945–2010 Regime attributes Marshall 
and regime change (2010) 
information 
Coup Data 1945–2010 All instances of coups Powell and Used to code 
and coup attempts Tyne 2011 coup risk 
Strategic Rivalries 1945–2010 Strategic Rivalries Tompson 
and Dreyer 
(2011) 
three observations. At any given year, the number of observations
consist of the number of independent states during this period. So
in 1 45 there are 44 observations, whereas in 2010, there are 1 4
observations. Te entire dataset used for this unit of analysis has a
time-series-cross-sectional (TSCS) structure. However, for reasons
discussed below, we use both the entire data and repeated samples
thereof. 
b. State-history unit of analysis. Tere are several good reasons to
aggregate the behavior of each state over the entire period during
which it was independent. First, the likelihood of a state getting
involved in an international confict is highly uneven: a few (about
20 percent) of all states account for about 80 percent of all milita-
rized conficts during this period (Maoz 2004, 200 a). Given this
extreme inequality in the confict proneness of nations, on the one
hand, and the fairly stationary structure of the religious variables,
on the other, it is fair to examine the extent to which the religious
characteristics of states relate to their general confict proneness
over their entire history. Second, since several of the theoretical
arguments linking religion to national behavior are fairly fxed—
that is, indicate a general propensity of a state—it makes sense to
see if certain types of states (e.g., religiously homogeneous, with
a high religion-state cohabitation structure, with high state-PRIE
religious diferences) indicate greater or lesser proneness to engage
in confict throughout their history than others. 
For this level of analysis we aggregate the characteristics of states and ana-
lyze the relationship between religion and confict propensity. Each state 
is observed once over the entire period during which it was independent. 
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Tis means that states that were independent in 1945 have a total “his-
tory” of sixty-six years, while states that emerged at a later point during 
this period are observed from the year in which they gained independence 
to the fnal year in our sample. For example, Chad attained independence 
in 1960, so it is observed over a period of ffty-one years, while Slovakia, 
which became independent after it seceded from Czechoslovakia in 1993, 
is observed over a period of eighteen years. Each observation in this set of 
analysis is a single state. Te variables used for this set of analyses consist of 
aggregated (or averaged) fgures for the focal state across its entire history 
over the period 1945–2010. We illustrate this in the next section. 
Dyadic level of analysis. Te dyadic level of analysis has been the focus
of much of the research on international confict in the last thirty years.
A dyad refects a pair of states, and the most popular unit of analysis has
been the dyad-year. However, the literature on international confict is
sharply divided on which dyads to include and which dyads to exclude.
Some (e.g., Bremer 1992) have focused on the entire population of dyads
since the Congress of Vienna; every possible pair of states that existed at a
given point in time afterward was included in the sample under analysis.
Others (e.g., Maoz and Russett 1993) argued that this practice infates the
sample size with multiple cases that are ex ante unlikely to have any con-
fict. Confict between Costa Rica and Tailand is highly unlikely due to
the distance between these states, their inability to project power over that
distance, and the lack of contentious issues that might give rise to confict.
Instead, Maoz and Russett argued that dyadic analyses of confict should
focus on the population of politically relevant dyads. A politically relevant
dyad is a dyad that meets one of the following conditions: 
1. It is geographically contiguous—that is, it shares a land border or
separated by a body of water with a distance of 150 nautical miles
between the shores of these countries. 
2. At least one of the members of the dyad is a major power with
global reach capacity or a regional power with a regional reach
capacity. By reach capacity we mean an ability to project force—to
transfer a large number of troops and materiel—over distance.12 
Maoz and Russett (1993), Lemke and Reed (2001), Bennett and Stam 
(2004), and Maoz et al. (2018) among others showed that (a) the politically 
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relevant dyads sample captures over 83 percent of all dyadic MIDs over the 
period 1816–2010; (b) most of the dyadic MIDs not captured by this 
sample consist of states joining MIDs between politically relevant dyads; 
and (c)  this selection does not cause signifcant biases in results. Tese 
results suggest that it is more sensible to focus on politically relevant dyads 
than on the entire population of dyads. However, as a robustness check, 
we examine both this limited sample and the more general population of 
all dyads. 
In this case too, we focus on two units of analysis: the dyad-year and the
dyad-history. 
1. Dyad-year unit of analysis. Te observation here is a (politically
relevant) dyad at a given year. Tus the US–Canada dyad makes
for sixty-six observations over the period 1 45–2010, whereas
the US–Dominica dyad makes for only thirty-three observations
because Dominica became independent only in 1 78. Te entire
population of dyads over this period totals 6 6,075 observations
of undirected dyads, whereas the population of politically relevant
dyads consists of 65,364 undirected dyads. Both samples have a
TSCS structure 
2. Dyad-history unit of analysis. As in the case of the aggregate nation
level, the distribution of conficts over diferent dyads suggests
extreme levels of inequality. Over 75  percent of all politically
relevant dyads did not have a single confict during their history
and an additional 8 percent had only one confict. Likewise, over
 6 percent of all politically relevant dyads did not fght a single
war during the period under analysis. Consequently, we aggre-
gate dyads to examine whether religion increases the propensity
of a dyad to fght repeatedly over its common history. Here, too,
we start observing a dyad when the “youngest” state of the dyad
enters the international system. Again, for reasons explained
below, it makes sense to examine dyadic histories as a whole. As
in the case of the national level of analysis, we include dyads that
had a common history of at least twenty years, so that they would
have a sufcient “chance” to fght. Tus, the entire population of
dyads that satisfy the twenty-year rule consists of 12,571 dyads. In
contrast, the population of politically relevant dyads that satisfy
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the same rule consists only of 1,677 dyads. Here too, this unit of
analysis has a cross-sectional structure. 
Te use of the state-history and of the dyad-history units of analysis is 
uncommon in confict research. Terefore an explanation is required. As 
noted above, a number of studies of interstate confict (e.g., Bremer 1980, 
Gochman and Maoz 1984, Maoz 2004, 2009a) pointed out that the dis-
tribution of conficts across nations or dyads is highly uneven; a small 
proportion of dyads accounts for most dyadic conficts. Te same dyads 
seem to repeatedly fght each other, whereas other dyads never engage 
in confict. Consequently, if religious factors play a role in increasing or 
decreasing the probability of national confict involvement of individual 
states, or the probability of confict between pairs of states, then we need to 
take this uneven distribution of confict participation into account. Tis is 
especially pertinent if we wish to test hypotheses derived from primordial-
ist theories of religion and politics. 
Regional level of analysis. Te Correlates of War classifcation of regions
divides the world into fve geographic regions and one residual (extrare-
gional) category. Tese regions are (a)  the Western Hemisphere consist-
ing of North and South America; (b)  Europe; (c)  sub-Saharan Africa;
(d) the Middle East including North African states, Fertile Crescent states,
and Persian Gulf states; (e) Asia; and (f ) extraregional, covering conficts
between states that belong to diferent regions. 
Note that some states can be members of two regions. For example, the
Soviet Union/Russia is in both Europe and Asia. Tus, conficts between
the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia are European conficts. In contrast,
conficts between the Soviet Union and China are Asian conficts. Likewise,
Turkey is a member of both Europe and the Middle East. Tus, conficts
between Turkey and Greece are European conficts; whereas, conficts
between Turkey and Syria are Middle Eastern conficts. Here our data-
set consists of a single unit of analysis:  the region-year unit. Each region
aggregates or averages the variables under analysis over all states in the
region for each year during the period 1945–2010. In principle, this data-
set should have consisted of 6 × 66 = 396 observations. However, since
some of the regions (e.g., Africa) were not meaningfully comprised of sov-
ereign units until the early 1960s, we use diferential periods for diferent
regions. In the Western Hemisphere, Europe, Asia, and the extraregional
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category, we have sixty-six years for each region. In the Middle East, we
start observations in 1947 and in Africa we start observations in 1960. Tis
makes for a total of 378 region-year observations. 
4. Variables and Measures 
We discuss the measures of the various variables at each unit of analysis. 
4.1. Explaining the Measurement of the Religious Independent Variables 
At the nation-year unit of analysis we employ several independent vari-
ables that characterize the religious structure of the state and the relations
between religion and state. 
Religious diversity. As noted in the text, religious diversity is the variance
of religious groups in the state. It is measured by the IQV. We demonstrate
this below. Following the common practice in network analysis (Maoz
2010: Ch. 2), we consider each year as a religious afliation matrix of order
n × k, where the n rows represent the states that existed at that point in
time, and k refects the number of religious groups (plus the religious fami-
lies of some of these religions as mentioned above). Denote the religious
afliation matrix for year t as RAt. Each entry in this matrix rairt represents
the proportion of state i’s population that practices religion r on year t. For
demonstration purposes, Table A5.3. lists the religious distributions in a
number of selected states for the year 2010. 
As noted in the appendix to Chapter 3, we measure religious diversity
as the variance of the distribution of religious groups in society. Tis is
given by 
2 
IQV = 
k ( 1 −ˆ ik = 1 p ) , i 
k − 1 
where k indexes the number of religious groups that actually exist in a soci-
ety and pi is the proportion of the state’s population that practices religion 
i. We calculate two versions of the IQV: one that considers only major 
religions (with the maximum k being 15), and one that considers religious 
families for some of the religions (with the maximum k being 28). Note 
that religious diversity should vary between zero and one. When a given 
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state has k religious groups, each of which accounts for 1/k percent of the 
population, IQV =1, this state is maximally diverse. When the state has all 
of its population in a single religious group, the IQV will be indeterminate 
because the denominator of the formula is zero. In this case we set the IQV 
arbitrarily to zero. Such cases represent absolutely no religious diversity. 
A few interesting points can be made about the religious diversity of
states as indicated by the data in the table. First, Haiti is highlighted because
it is one of the few states (Japan is another example) where people practice
dual religions. Tis causes the sum of religious group percentages to exceed
one. It follows that religious diversity for these states would also exceed one.
In order to avoid this problem, we normalize the religious proportions of
the various groups in these states so that their sum will be one. Tis has little
to no efect on the overall results. 
Both Haiti and Trinidad provide good examples of states with high reli-
gious diversity. Teir populations are relatively evenly split among several
religious groups. In contrast, Mexico and Saudi Arabia are examples of
states with very low religious diversity, with the former having a vast major-
ity of its population practicing Christianity (predominantly Catholics), and
the latter having a vast majority of its population practicing (Sunni) Islam. 
Religious homogeneity. Religious homogeneity is the complement of reli-
gious diversity, that is, H = − IQV .  In order to provide a more intuitive1 
interpretation of homogeneity, we use an ordinal version of this measure
by breaking it up into three levels: 1 = low homogeneity (the upper third
of the diversity measure), 2 = medium homogeneity (the middle third of
the diversity measure), and 3 = high homogeneity (the lower third of the
diversity measure). 
Religious similarity with the PRIE. Tis is the degree to which a state’s
religious composition is similar to the states that make up its strategic refer-
ence group. Tis measure is developed in two stages. First, we calculate a
set of dyadic religious similarity scores that refect the extent to which the
distribution of religious adherents in two states—i and j—are similar to
or diferent from each other. We discuss the development of the dyadic
religious similarity below. Second, we average the dyadic religious similarity
score between the focal state and the members of its PRIE. 
For example, in 1948, the PRIE of Egypt was made up of three neigh-
boring states:  Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. Te religious similarity
between Egypt, on the one hand, and Jordan and Saudi Arabia, on the
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other, was quite high (0.78 and 0.81, respectively). Te religious similar-
ity with Israel was low (0.09). Egypt was also connected to the United
Kingdom via indirect contiguity (the United Kingdom was still in colonial
possession of Sudan—similarity score 0.15), and we add to it the major
of that time, the United States and the Soviet Union, with relatively low
similarity (0.12 and 0.17, respectively). Tus, on average, Egypt had a reli-
gious similarity score of 0.35 with its PRIE, a medium-low level of religious
similarity. 
In 1962, Argentina had a total of eight states in its PRIE—fve neighbors
(Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay, Chile, and Uruguay), and four major powers—
the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China. Its
religious similarity score with all of its PRIE members—except the Soviet
Union (similarity score of 0.31)—was quite high (between 0.76 and 0.93).
Tus, its overall similarity score with the PRIE for that year was also very
high (0.796). 
Dyadic religious similarity. As noted, this is a measure of the extent to
which the religious distributions of two states are similar to or diferent
from each other. To do that, we use the religious afliation matrix for each
year and convert it to a religious similarity matrix. We use two diferent
methods to convert this matrix into a religious similarity matrix of order n, 
each producing a slightly diferent measure of religious similarity. 
Te frst measure is based on the standard method of afliation-to-
adjacency matrix conversion in network analysis (Wasserman and Faust
1994, Maoz 2010, Chapter 2). Te adjacency matrix RS is given by RS t = 
× RA ’ and has the following structure: RAt t 
2 2 (1) rsiit =ˆ rairt =ˆ pit , 
k k 
which means that diagonal entries refect the degree of religious
homogeneity in a given state (that vary between 1/m when the
state’s population is evenly distributed over 2 ≤ m ≤ k religious
groups, and 1 when the entire population of the state practices a
single religion); 
k 
(2) rsijt =ˆ rairtra jrt , 
r = 1 
that is, the of-diagonal elements are the degree of covariance
between the distribution of religious afliation in state i and
the parallel distribution of state j (entries vary from one when
the two populations are perfectly aligned in terms of religious
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groups to zero when any religious group that exists in state i
does not exist in state j and vice versa); 
(3) symmetry: that is, rs = rs ∀i, j ∈ RS. Tis means that the reli-ijt jit
gious similarity between state i and state j is the same as between
state j and state i. 
Te second method is based on a correlation between any two rows of the 
religious afliation matrix. Tus, rs = corr(ra , ra ). Obviously, the diago-ijt it jt
nal elements of RS are all ones. Here too, RS is symmetrical, and −1 ≤ rsijt 
≤ 1 ∀ rs ∈ RS. ijt 
Both methods produce highly similar results. Te correlations between
the religious similarity scores obtained across methods is r = 0.958. Tus,
while we ran tests for religious similarity based on both methods, we pres-
ent the results for religious similarity employing the standard conversion. 
Table A5.4 displays the conversion of the religious afliation matrix to
an adjacency matrix. Entries in the matrix refect religious similarity scores.
Let us consider some of the cases discussed above. First, examine some of
the diagonal entries. We highlight the entries for Trinidad, the Dominican
Republic, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia. Given the religious diversity of the
former, the homogeneity score of Trinidad is quite low. On the other hand,
the latter states are quite homogeneous in terms of religious composition.
Second, we highlighted the column corresponding to Mexico and the row
corresponding to Saudi Arabia. As we can see, the religious similarity scores
between Mexico and the other states in the table—with the exception of
Saudi Arabia—are quite high. Tis is so because all the other states have a
substantial proportion of their population who are Christian (and many of
them predominantly Catholic). By contrast, the religious similarity scores
between Saudi Arabia and all other states are very low given the predomi-
nantly (Sunni) Muslim population of Saudi Arabia. 
In Table A5.5, we show religious similarity scores based on correlating
the religious distributions of each pair of states in the sample we used for
illustration. Tis correlation is based on the distribution of religious fami-
lies (as opposed to religious similarity measured in terms of major religions
only in Table A5.3). Te results are similar to the results in Table A5.3, but
a number of things need to be pointed out. First, some of the correlations—
especially between states whose population is overwhelmingly Catholic—
are extremely high. On the other hand, the correlations between states with
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a substantial Protestant population (e.g., the United States and Canada)
and predominantly Catholic states are substantially lower. Second, the
correlation between states that are highly homogeneous (e.g., Dominican
Republic, Mexico) and states that are more religiously diverse (e.g., Trinidad,
Barbados) is still positive, but low. Tird, the correlation between predomi-
nantly Christian states and Saudi Arabia is low and slightly negative. 
4.2 Estimation 
We use a number of methods to estimate the relationships between reli-
gious factors and various measures of international confict across levels of
analysis. Te relevant method for each analysis is defned by the measure-
ment scale of the dependent variable. For the nation-year and dyad-year
units of analysis we use logit models when estimating the probability of
MID or escalation. For these analyses we also use years without confict and
cubic splines to control for temporal dependence. 
For the nation-year and dyad-year, we use fxed efect time-series
cross-sectional regressions when the dependent variables are continuous
hostility scores. For the region-year, we use region fxed efect models to
estimate regional confict (since all measures of confict at this level are
continuous). Finally, for the nation-history and the dyad-history we use
ordinary least squares (OLS) models. 
In contrast to most other analyses of confict at the national and the 
dyadic level, we rely both on conventional as well as alternative estima-
tion methods. Tese alternative methods are due to issues that afect the 
data structures we employ and raise threats to inference. Unfortunately, 
these issues are also present in other studies of religion and confict. Some 
of these problems are present as well in other analyses of international 
confict that do not incorporate religious variables. Several problems are 
signifcant in this context. 
Stationarity. As noted above, methods used in previous studies of
monadic or dyadic confict, and in particular, of religion-related determi-
nants of confict, sufer from stationarity bias. Specifcally, the variation of
several key covariates in such models is limited or even fxed within time
series. Variables such as distance and/or reputational status exhibit little or
no change over time for a given state or dyad. Other covariates—such as
democracy/joint democracy, alliance relations, and in our case the religion
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variables—are typically time invariant: they exhibit little fuctuation over
time within a given state or dyad. Te average changes in percentages of
major religions within states, as well as religious diversity within states, are
about one-tenth of 1 percent within fve-year intervals. When interpolated
into annual scores, annual rates of change averaged fve-hundredth of 1 per-
cent. Tis suggests that several independent and control variables are station-
ary within series. Some variables such as distance are dropped in fxed-efect
models due to their stationary nature. Other highly stationary—but not
fxed—variables (e.g., alliance with average duration of seven years, or joint
democracy with average duration of twelve years) are retained in such mod-
els, but their interpretation is problematic. 
Number of cases. In some of the analyses, the size of the population under
analysis is huge (in the hundreds of thousands of observations). Even if we
impose sampling flters on the population of dyads—and we do impose
the politically relevant dyad flter—the number of cases under analysis is
still very large. For example, even with the politically relevant dyads flter
and using undirected dyads, the N for the dyadic analyses hovers around
68,000 cases. Given this population size, even a very small efect is likely to
be statistically signifcant, and in many of the dependent variables (war, in
particular) it creates a huge rare event bias. 
Signifcance levels in entire populations. Te meaning of signifcance tests
when examining an entire (or close to an entire) population of cases is not
clear. Signifcance tests are based on the probability of obtaining a given
result in a sample that is drawn randomly from the population. When ana-
lyzing the entire population of cases, even a minuscule relationship is sig-
nifcant. So the distinction between a meaningful efect and a negligible one
in terms of statistical signifcance is not clear. 
To address these problems, we employ bootstrapping techniques to
supplement the standard analyses on the entire population of state years
and dyad years. Bootstrapping involves a process of repeated sampling with
replacement in which the estimated coefcients and standard errors are
recalculated across samples and bootstrapped standard errors are corrected
for bias (Mooney and Duval 1993). Tis technique draws a random sample
of size k (in our case k ranges between 15 and 20 percent) from the entire
population of cases, and runs the analysis on each sample. Te statistics we
wish to estimate in the sample are then saved, and the process iterates for a
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Table A5.6 Religious similarity of dyads in interstate wars, 1945–2007 
War War Name State A State B Year Relig. Level 
No. Sim. 
Score 
139 World War II Brazil Germany 1945 0.952 High 
139 World War II Canada Germany 1945 0.880 High 
139 World War II Canada Japan 1945 0.016 Low 
139 World War II China Japan 1945 0.060 Low 
139 World War II France Germany 1945 0.902 High 
139 World War II France Germany 1945 0.902 High 
139 World War II Germany Australia 1945 0.920 High 
139 World War II Germany Bulgaria 1945 0.823 High 
139 World War II Germany Bulgaria 1945 0.823 High 
139 World War II Germany New Zealand 1945 0.934 High 
139 World War II Germany Romania 1945 0.913 High 
139 World War II Germany Romania 1945 0.913 High 
139 World War II Germany South Africa 1945 0.545 Med 
139 World War II Germany USSR 1945 0.332 Med 
139 World War II Hungary USSR 1945 0.341 Med 
139 World War II Japan Australia 1945 0.010 Low 
139 World War II Japan New Zealand 1945 0.010 Low 
139 World War II Mongolia Japan 1945 0.066 Low 
139 World War II South Africa Japan 1945 0.006 Low 
139 World War II United Kingdom Germany 1945 0.908 High 
139 World War II United Kingdom Hungary 1945 0.853 High 
139 World War II United Kingdom Japan 1945 0.010 Low 
139 World War II United States Germany 1945 0.760 High 
139 World War II United States Japan 1945 0.017 Low 
139 World War II USSR Japan 1945 0.010 Low 
147 First Kashmir India Pakistan 1947 0.171 Low 
148 Arab-Israeli Egypt Israel 1948 0.088 Low 
148 Arab-Israeli Iraq Israel 1948 0.111 Low 
148 Arab-Israeli Jordan Israel 1948 0.094 Low 
148 Arab-Israeli Lebanon Israel 1948 0.054 Low 
148 Arab-Israeli Syria Israel 1948 0.088 Low 
151 Korean Belgium China 1951 0.005 Low 
151 Korean Belgium North Korea 1951 0.026 Low 
151 Korean Canada China 1950 0.004 Low 
151 Korean Canada North Korea 1950 0.024 Low 
151 Korean China Australia 1950 0.007 Low 
151 Korean China Philippines 1950 0.006 Low 
151 Korean China South Korea 1950 0.042 Low 
151 Korean China Tailand 1951 0.105 Low 
151 Korean Colombia China 1951 0.003 Low 
151 Korean Colombia North Korea 1951 0.019 Low 
151 Korean Ethiopia China 1951 0.019 Low 
151 Korean Ethiopia North Korea 1951 0.160 Low 
151 Korean France China 1951 0.011 Low 
151 Korean France North Korea 1951 0.044 Low 
151 Korean Greece China 1951 0.003 Low 
151 Korean Greece North Korea 1951 0.020 Low 
151 Korean Netherlands China 1951 0.011 Low 
(Continued) 
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Table A5.6 (Continued) 
War War Name State A State B Year Relig. Level 
No. Sim. 
Score 
151 
151 
151 
151 
151 
151 
151 
151 
151 
151 
151 
153 
155 
155 
155 
156 
158 
158 
159 
160 
163 
163 
163 
163 
163 
163 
166 
169 
169 
169 
170 
170 
170 
172 
175 
176 
176 
176 
178 
181 
181 
181 
181 
181 
184 
186 
Korean 
Korean 
Korean 
Korean* 
Korean 
Korean 
Korean 
Korean 
Korean 
Korean 
Korean 
Ofshore Islands* 
Sinai War 
Sinai War 
Sinai War 
Soviet Invasion of 
Hungary* 
IfniWar 
IfniWar 
Taiwan Straits* 
Assam 
Vietnam War* 
Vietnam War 
Vietnam War 
Vietnam War 
Vietnam War 
Vietnam War* 
Second Kashmir 
Six Day War 
Six Day War 
Six Day War 
Second Laotian, 
Phase* 2 
Second Laotian* 
Second Laotian 
War of Attrition 
Football War 
Communist Coali
Communist Coali
Communist Coali
Bangladesh 
Yom Kippur War 
Yom Kippur War 
Yom Kippur War 
Yom Kippur War 
Yom Kippur War 
TurcoCypriot 
War over Angola 
Netherlands 
North Korea 
North Korea 
North Korea 
North Korea 
Turkey 
Turkey 
United Kingd
United Kingd
United States 
United States 
China 
Egypt 
France 
United Kingd
Hungary 
France 
Spain 
China (PRC) 
China (PRC) 
Cambodia 
South Korea 
United States 
Vietnam 
Vietnam 
Vietnam 
India 
Egypt 
Jordan 
Syria 
Laos 
Tailand 
United States 
Egypt 
Honduras 
tion Cambodia 
tion United States 
tion* Vietnam 
India 
Egypt 
Iraq 
Israel 
Jordan 
Syria 
Cyprus 
Angola 
North Korea 
Australia 
Philippines 
South Korea 
Tailand 
China 
North Korea 
om China 
om North Korea 
China 
North Korea 
Taiwan 
Israel 
Egypt 
om Egypt 
USSR 
Morocco 
Morocco 
Taiwan (RO
India 
Vietnam 
Vietnam 
Vietnam 
Australia 
Philippines 
South Vietn
Pakistan 
Israel 
Israel 
Israel 
Vietnam 
Vietnam 
Vietnam 
Israel 
El Salvador 
Vietnam 
Vietnam 
South Vietn
Pakistan 
Israel 
Israel 
Saudi Arabia 
Israel 
Israel 
Turkey 
South Africa 
1951 
1950 
1950 
1950 
1951 
1950 
1950 
1950 
1950 
1950 
1950 
1954 
1956 
1956 
1956 
1956 
1958 
1957 
C) 1958 
1962 
1970 
1965 
1965 
1965 
1966 
am 1965 
1965 
1967 
1967 
1967 
1968 
1970 
1968 
1969 
1969 
1970 
1970 
am 1970 
1971 
1973 
1973 
1973 
1973 
1973 
1974 
1975 
0.042 
0.033 
0.033 
0.359 
0.051 
0.018 
0.000 
0.007 
0.039 
0.018 
0.074 
0.387 
0.105 
0.111 
0.114 
0.346 
0.043 
0.048 
0.321 
0.006 
0.126 
0.078 
0.114 
0.081 
0.050 
0.187 
0.144 
0.085 
0.087 
0.085 
0.130 
0.113 
0.112 
0.094 
0.926 
0.126 
0.112 
0.185 
0.124 
0.100 
0.104 
0.106 
0.101 
0.098 
0.191 
0.686 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Med 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Med 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Med 
Low 
Low 
Med 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
High 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
High 
  
 
 
21
Table A5.6 (Continued) 
War War Name State A State B Year Relig. Level 
No. Sim. 
Score 
186 War over Angola Cuba Dem. Republic 1975 0.692 High 
of the Congo 
186 War over Angola Cuba South Africa 1975 0.590 Med 
186 War over Angola Dem Repub of Angola 1975 0.793 High 
Congo 
187 Second Ogaden War, Cuba Somalia 1977 0.001 Low 
187 Second Ogaden War Somalia Ethiopia 1977 0.298 Med 
189 Vietnamese Cambodia Vietnam 1977 0.122 Low 
Cambodian 
190 Ugandan–Tanzanian* Tanzania Libya 1979 0.313 Med 
190 Ugandan-Tanzanian Uganda Tanzania 1978 0.364 Med 
193 Sino-Vietnamese* China Vietnam 1979 0.339 Med 
199 Iran–Iraq Iran Iraq 1980 0.902 High 
202 Falkland Islands Argentina United 1982 0.807 High 
Kingdom 
205 War over Lebanon Syria Israel 1982 0.114 Low 
207 War over the Aouzou Chad Libya 1986 0.441 Med 
Strip 
208 Sino Vietnamese China Vietnam 1987 0.313 Med 
Border War* 
211 Gulf War Canada Iraq 1991 0.028 Low 
211 Gulf War France Iraq 1991 0.050 Low 
211 Gulf War Iraq Egypt 1991 0.821 High 
211 Gulf War Iraq Kuwait 1990 0.862 High 
211 Gulf War Iraq Oman 1991 0.831 High 
211 Gulf War Iraq Qatar 1991 0.839 High 
211 Gulf War Iraq Saudi Arabia 1991 0.919 High 
211 Gulf War Iraq Syria 1991 0.876 High 
211 Gulf War Iraq United Arab 1991 0.905 High 
Emirates 
211 Gulf War Italy Iraq 1991 0.028 Low 
211 Gulf War Morocco Iraq 1991 0.944 High 
211 Gulf War United Kingdom Iraq 1991 0.037 Low 
211 Gulf War United States Iraq 1991 0.034 Low 
215 Bosnian Independence Croatia Yugoslavia 1992 0.679 High 
215 Bosnian Independence Yugoslavia Bosnia 1992 0.461 Med 
216 Azeri–Armenian Armenia Azerbaijan 1993 0.043 Low 
217 Cenepa Valley Ecuador Peru 1995 0.953 High 
219 Badme Border Ethiopia Eritrea 1998 0.451 Med 
221 War for Kosovo France Yugoslavia 1999 0.577 Med 
221 War for Kosovo Germany Yugoslavia 1999 0.579 Med 
221 War for Kosovo Italy Yugoslavia 1999 0.635 High 
221 War for Kosovo Netherlands Yugoslavia 1999 0.543 Med 
221 War for Kosovo United Kingdom Yugoslavia 1999 0.634 High 
221 War for Kosovo United States Yugoslavia 1999 0.631 High 
221 War for Kosovo Yugoslavia Turkey 1999 0.190 Low 
223 Kargil War India Pakistan 1999 0.138 Low 
(Continued) 
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Table A5.6 (Continued) 
War War Name State A State B Year Relig. Level 
No. Sim. 
Score 
225 Invasion of Afghanistan Afghanistan Australia 2001 0.018 Low 
225 Invasion of Afghanistan Canada Afghanistan 2001 0.021 Low 
225 Invasion of Afghanistan France Afghanistan 2001 0.062 Low 
225 Invasion of Afghanistan United Kingdom Afghanistan 2001 0.031 Low 
225 Invasion of Afghanistan United States Afghanistan 2001 0.015 Low 
227 Invasion of Iraq Iraq Australia 2003 0.034 Low 
227 Invasion of Iraq United Kingdom Iraq 2003 0.048 Low 
227 Invasion of Iraq United States Iraq 2003 0.033 Low 
228 Second Lebanon Israel Lebanon 2006 0.108 Low 
Sources: Sarkees and Wayman (2010); Maoz et al (2018). 
* A case can be made that this dyad is in fact characterized by high religious similarity; one member 
of the dyad was a communist state with a high self-reported percent non-religious. Given the changes 
in self-reporting of religious afliation in the postcommunist countries of Eastern Europe, there is a 
good reason to assume that religious afliations are similar to those of the other dyad member. 
large number of replications (r) specifed by the user. Te ultimate calcula-
tion of the standard errors is given by: 
 ˘ 2 SE = 1 ˆ 
r ( ˜  i − ˜  ) , [1]r − 1 i 1 = 
where θi is the test statistic (coefcient) of the ith sample and r is the num-
ber of replications (Hall and Wilson 1991). Tis reduces drastically the 
probability that two adjacent observations in a given national or dyadic 
series will emerge in the sample, thus removing the stationarity bias. In 
addition, since the samples are only a fraction of the entire population, 
the efects of the independent variables on the outcomes need to be much 
stronger to survive statistical signifcance. 
Our inferential rule is that a given relationship is statistically signifcant if
and only if it holds for both the entire population model and for the bootstrap-
ping analyses. Tis is a more demanding but also less biased rule of inference
compared to previous works examining these relationships. 
Network efects. Another threat to inference is spatial dependence
between observations at the nation-year and dyad-year level of analy-
sis. Since conficts evolve in relational networks, there is a strong pos-
sibility that individual observations are not independent and identically
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Table A5.7 Distribution of religious similarity across warring dyads 
Religious Similarity Cold War Post–Cold War 
Level Raw Pct. Modifed Pct.1 
Low 0.643 0.601 0.486 
Medium 0.133 0.105 0.143 
High 0.224 0.301 0.371 
1 Modifed to change asterisked cells in Table A10 (online appendix) to the High category. 
distributed (iid) random variables. Tis has been shown to be the case
in a number of networks, including confict (Cranmer, Desmarais, and
Meninga 2012; Desmarais and Cranmer 2011; Ward et  al. 2013). In
other words, the relationship between two states is apt to be afected
by the relations between each of them with third parties. We call this
type of dependence a network efect. In order to control for network
efects, we use a number of network statistics that measure diferent types
of network dependence. Tese are measured at the dyad-year unit of
analysis, and are then transformed in a way that can capture network
efects on national behavior. Tese measures include two stars, three
stars, and expected values. For a given dyad ij, the number of two-stars
is calculated by: 
S 2 ij =ˆ MID ji +ˆ MIDij − 2 * MIDij . [2] 
j i   i j   
And the number of three-stars is calculated by: 
  
S 3 ij =ˆ MID ji ˆ MID  ij − 3MIN ˆ MID  ji ,ˆ MID ij . [3] 
j i   i j    i j   (  )  j i   
Triangles are calculated as 
T = MID MID . [4] ij ˆ ij jk 
k j   
For the nation-year we average the two stars, three stars, and EVs over all of
a given state’s neighbors—that is, the states with which the focal state had
confict. 
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Chapter 6 
Religion and International Cooperation 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter we examined the possible linkages between reli-
gious factors and confict behavior. Tis chapter centers on the relation-
ship between religion and international cooperation. We examine when,
why, under what conditions, and in what ways religion can foster or inhibit
cooperation among states. Te theoretical discussion and empirical results
presented here go well beyond what has been previously written on the
relationship between religion and international cooperation. In particular,
we innovate in several key areas. 
1. We provide a focused theoretical framework on religion and cooper-
ation. While the literature on international cooperation and its
various aspects (security, economic, institutional) forms a cottage
industry in the academic scholarship on international relations,
relatively little has been written on the underlying causal mecha-
nisms that connect religious factors to various forms of coopera-
tion. We ofer a focused theory of the linkages between religious
characteristics of states, dyads, and regions and diferent areas of
international cooperation. 
2. We provide a multidimensional analysis of cooperation. Te typical
study of cooperation focuses on a specifc cooperative domain.
Studies of security cooperation tend to ignore economic or insti-
tutional cooperation. Studies of economic cooperation tend
to ignore security and institutional cooperation and so forth.
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Tere are a few studies that examine linkages between diferent
cooperative domains. For example, there has been a relatively
vigorous debate on the relationship between alliances and trade
(Mansfeld and Bronson 1  7; Gowa 1  5; Gowa and Mansfeld
1  3, 2004; Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares 1  8; Fordham 2010;
Vijayaraghavan et al. 2015). However, this literature is the excep-
tion rather than the rule. More importantly, religion does not come
into play in studies focusing on such linkages. By contrast, this
chapter covers multiple issue areas where cooperation takes place,
and our theory ofers diferential insights on the role religion plays
in diferent cooperative domains. Likewise, the empirical analyses
in this chapter allow a general assessment of the linkages between
religious factors and multiple cooperative domains. Finally, we
ofer both an integrative measure of cooperation and results on
the efect of religious factors on integrative cooperative ties. 
3.We provide a multilevel analysis of international cooperation. As in
the previous chapter, we ofer a multilevel analysis of the link-
ages between religion and international cooperation. We exam-
ine national cooperative patterns, dyadic cooperative relations,
and regional levels of cooperation. Here, too, our analyses go
well beyond the common practice in studies of cooperation,
which focus primarily on one level of analysis. Importantly, we
study emergent properties of cooperative relations—cooperative
communities. Our analysis of cooperative international commu-
nities adds novel insights into the emergent properties of reli-
gious factors in ways that have never before been demonstrated. 
4. We provide several methodological innovations. We add several addi-
tional layers to the key methodological innovations discussed
in the previous chapter—high-resolution measures of religious
similarity and religious characteristics, more appropriate estima-
tion techniques, and multiple robustness checks. Some of these
innovations are related to the estimation of cohesive communities
and their political and religious characteristics. We employ net-
work analytic techniques, which enable us to estimate unobserved
efects of cooperative structures and the role of religion in these
structures. Te methodology of community detection and the
estimation of community cohesion allows us to estimate whether
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cooperative communities are organized around religious lines, and
whether religion is a determining factor in their emergence and
persistence over time. 
All these innovative features combine to provide new insights into and
assessment of the conditions under which religious factors afect coopera-
tive international relations. To begin a discussion of the linkages between
religion and cooperative behavior, we need to provide a defnition of inter-
national cooperation. 
Following Keohane (1984), we defne international cooperation as coor-
dinated behavior between or among states that is designed to beneft them more
than unilateral behavior. Tis defnition has several elements. Te frst is
the notion of coordinated behavior. What we mean by coordination is that
two or more actors behave in a manner that is consistent with the expecta-
tions of all parties involved in this coordination. Tese expectations can be
established by some formal agreement that stipulates the expected behavior
under a prespecifed set of circumstances. Tey can also emerge due to some
informal or tacit adjustment of expectations by the actors without a formal
agreement or even without communication among them. Schelling (1963,
1978) provides multiple examples of coordination without communica-
tion. Axelrod’s (1984) study of cooperation among egoists provides both
a formal foundation and a number of intriguing examples of how coor-
dinated behavior can take place without communication betweeen actors
who are out to maximize their gains, sometimes even at the expense of
others. 
Te second element of the defnition has to do with the underlying
reasons for such coordinated behavior. Te general idea here is that actors
coordinate their behavior because each of them believes it can beneft more
from—explicitly or tacitly—coordinating behavior with others than by
trying to realize one’s goals without coordination. Tis may sound like a
rationalization of cooperative behavior. However, the beneft that actors
expect to receive from such coordination need not be material; it could
entail emotional, spiritual, or psychological fulfllment. Te point is that
such coordination is deliberate and conscious, and it occurs for a reason. 
Tere is a third element that is absent from the defnition, but it features
prominently in general theories of cooperation, and has led to a number of
important discoveries about social behavior across a number of disciplines.
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Coordinated behavior that arises from individual expectations of gains does
not necessarily yield social outcomes that maximize the society’s benefts.
Most social dilemmas or collective goods problems that have been analyzed
by game theorists address situations where cooperation yields socially opti-
mal outcomes, but individual incentives yield egoistic behaviors that result
in suboptimal individual and social outcomes.1 However, the opposite is also
possible, as Schelling (1978) shows: coordinated behavior due to common
expectations may result in social disasters. Runs on banks due to expecta-
tions of bank collapse, stock market crashes, major trafc jams due to drivers
slowing down to observe minor car accidents, the spread of unsubstantiated
rumors (e.g., false allegations of crimes committed by black Americans as
precipitant to white mob violence and lynchings in the US) are examples
of coordinated behavior resulting in social disasters. However, these cases
refect collective outcomes driven by common expectations that unilateral
behavior may minimize risk or maximize gain. Terefore, this mob behavior
is not what we typically mean by cooperation. 
Our focus is on cooperation among states. Such cooperation can take a
number of diferent forms. States may cooperate in one issue area and avoid
cooperation in another. In fact, states may cooperate in one issue area and
fght in another. Tis happens more often than one might think possible.
For example, over the period 1945–2010, 47 percent of all dyads that had
a MID also traded with one another to a signifcant degree.2 Over 19 per-
cent of all warring dyads had substantial trade between them. More com-
monly, over 50 percent of all warring dyads had substantial overlap in their
IGO membership.3 More than two-thirds of the dyads that were involved
in a MID over that period had substantial overlap in IGO membership.
Terefore, when discussing international cooperation, it is important to
understand that cooperation and confict are two sides of the same coin.
Also, it is important to emphasize that, while there is some association across
diferent issue areas of cooperation, these relationships are not very strong.4 
Tere are many areas within and across which states can and do cooper-
ate, and while we cannot cover them all, we nevertheless focus on some of
the most important and visible areas of international cooperation, which
include the following: 
1. Security cooperation. Formal security alliances are formal treaties
between or among states stipulating diferent forms of coordinated
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behavior under prespecifed circumstances. Such agreements can
cover cases of common defense against enemies of one of the
allies; common ofensive treaties that coordinate attacks against
common enemies; nonaggression or neutrality pacts that stipulate
nonviolence against members of the treaty; or even consultation
pacts (i.e., ententes), which stipulate consultation, coordina-
tion, or information sharing during crises. Some of these treaties
involve extremely costly commitments because they require states
to sacrifce the lives of their citizens and to commit large amounts
of material resources to help another state if the latter is attacked.
Other security treaties may impose on signatories an enormous
amount of restraint because compliance requires them to refrain
from violent action, even if they have major claims or grievances
toward each other. For reasons that we discuss below, states rarely
enter into alliances lightly. Terefore, such treaties represent one
of the most exacting forms of international cooperation. 
2. Economic cooperation. We analyze two forms of economic coop-
eration:  total trade and preferential trade agreements. Te pro-
cess of trading goods and resources is one of the most common 
forms of international cooperation. International trade very often 
involves limited political intervention; much of it is a frm-to-
frm or even citizen-to-citizen enterprise. Governments may have 
some control over exports and imports via taxes, tarifs, or various 
export and import regulations. However, governments have very 
little control over citizens’ demand for foreign goods and services, 
or their willingness and ability to sell goods and services interna-
tionally. Preferential trade agreements (PTAs), on the other hand, 
are government-to-government agreements that stipulate spe-
cial terms of exchange of goods and services between or among 
states (Saggi 2006). Tese agreements may entail both benefts 
and costs, as they improve the competitive edge of goods that 
one country exports to another. At the same time, such agree-
ments might make local producers worse of because they need 
to compete with more attractive import goods in terms of quality 
and price. 
3. Institutional cooperation. Here we examine the cooperation of
countries within multilateral institutional contexts, defned by
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their membership in diferent types of IGOs. A formal defnition
of an IGO (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Wranke 2004, Wallace
and Singer 1 70) views it as an institution that meets four condi-
tions: (1) it involves members of three or more states; (2) it has a
plenary that meets at least once a decade; (3) it has a secretariat
or an equivalent executive body that meets at least once a year;
and (4)  individual state representatives are appointees of their
respective governments. When a state joins an IGO it pledges
to comply with the IGO’s mission. Te extent to which IGOs
actually constrain unilateral state behavior is a central topic of
debate in international relations theory (Mearsheimer 1  4/
5, Keohane and Martin 1  5, Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal
2001). However, for the purpose of this chapter we assume that
states do not join IGOs lightly. Likewise, IGOs do not admit
states if they do not expect member states to use the IGO’s facili-
ties and institutions for cooperative purposes. We focus on IGOs
that perform diferent functions, including security, economic,
administrative, and more general (e.g., human rights, environ-
ment) functions. Note that institutional cooperation often over-
laps with economic or security cooperation. For example, NATO
is both a collective security organization that can be translated
into a series of bilateral alliance treaties among its members, as
well as a security IGO. Multilateral PTAs also meet the defni-
tional conditions of an IGO, and some PTAs have embedded
within them security alliances (Powers 2004, Henderson 2015).
However, many IGOs cover administrative or symbolic issue
areas that do not fall into the security or economic categories. So
the overlap between security cooperation or economic coopera-
tion, on the one hand, and IGO membership, on the other, is far
from complete. 
4. General cooperation. We also develop a general cooperation con-
cept that encompasses the three areas of cooperation discussed
above. General cooperation distinguishes between states that
cooperate with each other in one issue area (e.g., security) and
states whose cooperative ventures encompass multiple issue areas.
Tis enables us to examine how religious factors afect multiple
areas of cooperation. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
230 
230 Scriptures, Shrines, Scapegoats, and World Politics 
Te study of religion and international cooperation is a relatively new topic.
In contrast to the multitude of studies on the role of religion in interna-
tional confict, the study of religion and cooperation is not well developed.
Tus, the theoretical foundations of these linkages are rather weak, and
empirical research is almost nonexistent. To a large extent, this chapter rep-
resents an initial foray into uncharted waters. As such, the present chapter
provides a number of important contributions to our understanding of the
role of religion in world politics. 
1. It ofers a set of theoretical ideas—derived from the various per-
spectives we discussed in chapter 2—about the role that religion
might play in fostering international cooperation. 
2. Tese ideas center on the presence or absence of linkages between
religious factors and diferent forms of cooperative ventures
among states. We put forth a nuanced theory of religion and
international cooperation whose central point is that religion may
play an important role in fostering some forms of cooperation
but not others. A key objective of the theory is explaining which
particular areas of cooperation are infuenced by religious factors
and which are not. 
3. In keeping with the practice of previous chapters, we study the
linkages between religion and cooperation at multiple levels of
analysis. In contrast to other chapters, however, we highlight a
new unit of analysis—endogenous cooperative communities
(ECCs). Such communities emerge as dense clusters of coopera-
tive states. Members in any one ECC tend to cooperate with each
other much more often and more intensely than with members of
other ECCs. Consequently, the level of cooperation within ECCs
is much higher than between ECCs (Maoz 2017). We ofer the
frst analysis of the role that religion plays in the emergence and
persistence of ECCs. 
2. International Cooperation—State of the Art 
We do not purport to provide a comprehensive review of the literature on
international cooperation; others have done that (e.g., Gilligan and Johns
2012, Oneill, Balsiger, and VanDeveer 2004, Milner 1992). Our review
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centers on key ideas regarding diferent forms of international cooperation,
the factors that foster or inhibit cooperative behavior, and, in particular, the
role of religion in international cooperation. One of the issues that make
such a review somewhat complex is that none of the major paradigms of
world politics ofers a unifed framework of international cooperation that
cuts across issue domains. Tis is so, despite that all major paradigms dis-
cuss the possibility, causes, and implications of international cooperation
in rather general terms. Our review covers, frst, the general ideas about
international cooperation of each of the three paradigms.5 We then review
the key issues that separate these paradigms from each other as well as some
aspects of common ground. 
Te defnition of cooperation discussed above outlines a utilitarian drive
for cooperation. If two actors can do better by coordinating their behavior
than by acting alone, then they have an incentive to cooperate. Tis is what
we describe as a potential “win-win” situation. In such situations, the antici-
pated beneft from cooperation may have implications that go beyond the
individual gains. For example, cooperation may generate public goods that
improve the conditions of others beyond those actors who pay the costs of
obtaining/sustaining these goods. 
Yet, as some of the key theories of social interaction suggest, cooperation
is not guaranteed even if it ofers higher rewards to all units involved and
to each of them separately. Two models of social interaction illustrate this
point:  the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Stag Hunt Game (Axelrod 1984,
Jervis 1978). In both models the cooperative outcome provides each player
a higher payof than the payof of unilateral action. In both models, the
cooperative outcome is also Pareto superior; that is, it maximizes the social
utility. In both models, however, the mutual defection outcome—where
each player fails to cooperate—is either the only equilibrium (Prisoner’s
Dilemma) or one of the two equilibria (Stag Hunt) in the game. Tis means
that, once players choose not to cooperate, no one has an incentive to move
toward cooperative behavior. Tis dilemma of cooperation lies in the fact
that individual rationality dictates defection. Each actor expects other
actors to defect. Even if an actor would have liked to cooperate in order
to maximize its payof, it cannot rely on the others to do the same. In that
case, defection is the best (or the least-worse) choice. 
Many real-life problems of this sort (contributing to collective goods, cre-
ating environmental pollution, supporting allies under attack, maintaining
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production quotas in cartels) involve repeated interactions. In other words,
the problem reemerges every time actors have to make a decision about
cooperation, and typically with the same partners. Tis helps mitigate the
dilemma to some extent. Te trade-of becomes one between short-term
gains and long-term losses. Building on the concept of the “shadow of the
future,” Axelrod (1984) showed that some fairly simple strategies for play-
ing a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game induce cooperation. Moreover,
such simple strategies tend to “invade” more exploitative ones and survive
better in an environment made of egoistic strategies seeking to exploit other
actors’ weaknesses. 
Cooperation may be difcult to sustain if actors are rational because
there are short-term incentives to defect. Tere are also good reasons not
to trust other actors’ cooperative gestures. Even if cooperation is spelled
out in formal contracts, in the absence of an authority that can sanction
violations, there are rational incentives to renege on commitments. If actors
expect others to violate these contracts, there is no rational reason to sign
them in the frst place. 
However, even in an anarchic setting that lacks mechanisms of enforce-
ment, cooperation can and does happen frequently. Evidence of the mag-
nitude of international cooperation abounds. First, the degree of trade
cooperation increased from less than 20 percent of dyads in 1870 to nearly
80 percent of dyads in 2009. Second, the degree to which security alliances
are reliable varies among studies, with some (e.g., Leeds 2003) arguing that
alliances are reliable in over 75 percent of the cases where states are called to
help their allies in war. Others (e.g., Maoz 2015) argue that the reliability
rates are much lower (and depend on both alliance type and the specifc
circumstances in which commitments are invoked). Yet even so, allied states
are at least four times more likely to help their allies against third parties
than they are likely to fght those third parties when no alliance commit-
ments are invoked. 
Tird, the average state was a member of 0.2 IGOs in 1816, of seven
IGOs in 1900, of twenty-seven IGOs in 1945, and of over seventy IGOs
in 2004 (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Wranke 2004). Te number of IGOs
increased from one in 1816 to 27 in 1900, to 101 in 1945, and to 352 in
2004. Fourth, data on PTAs start in 1950, but the density of state mem-
bership in PTAs increased from 1.7 percent of the dyads having a PTA in
1950 to 38.7 percent of all dyads having one or more PTAs in 2006.6 Other
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types of defense cooperation agreements covering such issues as intelligence
sharing, joint exercises, bases, and the like have also increased exponentially
over the same period (Kinne 2014). 
Tese data clearly suggest that states cooperate with each other across
a wide array of issues. And the density of international cooperation is sig-
nifcantly higher than the density of international confict. Moreover, the
degree and scope of cooperative activities have increased signifcantly over
time. So any serious attempt to understand modern international relations
must address how and why cooperation expands and increases in spite of
continued anarchy. 
2.1 Realism and International Cooperation 
Tere are two versions of the realist (or neorealist) paradigm: ofensive real-
ism and defensive realism. Both difer primarily with respect to the kind
of goals they attribute to states. Both rely on the idea that international
anarchy—the absence of an institution or actor that is capable of enforc-
ing order and guaranteeing contractual compliance by states—is the funda-
mental characteristic of international relations. However, defensive realists
assume that the key actors—states—are driven primarily by the desire to
ensure their security. Tus, they are absolute gain maximizers:  each state
wishes to maximize its payofs regardless of whether or not other states gain
or lose. By contrast, ofensive realists assume that states are power seekers.
Since power is relative, they are driven by a desire to maximize their power
relative to, and at the expense of, others. Tis makes them relative gain
maximizers. Tis is a crucial diference in terms of what drives (or compels)
states to cooperate. 
If states are absolute gain maximizers, then international interactions are
mixed-motive games. States compete with each other in general, but there
are certain outcomes that represent collective gains. Tese outcomes may
drive states to cooperate. Tere are also outcomes that ofer mutual losses.
Such outcomes—for example, nuclear war—also drive states to coordi-
nate behavior to minimize the likelihood of collective disaster. Te mixed-
motive nature of international interactions suggests that states cooperate
when cooperative outcomes maximize individual gains as well as mutual
gains. Likewise, states cooperate when they are driven by a desire to avoid
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individual—as well as collective—disasters. However, even if most inter-
national games are mixed-motive games, actual cooperation is not assured,
and in fact—as in the case of games like the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Stag
Hunt, or Chicken—disaster may strike nevertheless. 
Tese mixed motives apply to various forms of interaction. States form
security institutions, such as alliances or collective security organizations, to
protect themselves against common threats. Such security structures ofer
capability pools that can deter common enemies from attacking. However,
alliances also entail risks. First, states lose a measure of autonomy because
decisions on war and peace may be made for them by their allies or by the
enemies of their allies (Smith 1995, Morrow 1994, Maoz 2000). States
wish to enter into alliances to get their allies’ support when they get into
trouble. Tey may also wish to enter into alliances to avoid trouble in the
frst place, hoping that the added capability that the alliance entails will
deter their adversaries (Smith 1995). Te benefts of alliance for a given
state, however, are often severely discounted or even ofset by the prospect
that it will have to help its ally when the latter gets into trouble. In many
cases, a state may form an alliance precisely so it can draw its ally into war
with a third party, one that its ally had no prior reason to fght. Tis is what
Maoz (1990b) called the “ally’s paradox.”7 
Defensive realists suggest that states enter into security cooperation
reluctantly; they form alliances only when they cannot confront their secu-
rity challenges via their own resources. Tis is what we call the “need” factor
of alliance formation. A state defnes its security challenges in terms of the
size and capabilities of its strategic reference group. A state that faces a large
and powerful group of enemies (or would-be enemies), whose capabilities
far outweigh the focal state’s capabilities, is badly in need of allies. By con-
trast, a state that has few enemies, or a state whose capabilities outweigh
those of its enemies, has no strategic incentive to form alliances. 
Te problem of cooperation is exacerbated if one accepts the ofensive
realist notion of states as relative gain maximizers. Te underlying implica-
tion of relative gain maximization is that international interactions refect
constant- (or even zero-)sum games. In such games, players have no interest
in cooperation because one player’s gains come at the expense of (or are
equal to) another player’s losses. Cooperation is feeting, yet it may occur,
and for the same reasons that defensive realists suggest:  the pooling of
resources against common enemies (Mearsheimer, 1994/5). 
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Given that a state has determined that it needs allies, who are the “best”
candidates for alliance? For realists, the answer to this question is fairly
straightforward: the best candidates for alliance are states that share com-
mon interests. Common interests in realism translate to common enemies
(Farber and Gowa 1995, Gowa 1999). Other afnities—cultural, ideologi-
cal, or political—between states matter very little. 
With respect to trade, however, both ofensive and defensive realists
agree that states are out to maximize absolute gains. Because trade is based
on the theory of comparative advantage, pursuing relative gains in trade
would greatly damage the benefts of trade. If a state defnes its benefts from
trade as a function of its revenues relative to its trading partner, then trade
cannot be an equilibrium outcome. Tis is so because the state that “loses”
in terms of relative gains would be better of without it. Trade is a means of
increasing a state’s national power—via access to resources and raw materi-
als. Tese are used to boost a nation’s economy and its military. Trade also
generates revenues and foreign currencies from exports. Cooperation via
exchange of goods and services is also possible if both sides feel that they can
beneft more from such exchange than from a self-contained economy—
which might be both inefcient and perpetuate some structural scarcities. 
Institutional cooperation is also seen by realists as a necessary evil.
Institutions enable states to coordinate behavior that serves their interests.
However, realists believe that states design international institutions in a
manner that refects the distribution of power in the international system.
Institutions are built so that they will not be able to override state interests.
One of the important aspects of such designs is the lack of meaningful
enforcement mechanisms of most international institutions. When they
attempt to enforce institutional norms, they cease to function efectively
(Mearsheimer 1994/5). Te manner in which the major powers designed
the UN Security Council refects this point more than anything else.
However, the realist claim extends to other international organizations as
well (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001). 
In short, the driving forces behind international cooperation, according
to the realist paradigm, are fundamental national interests. If states could
safeguard or advance their national interests without relying on other states,
they would avoid cooperation altogether. But the reality is that—in most
cases—they cannot. Tus, cooperation is a necessary evil; it starts when it
converges with states’ mutual interests, and ends when it does not. Lord
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Palmerston’s famous statement epitomizes this position: “We [Great Britain]
have not eternal allies and we have not perpetual enemies. Our interests are
eternal and perpetual and those interests it is our duty to follow.” 
Tis discussion suggests that realists see little room for any kind of
ideational attachments, such as those that are based on religious afn-
ity. Such factors are not taken to have a causal impact on the propen-
sity, duration, or type of cooperation. Realists accept the fact that some
areas of international cooperation may refect cultural afnities. For
example, institutional cooperation in areas that do not directly impinge
on national security—for instance, administrative matters or cultural
afairs—may refect a signifcant degree of cultural afnity. However,
security cooperation, both via collective security organizations and for-
mal alliances, is based on hard interests that have very little to do with
religion. Te same applies to economic cooperation, an area where inter-
ests play a critical role. 
It is instructive to summarize the realist theory of cooperation with a 
number of key headlines that emerge from the realist view of world politics. 
• Cooperation is born of necessity; it happens when a state cannot
meet the external challenges it faces with its own resources. 
• Tus, cooperation is motivated by need—the diference between
what a state wants to accomplish and what it can accomplish by its
own resources. 
• Partners for cooperative ventures are states that share common
interests; ideational or cultural afnities have little impact on
cooperation 
• Institutions are designed to refect the balance of power in the inter-
national system. Tey are convenient mechanisms for coordina-
tion and function as long as their activity does not challenge states’
national interests. When it does, states follow their interests frst. 
2.2 Liberalism and International Cooperation 
As in the realist paradigm, liberal scholars assume that states are driven by
interests. However, liberal scholars argue that states pursue a broader range
of interests than the power-centered (or survival-centered) types of interests
on which realists focus. Tis wide range of interests is predicated on the
assumption that the domestic makeup of states matters. Political leaders
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attempt not only to maximize national interests but also work to maximize
their political survival, that is, their chances of staying in ofce (Bueno
de Mesquita et  al. 2003). Te goal of political survival requires political
leaders to provide for their “winning coalition,” those who helped bring
them to power and sustain them there. In autocracies, leaders need to pro-
vide private goods to the members of their winning coalition: the military,
aristocracy, economic elites, or some ethnic group. In democracies, politi-
cal leaders must provide public goods so that a majority of the voters will
reelect them. 
Te liberal paradigm suggests that domestic politics and international
politics interact. Domestic needs and pressures afect the ways states behave
in the international system, just as events in the international system might
afect domestic political processes. Te raison d’état is not independent of
leaders’ personal goals and aspirations, or of social needs and structures. 
Liberals also assume that states seek absolute gains. As such, they are
aware that many areas of interaction—economic, cultural, or scientifc—
ofer multiple win-win opportunities. However, the actual realization of
cooperative ventures may be hampered by short-term incentives to exploit
others. Tese issues extend and become more complicated when we move
from a two-person (or two-state) interaction to multilateral interactions.
In such areas, the problem of cooperation becomes essentially a public-
good problem, or in professional jargon a “tragedy of the commons” prob-
lem. To sustain public goods such as parks or a sustainable environment, a
minimum number of actors have to contribute to the maintenance of such
goods. However, since such public goods are nonexclusionary—the benefts
they provide are general, not restricted to those who contributed toward
their existence—there is a strong incentive to “free ride,” to enjoy the public
good without contributing to its sustainability. 
States’ remedy to the free-riding or defection problem, according to lib-
eral scholars, is the design and establishment of international institutions
(Keohane 1984, Keohane and Martin 1995, Axelrod and Keohane 1985).
International institutions serve a number of purposes:  frst they increase
transparency, so that defection and free riding can be more easily detected.
Second, they create a longer horizon for states, so leaders can perceive the
long-term benefts of cooperation. Once they understand that long-term
benefts trump the short-term benefts of free riding, states might be will-
ing to accept the short-term costs of cooperation so that they can reap
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the long-term benefts. Tird, international institutions gradually develop
norms that induce compliance. Even though most international institu-
tions lack any enforcement capacity, they are capable of “naming and sham-
ing” violators. As such, they force states to think twice before violating these
agreements. 
Unger (2013) examined processes of joining and complying with
human rights treaties. She shows that when a state depends on joiners and
compliers, its tendency to join and comply with the provisions of such
treaties increases. By contrast, if the state depends politically or economi-
cally on nonjoiners or noncompliers of such treaties, it is less likely to join
human rights treaties. And if it does join, it is less likely to comply with
such treaties. 
Tere are three fundamental issues that separate liberal explanations of
international cooperation from realist ones. First, the nature, extent, and
persistence of cooperation among states—across issue areas—is a func-
tion of domestic factors as well as of common interests or mutual gains.
Specifcally, joint democracy is not only an important factor in reducing
the probability of confict among states but also an important facilitator of
cooperation (Russett and Oneal 2001; Mansfeld and Milner 2000, 2012;
Mansfeld and Pevehouse 2003). Second, institutions increase the magni-
tude of cooperation (Pevehouse and Russett 2006, Keohane and Martin
1995). Tird, even in the security realm where realists expect little coopera-
tion, there is evidence that institutional cooperation is prevalent and stable. 
An important aspect of liberal thinking about cooperation concerns
spillover efects. States that engage in a successful cooperative venture in
one realm are likely to expand such cooperation to other realms. A long-
standing debate in the liberal literature concerns the direction of spillover—
especially spillover between security and economic cooperation. Classical
liberal theorists (e.g., Kant, Auguste Comte) suggested that the spillover
process goes from trade to security. Tat is, states that share successful trade
relations are likely to increase their cooperation in the security realm. Most
empirical evidence suggests, however, that the causal path goes the other
way—at least in the post–World War II era. Specifcally, when two states
form security cooperation ties, they are likely to increase their economic
cooperation, but not vice versa (Mansfeld and Bronson 1997, Gowa 1995,
Gowa and Mansfeld 2004, Maoz 2010, Vijayaraghavan et al. 2015).8 Te
general point, however, is that cooperation may spill across issue areas.
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Several key points about cooperation can be deduced from the liberal
paradigm. 
• Cooperation emerges from the pursuit of absolute gains; most
international interactions are best represented by mixed-motive
games. Terefore, states cooperate when they view an exchange as
generating win-win opportunities or opportunities to avoid lose-
lose situations. 
• Even when cooperation is threatened by social dilemmas such as
the collective good problem, there are strategies that can mitigate
the tendency to defect from cooperative ventures. Tese strate-
gies include institutional design, transparency, and reciprocity.
Conditional cooperative strategies (e.g., tit for tat) may induce
cooperation even in environments that contain a relatively large
number of exploitative strategies. 
• Importantly, international institutions create cooperative norms
even when they lack enforcement mechanisms and when they can-
not directly sanction violators. Tese norms create a “shadow of
the future” for potential violators—an awareness that short-term
gains due to defection may be ofset by long-term losses. Such
norms reduce the tendency to violate cooperative agreements. 
• Domestic politics—in particular democratization—plays an
important role in increased cooperation across diferent issue-areas. 
• Cooperation in one realm increases the probability and magnitude
of cooperation in other realms (i.e. spillover efects). 
2.3 The Constructivist Paradigm 
Te principal criticism leveled by constructivists against the other paradigms
is the assumption of the latter that interests are (a) exogenous, (b) fxed, and
(c) primarily material. Constructivists argue that we cannot treat interests
as independent variables, as both realists and liberals do. Te key ques-
tions that constructivists ask include the following: (a) Where do interests
come from? (b) Which factors afect interest formation? (c) When, how,
and under what conditions do interests change? Te origins of interests
are a central area of inquiry in constructivism. Constructivists also dispute
the notion that interests are fxed. Whereas realists assume that states—
regardless of time and space—pursue either power or security, and liberals
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assume that political leaders aim to maximize their political survival, con-
structivists assume that interests change over time and difer from one state
to another. 
Both realists and liberals argue that states’ interests are material—that
is, they can be measured by such things as military capability, economic
wealth, or domestic stability. Constructivists claim that material indicators
of interests are derivative of ideational factors such as national identity. Te
latter point is the core idea of constructivism. As we noted in chapter 3,
constructivists claim that identity shapes perceptions. Perceptions shape
leaders’ (and therefore states’) worldviews, their characterization of friends
and foes, and, to a large extent, their interests. Such identities are based in
part on fxed elements—cultural, social, and political attributes—and in
part on experiential learning due to their interaction with the environment. 
Tis idea shapes the way constructivists view cooperative incentives.
Te less “radical” constructivists (e.g., Alexander Wendt, Michael Barnett,
Emanuel Adler) do not dismiss completely the material basis of interests.
States need resources to survive and prosper; they need allies to deter or
defend against common enemies; and they require institutions to admin-
ister the international commons such as the environment. Nor do con-
structivists challenge the fact that political leaders can seek both domestic
and foreign benefts from cooperation. Yet, their arguments center on two
questions: (1) why cooperate, and (2) with whom? 
Part of the constructivist answer to the frst question is similar to that
of the realist and liberal paradigms: states cooperate because they need to
or because they can beneft more by cooperation than by going it alone.
However, constructivists add to these incentives two other ones. First, states
cooperate if and when such action conforms to their identity conception.
Tis identity conception is not only dependent on the domestic attributes
of the state but also on the ideational relations between the focal state and
its external environment. Tis afects the answer to the second question.
Te other factor that infuences states’ incentives to cooperate is the prevail-
ing “international culture” (Wendt 1999). Specifcally, a prevailing Lockean
culture restricts cooperation to the minimum necessary to ensure survival.9 
By contrast, within a prevailing “Kantian” culture, states see themselves as
part of a corporate identity, shared values, and inherent interdependence.
Tis renders states’ identities commensurate with a collective international
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identity. Under these circumstances, states are driven to high levels of coop-
eration across issue areas. 
International cultures may not be universal, however. Tey can be lim-
ited to certain regions, or to a certain type or group of states. So the ques-
tion of “with whom to cooperate” is still germane even when the prevailing
international culture is “Kantian.”10 As noted, realists identify friends as
states with common interests. Tis often translates to states with shared
enemies. Liberals identify potential cooperators as states that share a similar
political culture—in particular, joint democracy. Constructivists’ answer to
this question is: cooperation is between states that have common identities
or between states that share values. States defne friends and foes not only
on the basis of what they do but also on the basis of who they are. We saw
this argument in the constructivist claims about the origins of confict.
Tis applies to cooperation as well. Trust is based on shared values and
shared ideas. Since cooperation requires trust, the likelihood of cooperation
between states increases with the degree of ideational convergence. 
Both identities and interests may change over time. Te argument about
states’ age can be extended to cooperative activities. When states are young,
their identities are shaped primarily by cultural characteristics. Teir defni-
tion of friends and trustworthy partners for cooperative ventures is based
primarily on shared cultural attributes. Consequently, at the early stages of
states’ interaction with their environment, they appear to seek partners for
cooperative ventures among states with which they share cultural identities.
As states grow “older,” their identity is increasingly shaped by interactive
experience. When states’ cooperation with other states creates net benefts,
they begin to share a corporate identity and growing sense of a commu-
nity. Once such a corporate identity is consolidated, cooperation not only
increases within the issue area where such benefts are manifest but also
begins to spill over to other interactive realms. Te choice of partners to
cooperation is shaped less by common cultural traits and increasingly by
shared experiential identities. Te following ideas emerge. 
• Shared ideas/identities afect international cooperation as much as
common interests. 
• At the early stages of a state’s international activity, it tends to
cooperate with actors that share common cultural traits. At later
stages of a state’s life cycle, however, it is increasingly more likely
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to cooperate on the basis of shared cooperative experience than on
the basis of cultural traits. 
• Te level of cooperation increases as the international culture shifts
from a Lockean culture to a Kantian one. 
3. Religion and Theories of International Cooperation 
In order to examine how religious factors infuence international coopera-
tion, we need to provide some principles that characterize a general theory
of cooperation that covers several questions: 
1. Why do states need to cooperate? 
2. How do states select partners for cooperation? 
3. What are the emergent implications of international cooperation? 
A general theory of international cooperation contains four principal ele-
ments:  need, attraction, prevention, and trust (NAPT). Te frst element
addresses the frst question. Te other three elements answer the second
question. Te answer to the third question is a logical consequence of the
answers to the frst two. We discuss each element in turn. 
Need. Te need factor defnes why some states choose to cooperate more
than others. It also explains why some states have more cooperative part-
ners than others. As we have seen in the various theories of cooperation,
cooperation may entail risks and problems. Terefore, a state chooses to
cooperate due to one of two reasons. Te frst reason is that it feels that
it cannot accomplish its goals by using its own resources. Alternatively, a
state cooperates—as the original defnition suggests—because it can gain
more from cooperation than by going it alone. Te need factor describes a
gap between what a state can accomplish via cooperation and what it can
accomplish by following a unilateralist strategy. Te wider the gap between
what states can accomplish via cooperation and what they can accomplish
on their own, the greater the need to cooperate, and consequently, the more
partners they require. 
In practice, the need for cooperation difers by issue area. In security
afairs, the need for cooperation is a function of the gap between the capa-
bilities of the focal state’s strategic reference group and the capabilities
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of the focal state. A state’s threat perception is a function of the size and
characteristics of its actual or potential enemies. Tis is what Maoz (2010)
called the focal state’s strategic reference group (SRG). Te SRG of a given
state consists of its past enemies and the allies of these enemies. A state’s
enemies include (a) states with which the focal state had a MID over the
past fve years, or (b) a war over the past decade, and (c) its strategic rivals.
When a state cannot meet the challenges posed by its SRG, it needs to
pool resources with other states to ensure its survival. Te size of the SRG
was found to be a strong motivator of alliance formation (Maoz 2010,
Ch. 5). 
Te need for trade cooperation (or the need to form PTAs) is a function
of two principal factors:  scarcity of some resources that are required for
economic development and growth, and surplus production. A state may
require resources for its economy such as raw materials, food, or certain
technologies and cannot extract these resources internally. Tus, it needs
to import these commodities from other providers outside its own bor-
ders. Second, specialization leads to efcient production. In such cases, the
goods or services that a certain sector produces exceed the internal needs for
such goods and services. Hence, producers need to sell these goods and ser-
vices to other states. Tis creates an export-oriented economy. Te import-
related needs and the export-related needs are often embodied in the same
economy. Tus, the greater the need for certain imported goods and ser-
vices and the greater the surplus production of other goods, the stronger
the need to trade. 
Te need for coordination is what drives institutional cooperation.
Security institutions such as multilateral alliances require coordination
among members, including common planning, joint maneuvers, and
shared resources such as intelligence. Tese drive the formation of insti-
tutions that manage these coordinative activities. Likewise, multilateral
trade agreements require mechanisms for the resolution of conficts and
disagreements and monitoring. Here too, institutional solutions are often
the way of dealing with such needs. In security, economic, or institutional
settings, increased interdependence creates a higher need for cooperation. 
Attraction. Te attraction element defnes how states select partners for
cooperation. Once a state has determined it cannot accomplish its goals on
its own (or it cannot do so in an optimal manner), it enters a large mar-
ket of potential partners. How does it choose its partners in this market?
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A would-be partner is attractive to the extent that it can provide the focal
state with what it needs from such cooperative ventures. Attraction is both
a function of the domain in which cooperation is sought and of the theory
we use to explain cooperation. In security afairs, attraction is defned in
terms of common interests, that is, shared enemies (Gowa and Farber 1994,
Mearsheimer 2001, Maoz 2010). Liberal scholars acknowledge that shared
interests are an important component of mutual attraction. However, the
overriding factor that determines attraction is similar political systems,
in particular, joint democracy and economic compatibility (i.e., similar
economic systems). 
Constructivists consider attraction to be a function of convergent
identity conception and a common value system. Tese traits may even
create a need for cooperation when no material need is present. Shared
values or identities between two societies determine how they view them-
selves, each other, and third parties. In this sense, constructivist concep-
tions of attraction encompass both realist and liberal conceptions of the
same concept. Joint democracy or compatible economies may help defne
national identities. Consider the two overriding themes in US national
rhetoric: democracy and capitalism. Tese themes shape the attitudes of
Americans toward other nations. Te same applies to many other states. 
Prevention. Tis factor plays an important role in the calculus of secu-
rity cooperation and, to a lesser degree, in economic cooperation processes.
It has little or no impact on institutional cooperation. Prevention is an
important factor in realist theories of cooperation, but it does not feature
prominently in liberal and constructivist theories. Te basic idea is that
states choose to cooperate not only because they need each other or fnd
each other attractive but also out of fear. For example, state A may choose
to cooperate with state B because it fears that if it does not cooperate, B
might forge cooperative ties with C, A’s enemy. Tis is the underlying logic
of neutrality pacts or nonaggression treaties. Such forms of cooperation
reduce the probability that the would-be partner may join one’s enemies if
a confict breaks out. 
Prevention may also be a motive for some forms of trade cooperation.
Te evidence on alliance to trade spillover suggests that “trade follows the
fag” (Keshk, Reuveny, and Pollins 2004, Vijayaraghavan et al. 2015). Tis
means that given that the prevention motive is a powerful driver for secu-
rity cooperation, it may also spill over into economic cooperation. Te
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latter type of cooperation is used as an incentive to stay out of the rela-
tions between one’s partner and its enemies. Tis kind of incentive may
have been an important factor driving PTAs between the major powers and
“third world” countries during the Cold War era. 
Trust. As we have seen from the outset of this chapter, a key question for
anyone considering a partner for cooperation is, “Can I trust that partner?”
Trust derives from an assessment of the probability that the potential part-
ner will honor the agreement underlying the cooperative venture. Trust is
diferent from attraction. Attraction addresses the question “Can the part-
ner give me what I need (or does the partner possess the qualities that can
give me what I need)?” By contrast, trust addresses the question “Will the
partner give me what I need when I need it?” Te ability to trust a potential
partner is a function of the partner’s reliability. Reliability may be related to
the partner’s reputation of honoring agreements, the costs associated with
the partner’s compliance, and the partner’s value system. Te latter factor
is an important aspect of assessment of the partner’s reliability. Carrying
out promises implies incurring some cost. In many instances promises—or
even pledges cemented in formal treaties—may be cheap talk, especially if
the pledging actor does not expect to be called upon to fulfll the promises. 
In the movie Te Godfather, there is a scene where a baker (Nazorine)
requests a favor from Don Corleone (the Godfather) on behalf of his
would-be son in-law Enzo. Te Don promises to fulfll this request and
tells Nazorine that sometime in the future he might request a return favor
from the baker. It turns out that when Enzo returns the favor, the cost is
potentially very high: he is to pretend to be a bodyguard confronting the
Don’s would-be assassins. 
Taken together, these factors determine the onset, duration, and efec-
tiveness of cooperation. Actors cooperate when they expect the benefts
from cooperation to exceed those from unilateral pursuits. Tey choose
partners for cooperation among those who are capable and willing to con-
tribute to the collective good, and those who are trustworthy. Actors are
also willing to select partners for cooperation even if such partners are not
really attractive. Tis is done for preventive purposes, to derail the prospect
of such partners cooperating with third parties, thereby preventing the focal
actor from accomplishing its own goals. Finally, partner selection is strongly
dependent on an assessment of the partner’s reliability. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
246 
246 Scriptures, Shrines, Scapegoats, and World Politics 
How does religion enter this picture? Religion plays a role in determin-
ing both the attractiveness of a potential partner for cooperation and the
trust one can place in such a partner. We discuss the drivers of cooperation
as these are seen by the key theories addressed in the present study. 
3.1 Primordialist Cooperation 
Religion serves as a normative guide to behavior; it contains a set of dos,
don’ts, and values that cover a wide array of interpersonal interactions. As
a social institution, virtually all religions provide fundamental principles
that regulate social exchanges. Some religions, such as Islam, impose strict
restrictions on economic transactions. Te Sharia prohibits Muslims from
providing loans that carry interest. For a long time, a similar custom was in
place in Catholicism, especially in the Middle Ages. In many cases, religious
adherence implies identifcation with an all-encompassing value system. 
Cooperation requires trust, especially when no mechanisms or sanc-
tions exist to enforce compliance. Under such circumstances, people are
more likely to cooperate when they share the same values. In disputes over
the interpretation of agreements, religious institutions, which are held in
high esteem by the disputants, often serve as facilitators and arbitrators.
Te primordialist conception of religion and politics considers religious
dissimilarity to be a source of suspicion, mistrust, and even outright ani-
mosity. By contrast, religious similarity engenders afnity. Such afnity
becomes a source of attraction beyond the trust instilled by shared nor-
mative values. When people look for potential partners for cooperative
ventures, religious afnities become an important source of attraction. 
Both trust and afnity are crucial in areas of costly cooperation, such as
international security, especially if the benefts from cooperation are not
immediately attached to the costs paid to sustain it. Tis is the case in alli-
ance politics. When a state signs an alliance, it may be forced to help its ally
who is attacked by a third party. If it honors its alliance commitment, it
pays sometimes a high cost for doing so. Te beneft it derives from the alli-
ance may come only if at some later date one’s ally comes to one’s aid when
one is attacked. Tis conditionality—costs frst, benefts (perhaps) later—is
not unlike the Godfather’s reliance on return favors. However, in the case
of alliance politics, the threat of retribution that may secure compliance
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in Mafa politics is not very meaningful. Terefore, the element of trust is
crucial. 
Afnity due to shared religion tends to drive institutional cooperation
in cultural and social afairs. Both the tangible costs of, and the tangible
benefts from, such institutions are not very high, so the reason for their
emergence and persistence is that they cement such afnities in symbolic
contractual arrangements and associations. In contrast, the  need for trust
and the signifcance of value-based afnities are not principal determinants
of economic cooperation. Tis is an area of mutual gains in which violation
can be reciprocated. Both costs and benefts are tangible and in most cases
can be reaped immediately. More important, in economic afairs difer-
ences, rather than similarities, may attract. Trade is more likely to take place
between economies producing complementary products. Economies pro-
ducing similar products are more likely to compete over the same markets. 
3.2 Instrumentalism and Cooperation 
According to primordialism, religious similarities attract because they entail
shared identities and shared value systems. Tis applies to the perception
of both leaders and publics. Instrumentalism, on the other hand, suggests
that leaders use religious values selectively when they want to cooperate.
Te goal of leaders’ invoking religious values and religious identity is to
mobilize public support for cooperative ventures. Tis can happen only
when societies are religiously homogeneous and when leaders can co-opt
the religious leadership in support of their cooperative visions. Here, too,
leaders are more likely to invoke religious factors when the costs of coop-
eration are high and when the benefts of cooperation are not immediately
visible—as in the case of alliance ties. Te need to manipulate religious val-
ues or symbols in order to ensure cooperation is less prevalent in economic
transactions. 
Te instrumentalist perspective also suggests that leaders are more likely 
to manipulate religious values to garner support for cooperative ventures 
when they feel that their hold on power is tenuous, that is, under condi-
tions of political instability, than when they are fairly confdent of their 
political survival. Cooperative ventures like alliances are not only designed 
to increase national security but also may be designed to help maintain 
leaders in power. In such cases, the need to mobilize support for such 
ventures requires leaders to invoke religious symbols of shared values and 
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shared belief systems. Tis is done not only to create an image that their 
country can trust its would-be ally but also as a diversionary tactic, draw-
ing attention away from domestic difculties and toward some foreign 
policy objective that can be obtained with the help of allies. 
3.3 The CoC Thesis and Cooperation 
Te CoC thesis focuses mainly on intercultural confict; nevertheless,
Huntington (1993, 34) contends that states are more likely to “cooperate
with and ally themselves with states with similar or common culture and
are more often in confict with countries of diferent culture.” Although
Huntington argues that the primary characteristic of a civilization is its
religion, he portrays civilizations in rather broad brushstrokes; therefore,
it is hardly a straightforward task to draw explicit inferences about the
religion-cooperation linkage from the CoC thesis, itself. For a civilization
to form, and for it to harvest some fundamental grievances toward another
civilization to the point that it is willing to confront its enemy by force,
its elements need to cooperate with each other. Intracivilizational alli-
ances must form; trade deals among sectors of a given civilization must be
struck so that resources would be available for such a fght; and institutions
must be established to ensure coordination. Te latter is consistent with
Huntington’s claim that increased economic regionalization has emerged
from and been reinforced by heightened civilization consciousness 
Te upshot is that from the perspective of the CoC thesis, we need to
expect high intracivilizational cooperation across issue areas, and low inter-
civilizational cooperation, also across the board. Here, too, the expectation
of the CoC thesis is that such intracivilizational cooperation is primarily a
post–Cold War phenomenon. 
3.4 The Integrative Theory of Religion and World Politics 
As we pointed out in chapter  3, our theory emphasizes the conditions
under which political elites fnd themselves as the mechanisms by which
religious factors may be invoked to motivate international action. Political
elites can turn on or of the “religion switch” to mobilize support for their
policies, their ability to do so depends on the structure of the society and
the relationship among those actors toward which a given action is contem-
plated. We discuss the implications of this idea as it relates to international
cooperation. 
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Leaders in states characterized by high levels of political stability may
seek strategies to reduce the risk of being removed from ofce. As we have
seen in the previous chapter, one approach is to apply diversionary tactics
by fnding external scapegoats. Te goal of diversionary policies is to direct
the attention and energy of the coalition that sustains them in power to an
external enemy. However, there are other strategies that leaders may use to
increase their chances of political survival. Some of them involve fnding
cooperative ventures. Tese ventures may provide benefts that improve the
standard of living of the general population, allowing them to reshufe the
winning coalition. 
Chow and Kono (2017) argue that authoritarian leaders who ascend to
power via extralegal methods (that is, via a coup or revolution) are politically
vulnerable and have a tendency to placate their constituencies by reducing
tarifs on food products, thus increasing food imports. Baccini and Chow
(2018) show that authoritarian leaders who face a high coup risk are more
likely to sign PTAs than political leaders who acquire their position via legal
means. Tese ideas cover economic policy. 
Political leaders who are at risk of losing their job can employ coopera-
tive security strategies to increase external support for their tenure. Seeking
allies who can extend support for the focal leader in confictual ventures is
directly related to the diversionary approach we discussed in the previous
chapter. Political leaders who use confict as a diversionary strategy need
to succeed in such risky ventures. If they engage in confict and end up on
the losing side, their job insecurity is bound to increase even more (Bueno
de Mesquita et al. 1992). One way of increasing the chance of success in
external adventures involves getting outside help in the form of alliances.
However, as we noted, alliances are a risky and potentially costly form of
cooperation. One’s ally may drag a state into an unwanted war before the
focal state drags the ally into a war of its own making. Terefore, trust is an
important factor that determines which allies to seek. Moreover, mobiliz-
ing public support for alliance formation suggests that the leader must fnd
allies that are “attractive” and “trustworthy.” Tis suggests that states would
seek religiously similar allies, because this similarity helps mobilize public
support for the alliance and increases the probability that the ally will fulfll
its obligations when necessary. 
Te relations between religious and political institutions also come into
play in such cases. Religious leaders and/or religious institutions may or
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may not enter this equation. When religious and political institutions are
closely aligned, political leaders may use religious organizations and reli-
gious leaders to mobilize support for their venture. For example, when Iran
negotiated a nuclear deal with six powers (including the “hated” United
States), there was a great deal of internal opposition from conservative
circles associated with the Revolutionary Guard (as well as conservative
circles in the United States). Once the deal was reached, President Hassan
Rouhani turned to the supreme leader and Muslim cleric Ali Khamenei for
his support. Khamenei’s support of the nuclear deal allowed this agreement
to be signed and implemented (Tabatabai 2017). 
Tis leads to the following hypotheses regarding religion and interna-
tional cooperation: 
H1. Religious similarity increases the probability of security
cooperation. 
H2. Religious similarity increases the probability and magnitude of
institutional cooperation. 
H3. Religious similarity does not have a signifcant efect on eco-
nomic cooperation. 
A more refned expectation covers the interaction between political sta-
bility and religious similarity and its efect on international cooperation,
specifcally: 
H4. Political instability increases the efect of religious similarity on
international cooperation. 
H5. States that have close ties between religious and political institu-
tions are more likely to cooperate with religiously similar states. 
Tese hypotheses cover the expectations of the primordialist, institutional-
ist, and integrative perspectives on religion and cooperation. To address the
expectations of the CoC thesis, we hypothesize the following: 
H6. Te relationship between religious similarity and international
cooperation is higher during the post–Cold War era than during
the Cold War era. 
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Te following hypothesis addresses the expectations derived from the con-
structivist perspective. 
H7. New states are more likely to cooperate with religiously similar
states than mature states. 
3.5 Religion and Cooperative International Communities 
International cooperation has emergent properties. Cooperative interac-
tions are not strictly dyadic; they cumulate and transform into multilateral
cooperative structures. We call these structures cooperative communities.
Since religious similarity is expected to afect the behavior of individual
states, dyads, and to determine levels of regional cooperation, we suggest
that religious factors have similar emergent efects. Specifcally, religious
factors are expected to afect the structure of cooperative security and insti-
tutional communities, but not the structure of economic communities. 
Before we discuss why this is the case, we need to explain the con-
cept of cooperative communities. Cooperative communities are clus-
ters of states that are characterized by high levels of cooperative ties
among members. Tese groups may emerge due to a formal agreement
among members, such as a collective security treaty (e.g., NATO, the
Warsaw Pact, or the Arab League). More often, however, they emerge
endogenously—due to the density of cooperative ties among mem-
bers but without a formal agreement. All the major paradigms discuss
cooperative endogenous groups. Te realist paradigm, overwhemingly,
focuses on cooperative security structures. Te central concepts that
ofer a close equivalence to the notion of endogenous cooperative
groups in the liberal paradigm are the concepts of international regimes
and international institutions. Te concept of international regimes is
also part of the realist vocabulary, but it is restricted to security coop-
eration (Krasner 1982, Jervis 1982). According to liberal scholars,
international regimes and international institutions cover both for-
mal arrangements and implicit ones. Tese emergent structures apply
to security afairs, economic afairs, and other domains, for example,
administration, environment, culture, and so forth. In the constructiv-
ist paradigm, the central concept is that of communities (Wendt 1999,
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Adler and Barnett 1998). Tis concept has several versions (including
“epistemic” communities; Adler and Hass 1992, Adler 2005), but it
broadly refers to a collection of units (states in our case)11 that assign
some shared meaning to each other and to out-groups. Members of
such communities also have a set of common norms and engage in
high levels of cooperative behavior within the community compared
to cross-community cooperation. In sum, the factors that defne the
emergence of endogenous cooperative groups difer across paradigms.
Each paradigm identifes one or more key factors that afect the forma-
tion of such groups. Table 6.1 lists the causal mechanisms that drive
the formation and persistence of cooperative communities. 
We suggest that religious similarity of societies helps cement trust 
and creates natural attraction tendencies among states in such issue areas 
where the risk of fulflling obligations in a multilateral context is high. 
Tis implies that we can extend the monadic and dyadic arguments about 
religion and cooperation to the community level. Specifcally, 
H . Security cooperation communities and institutional communi-
ties tend to be religiously cohesive; in contrast, economic com-
munities tend to be religiously diverse. 
What we mean by religious cohesion is that the religious similarity between 
members of a given community is signifcantly higher than the religious 
similarity between members of that community and nonmembers. 
Likewise, religious diversity of a given community implies that the degree 
of within-community religious similarity is little diferent than the degree 
of religious similarity between community members and nonmembers. 
4. Research Design 
In this chapter, too, we provide an intuitive and nontechnical description
of our research strategy. Much of this strategy resembles the design of the
research in the previous chapter. Terefore, we focus on the novel aspects
of the current chapter. A more detailed technical discussion of the key
issues in the research design appears in the appendix that accompanies
this chapter. 
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Table 6.1 Paradigms’ explanations of the emergence of endogenous cooperative groups 
Paradigm Variable Causal Mechanism Outcome 
Realism Shared common Balancing against common threats Collective security 
enemies communities, security 
regimes 
Liberalism Joint democracy Common contractual norms Collective security 
Spillover efects 
induce trust 
Benefcial experience in one 
communities, trading 
blocks, collective 
cooperative domain generates PTAs, Institutional 
shared interests, interdependence, communities, 
and mutual trust international regimes 
Constructivism Common culture Shared identities induce shared Collective security 
Spillover efects 
values and norms 
Benefcial experience generates 
communities, trading 
blocks, collective 
shared interests and ideational PTAs, institutional 
Epistemic 
convergence 
Cross-national expert groups that 
communities 
communities share ideas and norms induce 
policy cooperation 
4.1 Units of Analysis 
We follow the same levels of analysis as in the chapter on religion and inter-
national confict: specifcally, the nation-year and nation-history, the dyad-
year and dyad-history, and the region-year levels. For brevity, we report the
results of the nation-year, dyad-year, and region-year analyses. Te more
extensive results (including nation-history and dyad-history levels of analy-
sis) are reported on the book’s website. Te discussion of the results covers
those latter analyses as well. However, a key innovation of this chapter is
the examination of a new level of analysis: cooperative communities. Te
concept of “communities” is derived from network analysis. All of the coop-
erative structures we examine here can be studied with the tools of network
analysis. 
A brief defnition of a network is instructive at this point. A network is
a set of units—states in our case—and a rule that defnes the presence, the
direction, and/or the magnitude of a tie between any pair of units (Maoz
2010: 11). Tus, for alliance networks a tie exists between two states if
they have any alliance (in some cases we restrict ties to defense pacts only).
For trade networks, we recognize a tie between states if the level of trade
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between these states exceeds 0.1 percent of their respective GDPs. Te
presence of a PTA between two states indicates a tie in the PTA network.
In the IGO network we observe a tie between states when the proportion
of overlapping IGO membership between these states exceeds the average
proportion of IGO membership overlaps for all states at a given year.12 
A cooperative network refects the strength of cooperative ties between
two states across the three cooperative dimensions: security, economics, and
institutions. Once these networks are defned, we can identify communi-
ties. Te general concept of “community” in network analysis refers to a
subset of the units that (a) have a high density of ties among them and (b) a
low number of ties between members of a community and nonmembers.
Tere are a number of methods that enable community detection—the
partition of the network into a set of groups, based on the ties between
members. Te community detection algorithms seek to maximize a statistic
called the modularity coefcient (Newman and Girvan 2004), which mea-
sures the degree to which communities have the following characteristics: 
1. Maximal density of ties between states belonging to the same com-
munity: states that share community membership are likely to have
direct ties (or tend to be connected via short paths) with each other. 
2. Minimal density of ties between states belonging to diferent com-
munities: states that belong to diferent communities are unlikely
to have direct ties (or tend to be connected by long paths) with
each other. 
3. Maximal diference between the actual community structure and
chance. 
Substantively, cooperative communities are emergent structures of highly
dense cooperative interaction between state members, and highly sparse
interactions between states belonging to diferent communities. Here we
analyze the structure of such communities. 
4.2 Measures of Key Variables 
In the previous chapter, we ofered defnitions for many of the independent
and control variables used in the empirical analyses. We do not repeat those
here. Instead we focus on (a) the defnition of the key cooperation variables,
and (b) additional variables not discussed before. 
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Security cooperation. In the previous chapter we defned security coop-
eration in terms of the number of alliances of a given state (at the monadic
level), the presence or absence of an alliance (at the dyadic level), and the
average number of alliance commitments per state (at the regional level).
Here we add a new variable that incorporates both the number of alliance
commitments of a state/dyad and the level of these commitments. Te rela-
tive commitment variable (Maoz 2010, 42) is a ratio of the weighted alliance
commitment score between two states to the largest possible level of com-
mitment of any two states. Te appendix provides a more detailed discus-
sion of this variable. At the region-year level, we defne this as the number
of within-region alliances divided by the number of within-region dyads. 
Economic cooperation. We defne economic cooperation by two vari-
ables: relative trade and number of trading partners. Relative trade is defned
as the total amount of trade (imports + exports) divided by the state’s GDP.
Te number of trading partners is the number of states with which the focal
state trades more than one-tenth of 1 percent of its GDP. At the dyadic
level, this variable is defned as log trade: the (logged) total amount of goods
and services exchanged between two countries. At the regional level, we
defne this as the average level of relative trade of states in a given region. At
the region-year level, economic cooperation is defned as the average dollar
amount of trade between regional dyads. 
Preferential trade agreements. At the nation level, we use a count of the
number of PTAs involving the focal state. At the dyadic level, we use a
binary variable assigned a score of one if dyad members had at least one
PTA between them, and zero otherwise. At the regional level, we average
the number of PTAs per state member. We again defne this as the ratio of
within-region PTA dyads to the number of regional dyads. 
Institutional cooperation. At the nation level, we measure institutional
cooperation as the number of IGO memberships of the focal state. At the
dyadic level, we employ Maoz’s (2010) index of relative IGO membership
score defned as a ratio of the number of shared IGO memberships between
dyad members to the number of IGO memberships of the focal state. At
the regional level, institutional cooperation is the average number of IGO
memberships of states in the region. 
Combined cooperation. We combine the security, economic, and institu-
tional cooperation variables as follows. At the national level, we frst generate
a rank order for each of the cooperation variables for every year, such that
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the most cooperative state (e.g., the state with the most allies, the state with
the largest share of trade to GDP) gets the highest number and the least-
cooperative state (e.g., the state with the fewest allies, the state with the least
trade per GDP) gets the lowest rank.13 Second, we generate a relative rank by
dividing the state’s rank by the number of states in the global system for that
year. Tis gives us a relative rank score on each of the cooperative dimensions
(e.g., a state gets a security cooperation rank score, an economic cooperation
rank score, etc.). It allows us to generate a cooperative ranking of states that
takes into account changes in the number of states in the system over time.
Tird, we average the cooperation rank scores for each state across all the
cooperative variables. Tis gives us a combined cooperation score. 
At the dyadic level, we assign each dyad a score of one for alliances if
it had an alliance. We assign it a score of one if its level of trade (mea-
sured by log trade dollars of exports and imports exchanged by the mem-
bers of the dyad) exceeded the average dyad trade score for this year. We
assign the dyad a score of one if it had a PTA in a given year. Finally,
we assign the dyad a score of one if its level of shared IGO membership
exceeded the mean level of shared IGO membership for that year. We
then average across the four binary cooperation scores. Tus, a dyad that
had a high level of alliance commitment, a high degree of trade, a PTA,
and a high level of joint IGO membership receives a score of one, and so
forth. Note that we did not assign weights to diferent areas of coopera-
tion, although it would make sense to assign to alliance and/or trade levels
a higher weight than joint IGO membership. When we do that, results
do not change substantially. At the region-year level, we average across
the combined cooperative scores of the states making up a given region. 
Religious Cohesion of Cooperative Communities. Te appendix pro-
vides a detailed methodological discussion of the community detec-
tion algorithm and the derivation of the cohesion score. Here we discuss
the general intuition of this method. First, for each cooperation vari-
able, we use a known algorithm (Leicht and Newman 2008) to detect
communities. We improve on this algorithm by allowing states to over-
lap over multiple communities. Tis method is discussed in Maoz
(2017, Appendix). We then partition the original adjacency matrix (for
example, the one that indicates whether states have an alliance), into
a community-overlap matrix. In this matrix, communities are aligned
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
   
 
 
  
 
257 
Religion and International Cooperation 257 
along the main diagonal of the matrix, and of-diagonal blocs represent
between-community membership. We insert into the community overlap
matrix the religious similarity scores. So each cell in that matrix refects the
degree of religious similarity between the row state and the column state. 
At this point, we calculate the cohesion coefcient. Tis coefcient 
refects the degree to which the within-community religious similarity is 
diferent (higher or lower) than the between-community religious similar-
ity. Specifcally, we measure the average within-community religious simi-
larity and subtract from it the between-community religious similarity. 
Te cohesion coefcient varies between 1 (when the religious similarity 
of all dyads within a given community is 1, and the religious similarity 
between community members and nonmembers is zero) to -1 (when 
the opposite holds—that is, when the religious similarity between dyads 
within communities is zero and the religious similarity between members 
of one community and noncommunity members is 1). We then run a 
signifcance test based on the within- and between-community variances. 
Tis test allows us to assess the probability of getting a specifc cohesion 
coefcient by chance alone. Again, a detailed discussion of this procedure 
is given in the appendix and in Maoz (2017). 
4.3. Estimation 
As in the previous chapter, we run bootstrapped estimations of the nation-year
and dyad-year models, in order to (a) account for stationarity biases in mea-
sures of religion (as well as stationarity biases in long-term cooperative ties),
(b) reduce the sample size to ensure that inferences are not biased by excessively
large N’s,14 and (c) test for the robustness of the results. For the nation history
and dyad history, we run simple OLS models. Finally, for the region year we
run binary or continuous (fxed-efects) time series cross-sectional regressions.
Note that for the nation year and dyad year we include spatial controls (e.g.,
two stars and three stars) as discussed in the previous chapter. 
5. Results 
5.1 Nation-Level Analyses 
We begin our discussion of the results with the nation-year analyses
(Table  6.2). We focus on the efect of religious factors on cooperative
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Table 6.2 Effects of determinants of monadic (nation-year) international cooperation, 
1945–2010 
No. Allies Log Trade No. PTAs IGOs Combined 
Cooperation 
Religious Similarity 0.222** 0.022 -0.361** 0.029 0.363** 
State-PRIE  (0.018) (0.38) (0.123) (0.028) (0.044) 
Religious Homogeneity 
Medium 0.023** -0.12* -0.189* -0.034 0.01 
(0.005) (0.054) (0.089) (0.024) (0.013) 
High 0.043** -0.185** -0.309** 0.048 0.08** 
(0.005) (0.052) (0.084) (0.024) (0.011) 
Religion-State Relations 
Some relation 0.01 0.217** -0.295** -0.064** 0.029** 
(0.005) (0.055) (0.084) (0.022) (0.011) 
Cohabitation 0.002 0.63** -0.038 -0.046 0.047** 
(0.007) (0.074) (0.113) (0.035) (0.013) 
Pct. Non-religious -0.046** 1.753** 0.546** 0.638** 0.171** 
(0.019) (0.169) (0.212) (0.082) (0.028) 
Coup Risk 0.015 -0.372* 0.089 0.024 -0.009 
(0.009) (0.152) (-0.309) (0.048) (0.02) 
Religious Similarity State- -0.012 0.147 -1.391* 0.031 -0.032
  PRIE#Coup Risk (0.027) (0.38) (0.566) (0.163) (0.056) 
Constant -0.074** 1.685** 0.793** 2.797** 0.298** 
(0.009) (0.177) (0.185) (0.101) (0.017) 
N 7,444 7,444 7,443 7,456 7,479 
F 385.99 1,385.13 
Chi-Square 877.13 3,247.14 655.74 
R-Squared 0.374 0.652 0.029 0.092 0.338 
Notes: All analyses are bootstrapped models based on a sample of n = 1,500 out of roughly 10,000 
nation-year observations and 300 replications. 
Control variables omitted to preserve space. Full tabular results are provided in the book’s website. 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
behavior. Te frst important takeaway from these analyses is that the efect
of religious characteristics of states on cooperation is domain specifc. As
noted above, most analyses of the relationship between religion and inter-
national cooperation have not diferentiated among separate domains of
cooperation. We fnd that religious homogeneity has a positive efect on
security, institutional, and combined cooperation. However, it has a nega-
tive efect on trade and on PTA membership. Second, we fnd that high
levels of religious similarity between the focal state and its PRIE increase
the number of alliances and the level of commitment these alliances entail.
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Religious similarity of state-PRIE also afects the combined cooperative sta-
tus of states. However, religious similarity between the focal state and its
PRIE has little or no efect on its trade ties and reduces the number of its
PTAs. Tird, as the percentage of Christians and/or Muslims in a coun-
try increases, its number of alliances, and its overall cooperative rank, also
increases. By contrast, we do not fnd signifcant cooperative tendencies in
countries dominated by other religious groups. 
Finally, secularism—measured by the size of the non-religious popu-
lation in states—has a negative impact on security cooperation; however,
it positively afects states’ level of economic and institutional cooperation.
Secularism also has a positive efect on the overall cooperative rank of a
state. It appears that while secularism may encourage a range of interna-
tional cooperation, it does not supersede the impact of religious similarity
when it comes to the important domain of security cooperation. 
In the previous chapter we found that regime instability mediated 
between religious factors and international confict. By contrast, we fnd 
that regime stability or instability does not have a meaningful efect on 
international cooperation at the national level of analysis. Figure 6.1 high-
lights some of the results on the interaction efect between political stabil-
ity or religious homogeneity, on the one hand, and religious similarity, on 
the other, on various measures of cooperation. First, there is no signifcant 
interaction efect between political instability—measured as coup risk—
and religious similarity state-PRIE on cooperation. In general, religious 
similarity between the focal state and its PRIE has a positive efect on secu-
rity cooperation and overall cooperation. However, this efect is not dif-
ferent for politically unstable states compared to stable ones (Figures 6.1.1 
and 6.1.4). By contrast, politically stable states tend to reduce their degree 
of trade as the level of religious similarity between the focal state and its 
PRIE increases (Figures 6.1.3). Second, we do fnd that highly religiously 
homogeneous states facing high risk of regime transition tend to form 
more security alliances than stable or low-risk states (Figure 6.1.2).15 
Figure  6.2 assesses the hypotheses derived from the CoC thesis and
from the constructivist approach with respect to national cooperation.
Figure 6.2.1 clearly illustrates that the relationship between religious simi-
larity between the focal state and its PRIE and cooperation was signifcantly
more pronounced during the Cold War era than during the post–Cold
War era. Tis casts doubt on the CoC’s argument. Te same applies to the
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6.˜.˜: Coup Risk, Religious Similarity State-PRIE 6.˜.2: Coup Risk, Religious Homogeneity, 
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Fig. 6.1. Interaction effects on measures of cooperation, nation-year unit of analysis 
Note: Solid lines indicate statistically signifcant relations; nonsignifcant relations are
marked by dashed lines. Bars in the fgure are 95 percent confdence intervals. 
Signifcant differences between the effects of different values of the intervening variable 
(e.g., state age) exist when the confdence intervals associated with one level (e.g.,
mature) do not overlap with the confdence intervals associated with another level 
(e.g., new). 
constructivist expectation that religious similarity will have a stronger efect
on cooperation when states are “young” than when they are more mature.
Figure 6.2.2 suggests that the opposite is, in fact, the case: religious similar-
ity has a greater efect on the combined cooperative rank of more mature
states than on that of new states. 
Te results of the nation-history level of analysis (reported in the book’s
website) largely mirror those of the nation-year level. Specifcally, religious
similarity between the focal state and its PRIE afected the tendency of the
former to form and maintain allies, but not its level of trade or IGO mem-
bership. Religious homogeneity and religion-state relations do not have a
signifcant efect on any of the issue areas of cooperation examined herein.
Te interaction between coup risk and religious similarity state-PRIE
also did not have a meaningful efect on diferent areas of international
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Fig. 6.2. Effects of political instability, religious similarity state-PRIE by period and 
state age 
cooperation. By contrast, secularism appears to have signifcant impact on
the state’s history of cooperation. Tis applies to all cooperative dimensions
except alliances, as well as to the average cooperative rank of the state over
its history. Tis leads us to the dyadic analyses. 
5.2 Dyadic Analyses 
Te dyad-year analyses are given in Table 6.3. Tere are several key results
in these analyses. First, dyadic religious similarity has a strong efect on
security cooperation, PTAs, joint IGO membership, and combined coop-
eration. Tis efect is consistent and robust across issue areas. However, reli-
gious similarity has a negative impact on the degree of dyadic trade. Tese
results again provide support to H1 and H2 above. Specifcally, dyads that
are composed of religiously similar states are more likely to form alliances,
share IGO membership, and have a generally higher cooperative profle
than dyads made up of religiously diferent states. 
Second, religious homogeneity has a negative efect on trade ties,
PTA relations, and IGO membership, and a mixed efect on combined
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cooperation levels. Tis means that if both members of the dyad are made
up of highly homogeneous states, they are less likely to trade than if one
or both members of the dyads were religiously diverse. Likewise, the efects
of religion-state relations are inconsistent across indices of dyadic coopera-
tion. Generally speaking, dyads made up of members who have a moderate
or high degree of religion-state coordination tend to trade less, have fewer
PTAs, and are generally less likely to cooperate than dyads whose members
practice separation of religion from politics. 
Tird, we fnd that secularism in the dyad—that is, dyads composed of
states with a higher level of non-religious people—has a consistent efect
on dyadic cooperation. Relatively secular dyads are more likely to form
alliances, trade, and have a higher probability of forming and maintaining
PTAs; however, they are less likely to share IGO membership. Nevertheless,
such dyads are more likely to have a higher cooperative profle. 
We present the results of the interaction efects, as well as tests of the
hypotheses derived from the CoC thesis and the constructivist perspective
in Figure 6.3. Te results of these analyses suggest that religious similarity
has a strong efect on dyads made up of states facing a low level of political
instability as well as on dyads composed of states facing high levels of politi-
cal instability. However, dyads composed of the latter type of states—those
facing high coup risks—are more inclined to cooperate the more religiously
similar they are. 
As was the case with the nation-level analyses, we fnd that the efect of
religious similarity on cooperation was more pronounced during the Cold
War era than during the post–Cold War era. Tis provides additional evi-
dence contradicting the expectation of the CoC thesis. Likewise, we fnd
that the level of cooperation of dyads composed of “mature” states is more
strongly afected by religious similarity than dyads composed of one or
both “new” member states. Tis too runs against the expectation of the
constructivist perspective. Common identity seems to run deep even after
states become more experienced members of the club of nations. In fact,
the latter is more consistent with an early argument (Maoz 1989) that the
behavior of newer states as they join the “club of nations” is more a function
of their provenance as “revolutionary” or “evolutionary” states, and that
regardless of either process, their international behavior is likely to regress to
the mean of that of more mature states. Tus, given the general relationship
between religious similarity and international cooperation, in general, it is
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Table 6.3 Effects of religions factors on national cooperation—dyadic analysis 
Alliance Trade PTA IGO Combined 
Cooperation 
Religious Similarity 2.353** -0.167** 0.831** 0.037** 0.103** 
(0.096) (0.053) (0.105) (0.005) (0.006) 
Religious Homogeneity 
Medium -0.045 -0.08** -0.629** -0.017** -0.024** 
(0.051) (0.025) (0.051) (0.003) (0.003) 
High 0.082 -0.203** -0.712** 0.031** -0.018** 
(0.051) (0.023) (0.056) (0.003) (0.003) 
Religion-State Relations 
Some Relation -0.052 -0.056* -0.602** 0.011** -0.028** 
(0.045) (0.025) (0.046) (0.002) (0.003) 
Cohabitation -0.067 0.274** -0.103 -0.092** 0.012** 
(0.056) (0.032) (0.054) (0.003) (0.004) 
Secularism in Dyad 4.498** 9.164** 0.538* -0.147** 0.591** 
(0.182) (0.160) (0.248) (0.022) (0.044) 
Coup Risk 0.299** -0.61** 0.63** 0.061** -0.024** 
(0.078) (0.032) (0.08) (0.003) (0.002) 
Coup risk#Religious 0.132 0.051 -0.643** 0.006 
Similarity 
(0.116) (0.066) (0.128) (0.007) 
Relig-State Relations#Religious 
Similarity 
Some Relation 0.088** 
(0.008) 
Co-Habitation 0.094** 
(0.01) 
Constant -7.755** 2.211** -3.144** 0.137** 0.534** 
(0.213) (0.105) (0.15) (0.01) (0.01) 
N 533.393 539.420 445.442 539,420 508,816 
chi2/F-Statistic 7,628.01 12,195.18 5,575.79 57,543.62 8,867.89 
r2 0.464 0.259 0.272 0.250 0.143 
Note: All analyses are bootstrapped models with sample size of 15,000 observations and 300 
replications. 
less surprising—though contradictory to a constructivist argument—that
mature states refect this status quo bias more than newer states. 
Another way of viewing the latter fnding is that according to constructiv-
ism, the newly independent state should start of relying on cultural factors
more than on material factors in determining their partners for international
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
264 
264 Scriptures, Shrines, Scapegoats, and World Politics 
.0
5 
.˜
 
.˜
5 
.2
 
.2
5 
Pr
(A
lli
an
ce
) 
0 .˜ .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 ˜ 
Religious Similarity 
Low High 
Coup Risk 
6.3.˜: Coup Risk, Religious Similarity, and Dyadic Alliance 
.2
 
.3
 
.4
 
.5
 
Li
ne
ar
 P
re
di
ct
io
n 
0 .˜ .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 ˜ 
Religious Similarity 
Separate Some Relation Co-Habitation 
Relig.-State Relations 
6.3.2: Religious Similarity, Religion-State Relations, 
and Combined Cooperation 
.2
5 
.3
 
.3
5 
.4
 
.4
5 
Li
ne
ar
 P
re
di
ct
io
n 
0 .˜ .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 ˜ 
Religious Similarity 
Cold War Post-Cold War 
Period 
6.3.3: Religious Similarity and Combined 
Cooperation by Period 
.2
5 
.3
 
.3
5 
.4
 
.4
5 
Li
ne
ar
 P
re
di
ct
io
n 
0 .˜ .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 ˜ 
Religious Similarity 
Mature Dyad New Dyad 
Dyad Age 
6.3.4: Religious Similarity and Combined 
Cooperation by Dyad Age 
Fig. 6.3. Interaction effects of intervening variables and dyadic cooperation 
cooperation; but actually since most of the world’s states emerged from
colonialism into the bipolar ideological standof of the Cold War, there
was a historical and contemporary bias toward either supporting the for-
mer colonial power or opposing it.16 To a large extent, this was captured in
Maoz’s (1996) evolutionary versus revolutionary framework, but one can
add to this another layer concerning the international orientation of the
newly formed states. States that emerged through an evolutionary process
usually were accommodating to the metropolitan power, which in this con-
text was either a direct member of, or allied with, the international status
quo powers (i.e., the United Kingdom, France, or NATO allies Portugal,
Belgium). If, however, these new states emerged following a revolutionary
anticolonial struggle, they tended to establish a politico-military leaning
toward the major power opponents of their colonial masters, namely, the
USSR and China (and their satellites). 
Te implications for the study of religion and confict/cooperation is
that given that the Western states were more oriented toward Christianity
and the Eastern states toward atheism, maturation, in this scenario, would
be from identities infuenced by the relatively weaker newly independent
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state’s politico-military alignments toward more cultural ones as the states
matured and became stronger and began to articulate and promote their
more self-determined orientations in the global system as they advanced
from the conditions of their birth (i.e., their early independence). Tus,
maturation in this postcolonial process is more likely to be away from ini-
tial politico-military orientations in considering international cooperation
partners and toward more cultural ones as the state matures: the opposite
of what constructivists would expect from extant states (i.e., those that had
been independent for some time prior to the postwar era), but consistent
with our fndings that more mature states that are religiously similar are
more likely to cooperate. 
5.3 Regional Analyses 
Our fnal set of “conventional” analyses centers on the region-year level.
Table 6.4 displays the results of the analyses at that level. 
Te regional results resemble the dyadic and monadic results. Regional
religious similarity increases regional security cooperation and combined
cooperation, but it does not afect regional trade or regional institutional
cooperation. We also fnd a similar efect of regional secularism on coopera-
tion. Specifcally, regions composed of states with a higher proportion of
atheists, agnostics, or non-religious populations tend to have a higher level
of security cooperation and overall cooperation than regions composed of
highly religious member states. 
Regional religious homogeneity seems to have unstable and contradic-
tory efects on diferent areas of cooperation. Te same can be said for the
average structure of relations between religious and political institutions
within regions. However, this variable seems to have a positive efect on
security cooperation and on combined cooperation, but it has a negative
impact on institutional cooperation. Figure 6.4 shows some of the interac-
tions that are suggested by various hypotheses in a regional context. 
Figure 6.4 suggests that regional religious similarity has positive efects
on regional cooperation and this applies both to low-coup-risk regions and
high-coup-risk regions. Interestingly, the efect of religious similarity on
regional security cooperation is signifcantly higher in regions marked by
close ties between religious and political institutions (e.g., the Middle East,
Asia), suggesting that the co-habitation of religion and politics domestically
in these states fnds its corollary in the security sphere as religious similarity
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Table 6.4 Effects of religious characteristics on regional cooperation 
Alliance Trade PTA IGO Combined 
Cooperation 
Avg. Religious Similarity 0.706** -2.253 55.824** -0.11 0.629** 
(0.172) (1.528) (14.517) (0.374) (0.099) 
Religious Homogeneity 
Moderate 0.055** -0.019 -2.422 -0.208** -0.008 
(0.02) (0.172) (1.628) (0.04) (0.011) 
High 0.029 -0.522* -4.758* -0.258** -0.048** 
(0.024) (0.209) (1.996) (0.049) (0.013) 
Religion-State Relations 
Some Relations 0.053** -0.117 1.81 -0.094** 0.013 
(0.014) (0.121) (1.149) (0.029) (0.008) 
Cohabitation 0.078** 0.055 2.878 -0.152** 0.028** 
(0.019) (0.166) (1.574) (0.04) (0.011) 
Coup Risk 0.132** -0.712** -2.42 -0.122 -0.019 
(0.029) (0.257) (2.466) (0.063) (0.017) 
Coup Risk#Religious -0.17** 0.112 -0.868 0.136 -0.05 
Similarity (0.044) (0.393) (3.723) (0.096) (0.026) 
Secularism 1.970** 6.543 1.645 1.360 1.880** 
(0.601) (4.821) (0.932) (1.288) (0.296) 
Constant -1.244** 3.544* 69.702** 0.446 0.954** 
(0.171) (1.6) (15.278) (0.393) (0.098) 
N 315 315 315 315 315 
F-Statistic 17.901 30.652 30.524 34.458 21.927 
R-Squared 0.419 0.552 0.572 0.581 0.422 
Notes: Control variables omitted to conserve space. Full results are given in the book’s appendix. 
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 
breeds regional security cooperation; however, this does not extend to the
efects of religious similarity on economic and institutional cooperation. 
Examining the CoC expectation that regional cooperation within reli-
giously similar regions would be higher in the post–Cold War than in the
Cold War era, we fnd that just the opposite holds. Te efect of religious
similarity on cooperation was signifcantly higher during the Cold War era
than in the post–Cold War era. Likewise, the hypothesis derived from the
constructivist perspective suggesting that regions composed of “new” states
(e.g., Africa, the Middle East, Asia) would engender more cooperation than
regions composed of mature states (e.g., the Western Hemisphere, Europe)
is also not supported. Te efect of religious similarity on cooperation is
higher in more established regions than in the newer regions. 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
267 
Religion and International Cooperation 267 
5.4 Cooperative International Communities 
Te fnal and most original aspect of our analysis of the efect of religion on
international cooperation centers on cooperative international communi-
ties. As noted in the research design, cooperative international communities
are emergent structures that refect clusters of states marked by high den-
sity of within-community cooperation and sparse cooperative ties between
states belonging to diferent communities. Rather than characterize security
communities such as NATO or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) by some exogenously defned agreement, we allow the network
of relations to determine the community structure of cooperative net-
works. Figure 6.5 shows the religious cohesion levels of various cooperative
communities. Religious cohesion is defned as the diference between the
average religious similarity within communities and the average religious
similarity between communities. 
Te results of the community-cohesion analyses provide evidence that 
security community structure is signifcantly afected by the religious 
composition of members. Note that the modularity coefcient—an index 
of the “quality” of the partition of the security cooperation network into 
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the community structure detected by the algorithm.The cohesion coeffcient measures the 
extent to which within-community religious similarity is different (higher > 0, lower < 0) than 
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coeffcient that would have been obtained by chance.The higher the difference between the 
actual cohesion coeffcient and the null coeffcient, the higher the impact of religious similarity on 
community formation. 
communities—is quite high. Tis indicates that (a)  the assignment of 
security community membership to individual states is very reliable and, 
given that, (b) the religious cohesion of such communities is signifcantly 
higher than what we would expect by chance alone. What that means is 
that security communities are marked by a high degree of religious similar-
ity between members of such communities. At the same time, the degree 
of religious similarity between states belonging to one security community 
and states associated with another security community is relatively low. 
Te same applies, albeit to a lesser extent, to the religious composition
of institutional communities and combined cooperation communities.
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However, the modularity coefcient of economic and institutional com-
munities is quite low, suggesting that inferences about community cohesion
in these areas of international cooperation are not very reliable. Hence, we
cannot make any strong inferences about the religious cohesion of eco-
nomic, institutional, or combined cooperative communities. 
Te efect of religious cohesion on security communities is an interest-
ing and important result; it also corroborates the previous fndings suggest-
ing that religious similarity has a signifcant impact on alliance formation
and persistence. Te results on the religious characteristics of economic and
institutional communities seem to suggest that religious factors have played
a very minor role in determining membership in such communities and
their evolution over time. 
6. Conclusion 
Tis is one of the frst, certainly the most general, forays into the relations
between religion and various issue areas of cooperative international rela-
tions. As such, the results should be seen as preliminary. Additional research
into the topics covered by this chapter would probably shed light on some of
the key open questions. We summarize the results of the empirical analyses
on religion and international cooperation in Table 6.5. Te overall results
suggest a mixed picture of the relationship between religious factors and
international cooperation. However, some general conclusions emerge. 
1. Te principal and most robust fnding is that religious similarity
has a consistently strong efect on security cooperation. Religious
similarity also tends to afect combined cooperation. Tese results
hold across levels of analysis. 
2. Secularism seems to positively afect security cooperation and
overall cooperation at the nation, dyad, and regional level; how-
ever, we do not fnd consistent efects of secularism on coopera-
tion across levels of analysis or across cooperative issue areas. In
addition, these relationships are sensitive to model specifcation.
Terefore, we urge caution in inferring a positive link between
secularism and cooperation. 
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3. In general, religious factors tend to play a minor role in economic
cooperation, and when they do, this efect is neither consistent
nor robust. 
4. Security communities show signifcant religious cohesion:  the
degree of religious similarity between members making up a given
security community is considerably higher than the religious simi-
larity of states belonging to diferent security communities. Tis is
evident in the religious structure of such collective security organi-
zations like the Organization of American States (OAS) or NATO
(dominated by Christian states), on the one hand, and the Arab
League (dominated by Sunni Muslim states), on the other. Tis
efect seems to be fairly stable over time. Ironically, this is precisely
the type of community in which realists would expect to fnd the least
religious cohesion. 
5. Te religious organization of other, that is, economic, or institu-
tional, communities seems to be neither as signifcant nor as stable
as the religious organization of security communities. 
6. Unlike the results on religion and confict, there does not seem
to be a robust or consistent interaction between political instabil-
ity, religious similarity, and international cooperation. We do fnd,
however, that this interaction produces results that support our
hypothesis at the dyadic level. However, the same is not true of
other levels of analysis. 
7. States/Dyads with Christian or Muslim majorities tend to cooper-
ate more in security afairs than either states with other religious
majorities or dyads that do not share Christianity or Islam as their
major religions. However, this efect does not extend to other
cooperative domains. 
8. While it may seem that the robust relationship between religious
similarity and cooperative security ties (as well as combined coop-
eration) supports the CoC thesis, this is clearly not the case because
the expectation of the CoC thesis is that this is a singular post–Cold
War phenomenon. Our results strongly disconfrm this assertion.
We fnd that the “religious similarity afnity” argument is much
more a Cold War phenomenon than a post–Cold War one. 
. Likewise, we do not fnd support for the hypothesis derived from
the constructivist perspective that the efect of religious similarity
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on cooperation is characteristic of “young” states or dyads as
opposed to more “mature” ones. When diferences do exist, it
seems that religious similarity afects cooperation between more
mature states or dyads. 
Tese results support our key hypotheses suggesting that religious factors
play a key role in security and institutional cooperation but not in economic
cooperation. Tey also provide some support (although hardly robust) for
our contention that political leaders tend to use religious factors as mobili-
zation tools when they feel politically insecure. Tis is particularly the case
when there are strong ties between political and religious institutions. 
Te present study ofers a rather nuanced and qualifed picture of how,
when, and to what extent religious factors afect international cooperation.
Several important implications do follow, however. First, religious factors
seem to matter most in areas where trust appears to be a critical component
of the decision to form cooperative ties. If states pursue relative gains, as
ofensive realists would have us believe, then they tend to be more suspi-
cious of each other when it comes to security cooperation than in other
cooperative domains. In such situations, the notion of states cooperating
against common enemies is valid. But having common enemies does not,
in itself, induce trust. It appears that common religious values seem to be an
important factor that increases trust. It is also possible—given our fndings
about religious diferences and international confict—that states that share
religious values also tend to share enemies. Tis adds another layer—that of
common interests—to the incentive to cooperate in international security
afairs. 
Second, the results about the religious cohesion of security cooperation
and institutional communities are of particular importance. Tey suggest
that the intentional design of security cooperation structures, such as mul-
tilateral alliances, takes place along religious lines. However, as we noted
above, cooperative communities refect not only formal structures formed
and sustained by international treaties but also an emergent property due
to the structure of dyadic, triadic, . . . , or k-adic, cooperative ties. Te
high degree of religious cohesion in security and institutional communi-
ties accentuates the signifcant impact of religion on international coopera-
tion. Equally important is the result that religion has little or no efect on
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economic cooperation or on the structure of economic cooperation com-
munities. Tis implies that economic transactions are based on principles
that are fundamentally diferent from (although not necessarily indepen-
dent of ) institutional and security cooperation. We return to some of these
points in the next chapters. 
Overall, the results suggest interesting and previously unknown
links between religion and various dimensions of international coopera-
tion. Tese carry important implications for the theory and practice of
international relations. We explore these implications in the concluding
chapter. 
  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
274
274 Scriptures, Shrines, Scapegoats, and World Politics 
Appendix to Chapter 6 
1. Introduction 
As in previous chapters, this appendix covers in more detail the meth-
odological issues we have discussed in the chapter. Additional material,
including replication data, is provided in the book’s website. We focus here
on additional issues—data, measures, and methods—that are specifc to the
study of religion and international cooperation and have not been discussed
in the appendices to previous chapters. In particular, we focus here on com-
munity detection and on the measurement of the cohesion coefcients. 
2. Data 
In general, most of the datasets used for the study of religion and interna-
tional cooperation were discussed in previous chapters. Tis applies also
to the various measures of religious factors. However, in addition to the
datasets used in previous chapters, we include a dataset on PTAs collected
by Milner and Mansfeld (2012). Tese data form a binary network where
the presence of a PTA between two states is assigned a score of one for that
year, and zero otherwise. Here we present the descriptive statistics for the
cooperation measures used in the present study. Te descriptive statistics of
the religious factors have been provided in the appendix to chapter 5 above. 
3. Methods and Measures 
We discuss here three principal issues:  the community detection process,
the measurement of cohesion coefcients, and network efects. 
3.1 Community Detection 
A community is a subset of a network characterized by high density among
community members and low density between members of a given com-
munity and members of any other community. Tere are a number of ways
to detect communities in network analysis. We focus here on one of the
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common strategies of community detection developed by Newman and
Girvan (2004) and extended by Leicht and Newman (2008) to community
detection in directed networks. 
Briefy, the detection algorithm does not require prespecifcation of the
number of desired communities. Rather, this number is determined by the
algorithm. Te algorithm uses a number of computerized optimization
methods such as the Travelling Salesman algorithm (Bektas 2006) or simu-
lated annealing (Lancichinetti et  al. 2009), to maximize the modularity
coefcient, Q. Te modularity coefcient is given by: 
do d i in 1 − 
i i  =ˆ ˆ n j i  1 = + 
j  
− ° x c c  i j  ij E 
Q = , [A6.1] 
E 
where xij is the presence (1) or absence (0) of an edge between nodes i
and j, doi and dij are the out-degree of node i (the number of edges leaving
node i—for example, the number of export partners of a state) and the
in-degree of node j (the number of edges entering node j—for example,
the number of import partners of node j), respectively, ci and cj are the
community labels of nodes i and j, δ is the Kronecker delta (defned as 1 if
ci = cj, and zero otherwise), and E is the number of edges in the network. 
Te community detection algorithm assigns nodes to communities
iteratively. For each iteration, it measures the modularity coefcient. Tis
process is repeated until the maximum modularity is found, and no sub-
sequent community assignment produces a higher modularity coefcient.
Intuitively, the modularity coefcient maximizes the diference between a
given community structure and chance. Tis is done by subtracting the
actual assignment of nodes to communities from what would be expected
by randomly assigning such nodes to communities. Te result is a com-
munity structure that ensures two community structure characteristics:
(a) the maximum within-community density and the minimum between-
community density, and (b) the maximum diference between the optimal
community assignment (as defned in (a) above) and chance. 
Once a community structure is defned, we can estimate the degree
to which these communities are cohesive with respect to a certain attri-
bute of the nodes (states). In this particular case, we examine the extent
to which within-community religious similarity is higher (or lower) than
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between-community religious similarity. In other words, a high positive
cohesion coefcient in the security cooperation network suggests that states
that belong to a given community are more religiously similar than states
that belong to diferent communities. A negative cohesion coefcient sug-
gests that within-community religious similarity is lower than between-
community religious similarity (that is, states tend to form alliances on the
basis of factors other than religion). 
For that purpose we use the religious similarity matrix. We partition 
the religious similarity matrix by community assignments of nodes, such 
that all nodes belonging to the frst community appear as frst rows and 
columns, followed by nodes belonging to the second community, and so 
forth. In order to demonstrate this process, consider the following example. 
Te left part of the table (labeled Network) is the network of nodes
(states). A cell has a value of one if there exists an edge (tie) connecting
the row node with the column node, and zero otherwise. Te right-hand
part of the table (labeled Communities) is the fnal community assignments
of nodes. Tis part of the table consists of the ten nodes in the rows, and
the community labels (in Roman numeral-labeled columns). An entry of 1
means that a node (row) is a member of a given community (column). In
the current example, each node is a member of one community only, and
no two communities share nodes in common. Tis is just a coincidence. In
general, a node can be a member of multiple communities and two com-
munities can have one or more nodes in common. 
We can present these as graphs, as shown in Figure A6.1 below. 
Table A6.1 A hypothetical cooperative network with community assignments 
Network Communities 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 I II III 
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
2 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 1 
3 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 3 0 0 1 
4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 4 1 0 0 
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 0 1 0 
6 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 6 1 0 0 
7 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 7 0 1 0 
8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 1 0 0 
9 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 9 0 1 0 
10 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 10 1 0 0 
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Assume a hypothetical religious similarity matrix of the following type
(Table A6.2). 
Figure A6.1. A graphical representation of the hypothetical network and community 
assignment 
Table A6.2 Religious similarity of the states in the hypothetical cooperative network 
Religious Similarity 
State 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.45 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.55 
2 0.5 0.45 0.4 0.55 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.55 
3 0.6 0.4 0.33 0.65 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.55 
4 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.89 0.55 0.55 0.35 0.75 0.45 0.5 
5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.55 1 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.35 
6 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.55 0.8 0.44 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.25 
7 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.35 0.7 0.6 0.62 0.5 0.6 0.45 
8 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.12 0.5 0.55 
9 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.45 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.55 0.65 
10 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.5 0.35 0.25 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.88 
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We partition the network X by ordering nodes by community. Tis is
given in Table A6.3. In this table, the order of rows and columns is not as in
the original network matrix (i.e., by node id number). Rather it is ordered
by the community membership of nodes. Te frst community is in the
upper left quadrant of the matrix, the second community is in the middle
quadrant, and so forth. Entries in this matrix are the religious similarity
scores of the row node and the column node. 
Based on the community partitioned religious similarity matrix, we
generate a community cohesion matrix CC, with entries ccij  defned as: 
ˆ ˆ  s i q   j r ij ccij =  , [A6.2] n n  q r  
where sij is the religious similarity score of nodes i and j, and nq, nr are the
number of nodes in communities q and r respectively. In our example, we
get the following CC matrix. 
Table A6.3 Community-partitioned religious similarity 
Partitioned Religious Similarity 
Community I II III 
1 4 6 8 10 5 7 9 2 3 
I 1 0.7 0.45 0.4 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 
4 0.45 0.89 0.55 0.75 0.5 0.55 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 
6 0.4 0.55 0.44 0.3 0.25 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.6 
8 0.5 0.75 0.3 0.12 0.55 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 
10 0.55 0.5 0.25 0.55 0.88 0.35 0.45 0.65 0.55 0.55 
II 5 0.6 0.55 0.8 0.5 0.35 1 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 
7 0.6 0.35 0.6 0.5 0.45 0.7 0.62 0.6 0.5 0.6 
9 0.6 0.45 0.4 0.5 0.65 0.6 0.6 0.55 0.5 0.5 
III 2 0.5 0.55 0.4 0.6 0.55 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.45 0.4 
3 0.6 0.65 0.6 0.5 0.55 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.33 
Table A6.4 Community cohesion matrix 
Community Cohesion Community Variance 
Com1 Com2 Com3 Com1 Com2 Com3 
Com1 0.51 0.53 0.55 Com1 0.0342 0.0136 0.0045 
Com2 0.53 0.66 0.52 Com2 0.0136 0.0163 0.0014 
Com3 0.55 0.52 0.4 Com3 0.0045 0.0014 0.0018 
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Consider frst the left part of Table 5.5 labeled Community Cohesion. 
We denote the diagonal in this matrix as ccqq and derive the cohesion
coefcient C as: 
ˆ qk = ( cc − cc ) qq qr C = 1 , [A6.3] 
k k  ( − 1 ) 
where k is the number of communities. Te cohesion coefcient in this case
is C = -0.01. 
To estimate the statistical signifcance of this coefcient, we generate
a variance matrix from the partitioned community matrix. Tis matrix is
given by the right-hand part of Table A6.5 labeled Community Variance. Te
question we wish to address when asking if the cohesion coefcient is sta-
tistically signifcant is this: to what extent are within-community cohesion
scores signifcantly diferent (higher or lower) than between-community
cohesion scores? To answer this question, we calculate the weighted within-
and between-community means, and the within- and between-community
variances, as follows: 
ˆ cc n 2 qq qq 
w = qq 2 , [A6.4] m ˆ qqn qq 
ˆ cc n n  qr q r  
bm = 
q r  ,  ˆ n n  q r  qr 
where w bm , m  are the within- and between-community weighted means,
“ nqq  is the number” of nodes in community q, and nqr  is the product of the
number of nodes in community q and the number of nodes in community r. 
Likewise, weighted variances are calculated by: 
ˆ cv n 2 qq qq 
w = qq , [A.5.5] v ˆ n 2 qq qq 
ˆ cv n n  qr q r  
bv = 
q r  ,  ˆ n n  q r  qr 
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where w b  are the within- and between-community weighted variances,,v v 
and cvqq  is the within community variance of community q, and cvqr 
is the cohesion variance of the nodes in community q and the nodes in
community r. 
Te signifcance score is measured by a diference-of-means T-statistic
given by 
w − b 
T = m m . [A6.6] 
wv bv + 2 n n n  qq q r  ˆ q r  = ˆ q r   
A T value of 1.96 or higher implies that a positive cohesion coefcient is
statistically signifcant at the p < 0.05 level. Likewise, a T value of -1.96 or
smaller implies that a negative cohesion coefcient is signifcant at the 0.05
level. In this particular example, T = -0.654, meaning that the cohesion
coefcient is not statistically signifcant. So in this case, we can say that
religious factors were probably not a key determinant of the emergence of
cooperative communities. 
3.2 Network Effects 
When we analyze multiple cases, consisting of states deciding whether and
with whom to cooperate at a given point in time, and repeatedly choosing
whether to cooperate at a diferent point in time, we must consider two
types of problems that may confound our results. Te frst type of factor is
time dependence. Te decision of a state about whether and with whom to
cooperate at one point in time is not independent from its prior decisions
(or the consequences of past decisions). Tis factor is controlled for, at least
to a meaningful extent, in our analyses by the bootstrap sampling. 
Te second factor is spatial dependence—or what we describe as net-
work efects. Tere is ample evidence that the decision of a state about
whether and with whom to cooperate is not independent of the decision
of other states, or of the ties each of these would-be partners have with
third parties. Tis implies that the observations we try to explain are not
independently and identically distributed (iid), as most estimation methods
assume. Specifcally the decision of state A to form a cooperative tie with
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another state B is dependent both on its own ties with third parties (C, D,
E . . .), the ties between B and third parties (C, D, E . . .), the ties of those
third parties with A, B, C, D, . . . , and so forth (Cranmer and Desmarais
2011, Warren 2010, Cranmer Desmaris and Menninga 2012). 
Our network data refect a sum total of cooperation decisions. However,
they do not tell us directly how we got to a specifc confguration of coop-
erative ties. Religion may have been a factor in defning whether or to
what extent two states have a cooperative tie. However, other processes—
endogenous to the structure of relations—may have been at work as well.
For example, states may have opted to form ties with other states to the
extent that the latter were “popular” or central. Tis is what network ana-
lysts call “preferential attachment.” Te reasoning is that if one forms a
cooperative tie with a central state, one benefts from the ties of its partner.
Tat is, it is exposed to more cooperative opportunities via its partner with-
out having to pay the cost of forming or maintaining ties with the partners
of the partner (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996). Likewise, if state A has a coop-
erative tie with state B and state B has a cooperative tie with state C, state
A may have an incentive to close the triangle by forming a tie with C. Tis
is what network analysts call “triadic closure.” Such tendencies are apparent
in alliance networks in which we observe a multitude of collective security
arrangements like NATO, the Warsaw Pact, OAS, the Arab League, and
so forth. 
If we want to estimate the impact of such factors as religious similar-
ity or state-religion relations on states’ choices of partners for cooperative
ventures, we must control for these network efects. If, controlling for
endogenous network structural efects on the formation and maintenance
of cooperative relations, religious factors have a signifcant impact on such
relations, then we can be far more confdent that religion plays a meaning-
ful role in international cooperation. Tis means that we must estimate the
probability of observing a given network structure by chance. 
Tere are several methods for estimating network efects. Tese include
exponential random graph models (ERGMs; Lusher et al. 2013, Cranmer
and Desmarais 2011), econometric spatial lag models (Franzese and Hayes,
2007), or latent space analysis (Hof and Ward, 2004). 
Each of these approaches has some problems and is more suitable for
one type of analysis than for others (e.g., ERGMs are particularly useful
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in dyadic analyses with binary dependent variables, whereas spatial lag
models apply to continuous variables). We employ here a mixed approach.
First, we extract several network statistics that are proxies for a number of
endogenous network formation processes such as preferential attachment
or homophily (Maoz 2012a). Tese include two- and three-star indicators,
which measure the actual or expected number of two-star relations between
members of a dyad. Tese are indicators of popularity efects. We also use
the number of closed triangles associated with a dyad as an indicator of a
triadic closure tendency (typically associated with homophilic processes).
For the nation-year analyses, we use the average number of two stars or
closed triangles of a state’s network neighbors as potential network efects.
For the dyad-year analyses, we use the actual two  and three stars and closed
triangles to estimate dyadic relations. However, for continuous dependent
variables, we employ a network statistic developed by Joyce et al. 2015 and
labeled expected value (EV). Te EV variable is based on the degree distri-
bution of the network and is measured by: 
x x ˆ ˆ  ij ji
EVij = 
i j , [A6.5] 
x ˆ ˆ  ij i j 
where xij and xji are the entries of the cooperative network associated with the
ij (or ji) dyad, respectively. Te expected value statistic is more general than
the other network statistics in that it applies to both binary and weighted
networks as well as to signed networks (which we do not analyze here). 
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Chapter 7 
Religion and CivilWar 
1. Introduction 
Scholars and practitioners have long been concerned with the relationship
between political boundaries that mark the territory of a state and the com-
position of the society that resides within these boundaries. Tis relation-
ship has many dimensions: geopolitical, social, economic, and cultural, to
name just a few. Accordingly, the relationship between various groupings
of people and the state in which they reside is of interest to economists,
sociologists, cultural and religious scholars, and political scientists. In fact,
the oldest subfeld of political science, political philosophy, was focused
almost exclusively on the relationships among individuals, groups, and gov-
erning institutions. One of the central concerns of political philosophers
and modern political scientists has been the conditions under which law
and order are maintained, or, stated diferently, when, why, how, and under
what circumstances individuals and groups organize to challenge political
authority. More importantly, when and why do some of these challenges
turn into violent confrontations? 
States are a relatively recent phenomenon; they capture less than 20 per-
cent of organized human history, according to a more conservative count,
and less than 2  percent of human history, according to a more realistic
estimate.1 However, during this rather brief moment in human history,
states were formed and functioned as long as they possessed three principal
characteristics: 
(a) a well-defned territory marked by physical and/or political
boundaries 
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(b) a population residing within these boundaries 
(c) internal sovereignty: a unifed set of institutions that efectively
make and enforce laws for this population. 
From an IR perspective, there is a fourth condition of statehood:  exter-
nal sovereignty. External sovereignty requires that a minimum number of
other states recognize the internal sovereignty and territorial integrity of
that political unit. However, in terms of the actual functioning of a com-
munity as a state, the external sovereignty characteristic was neither a neces-
sary nor a sufcient condition. For a very long time, states existed without
being recognized as such—in many cases because they had been isolated
in the international environment.2 Te importance of external sovereignty
increased with the rise of international interdependence. When states
ceased to be economically and militarily self-sufcient, thus requiring con-
tact and collaboration with other states, recognition of their internal sov-
ereignty became increasingly important. Interdependence required setting
limits between international interactions, which operate within an anarchi-
cal system lacking central enforcement mechanisms, and internal authority,
which is considered absolute according to this principle. Tis gave credence
to the notion of external sovereignty and converted it into one of the few
laws that survived the turns and tides of international relations over nearly
400 years. 
Te concept of sovereignty is a nominal creation of the Peace of
Westphalia of 1648, which many IR scholars consider to mark the dawn
of modern international relations. External sovereignty also implies the
principle of noninterference in the internal afairs of a “legitimately rec-
ognized” state. Once a state was recognized as sovereign by other states,
legally, its regime was pretty much free to do whatever it wanted to its
citizens, and other states could do nothing about it—whether they liked it
or not. While recent years have seen signifcant erosion in the external sov-
ereignty concept, it is still widely accepted as a law of international politics
(Krasner 2001). 
Te internal makeup of societies is multidimensional. Societies can be
considered homogeneous on one dimension and heterogeneous on another.
Members of a given society can share a single religion but speak many
diferent languages. A  society may be ethnically, racially, religiously, or
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linguistically cohesive, but economically or politically polarized. Te mul-
tidimensionality of social fractionalization renders research into the social
causes of civil violence complicated and, to a large extent, inconclusive. Te
jury is still out on the question of which specifc aspects of social fractional-
ization cause civil violence. We do not pretend to resolve the debates in the
literature on the causes of civil confict. What this chapter does, however,
is shed light on the role of religious factors in determining the outbreak,
scope, extent, and outcomes of violent civil conficts. Religious factors are
rarely, if ever, the only or even the most important factors that foment civil
violence. Tey are rarely the immediate triggers of such violence. However,
they may establish underlying causes of social fractionalization that makes
certain societies ex ante more prone to violent protests, rebellions, and civil
wars than others. 
2. Characteristics of Civil Violence in the Post–World War II Era 
Before we discuss its characteristics, we need to defne the concept of civil
violence. As Sambanis (2004) points out, civil violence encompasses a
broad range of actions that involve some degree of political disorder—from
strikes, protests, and demonstrations, to full-fedged warfare between or
among organized groups. In order to impose some degree of coherence on
the events that we consider signifcant levels of civil confict, we focus on
the following characteristics of these phenomena: 
1. Organization. Te actors in civil violence are organized collec-
tives, which operate under some form of central leadership. Tis
leadership—an individual or group—directs the action of the col-
lective and decides on the specifc strategy that the collective uses. 
2. Government involvement. One of the actors involved in the action
is the government of the state that directs and operates various
security forces—police, secret police, military, and (sometimes)
paramilitary groups. 
3. Goal. Civil violence may have many causes, as we discuss below.
However, the events on which we focus involve, in one form or
another, a struggle over the control of the state and its institutions. 
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4. Lethality. Civil resistance may be violent or nonviolent (Chenoweth
and Stephan 2011). We focus on the former type. We measure vio-
lence by lethality. Te data we use vary with respect to the lower
bound of what is considered a lethal form of civil violence. Some
of the data (e.g., Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015) that we are rely-
ing upon require relatively low levels of lethality. For example, one
dataset used in this chapter—the Uppsala armed confict dataset—
defnes civil confict as violent confrontations resulting in a mini-
mum of twenty-fve fatalities per year of confict. Other datasets
(e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003, Sarkees and Dixon 2015) require
a minimum of 1,000 battle-related deaths per year to qualify as a
“civil war.” Regardless of which fatality threshold we use, lethality
is a key characteristic of civil confict. Tese vastly diferent lethal-
ity cutofs and the associated labels (e.g., armed confict, civil war)
move us to use the term “civil confict” to encompass any event
that has a minimum threshold of lethality that also meets the other
criteria stated above. 
Tus, we defne an incidence of civil violence as an armed struggle between
or among organized groups, one of which involves a government and its institu-
tions, over the control of the state and its institutions that results in a minimum
of twenty-fve or more fatalities per year of struggle. We distinguish between
low-level civil violence that involves incidents resulting in fewer than 1,000
deaths per year of confict, and civil wars that involve 1,000 or more deaths per
year of confict. 
By focusing on the role of religious factors in civil violence, we are ignor-
ing a large number of cases of nonviolent civil resistance (Chenoweth and
Stephan 2011). Tis may be a serious limitation as nonviolent resistance
movements may have important characteristics, some of which concern
religious issues. However, our focus on violent civil confict is in line with
the major trends in the literature that regard such events as having sig-
nifcant international antecedents and even more important international
implications. 
A number of authors have pointed out the decline of political violence
in the modern era (Mueller 2007, Pinker 2011). Even more research focuses
on the decline of interstate war and the rise of domestic political violence—
civil war being the more extreme type of such violence (Van Creveld 2009,
Luttwak 2001, Gat 2006). However, from some perspectives, there are
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fundamental similarities between civil wars and interstate wars in the post–
World War II era. Te most striking similarity is that a vast majority of
the states in the system have experienced little or no political violence of
major magnitude, either internally or externally. By contrast, virtually all of
the conficts—domestic or international—were fought within or between
a handful of states. Tis tendency of repeated fghting by the same states is
what one of us has labeled “fghtaholism” (Maoz 2004, 2009). We illustrate
this skewed distribution of violent confict in Figure 7.1. 
Te trends of civil wars and interstate wars are remarkably simi-
lar: between over 75 percent of the states in the international system expe-
rienced no severe confict, that is, no major interstate or intrastate confict
during the period under examination. So that means about 25 percent of
all states accounted for all civil and international wars, which suggests that
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Fig. 7.1. The distribution of international and civil conficts 1945–201023 
Key: Interstate war data and COW civil war data are from Sarkees and Wayman (2007); UCDP 
civil confict data are from the Uppsala Department of Peace and Confict Research and PRIO 
(Peace Research Institute, Oslo). FL is the Fearon/Laitin dataset (Fearon and Laitin 2003) updated 
to 2013, and NAVCO is the Non-Violent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (Chenoweth and 
Stephan 2013).The vertical axis is the percent of states experiencing a given range of civil confict. 
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most of the states were pacifc in terms of their international relations and
their domestic political discourse. Only a handful of states accounted for all
civil and interstate wars. 
Another way to represent this inequality in the distribution of conficts
across states is by measuring it statistically. Te Gini coefcient is one of the
most commonly used indicators of inequality in the social sciences. It assumes
the value of zero when the distribution of a specifc variable (for example,
income in a society) is completely equal, that is, each person’s income is
exactly the same as that of every other person’s income. It assumes the extreme
value of one when one person in the society controls all the income of that
society, and all other people in the society control no income at all. In most
cases, however, the Gini coefcient varies between these two extremes.3 As its
value increases, so does inequality. Before we present the statistical inequality
in the distribution of civil and interstate wars, we must emphasize that the
data shown in Figure 7.1 may be misleading. Some states have been around
for the entire period 1945–2010, while others have been around only for a
few years. Tose that had longer periods of independence had, ex ante, more
opportunities to engage in conficts—both internal and international—than
those with shorter periods of national independence. So we must control
for the length of time during which each of the states was independent.4 We 
do that by dividing the number of conficts—civil and international—each
state has experienced by the number of years during which the state has been
independent. Figure 7.2 shows the Gini coefcients of the relative number of
years during which states have been in confict. 
Here we look only at the confict experience of states that had twenty
or more years of independence during the period under study. Had we
examined all states, regardless of the length of time during which they were
independent, the results would have been even more extreme. But even
without the “young” states, the picture is dramatically clear: the degree of
inequality in the distribution of civil and interstate war is extremely high. 
3. Theory and Evidence on the Determinants of Civil Confict 
3.1 Key Themes in Research on Civil Confict 
Research on the causes and consequences of civil confict in the modern
era is probably the dominant trend in the literature in IR in the last two
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Key: Gini coeffcient—degree of inequality in the distribution of civil/interstate confict. Datasets are 
as mentioned in Figure 7.1 above. 
decades, largely outpacing research on interstate confict or international
cooperation. Tis trend refects the growing level and lethality of domestic
violence since the end of the Cold War, and a declining trend of interstate
violence over the same period. As was the case in previous chapters, we do
not provide a comprehensive review of this burgeoning literature. We do,
however, lay out the key arguments on the determinants of civil violence
and the evidence on these arguments. 
During much of the Cold War era, the focus on civil confict was almost
exclusively the domain of comparative politics scholars. Perhaps the most
signifcant theory of such confict was found in the relative deprivation
(RD) literature (Davies, 1962, Gurr 1970). Te original RD arguments
focused on perceived discrepancies between achievement and aspirations
and the frustration that arose from this for individuals and groups. When
individuals and groups found that their achievements lagged behind their
aspirations, they were apt to rebel. Tis tendency was said to be most acute
when—following a period of rising achievements, which induced high
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expectations of increased material and psychological payofs in the near
future—there was a sharp decline in actual achievement. Tis was dubbed
the inverse J-curve theory of revolution (Davies 1962). 
RD was often conceptualized and measured in terms of material factors
(Koubi and Bohmelt 2014). Yet, the focus on material or objective griev-
ances, defned largely in socioeconomic terms, might not capture the less
material and more subjective grievances, defned more in sociopsychologi-
cal terms, which are implicated in RD arguments. Te “materialist” opera-
tionalization of RD arguments may account for the weak empirical support
for these claims in studies of civil war (e.g. Fearon and Laitin 2003, Collier
and Hoefer 1998, 2004). 
Te beginning of the shift in scholarly focus from interstate to intra-
state confict was evident as civil conficts became more widespread and
destructive. Tis may have been due to two factors: 1) the increase in the
number of independent states that emerged from the fall of European
colonialism, many of which were often politically unstable, and 2)  the
increased incidence of “proxy wars” of the superpowers via their regional
clients. Te two superpowers sought to avoid direct confrontation for fear
of escalation to nuclear war. Instead, they often managed their competi-
tion through third world state proxies, especially in Asia, Africa and the
Middle East. Tese wars became more deadly through superpower provi-
sion of weapons to their combatant allies, often spreading to neighboring
states as insurgents sought rear bases. Many such conficts became pro-
tracted as a result of continuous resupply by the superpowers. Te proxy
wars in Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique, and Afghanistan, which began as
civil wars, emerged as some of the most destructive conficts of the Cold
War era. 
Te salience of civil wars was reinforced in the early post–Cold War era
as the former Soviet satellite states imploded into a number of often horrifc
civil wars. Tese were epitomized in the Yugoslav war and the subsequent
war in Kosovo, in which NATO forces were deployed for the frst time as
a belligerent under the auspices of the 1949 treaty. Tese events demon-
strated that, even in a post–Cold War context bereft of the ideological strife
of the Cold War, internal conficts could become internationalized just as
Cold War era proxy wars had been. Tese substantive developments led IR
scholars to increasingly focus on civil confict (e.g., Brown 1996, Regan
1996, Rummel 1997, Benson and Kugler 1998). In efect, IR scholarship
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in the post–Cold War era appropriated the study of civil confict from com-
parative politics scholars, who had produced the most signifcant work on
such conficts during the Cold War era (e.g. Eckstein 1964; Gurr 1970,
1980; Hibbs 1973; Gurr and Lichbach 1979; Horowitz 1985).5 
Moreover, a number of theories profered that religious rationales were
supplanting the Cold War ideological struggles as precipitants and/or
concomitants of these post-Cold War civil wars. Te arguments advanced
in these studies were that ethnic, racial, linguistic, and especially religious
symbols were manipulated by political elites in order to provide justifca-
tion for major armed conficts against political opponents within states.
Te resultant armed conficts were regarded as recent manifestations of
timeless intractable battles rooted in primordial diferences among the
disputants (Posen 1993). Tus, many scholars viewed religious identity
as a catalyst of major post–Cold War era civil wars. For example, the
civil war in the former Yugoslavia—for both belligerents and allies—was
not only a confict over material resources and political values but it also
pitted major religious groups against each other. It seemed that many
Western Christian states supported Catholic Croats, while Russians and
other Orthodox states sided with Serbs, and Islamic states such as Iran
favored Bosnian Muslims. Tese fssures and alignments appeared to some
as evidence of a “clash of civilizations,” viewed mainly in religious terms. 
A large number of quantitative studies of the role of religion in civil war 
were dominated by those focusing on several key theoretical themes. Tese 
included the clash of civilizations thesis (Huntington 1993), the post–
Cold War emergence of religious based nationalism (e.g., Juergensmeyer 
1993, 2017; Tomas 2005; Toft et al. 2011); and the religious dimensions 
of “ethnopolitical confict” (Gurr 1994, Gurr and Harf 1994). Having 
discussed Huntington’s thesis throughout this book, sufce it to point out 
here that the clash of civilizations applied to intrastate as well as interstate 
war. In fact, Huntington (2000) argued that the CoC thesis was more 
applicable to civil wars given that they had become more prevalent and 
destructive than interstate wars. His rendering argued that states bisected 
by civilizational fault lines, defned primarily in religious terms, were more 
likely to experience civil wars—and the most intense ones. 
Juergensmeyer (1993) likewise implicated religious factors in the most
intense armed conficts in the post–Cold War era. In contrast to Huntington’s
thesis connecting CoC civil confict to supranational “civilizational” divides,
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Juergensmeyer’s (1996) argument was tied more directly to religious nation-
alism. His focus was on “religionizing politics” exacerbated by the “geopo-
litical crisis” associated with the end of the Cold War. He noted that “as
nations rejected the Soviet and American models of nationhood, they turned
to their own past, and to their own cultural resources.” Consequently, “polit-
icized religious movements are the responses” (p.  19). Tese movements
“religionize[d] politics” by putting “political issues and struggles within a
sacred context” such that “compatability with religious goals becomes the
criterion for an acceptable political platform” (p.  5). Tis put religious
nationalists in confict with secular nationalists—and even their nonna-
tionalist coreligionists—in the former’s aspiration to “religious statehood,”
leading to armed conficts that were so much more frequent, intense, and
widespread that they constituted a “new Cold War.” 
Gurr’s (1994) focus on ethnopolitical conficts in the post–Cold War era
provided one of the frst systematic analyses of Huntington’s thesis, while
also engaging aspects of Juergensmeyer’s thesis. Drawing on his Minorities
at Risk (MAR) dataset, Gurr found that while conficts among ethnoreli-
gious groups were more intense in the post–Cold War era, they were not
more frequent. What appeared to be a greater incidence of ethnoreligious
violence within states actually refected the greater number of political tran-
sitions especially in post-Soviet states with the end of the Cold War, which
had less to do with religious factors per se. Most quantitative analyses found
little support for Huntington’s claims regarding intrastate conficts. Among
the exceptions was Roeder’s (2003, 517) study of the relationship between
civilizational diferences and the intensity of ethnopolitical confict from
1980 to 1999. Roeder analyzed 1,036 ethnopolitical dyads and found that
from 1990 to 1999, civilizational diferences were signifcantly associated
with the intensity of such conficts, supporting Huntington’s claim that
religious diferences were associated with more intense ethnopolitical con-
ficts in the post–Cold War era. In contrast, Henderson’s (2004) study uti-
lized two diferent civil war datasets (i.e., Regan 2000 and Sambanis 2000)
and found that the period 1989–99 in comparison to 1978–88, witnessed
fewer “clashes of civilizations” as a proportion of all civil wars or all “ethnic
civil wars.” 
Licklider (1995, 685), relying on COW civil war data over the period
1945–93, divided civil wars “rather crudely into those primarily driven by
ethnic-religious-identity issues and those driven by other concerns (primarily
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socioeconomic).” He found that 69 percent of the 91 civil wars were classi-
fed as identity wars. Utilizing fve measures of intensity (i.e., continuance,
length, casualty patterns, recurrence, and genocide), his analysis suggests
that identity civil wars—of which religious wars are a subtype—“are not
clearly more intense than nonidentity ones” [original emphasis] (p. 686). Both
“identity” and “non-identity” civil wars “are about equally likely to end in
negotiated settlements” [original emphasis] (p. 686). Mason and Fett (1996)
found that civil wars “with an ethnic or religious component” (p. 558) were
“no more or less susceptible to negotiated settlement than nonethnic con-
ficts.” Tis, they argued was “at odds” with the “general notion that the
indivisibility of the stakes in a civil war makes them more difcult to resolve
by negotiations” (pp. 561–62). Walter’s (1997, 356) analysis of COW civil
wars from 1940 to 1990 not only diferentiated between “identity” and
“nonidentity” wars but also distinguished within the former between reli-
gious and ethnic civil wars. Her fndings also suggest that “wars with strong
ethnic underpinnings appear to be no more difcult to resolve than those
fought over nonidentity issues,” and “only very weak support was ofered
for the connection between religious wars and the absence of settlement.” 
Regan (1996) was the frst major study to utilize the COW cultural
dataset—a forerunner of the WRP data. Regan found that interventions in
ethnic/religious civil wars had a higher probability of success than interven-
tions in ideological civil wars (p. 349). In contrast, and more in keeping
with the conventional wisdom, Doyle and Sambanis’ (2000) study of 124
civil wars from 1944 to 1997, based mainly on COW and Uppsala data,
found a lower probability of peacebuilding success in “identity wars,” which
they characterized as “ethnic and religious wars.” Tus, the consensus of
these early post–Cold War studies of civil conficts was that while religious
factors might play a role in these conficts, they did not appear to operate
along the lines implied by the CoC or the religious nationalism thesis. In
fact, where religious factors seemed to infuence the onset of civil wars,
this impact was evident at least back to World War II—if not earlier—well
before the presumed “explosion” of “religious conficts” in a post–Cold War
era “clash of civilizations.” 
While insightful, these studies were limited insofar as they often con-
fated religious, ethnic, racial and linguistic factors, and did not directly
focus on the role of religion in the onset of civil wars. In fact, the frst pub-
lication in what would become one of the most infuential post–Cold War
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era research agendas on civil war—the greed-grievance framework—Collier
and Hoefer (1998) did not include a religion variable in the analyses.6 
Near the turn of the millennium, several studies began to address these
broader shortcomings. Notably, drawing on an original dataset, which dif-
ferentiated among the religious, ethnic, and linguistic attributes of all states
from 1946 to 1992, Ellingsen (2000) found that religious fragmentation
is positively and signifcantly associated with civil war onset, and states
whose second largest religious group is medium size (between 5 percent
and 20 percent of the population) are more likely to experience civil war.
Focusing on African civil wars and those in other developing countries for
1960–99, Collier and Hoefer (2002) also found that religious fractional-
ization increased the likelihood of civil war onset, and Hegre et al. (2001)
found a similar relationship for all states from 1816 to 1992. Hegre et al.
(2001) drew on Ellingsen’s data for 1946–92, but although it disaggregated
ethnicity, linguistic, and religious measures, it reported fndings for only
the ethnic heterogeneity variables. Tese fndings corroborated Rummel’s
(1997) earlier results from his analysis of all states from 1932 to 1982 that
the greater the number of religious groups in a society, the more intense its
domestic collective violence, ranging from coups and purges to riots and
internal war. 
Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) study of civil wars from 1945 to 1999 chal-
lenged these earlier results and found that neither religious fractionaliza-
tion nor religious polarization was signifcantly associated with civil war
onset. Religious diversity had at best a weak and inconsistent relationship
with civil war onset. Tey also found that measures of state discrimination
against religious minorities were not associated with a systematically higher
risk of civil war onset. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) focused on
138 states from 1960 to 1999 and also found that religious fragmentation
does not have a signifcant relationship with the incidence of civil war, but
that religious polarization is positively and signifcantly associated with it.
Drawing on a more expansive research design than their previous work,
Collier and Hoefer (2004) revised their earlier results and, like Fearon and
Laitin (2003), found that neither religious fractionalization nor polariza-
tion was signifcantly associated with the onset of civil wars for 1960–99.
Similarly, Wimmer and Min (2006) also found no signifcant relationship
between religious fractionalization and civil war onset for all states from
1950 to 2001. 
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Hegre and Sambanis (2006) conducted a sensitivity analysis of earlier
fndings on civil war onset to determine the robustness of 88 candidate
variables—including several religious factors—on the probability of intra-
state confict. Tey found that religious fractionalization is positively associ-
ated with the onset of internal armed confict, but its impact is not robust
for civil war. Tese results raised the intriguing question of why religious
fractionalization would be signifcantly associated with less intense armed
conficts and not more intense ones, such as civil wars. Resonating with
arguments from previous chapters on the importance of regional factors
(i.e., PRIEs) in international conficts, Hegre and Sambanis (2006) also
found robust “neighborhood efects” infuencing the onset of civil wars.
Both whether a neighboring state was at war and the total number of neigh-
boring states at war in a given year had robust positive efects on both inter-
nal armed conficts and full-scale civil wars. Te authors view these fndings
as supporting theses on the difusion, contagion, or demonstration efects
of civil war, although they emphasize that their analysis “cannot explain
why or how civil wars spread across neighboring countries” (p. 532). 
Relatedly, Miller (2007) argued that the “state-to-nation” balance, which
refects the degree of ethnic homogeneity within the boundaries of a given
state, was a key cause of regional conficts. A society within a state that is
highly homogeneous in terms of ethnic, religious, and linguistic character-
istics yields a “balanced” state. Such a state handles its external interactions
using realist principles, and its foreign policy is not driven by domestic
considerations. On the other hand, an ethnically heterogeneous state suf-
fers from an imbalance in terms of the state-to-nation ratio. Such states are
motivated by both domestic and external concerns when managing their
foreign policies. First, they are internally unstable; leaders are invariably
concerned with their political survival. Second, they are open to incitement
and (overt or covert) intervention by other states and nonstate actors with
afnity to some minority groups within such states. Viewing religion as
an inherent part of ethnicity, this corresponds with an expectation of both
lower internal and international stability in such regions. 
Several scholars have focused on the relationship between external
actors’ religious afnity to rebel groups as a factor afecting the prospect
and outcomes of intervention. San-Akca (2016) found that the probability
of external state support for non-state armed groups (NAGs) in a civil con-
fict increases signifcantly with ideational afnities, based on ideological or
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religious similarities, between the external state and the NAG. Jackson,
San-Akca, and Maoz (2020) fnd that actual or would-be rebel groups that
anticipate support from external actors, including on the grounds of reli-
gious afnities between such groups and external actors, are more likely to
rebel. Te anticipation of such support also increases the probability of a
violent uprising. 
In their study of how civil wars may lead to international conficts,
Gleditsch et  al. (2008) found that transnational linkages, including
those that are associated with religious factors, infuence the relation-
ship between civil wars and MIDs; and this relationship was not mit-
igated when separating “ethnic” from “nonethnic” civil wars (also see
Cunningham et al. 2009). Salehyan et al. (2011) found that transnational
ties are signifcantly associated with increased support for rebels. Tese
studies provide additional support for the importance of regions (e.g.,
PRIEs) in the analysis of civil wars, as well as the impact of civil wars on
regions. Expanding on the research on “neighborhood efects” and the
infuence of regional factors in civil wars, Gleditsch (2007) found that
transnational linkages and attributes of surrounding countries, includ-
ing the regional dispersion of ethnic groups, operationalized to include
religious heterogeneity, exerts a substantial impact on the risk of civil war
onset.7 Gleditsch’s (2007) indicator may proxy religious heterogeneity in
some cases, but in other cases it proxies any of its other social dimensions
because it defnes the largest ethnic group by the smallest of the dominant
group shares on any of the indicators of ethnicity, which include race and
nationality as well as religion. For example, Albania is coded as having
a population that is 100 percent Caucasoid, 90 percent Albanian speak-
ing, and 70  percent Muslim; therefore, its heterogeneity score is 100
- 70 = 30 since 30 percent of the population is not Muslim. If, instead,
Albania were 90 percent Muslim and 60 percent Albanian speaking, then
the heterogeneity score would also be 30 percent, but this would refect
its linguistic heterogeneity and not its religious heterogeneity. 
Indicators such as these are often cross-temporally and even more so
cross-nationally incomparable. Similarly, operationalizations from the
Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset that subsume “ethnoreligious
groups” in categories that also include ethnolinguistic and ethnosomatic
(or “racial”) groups in a composite measure of ethnicity (e.g., Wimmer
et al. 2009, Cederman et al. 2010, Koubi and Bohmelt 2014) may proxy
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religious characteristics for some states but not for others because (a) eth-
nicity and religion do not overlap and the EPR coding is based on a mix
of religious, linguistic, and racial characteristics, and (b) the EPR coding
is cross-nationally incomparable. With respect to the latter for example,
people of European descent are characterized as “whites” in the United
States, but people with the very same racial heritage are characterized as
English, Scottish, Welsh, and so on in the United Kingdom. Tis precludes
any meaningful cross-national afnity classifcation. In sum, they are cross-
nationally incomparable for purposes of analyzing the religious correlates
of wars. 
Typically, such problems in the quantifcation of religion variables
were extensions of those evident in early systematic studies of civil war
onset that subsumed religious factors under broader “ethnicity” variables,
or interactions of composite estimates of ethnic, linguistic, religious, or
racial characteristics (e.g., Vanhanen 1999ab, Sambanis 2001, Collier and
Hoefer 2002, Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002, Regan and Norton 2005,
among many others).8 Tis did not allow us to discern the specifc efects
of religious factors on civil war onset. In addition, some of the early stud-
ies also distinguish and dichotomize “identity” wars, which are assumed to
be ethnic and religious based, and “non identity” wars, which are assumed
to be ideologically or resource driven (e.g., Regan 1996, 2000; Sambanis
2001; Reynal-Querol 2002). Even proponents of the latter scheme such
as Sambanis (2002, 234) note that “there is no consensus in the literature
on the theoretical validity and empirical applicability of these classifca-
tions.” Nevertheless, scholars have continued to confate religion with
non-religion predictor variables (e.g., Gleditsch 2007, Jakobsen and De
Soysa 2009, Cederman et al. 2010, Buhaug et al. 2014) and diferenti-
ate identity/religious and nonidentity/non-religious conficts (Toft 2007,
Kathman 2011, Basedau et  al.’s 2016), which further complicates our
ability to determine the actual religious correlates of civil war. 
On the latter point, journalist Deborah Scroggins’s (2004, 79–80)
description of the civil war in Sudan refects the multidimensionality of
armed conficts subsumed under the category of “religious” wars, and the
often gross oversimplifcation associated with such characterizations: 
I have often thought that you need a . . . kind of layered map to
understand Sudan’s civil war. A surface map of political confict, for
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example—the northern government versus the southern rebels; and
under that a layer of religious confict—Muslim versus Christian and
pagan; and under that a map of all the sectarian divisions within
those categories; and under that a layer of ethnic divisions—Arab
and Arabized versus Nilotic and Equatorian—all of them containing
a multitude of clan and tribal subdivisions; and under that a layer of
linguistic conficts; and under that a layer of economic divisions—
the more developed north with fewer natural resources versus the
poorer south with its rich mineral and fossil fuel deposits; and under
that a layer of colonial divisions; and under that a layer of racial divi-
sions related to slavery. And so on and so on until it would become
clear that the war, like the country, was not one but many: a violent
ecosystem capable of generating endless new things to fght about
without ever shedding any of the old ones. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that even those who utilize such rubrics as “reli-
gious conficts” admit that such conficts are exceedingly rare and remain a
minority of conficts into the present decade. For example, Svensson (2007,
938) notes that among the civil wars from 1989 to 2003, only 48 of the
217 confict dyads involve a religious incompatibility, while 169 (78 per-
cent)—the vast majority—are intrareligious, involving parties belonging
to the same religious tradition. Toft (2007) reports that of the 133 civil
wars fought from 1940 to 2000, 42 (32 percent) were religious civil wars.
Basedau et al. (2016) notes that out of a total of 138 armed confict onsets
between 1990 and 2010, less than half (n = 60) are interreligious conficts
in which warring factions difered greatly in their religious afliations, and
only 41 were theological conficts in which at least one of the belligerents
had explicit religious aims.9 
Each of these major studies of “religious wars” indicates that although
religion plays a role in civil wars, religious civil wars are a minority of all
civil wars. Moreover, branding certain wars as “ethnic,” “religious,” or “iden-
tity” and then testing whether ethnicity, religion, or identity factors afected
their character and/or outcome biases the results in favor of the hypoth-
eses. It is akin to drawing the target around the hits. Consequently, our
focus on the relationship between religion and armed confict should not
employ arbitrarily truncated datasets restricted to often dubious categories
of “ethnic/religious/identity wars.” Tese terms obscure broader and more
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anodyne outcomes associated with religious factors. With respect to the
latter point, for example, De Juan (2015) is simply one of many scholars
who acknowledge the pacifying impact of religious factors. In an analysis of
more than 60,000 villages in Indonesia, he found a statistically signifcant
negative relationship between the density of local religious institutions and
the probability of mass fghting. Interestingly, an important qualifcation
was that the pacifying efect of religious institutions was weak or absent
in conficts that evolved along explicitly religious cleavages, reminding us,
even in this example, of the tensions that are at times attendant to religious
diferences. Tis argument extends to analyses that impute the “relevance”
or “salience” of religion in armed conficts, which is often imposed quite
idiosyncratically. 
For reasons similar to the difculty of diferentiating “ethnic” civil wars
(Kalyvas 2001), the extent to which a civil war is “religious” as opposed to
“non-religious” is exceptionally difcult to determine in a systematic way.
Our theory suggests that religion can be mobilized to advance political,
territorial, or personal goals. Branding certain wars as “religious,” almost by
defnition eliminates our ability to discern these tendencies. 
Importantly, we do not reject coding schemes that include religious 
factors among their list of social incompatibilities. Rather, we argue that 
we need to consider a more refned way of isolating religious factors from 
other factors that operate in civil conficts, many of which have multiple 
grievance dimensions at any given time. Moreover, religious diferentia-
tion is important given that many civil wars have a dynamic nature, which 
includes signifcant changes in the relative importance of various factors. 
Te grievances that cause people to rebel may be diferent from those that 
cause them to sustain the fght or to terminate it at some point. In the 
course of civil conficts, groups may rise and fall, and so may their spe-
cifc causes (Henderson and Singer 2002). For example, the uprisings in 
Egypt and Syria in 2011 were concerned with political and economic free-
doms and development. Tey were spearheaded by liberal groups; religious 
groups and institutions took a backseat to secular prodemocracy popular 
sentiments. However, these soon were converted into struggles involv-
ing highly contentious religious issues. In Egypt, the secular revolution 
was appropriated by the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafs who were 
elected in popular elections and attempted to impose religious laws on the 
country. Tis led to resistance by liberal groups, and ultimately resulted 
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in the takeover of power by the Egyptian military. In Syria, the civil war 
was quickly converted into a complex web of groups fghting both against 
the regime and against each other—in many cases on religious and ethnic 
grounds. 
Te early phases of the Israeli–Palestinian rivalry were primarily nation-
alist and anticolonial. Te Palestinian national movement was led by a
semisecular nationalist organization, Fatah (and smaller Marxist organiza-
tions such as the Popular Front of the Liberation of Palestine, PFLP). On
the Israeli side, the confict was largely managed by a political system led by
secular parties such as the Labor Party and Likud. In the 1980s, Palestinian
religious groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad started gaining infuence
among the Palestinians, and this infuence has deepened considerably since
then. On the other hand, the rise of the religious right in Israel has also been
infuential in Israeli politics. Tese trends have converted this confict into
one that has taken on an increasingly religious character, largely superim-
posed on (and sometimes superseding) the nationalist orientation of this
confict. 
Scholars also examined the impact of religious factors on a range of
other civil war outcomes. Among the most prominent were civil war dura-
tion and severity/intensity, the latter typically measured in terms of num-
bers killed. For example, Collier, Hoefer and Söderbom (2004) found that
religious fractionalization did not have a signifcant relationship with the
duration of civil wars from 1960 to 2000. Fox (2004a, 57) found that “eth-
nic” and “revolutionary wars” characterized by religious diferences among
the belligerents—which at their highest levels are civil wars—were more
intense than “non-religious conficts,” and, in a related study (Fox 2004b,
727), showed that religious homogeneity was negatively and signifcantly
associated with the number of fatalities—his primary indicator of confict
intensity—in civil wars from 1965 to 1999. 
Pearce’s (2005) study using data on 278 cases of territorial confict
phases in both intrastate and interstate armed conficts between 1946 and
2001 found a weak relationship between the extent of religious difer-
ences of the belligerents and intensity (measured in terms of the number of
confict-related deaths and the duration of the confict), and this weak rela-
tionship washed out when “religious relevance” was considered. In contrast
to these studies, Lacina (2006) found no signifcant correlation between
religious heterogeneity or religious polarization and the severity of civil war
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
301
Religion and Civil War 301 
for 1946–2002, utilizing Lacina and Gleditsch’s (2005) fatalities data on
114 civil wars. 
Analysts examined the role of religion in other aspects of civil wars,
as well, such as international peacekeeping, negotiation, and terrorism.
For example, Mullenbach (2005) did not fnd that religious issues have
a signifcant impact on the establishment of peacekeeping missions for
civil conficts, from 1945 to 2002. Svensson (2013) found that intrastate
confict dyads from 1989 to 2003 are signifcantly less likely to be termi-
nated through negotiated settlement when governments or rebel groups
have made explicit religious claims. At the same time, whether the primary
parties come from diferent religious traditions does not afect the chances
for negotiated settlement. De Soysa and Nordås (2007) analyzed data for
141 countries with over one million inhabitants for the period 1980–2000
to determine whether Muslim societies were associated with higher levels
of political terrorism and concluded that “public and scholarly discussion
seems to be wrong about the uniqueness of Islam for predicting levels of
dissent and repression, and they may have overemphasized religion over
other, more important, factors based on political economy” (p. 936). In
contrast, Toft (2007) claims that Islam played a disproportionally high
role in “religious” civil wars between 1940 and 2000 (thirty-four out of
forty-two “religious” wars). Her explanation for this disproportionate par-
ticipation of Islamic governments or rebels in such wars involves geography
(proximity of Islam’s holiest sites to Israel) and resources, particularly oil,
which are more structural. However, she also identifes jihad—unique to
Islam—as a phenomenon that both religious actors and political elites can
manipulate to boost mobilization. 
Returning to our main focus on religious heterogeneity and civil war
onset, near the turn of the decade, Regan and Bell (2010) found no signif-
cant relationship between religious fractionalization and civil war onset for
all states from 1949 to 1999, including 110 civil war onsets after removing
anticolonial wars. Similarly, Gubler and Selway (2012), using cross-national
data from over 100 countries, found that religious fractionalization had no
signifcant impact on civil war onset when controlling for the combination
of geographic, income, and religious cross-cutting cleavages in the society.
Tey fnd that civil war onset is on average nearly twelve times less probable
in societies where ethnicity is crosscut by socioeconomic class, geographic
region, and religion. More recently, Basedau et al.’s (2016) analysis of 130
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
302
302 Scriptures, Shrines, Scapegoats, and World Politics 
developing countries over the period 1990–2010 found a negative and sig-
nifcant relationship between religious fractionalization, religious polariza-
tion, and religious overlap with ethnicity, on the one hand, and the onset of
armed intrastate confict. By contrast, they found a positive and signifcant
relationship between religious dominance and armed confict. 
3.2 Debates and Issues in the Research on Civil Confict: Ethnicity, 
Linguistic, and Religious Factors 
Tis review suggests that the main division in the literature on the sources,
processes, and outcomes of civil confict is between those who believe that
identity factors play an important role in such processes, and those who
suggest that conficts, in general, and civil confict, in particular, are driven
by materialistic factors. Te greed-grievance framework, popularized by
Collier and Hoefer (1998, 2004), ofers a window into this theoretical
and empirical fault line. Te concept of greed as a cause of civil confict
concerns a struggle for tangible resources; civil confict is about the redis-
tribution of wealth or the means of production (e.g., land). Grievance
concerns high economic inequality, political repression, and ethnic and
religious divisions in the society (Collier and Hoefer 2004). An alternative
interpretation of this framework diferentiates between motivations and
opportunities. Motivations refect underlying factors that make individuals
or groups dissatisfed with the political, social, or economic status quo in a
society. Opportunities refect access to resources that are necessary for social
mobilization. 
What is common to both sides of this debate is the notion that a prin-
cipal motivation for the outbreak of such conficts is some deep satisfac-
tion with a social, political, or economic status quo. Te basic idea is that
a motivation for government change emerges when people are unhappy
with their lives and when they attribute this unhappiness to government
policies. Tese situations emerge when people’s absolute utility gains are
low—for example, when they sufer from low income, unemployment, or
lack of opportunities to practice their way of life. However, these situations
can also arise when the relative utility of individuals or groups is low, that
is, when a person’s own group’s lot is relatively lower than that of other
individuals or relevant reference groups. In the latter case, people may have
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basic resources that sustain them, or they can be free to pursue cultural or
spiritual values, yet they feel that their conditions are unjustly disadvan-
taged compared to the conditions of equivalent people or groups. Tis is
akin to what Gurr (1970) called “relative deprivation.” Collier and Hoefer
(2002) argue insightfully that if people defne their attitude toward a given
status quo based on such a comparison, there will always be individuals or
groups that are dissatisfed and motivated to change it. 
Te concept of relative deprivation may be seen in a diferent light, how-
ever. Grievances may arise due to gaps between a group’s value aspirations
and their actual capabilities. Tis discrepancy has been taken as an impor-
tant precipitant of civil confict (Davies 1962, Gurr 1970).10 Yet one way of
assessing a group’s actual accomplishment is not based on absolute utility
analysis—how much do I get relative to what I expect?—but rather, how
much do I get relative to others in groups that serve as my reference groups?
Relative deprivation can be interpreted as a precipitant of civil confict in
both relative utility and absolute utility frameworks. 
Dissatisfaction with the status quo can operate on an individual level,
and there may be a lot of individuals who are dissatisfed with the prevail-
ing status quo. However, civil confict requires organization, so individual
motivations for change need to be channeled through some group mecha-
nism. Several studies suggest that a common group identity (e.g., ethnicity,
race, language, religion) and a sense that a community is disadvantaged in
absolute or relative terms makes for a powerful organizational mechanism
(Basedau et al. 2016, Cederman et al. 2011). 
Even if individuals are both motivated to change the status quo and
are sufciently organized to convert their individual dissatisfaction into
group action, the question of opportunity is critical. People who feel that
a social order threatens their identity or values may have many options
to act. In some cases—principally in democratic states—they may orga-
nize as political parties and replace the government via elections. In other
cases, they may choose nonviolent resistance tactics such as peaceful dem-
onstrations, strikes, or nonparticipation (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011).
And some may choose not to act because the expected costs of resistance—
government repression and violence—are expected to outweigh the ben-
efts of resistance. Te willingness-opportunity framework (Most and Starr
1989) that has been applied primarily to interstate confict (Siverson and
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Starr 1991) seems equally applicable as a way of explaining the outbreak of
violent civil confict. 
Research on processes of resource mobilization and political opportu-
nity focuses on the changed opportunities created by transformations in the
politico-economic environment that alter the costs and benefts of rebellion
for individuals (Olson, 1965) and collectives (e.g., Tilly, 1978). Empirical
analyses drawing on either perspective have yielded varying degrees of suc-
cess. Both approaches have theoretical limitations that are framed nicely by
Lichbach (1995, 13): “Given the ubiquity of grievances, for Gurr (1970)
the problematique is to explain why people do not rebel . . . [and] given
the ubiquity of free riding, Olson’s (1965) problematique is to explain why
people do rebel.” 
A key issue with the greed-grievance framework is that it is actually a
political opportunity approach, in contrast to the grievance-based perspec-
tives. It argues, inter alia, that the prospects for looting and securing rents
from primary commodity exports allow rebel leaders to overcome collective
action problems and gain recruits and retain them. Tis approach faced
signifcant empirical and theoretical critiques. Such critiques were based on,
among other things, the inability of scholars to replicate some of the main
fndings on the relationship between the primary proxy of greed—resource
extraction—and civil war onset (Fearon 2005, De Soysa and Neumayer
2007). Other critiques centered on assumptions regarding incentives for
looting (Kalyvas 2001), the coding and interpretation of grievance variables
(Nafziger and Auvinen 2002), and the conceptualization of the mechanism
for rebellion in terms of greed-driven rebels engaged in a criminal enterprise
(Humphreys 2005, De Soysa and Neumayer 2007). 
Tese critiques led Collier and Hoefer to abandon the “greed” refer-
ence and rename it the “opportunity” model (Collier and Hoefer 2004),
then rephrase it as the “feasibility” thesis (Collier et al. 2009). Tis moniker
simply notes that civil wars are more likely where they are most feasible. In
efect, the “feasibility” thesis, which they contrast with “motivation” factors,
is simply a restatement of their original distinction between “greed” and
“grievance.” Now “greed” is assigned to a number of possible motivations
for civil war along with grievances, and opportunities are represented by an
array of institutional, political, cultural, and economic factors. 
Religious factors are viewed as providing a basis for grievance as well as
an organizational apparatus and impetus to coordinate collective action.
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Tus, religious factors have been incorporated into each of these per-
spectives to account for civil war outcomes, but with largely inconsistent
results. As Murshed and Tadjoeddin (2009, 95) point out, “the content
of their [Collier and Hoefer’s] previous ‘greed’ hypothesis (now part of
motivation) is almost identical with what they now re-phrase as ‘feasibil-
ity’ ”; and “if feasibility is about opportunity, greed is also about oppor-
tunity”; therefore, “the basic arguments and empirical evidence are much
the same as before.” Tus more than a decade of theorizing and testing
of the “greed versus grievance” framework simply returns the attention
of many political scientists to the status quo ante diferentiation between
political opportunity/resource mobilization and relative deprivation
explanations of civil war. 
Te weak or insignifcant fndings on the relationship between religious
fractionalization or religious discrimination and civil war (e.g., Fearon and
Laitin 2003, Collier and Hoefer 2004, Hegre and Sambanis 2006) were
often framed as refuting “grievance”-based arguments. Tese results also
challenged the view that religious factors were important aspects of resource
mobilization and political opportunity arguments, as well. For example,
religious groups may have lower costs of rebellion than nonidentity groups
such as those based on class. Religious groups can more easily recruit from
within their identity group (just as ethnic, linguistic, and racial groups do);
they can draw on shared religious symbols and norms to rally coreligionists.
And, more than most other identity groups, religious groups can utilize
the suspicion and mistrust often rooted in doctrinal diferences and exac-
erbated by discrimination between diferent religious groups to overcome
collective action problems, especially when this discrimination is generated
by the state (Koubi and Bohmelt 2014, 22). 
Te ability of religious groups to overcome collective action problems
resonates with Esteban and Ray’s (2008a) argument that, in the presence of
economic inequality, ethnoreligious groups more than class-based groups
are more likely to resort to confict. Tis is so, in part, because ethnoreli-
gious alliances generate a “perverse synergy” that induces the rich within
the group to supply the resources for confict and the poor to supply the
labor. By contrast, in class-based confict this synergy is largely absent given
that the rich have little incentive to initiate a redistribution efort, and the
poor have exceptionally high opportunity costs for resources (p. 2186). Gill
(2011) also emphasizes the ability of religious mobilization to overcome
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collective action problems in the case of suicide bombings. But he argues
that the religious mobilization strategy is far more general than the more
limited and far less common case of suicide bombings. 
Te seemingly weaker support for relative deprivation explanations of
civil war onset was criticized on theoretical and empirical grounds. Buhaug
et  al. (2014) argued that theoretical misspecifcation and measurement
problems contributed to the inconsistent fndings on the relationship
between grievances and civil war. For example, Stewart (2008) focused on
the largest discriminated group in a state—which in some cases refers to
a religious group—rather than the total excluded population, and used a
measure of relative deprivation emphasizing “horizontal inequality,” which
denotes inequalities between groups, rather than “vertical inequality,”
which refers to inequality between individuals within an otherwise homo-
geneous population.11 In their analyses of civil war onsets from 1960 to
2005, Buhaug et al. (2014) fnd that political and socioeconomic disparities
associated with grievance increase the risk of civil war onset primarily when
they overlap with horizontal cleavages among groups (also see Koubi and
Bohmelt 2014). 
Cederman et al. (2010, 114) argue that “proper” conceptualizing and
measuring of “ethnic politics” would allow researchers to identify “those
ethnic constellations of power that are particularly war prone.” Tey ana-
lyzed 124 “ethnic conficts” fought between 1946 and 2005—half of which
were full-fedged civil wars (p. 102)—focusing on whether representatives
of a “politically relevant ethnic group” are discriminated against, are pow-
erless, or have regional or separatist autonomy (see Wimmer et al. 2009).
Importantly, for our analysis, their conceptualization of ethnicity included
“ethnolinguistic, ethnosomatic (or ‘racial’), and ethnoreligious groups,”
which suggests that in certain cases it captures religious characteristics of
groups (p. 99). Tey noted that “without denying the relevance of feasibil-
ity mechanisms,” there is support for grievance-based claims grounded in
issues of ethnic discrimination as explanatory factors in civil wars. Large
politically relevant ethnic groups—which can include religious groups—
that are either underrepresented in government or excluded from state
power, are more likely to pursue violent domestic confict. Specifcally,
they “demonstrate empirically how the logics of contention and mobiliza-
tion lead ethnically defned actors who are excluded from state power into
armed confict,” and note that “roughly half of the conficts fought since the
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Second World War can be linked to this dynamic of ethnopolitical struggle
for state power” (p. 114). 
Esteban et  al. (2012) analyzed 138 countries over the period 1960–
2008. Tey relied on an update of Fearon’s (2003) dataset, which identifes
over 800 “ethnic and ethnoreligious” groups in 160 countries, but without
relying on “income-based groups or income-based measures.” Tey fnd
support for grievance-based arguments, suggesting a relationship between
economic inequality and domestic confict. Tey conclude that “this is
not to say that confict is fundamentally noneconomic,” but that “there is
an equal possibility that the economics of confict fnds expression across
groups that are demarcated on other grounds: religion, caste, geography, or
language” (Esteban et al., 2012, 1137).Tese fndings dovetail with those of
Basedau et al.’s (2016) analysis of 130 developing countries from 1990 to
2010. Basedau et al. (2016) diferentiate among armed conficts in general;
“interreligious” armed conficts, in which warring factions difer in terms of
their religious afliation (e.g., the Hindu government vs. Christian rebels
in Nagaland in India; the Christian government vs. Muslim rebels in the
Philippines, and the Buddhist government vs. Hindu rebels in Sri Lanka);
and “theological” armed conficts, which are diferentiated by the presence/
relevance of an incompatibility over religious ideas between the government
and rebels (e.g., the introduction of religious law). Te authors employed
variables to explicitly proxy religious grievances such as religious fraction-
alization, religious polarization, and religious overlap with ethnicity and
the use of violent religious rhetoric. Tey suggest that such variables are
positively and signifcantly associated with “interreligious” or “theological”
conficts, but not with armed confict, in general.12 
Te latter point is supported by fndings that assert the greater relevance
of psychological over economic-based grievances in “religious” conficts.
For example, Canetti et al. (2010) reject what they view as the tendency
to rely mainly on economic resource loss in estimations of relative depriva-
tion, given that psychological, not economic, resources seem to mediate the
relationship between religion and support of violence. Teir analysis of a
sample of 545 Israeli Jews and Muslims found that the relationship between
religion and support of political violence is mediated by relative depriva-
tion based in psychological rather than economic resource loss. Tey argued
that “even acute economic deprivation can hardly explain the tendency of
certain individuals to support violence while others remain peaceful.” Tis
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“suggests that the typical tendency to focus on economic resource loss is
over simplistic.” Instead, “it is the loss of psychological, not economic,
resources that mediates the relationship between religion and support of
violence” (pp.  583–84). Tey also note that “group diferences between
religions seem to matter more than diferences between levels of religiosity
within the same religion” (p. 583). 
Isaacs’s (2016) study of the relationship between religious rhetoric and
violence using annual data on 495 organizations worldwide from 1970 to
2012 suggests that an organization’s recent participation in confict, and the
intensity and duration of the confict, substantially increased the likelihood
that the organization would adopt religious rhetoric (p.  222). Religious
rhetoric became more likely with both more intense and longer conficts.
He concluded that violent organizations strategically adopt religious rheto-
ric to resolve logistical challenges associated with resource mobilization and
the recruitment and retention of members. Such rhetoric assists political
entrepreneurs in “gain[ing] an edge over their rivals” (p. 222). Isaacs’s fnd-
ings, in demonstrating the endogeneity of religious rhetoric and violence,
provide empirical support for the contention that “various logistical chal-
lenges associated with participation in violence encourage the adoption of
religious rhetoric” (p. 222). 
A key focus of the recent literature connecting religion to confict
focuses on religious discrimination as a motivating factor for rebellion.
Akbaba (2006), Akbaba and Taydas (2011), and Fox, James, and Li (2009),
for example, fnd that religious discrimination increases motivations for
violence and therefore the probability of the onset of violent domestic con-
fict. However, the causal motivation outlined in these studies seems quite
underspecifed, because it does not focus on opportunities and on the rela-
tionship between religious grievances based on discrimination and other
grievances. 
Perhaps the most direct and relevant research on the causal factors
that connect religion to civil war comes from the work of Basedau and his
colleagues (Vüllers et al. 2015, Basedau et al. 2016, Basedau et al. 2017)
using a dataset on religion and confict in 130 developing countries from
1990 to 2010. Tis group establishes a causal mechanism connecting reli-
gion to both motives and opportunities. Te argument is that religion as
a political component has two aspects: practices and structures (Basedau
et al. 2016, 231–36). If the practice of religion is somehow hampered
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or oppressed by political and social constraints, this may invoke feel-
ings of discrimination among believers, thereby generating motivation to
change the conditions that produce discrimination. Such perceptions of
discrimination breed motivation for violence. Second, religious institu-
tions, and the overlap of religious and other social identities, help would-
be rebels overcome the collective action problem. Religious leaders may
assist organization and mobilization by calling for rebellion and violence,
thereby increasing the opportunities that arise from mass mobilization.
As these authors argue, this framework does not ft all civil conficts. It
applies to specifc types of confict. In particular, they argue that reli-
gious factors afect confict onset when the confict possesses a religious
or theological component (p. 236). Likewise, religious identity overlaps
increase the risk of interreligious armed confict, and interreligious dis-
course increases the risk of theological armed confict. 
3.3 Problems with the Extant Literature 
Although we reviewed and critiqued some of the studies of religion and civil
confict in chapter 2, the current literature review of civil confict goes well
beyond that focus, embedding the religion-civil confict nexus in broader
theoretical frameworks. Our review of this broader literature highlights sev-
eral issues that we fnd troubling. We point out at the outset that our review
of the literature suggests that the jury is still out when it comes to adjudi-
cating the greed-grievance or the relative deprivation/resource mobilization
frameworks. Tis also applies to the role of religious factors in fomenting
and sustaining civil confict. Tere may be ample reasons for this lack of
consensus on some of the fundamental factors that might afect the onset
and characteristics of civil confict. We pointed out some of the reasons for
this diversity of fndings above. However, several issues need clarifcation
before we discuss our theory. 
First, the discussion of religion in this literature was, more often than
not, embedded in broad classifcations of social groupings. In many cases,
religious factors were confated with other elements of group identity such
as ethnicity and language. Relatively few analyses singled out religious fac-
tors and theorized about the causal mechanism that makes religious iden-
tities more or less prone to violence.13 Te theorizing about these aspects
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
310
310 Scriptures, Shrines, Scapegoats, and World Politics 
of the religion-civil violence nexus was not separated from other types of
identity markers. As we pointed out above, religion can be a powerful group
identity marker, a motivating grievance, and an organizational tool (both
via invocation of common grievances based on values and on organizational
characteristics of religious institutions). 
Second, most of the studies focusing on religion as a motivating or mobi-
lizing factor center on religious discrimination and the mobilization capacity
of religious groups. However, very few studies examine how religion can be
manipulated by ruling political elites to advance specifc goals—including
oppressing and discriminating against religious groups—especially religious
minorities. Such actions are often justifed by political elites (sometimes
with the help of religious elites) by pointing out—correctly or incorrectly—
the rebellious intentions of such minorities. Another common argument
that political elites use to justify discriminatory practices against religious
groups concerns the afnity between such groups and external enemies of
the state. For example, Israel practices nominal religious freedom and pro-
vides equal political rights to the Arab-Palestinian minority within its pre-
1967 borders. However, political elites have often depicted this minority
as a ffth column. On election day of March 17, 2015, the Israeli prime
minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, who at the time was trailing in some polls,
posted on his Facebook page the following: “Te rule of the right-wing [led
by Netanyahu] is at risk. Arab voters are moving in droves to the polling sta-
tions. Te left-wing NGOs drive them to the polling stations in buses . . .
Go and vote, bring your friends and family members. With your help, and
with God’s help . . . we will form a national government that would protect
the state of Israel.” Tis is a typical racist mobilization tactic applied by
political elites in states characterized by strong afnities between excluded
religious groups and hostile neighboring states. 
Tird, partly because of the tendency to confate religion with other
identity markers, the relationship between religious institutions and state
institutions as a precipitant of confict remains unexplored. Specifcally, are
states that have a tight relationship between religious and political institu-
tions more or less likely to experience civil war than states that explicitly
separate religion from politics? Te measurement of religion was done pri-
marily to identify the degree of fractionalization in a society, or the access
of certain groups to power. However the institutionalization of religion was
not really understood as a factor in the emergence of civil confict. Even
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in studies using the religion and state dataset, the focus was on the linkage
between discrimination and confict rather than on the institutionalized
relations between religion and state (for example, on the degree of religious
legislation and religious regulation) in states and the likelihood of civil vio-
lence. Institutionalization of religion by political elites elevates the oppor-
tunity of those elites to mobilize religious leaders and religious institutions
to oppress and discriminate against other religious groups; as a result, creat-
ing both conditions for, and helping motivate such groups to rebel. Tus,
the causal mechanism of Basedau and his collaborators, and of Akbaba,
Fox, and their coauthors linking discrimination to civil confict seems to
cover only part of the story, conceptually. We focus on the work of Fox and
Akbaba on religious discrimination, and of Basedeau and his colleagues
on the more general causal mechanism connecting religious practices and
religious institutions to the outbreak of political violence not because they
are unique in these regards, but because they exemplify the main concerns
we discuss herein. 
Additionally, as we pointed out in chapter 2, methodologically, there is
a problem with many of these studies insofar as they truncate civil confict
in a manner that creates selection bias and, possibly, predetermines their
results. Tere are two related issues here. First, confict has several distinct
characteristics that are, and should be, treated as independent of the causes
of these phenomena. By selecting a subset of cases on the basis of presumed
underlying causal mechanisms—thereby branding such confict as ethnic,
ethnoreligious, religious, or theological—researchers may predetermine the
outcome of their investigation. If such conficts already constitute a fraction
of all conficts that are selected by independent criteria (e.g., degree of par-
ticipation, lethality), then the probability of a hypothesis being supported
by the data is not due to the accuracy of the theory but to the fact that
cases were selected on the independent variable (King, Keohane, and Verba
1994). To alleviate such selection bias, we need to test hypotheses connect-
ing specifc motivations to fght to all types of civil confict. Saying that a set
of motivations (e.g., religious discrimination) fts religious confict amounts
to equating a concept to itself. Tis does not constitute scientifc evidence
of anything. Explaining civil confict requires selecting a set of cases on cri-
teria that are independent of the possible causes of such conficts. 
Further, the subset of studies that focuses on the dimensions of civil
confict (e.g., duration, outcome, or form of settlement) and ties religious
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factors to these conficts ofers some interesting insights. However, without
studying the conficts that did not occur, we cannot really say that religious
conficts are more intense, last longer, or are more difcult to settle peace-
fully than other types of conficts. Te opportunity for confict within a
given state exists all the time, but only a small fraction of all states experi-
ence civil confict. It is quite possible that there exist a large number of
conficts that have zero intensity, last no time at all, and have been resolved
peacefully. Tese are the conficts that did not happen. And without know-
ing the religious, economic, social, or political characteristics of the dogs
that did not bark, we cannot say much that would be credible about the
dogs that did. A credible analysis must include the opportunity for confict
outbreak and distinguish between those conficts that did break out and
those that did not. We address this issue below. 
Despite the deep disagreements in, and the inherent problems of, the
literature on civil confict, this literature provides some meaningful guides
and points of departure to our theorizing and empirical analyses. We there-
fore move to a discussion of key theoretical linkages between religion and
civil confict. 
4. Religion and Civil Confict 
4.1 The Religious Structure of Societies 
Te extant literature on the causes of civil war provides much of the theoriz-
ing on the relationship between religion and civil confict, either as a dis-
tinct variable or as part of the broader category of ethnic fractionalization.
Tese theories center on two central themes: motivations and opportuni-
ties. We connect these theoretical themes and their analytic frameworks
that guided our research thus far. 
Another way of framing the manner by which various factors—
including, but not restricted to, religious ones—afect the probability and 
magnitude of civil confict, is to distinguish between underlying causes 
and immediate (proximate) causes of confict (Levy and Tompson 
2010, Miller 2007). Tis typology of causes also captures the interaction 
between motivations (or grievances), and opportunities that characterizes 
much of the relevant literature. Underlying causes of confict refer to basic, 
entrenched, and long-term factors that elevate the expected probability of 
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confict. Tey also indicate whether a given actor is at a higher or lower risk 
of confict involvement or confict outbreak than another actor. Analogous 
to the science of predicting earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, geolo-
gists typically can identify areas, regions, or specifc locations that are more 
prone to experience such disasters. Tese predictions are general, in the 
sense that they are based on tectonic structures, magma buoyancy, crust 
thickness, and so forth. Based on the mapping of these and other factors, 
geologists can identify high-risk areas. In the case of civil confict, under-
lying factors refer to relatively stable characteristics of societies associated 
with an elevated risk of confict outbreak in a more general sense. 
However, underlying causes do not allow more precise explanation of
when confict will occur. Geologists using underlying factors typically can-
not predict when earthquakes will take place, or when a volcano will erupt.
To provide such predictions, geologists typically rely on more proximate
indicators, such as frequency of tremors, magmatic activity, and other geo-
logical factors. Yet even those proximate indicators do not allow for accu-
rate predictions of the timings of such disasters, or even their locations.
Proximate causes of civil conficts may include specifc triggers (for exam-
ple, a specifc dispute over a holy shrine; the assassinations of Martin Luther
King Jr. or Indira Gandhi; or the immolation of Mohammed Boazzizi in
Tunisia on October 17, 2010), but more broadly, they refer to specifc pro-
cesses such as the mobilization of groups, specifc policies, short-term hard-
ships, or other processes that transform these underlying causes into actual
violence. Motivations typically cover underlying causes of confict, whereas
opportunities cover more immediate or proximate causes. Tis typology
allows us to make better sense of the causal mechanisms associated with the
various frameworks that form the common theoretical thread of this study. 
Starting with the primordialist framework, it views religious diversity as
a fxed factor; it does not change very much over time within a given state.
Likewise, the same can be said for the relationship between religion and
state. Terefore, when considering the predictions that can be derived from
the primordialist perspective, it is analytically reasonable to connect reli-
gious diversity to a general propensity of states to become embroiled in civil
confict. Te fact that there is a structural disparity in civil war experience
across states suggests that the primordialist account of structural instability
in religiously diverse societies may be quite compelling. Te inequality of
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civil confict across states also attests to the importance of understanding
the underlying conditions leading to civil war propensity. 
But, as we have seen in the literature review, many—if not most—civil
conficts implicate the interaction of motivations and opportunities. So,
how does religion factor into this process? Te short answer is that civil
war is more likely when there is a convergence of religious and economic
discrimination. Specifcally, the probability of civil war in a state increases
when one religious group controls a disproportionate share of political,
social, and economic resources, largely at the expense of other religious
groups. Likewise, relative deprivation is most commonly connected with
civil violence when the material gap between aspirations and achievements
is framed in both economic and ideational terms. In other words, civil war is
more likely when one religious group experiences a signifcantly higher gap
between aspirations and achievements than other groups. Tis is especially
the case when the former’s sense of relative deprivation is high, whereas the
latter’s is low or negative (that is, their aspirations match or outpace their
achievements). 
Political and economic inequality can be prevalent in both religiously
homogeneous and religiously diverse societies. In religiously homogeneous
societies, civil wars are typically not about religion. Indeed, many civil wars
broke out in relatively homogeneous societies for example, the Russian
Revolution, the Spanish Civil War, or even the American Civil War. Indeed,
as we documented in the literature review, evidence suggests that most civil
wars are not about religion. Te key stakes in these wars are political dis-
putes or economic grievances. However, religion may become an issue in
diverse societies when one or more groups feel that they are exploited or dis-
criminated against because of their religion or other cultural characteristics
that are connected to religious beliefs. 
4.2 The Mobilizing Power of Religion 
It is important to clarify that religion operates as a group identifer more
than as an independent motivator of civil resistance. Even in societies where
the practice of certain religions is severely curtailed by policies and legisla-
tion, religious discrimination in itself may not be the critical factor driv-
ing rebellion. Rather, it is the combination of discrimination on religious,
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political, and economic matters that pushes disadvantaged groups to rebel.
As noted, religion may be a powerful mobilization mechanism if a com-
munity has a common identity marker and at the same time feels that dis-
crimination is both cultural and economic. 
From the primordialist perspective, the combination of economic dis-
crimination and religious identity fuels the grievances of a community
more than either of them taken separately. Tis point also provides a base-
line for the expectations of the instrumentalist perspective. Mass mobili-
zation is necessary in order to stage mass civil protest. When economic
grievances overlap with religious discrimination, leaders of a protest move-
ment may fnd it practical to use religious symbols to mobilize social pro-
test. It is important to note that protest, in and of itself, does not entail
violent uprising; it can include peaceful demonstrations and other acts of
civil disobedience (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Violence in such cases
may result from government’s use of force to crush nonviolent resistance
(Sutton, Butcher, and Svensson 2014, Rorbaek and Knudsen 2017). In
cases where protesters are organized along religious lines, the government
can use its own religious symbols to mobilize support of its winning coali-
tion members against the threat emerging from diferent religious groups.
It can depict the struggle as a fght for preserving the state’s identity vis-à-vis
a religious enemy. 
A religiously divided society is also a prescription for trouble accord-
ing to the constructivist perspective. Divided states are less likely to form
a unique national (or corporate) identity than religiously homogeneous
states. Nationalist ideas that establish a unity of people, territory, and
political institutions compete with divisive ideas about religious or other
aspects of cultural afnity. Te loyalty of people to the state and its politi-
cal institutions depends on the extent to which they identify with other
people in the territory controlled by such institutions. Mobilizing popula-
tions for national projects that are fnancially and humanly costly is dif-
cult under the best social and political circumstances; mobilizing a divided
society where some groups feel that the demands imposed on them far
exceed the benefts they get from playing by the rules is even more dif-
cult. In religiously diverse societies, the ability of group leaders to mobilize
disadvantaged groups against the ruling elite is far greater than in homo-
geneous societies in which leaders may share the religious beliefs of their
constituents. 
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Recall that constructivists argue that interaction shapes identity. Tis
is true for both interstate interactions that shape national identities, and
for intrastate interactions among various groups that shape group identity.
Marginalization of certain groups may create a stronger sense of group iden-
tity and increase group mobilization. Likewise, groups that beneft from a
given status quo might develop an identity based on entitlement. Tis raises
the degree of group awareness and increases the probability that disagree-
ments among people from diferent groups will be perceived as intergroup
confict, and that instability is presumed to follow. 
It also follows that as the level of social secularization—the number of
people in a society who do not ascribe to absolute values associated with
religious beliefs—increases, it is more difcult to mobilize resistance to rul-
ing elites or prevalent policies along religious markers. Such societies might
also experience political instability, but when that happens, this is more
likely to result from economic hardships and inequalities than from cultural
discrimination. 
Our integrative theory contends that politics within a society are shaped
by a relationship between two variables: the degree of religious homogene-
ity/heterogeneity and the degree to which religious afairs are separated from
political, social, and economic afairs (the separation of religion and state).
Te interaction between these factors provides the context for mobilization
opportunities by political elites and counterelites. Religious homogeneity
and religion-state relations may also provide a context for religious-based
grievances in the society. For example, recall that Type I states are charac-
terized by religiously homogeneous societies that lack separation between
religion and politics (e.g., Saudi Arabia and Iran). In such states, religion
plays a pivotal role in domestic politics. Religion afects leader selection
(since political leaders need to be acceptable to religious institutions and
to religious leaders). Religion also defnes the legal system in which reli-
gious laws play a powerful role. Loyalty to the state and loyalty to the pre-
vailing religion are viewed as synonymous. Secularism is either disallowed
or marginalized. In such states, it is unlikely that religion would play an
important role in fomenting internal confict. Te ability to use religious
symbols or to mobilize one group against another is very limited. Religion
is a unifying force, not a divisive one. Even religious discrimination against
minority religious groups may not be a cause of internal confict. In reli-
giously homogeneous societies, the minority groups are typically too weak
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and reluctant to use their religious identity as a mobilizing force. Doing
that would unify and solidify their opponents’ ability to defeat them and
increase the already rampant discriminatory practices. Only coalitions
among diferent groups that are formed to mitigate other economic, politi-
cal, or social grievances, would give rebels a fghting chance. Terefore, civil
conficts in such societies—to the extent that they break out—would tend
to be about non-religious grievances. 
Type II states are religiously homogeneous societies that have separated
religion from state (e.g., Scandinavian states, Turkey during the post-Ataturk
but pre-Erdogen period). Such states minimize the formal role of religion
in politics via a constitution or a civil legal system. Religious beliefs and
practices of candidates for political ofce can still play an important role in
their election or selection. Although religious discrimination is outlawed,
attitudes toward religious minorities may be mixed if not outright suspi-
cious. In such states, too, religion cannot be a powerful unifer because it is
difcult to claim that institutionalized practices induce religious discrimi-
nation. Terefore, the ability to mobilize groups around religious grievances
is quite limited, and the use of religious values to mobilize minorities may
in fact be counterproductive. 
Type III states are religiously heterogeneous but do not separate religion
from state (e.g., Sudan during the Islamic regime, 1989–2008; Myanmar
since the early 1990s). In such states, one religious group’s rules, principles,
and legal values tend to dominate those of other groups, and political lead-
ers are selected from those identifed with the “state religion.” Religious
discrimination is rampant and systematic, privileging the narrow religious
identity of the dominant group. Tis happens even though religious free-
dom may be a nominal legal right. In these societies, religious civil confict
is most likely. Te combination of religious diversity and religious discrim-
ination creates potential for grievances that center on religious issues or
the combination of religious grievances and economic or political ones.
Religious diversity may lead several discriminated religious groups to form
coalitions against the discriminating practices of the state. Tese are the
kinds of societies that display a linkage between religious discrimination
and civil confict (Akbaba 2006, 2011; Fox et  al. 2009; Ozdamar and
Akbaka 2014). 
Finally, Type IV states are religiously diverse societies with separation of
religion and state (e.g., United States). In these societies, national identity
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is formed around non-religious symbols and afnities; political leader-
ship criteria are largely secular; and the role of religious factors in political
discourses is minimal. While these states manifest some tensions between
diferent religious communities, other factors, such as secular ideological
similarities (e.g., classical liberalism, neoliberalism), defne political atti-
tudes. Here, too, the likelihood of religious factors afecting civil confict
is low because it is difcult to show explicit or legal limits on practicing
religious beliefs. It is also difcult to use religion to mobilize mass rebellion
because of the religious diversity. 
One may argue that these sociopolitical characteristics of states are
logically prior to the socioeconomic and sociopsychological processes that
the relative deprivation and resource mobilization/political opportunity
perspectives emphasize in generating confict. In fact, relative depriva-
tion and resource mobilization processes are embedded in the sociopoliti-
cal characteristics of states. However, both primordialism and, to a lesser
extent, constructivism emphasize underlying and structural conditions
that make some societies more prone to internal confict than other societ-
ies. Tey are less useful in explaining when confict will break out in such
societies. So we need a more dynamic account of civil confict outbreak. 
4.3 Proximate Determinants of Civil Confict 
To answer questions about when (rather than where) civil confict is likely to
occur, we have to consider factors that are less time invariant than the religious
homogeneity of societies. As discussed in chapter 3, our integrative theory
posits that religious factors afect political processes when the religious char-
acteristics of a society interact with other factors. Accordingly, we suggest that
religious factors become prominent determinants of internal confict when
they interact with (a) political and economic factors, (b) the relations between
political and religious institutions, and (c)  the religious afnities between
domestic groups and the politically relevant external environment of the state.
We discuss each of these interactions in turn. 
We accept the idea that religiously diverse societies are more prone to
internal friction than homogeneous societies. Te key question, however,
concerns the specifc conditions under which religious groups can be mobi-
lized to oppose governments’ policies and laws. First, religion may become a
mobilizing instrument when economic conditions deteriorate. Tis may be
the case when economic conditions are particularly worse for specifc religious
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
319
Religion and Civil War 319 
communities, especially when compared with the economic lot of other reli-
gious communities. We also agree that the overlap of religious identities with
class identity helps mobilize communities along religious lines. Fox et  al.
(2017) point out that objective measures of religious discrimination do not
predict grievances. Rather, it is the ability of religious and political leaders to
mobilize communities around common grievances that helps predict political
action. Tis fnding dovetails with our argument that mobilization requires a
combination of conditions that would make people angry and willing to risk
their lives for a common goal. Using religion as a mobilization strategy requires
a perception by members of a community that it is the linkage between their
religious beliefs and their economic and political conditions that is responsible
for the perceived disadvantaged, oppressed, or otherwise exploited condition
of their community. 
Mobilizing communities for political action along religious lines requires
the support of religious authorities. Tis is true for both governments and
rebels. A government that has close ties with religious elites can mobilize
its religious allies against challenges stemming from both religious and
other economic, political, or social groups. Governments that have sepa-
rated religion from state face two challenges when confronting opposition.
First, they cannot mobilize religious elites to support their policies. Second,
religious elites may have antigovernment sentiments precisely because of
this separation of religion from state. By contrast, religious elites of com-
munities that sufer from religious and other discriminatory practices can
mobilize antigovernment groups. Tis is facilitated by policies and laws that
cause discrimination and economic or social hardships. Under such condi-
tions, religious elites can use group grievances as a mobilization instrument
not only against specifc government policies but also against the system of
political and religious institutions that perpetuates discrimination. 
4.4 The External Dimension of Civil Confict 
One of the more neglected aspects of mobilization in the civil confict
literature concerns the strategic anticipation of external support. Te cal-
culus of rebellion involves a strategic assessment of risks and benefts.
Te benefts of victory and the utility of the status quo defne the moti-
vation for rebellion. If the status quo is deemed satisfactory compared to
the expectation of political, social, or economic change following rebels’
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victory, then there is no reason to rebel. Te status quo ofers more ben-
efts than any expectation of change. On the other hand, if the status quo
is seen as deeply damaging, then the motivation for changing it increases. 
However, motivation to preserve or change a given status quo requires
assessment of the risks associated with such a change. A rebellion may result
in victory or defeat; in either case rebels pay a price. Terefore the prob-
ability of victory is a key to a decision whether to rebel and what strategy
to use. Te mobilization literature is important in that it tells us not only
who can be mobilized and for what causes, but also how many can be mobi-
lized, what resources can be used to advance rebels’ strategy, and, ultimately,
how all this afects the prospect of victory. Highly motivated communities
that lack the resources to succeed in protesting the government’s policies
are unlikely to rebel, no matter the depth and magnitude of their griev-
ances. Unfortunately, while there exists a signifcant body of literature on
third-party intervention in civil confict, most of it focuses on post-uprising
intervention. Tere is little work on the anticipation of external support as
part of the calculus of uprising (Jackson, San-Akca, and Maoz, (2020). We
argue that would-be rebels assess not only factors that concern the relative
capabilities of the disputants before they decide whether to rebel but also
the balance of external support for uprisings as an important factor in their
risk assessment. 
Jackson, San Akca, and Maoz (2020) outline a strategic assessment
of anticipated external support for an uprising by potential rebels. Tis
assessment is based on a set of strategic, political, and ideational afni-
ties between (a) would-be rebels and external actors, and (b)  the gov-
ernment and external actors. Religious factors enter into the equation
when potential rebels share afnities with external actors. In such cases,
would-be rebels can anticipate some support for their cause by external
actors. If such external actors also share some degree of enmity with the
government of the focal state, the likelihood of support for a rebellion
by such external actors increases. Tis pre-rebellion calculus of external
support has an efect on the balance of risks associated with an uprising.
Typically, the balance of capabilities between would-be rebels and the
government tilts heavily in favor of the latter. Anticipation of external
support—in the form of material support or through political and dip-
lomatic support—can either narrow this balance of capabilities or alter
it in favor of the rebels.14 
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We can summarize these ideas by the following propositions. 
H1. All else being equal, the probability of civil confict increases
with the interaction between 
a. the religious diversity of a state and the relations between
religious and political institutions, and 
b. the religious diversity of the state and the degree of religious
discrimination and religious intolerance. 
H2. Te probability of civil confict decreases with the proportion of
the secular population in the state. 
H3. Te probability of civil confict decreases with the degree of
religious similarity between the major religious group in a given
state and the religious makeup of the state’s PRIE. Conversely,
the probability of civil confict increases with the degree of reli-
gious similarity between the largest minority religious group
and the religious makeup of the state’s PRIE. 
Note that in H3, we focus on the religious similarity between two religious
groups in a given state and the makeup of the state’s PRIE. We assume that
states are usually governed by political leaders who belong to the largest
religious group. Tis is not a general case, but it is a reasonable assump-
tion. Likewise, we assume that the second-largest religious group in a state
is more likely to be excluded from power than the largest religious group.
Again, this is not a general case, but it is quite common. We discuss these
assumptions in the next section and take measures to control for other
confounding factors. H3 suggests—in the spirit of Jackson, San Acka, and
Maoz (2020) argument—that the religious afnity between the ruling elites
and the state’s PRIE suggests to would-be rebels that the ruling elites may
get outside support in the case of an uprising. Conversely, if there is high
religious similarity between the would-be rebels and actors in the state’s
PRIE, would-be rebels can expect outside support for their cause. 
Before turning to a discussion of the research design to test these prop-
ositions, it is important to return to the issue of selection bias in the treat-
ment of the types of civil wars (i.e., religious versus non-religious). Most 
students of civil confict tend to lump together the probability of civil 
confict with the attributes of civil conficts such as its type (e.g., religious 
versus non-religious), intensity, duration, or outcome. Tis is wrong on 
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both theoretical and methodological grounds. Societies “select” themselves 
into civil confict. As we have seen in section 2 above, most states have lit-
tle or no civil confict. Tose that do, tend to have such confict repeatedly. 
Tis means that there is some—potentially systematic—set of factors that 
causes states to “select” themselves into such confict. Civil conficts can be 
more or less intense only if they actually occur. Terefore, the argument 
that religious conficts are more intense, last longer, and are less likely to 
end in a negotiated settlement needs to take into account the probability 
that such confict would break out in the frst place. Tis requires us to 
estimate selection models that account for such processes (more below). 
Although, as we mentioned in chapter 2, we are uncomfortable with
the partition of civil conficts into religious and non-religious ones and we
do not endorse “religious-based” classifcatory schema of armed conficts,
we nevertheless realize that many students of religion and civil confict
rely heavily on such distinctions (e.g., Toft 2007; Toft, Philpott, and Shah
2011; Svensson 2007, 2013; Pearce 2005, 2006; Fox, 2004a, 2004b, 2015;
Bormann et  al. 2017; Wucherpfennig et  al. 2012). Terefore, we exam-
ine which factors account for these so-called “religious” civil conficts as
opposed to allegedly “non-religious” ones, as well. We also use the type of
war as a variable that is expected to account for the attributes of the war
such as its duration and intensity. Finally, we examine the efects of war type
and various religious factors on the type of war termination. 
Hypotheses on these matters are as follows: 
H4. Religious polarization increases the likelihood of “religious war.” 
H5. Te similarity between the majority religious group in the
focal state and the majority religious group in the state’s PRIE
reduces the probability of “religious war.” 
H6. Te similarity between the second-largest religious group in the
focal state and the majority religious group in the state’s PRIE
increases the probability of “religious war.” 
H7. “Religious wars” are 
a. more severe than “non-religious wars,” 
b. last longer than “non-religious wars,” and 
c. are less likely to end in a negotiated settlement than
“non-religious wars.” 
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5. Research Design 
We discuss the structure of the data analysis briefy here. A more detailed
discussion is provided in the appendix to the chapter. 
Data. Our principal data source for religious factors in civil wars is the
WRP dataset. Tese data allow us to determine the composition of a soci-
ety in terms of the distribution of religious groups in that society. In order
to examine the relations between religion and state, we combine, as dis-
cussed in previous chapters, the religion-state dataset (Fox 2016) with the
Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP) of Elkins et al. (2014). We dis-
cuss the religion-state measure below. 
Civil Confict Datasets. Our dependent variables concern civil confict. 
Here we employ four diferent datasets: the COW Intrastate Wars dataset 
(Sarkees and Wayman 2010, Sarkees and Dixon 2015), the UCDP Armed 
Confict dataset (UCDP 2014), a dataset collected by Fearon and Laitin 
(2003), and the Non-violent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes 
(NAVCO) data (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013). Te datasets difer sub-
stantially. Te COW intrastate war dataset covers civil wars defned as “any 
armed confict that involved (1) military action internal to the metropole 
of the state system member; (2)  the active participation of the national 
government; (3) efective resistance by both sides; and (4) a total of at least 
1,000 battle-deaths during each year of the war” (Sarkees and Wayman 
2010, 43; Dixon and Sarkees 2015). In other words, the COW intrastate 
war dataset focuses on cases properly characterized as “civil wars,” that is, 
large-scale armed conficts between the government of a state and orga-
nized elements of its population that involve high levels of violence result-
ing in substantial (at least 1,000) fatalities. Te COW civil war dataset 
covers the period 1816–2015, and we use the COW data for the period 
1945–2010. 
Te UCDP armed conficts project defnes an internal armed confict
as any series of engagements between nongovernment groups/individuals
and government forces, or between diferent nongovernmental groups.
Te UCDP project has two levels of armed confict. Low-scale conficts are
those that result in 25–999 fatalities per year of confict. High-scale con-
ficts involve 1,000 or more fatalities per year of confict. Te UCDP civil
confict dataset covers the period 1945–2010. 
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Te Fearon and Laitin dataset (hereafter FL dataset) defnes civil wars as
involving incidents of 
1. fghting between agents of (or claimants to) a state and organized
groups who sought either to take control of a government, take
power in a region, or use violence to bring about a change in gov-
ernment policies; 
2. a confict that killed or has killed at least 1,000 [people] over its
course; and 
3. at least 100 of the dead being on the side of the government
(including civilians attacked by rebels). Tis last condition is
intended to rule out state-led massacres where there is no real
organized or efective rebel opposition (Fearon and Laitin 2003). 
Te FL dataset covers the period 1945–2010.15 
Te NAVCO 3.0 dataset covers violent and nonviolent campaigns.
A campaign is defned as “a series of observable, purposive, mass-tactics or
events in pursuit of political objectives” (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013, 416),
that involve 1,000 or more participants. Te NAVCO dataset covers 290 vio-
lent and 161 nonviolent country-year campaigns over the period 1945–2012. 
Data on war attributes—duration and intensity—are derived from
these datasets. 
War type. We use Toft’s (2009) and Toft, Philpott, and Shah’s (2011,
145)  classifcation of civil wars as religious or non-religious. Tese are
matched with the civil confict datasets, so that any civil war that appears
in Toft’s list and also in one of the other datasets is designated “religious” or
“non-religious” based on Toft’s coding. We also match this with Svensson’s
(2007) data, so that any war that is coded “religious” by Toft or as involving
religious issues (due to Svensson’s coding), is coded “religious” in our dataset. 
Termination type. We use Hartzell’s (2009) data on war termination.
Hartzell classifes war termination types as military victory, negotiated set-
tlement, or truce. We code the frst category as zero and the last two catego-
ries as one—negotiated termination. 
Levels of  analysis. We focus on the nation-year and the nation-history
unit of analysis. For the nation-history level, we include only states that had
a history of independence of ten or more years during the period under
observation. 
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Measures. We use several measures of the dependent variable. For the 
nation-year unit of analysis, we employ the following measures of civil war. 
1. Civil war occurrence. Tis variable is assigned a score of one for
each year a civil war was underway and zero otherwise. 
2. Civil war duration. Tis is the number of days during which civil
war was underway for a given year. 
3. Civil war severity. Tis is the log of battle deaths for the entire
period of the civil war.16 Analyses on this variable were conducted
once for a given civil war. 
As noted above, war type is assigned a value of one (i.e., “religious war”) if
the issues in contention involved religious factors, following the criteria of
Toft (2006, 97). Tese factors may involve confict over the status and role
of religion or religious institutions in social, economic, or political afairs,
or confict between or among religious groups over things like holy places,
religious liberties/privileges, or religious practices. 
In order to provide a more general assessment of selection efects (as well
as to conserve space), we combine the dependent variables for the analyses
of civil confict attributes as follows: 
1. In the analysis of war type, we defne a civil confict as any nation-
year during which any of the datasets listed above indicated an
ongoing civil confict. 
2. In the analysis of civil confict duration and civil confict intensity,
we used the maximum score of duration and intensity of any of
these datasets. Since intensity was measured diferently in the vari-
ous datasets, we used the UCDP levels to indicate intensity (that
is low intensity was given a score of one if the number of deaths
due to civil confict in a given year was between 25 and    , and
a score of two if the number of deaths was 1,000 or more. We also
assigned an intensity value of three if the number of deaths in a
given year exceeded 10,000—mostly based on COW battle deaths
data.). 
3. For civil confict settlement, we used Hartzell’s (200 ) data on
negotiated settlements, following her coding rules. 
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For the nation history. Te same three variables were aggregated over the
entire state’s history and divided by the number of years during which a
given state was independent. Tis gave us a mean frequency, duration, and
severity per year of history. 
Note that we do not follow much of the convention in the religion-civil
confict literature to focus on the outcomes of civil confict. Our theory
does not have anything specifc to say about this linkage. As we noted
above, we view the truncation of civil confict types (i.e., into religious con-
fict, ethnic confict, etc.) in this literature to be fundamentally biased and
methodologically inappropriate. 
Independent Variables. We used a number of measures of religious fac-
tors. Te frst set of factors concern the degree of religious diversity, polar-
ization, or fractionalization. We do so because of a debate in the relevant
literature about the way in which diversity/fractionalization/polarization
is measured, and the extent to which diferent measures afect the results
(Cederman and Girardin 2007; Fearon, Kasara, and Laitin 2007; Esteban,
and Ray 2008b). We use the following measures: 
1. Religious diversity.We used the IQV as in previous chapters. Here
we use a normalized IQV over the valid number of religious
groups in a given state. We also applied a normalized IQV for
religious families. As in the previous chapters, we trichotomize
this index into low/medium/high homogeneity values using the
same breakpoints as before. We also conducted analyses using the
continuous version, and these results are reported in the book’s
website. 
2. Religious polarization. We employ a measure developed by Maoz
(2006, 2010) of the degree of group religious polarization in
society as: 
k 1 − p p  ) ˆ ( i i i = 1 gpol = , [7.1] 
.25 k 
where k is the number of valid (nonzero) religious groups in the society
and pi is the percentage of religious group i in the state’s population.
17 
Tis measure varies between zero (when there is one group that includes
the entire population, that is, a single religious group within a state) and
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one. Maximum polarization (gpol = 1) occurs when the society is strictly
bipolar: it is divided into only two groups, each of which controls exactly
50 percent of the population. 
3. Religious fractionalization. We use the measure employed by
Fearon and Laitin (2003): 
k 
RF = p p [7.2] ˆ i j . 
i = 1 
As we show in the appendix to this chapter, these measures are highly cor-
related. Terefore, in the analyses in the body of the chapter, we focus on
the fractionalization and group polarization (GPOL) measures. 
4. Secularism. We measure secularism as the percentage of non-
religious members of a society. Tis does not include the residual
category of other religions. Rather, it refects the proportion of
people who do not practice a given religion (including atheists,
agnostics, and other nonpractitioners). 
5. Afnity of minority group with members of a state’s relevant envi-
ronment. As noted in previous chapters, a state is surrounded by
politically relevant neighbors. Tese include all of the states that
are contiguous to the focal state, as well as regional powers with
regional reach capacity and major powers with global reach capac-
ity (Maoz 2010). Tis is the focal state’s PRIE. Hypotheses H3–
H5 require data on the religious composition of the ruling elite
and potential or actual opposition groups in states. Unfortunately,
we do not have such data, so we use a less refned measure here.18 
We assume that the majority religious group in a country is likely
to be associated with the ruling elite, whereas the second-largest
group is likely to be associated with the opposition. Under this
assumption, we focus on two types of relationships between reli-
gious groups within the focal state and religious groups in its
PRIE. First, we focus on the afnity between the majority reli-
gious group in the focal state and the majority religious group in
the state’s PRIE. Tis is an indicator of the potential support a
regime may expect to receive if religion-based mobilization occurs
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in the focal state. Second, we examine the afnity between the
second-largest religious group in the focal state and the major-
ity religious group in the state’s PRIE. Tis is an indicator of the
expected support the opposition can receive from neighboring
states. 
Tese measures are as follows: (a) major-major match (Match State-PRIE
Maj. Relig. Groups); this variable is the sum of states in a focal state’s PRIE
whose modal religious group is the same as the modal religious group in
the focal state; (b) minor-major match (Match State-PRIE Min-Maj. Relig.
Groups); this variable is the sum of states in a focal state’s PRIE whose
modal religious group is the same as the second-largest religious group in
the focal state. 
Note that for any given composition of a PRIE, both the regime and the
opposition may expect to receive support from PRIE members. Some states
in one’s PRIE may be matched on religious majorities; other states in one’s
PRIE might be matched on the state’s religious minority. When these two
variables receive high value, the expectation is that the probability of severe
civil confict will increase. 
Control Variables. 
1. Democracy. We measure democracy in the same way as in previ-
ous chapters. Te general expectation is that democracies are less
vulnerable to violent civil unrest because publics have legitimate
avenues for expression of dissent and grievances. If certain seg-
ments of the public are unhappy with government policies, they
can protest or replace the government in the elections. In autocra-
cies, even peaceful protest against government policies is not likely
to be tolerated and therefore violent opposition is more likely. 
2. Log. per capita GDP. Tis is a commonly used control that mea-
sures overall economic wealth. Te expectation is that wealthier
countries are less vulnerable to civil unrest than poor ones. We
log-transform this magnitude to prevent exceedingly small coef-
fcient estimates. 
3. Change in per-capita GDP. Tis is a three-year moving average
of the annual percent change in per-capita GDP. Tis measures
the change in economic conditions over the previous three-year
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period. When the economy is growing, people are more likely to
be satisfed with the government than when the economy is stag-
nating or shrinking. 
4. Log population. Again, the size of the population was considered in
many previous studies of civil confict to be an important factor in
civil wars. Large populations typically imply more potential griev-
ances and weakened state capacity (an ability to extract resources
and to protect law and order, lower reach capacity to various seg-
ments of the population). 
5. External confict. We measure external confict as the three-year
moving average of MIDs involving the focal state. Exposure to
external confict may make a state either more or less vulnerable
to civil confict: the former may result from discontent within the
state from the government’s handling of the external confict; and
the latter from the benefts to the state of a “rally around the fag”
efect that encourages greater support for the government. 
6. Ethno-religious excluded population. We use the EPR dataset
(Wimmer et al., 200 , Cederman et al. 2010). Tis dataset con-
tains an ethnic breakdown of states, with an assessment of the
extent to which ethnic groups share equal access to political
power. We use a variable of the proportion of ethnically excluded
population as a control on religion, under the assumption that
ethnicity and religion do not usually overlap. Te average correla-
tion between this variable and religious fractionalization/polariza-
tion is in the range of 0.05 ≤ r ≤ 0.125, which suggests that this is
a reasonable control. 
7. Past civil war/confict. Due to the skewed distribution of civil con-
fict onset, it is important to include the number of past years
during which a civil war occurred. Just as studies of recidivism
show, this is expected to have a very powerful impact on civil war
recurrence. 
5.1Estimation. 
We use a number of diferent methods to estimate the equations that stem
from the various hypotheses, depending on the structure of the data and the
nature of the dependent variable. For the nation year, we use logit models
with nonevent years and cubic splines when the dependent variable is the
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occurrence or nonoccurrence of a given event. For the duration of civil wars,
which is an event count, we use cross-sectional time-series negative binomial
regression. For the intensity (log battle deaths), we use cross-sectional time-
series regression. Because of the skewed distribution of civil wars over states,
we cannot use fxed-efects models. Tese models would drop all states with
zero civil wars during their history—a huge proportion of the entire sample;
therefore, we are compelled to use random-efects models. A  generalized
least-squares model with an ar(1) autocorrelation structure produces similar
results. For the nation-history unit of analysis, we use OLS estimation. 
As noted in the literature review and the previous section, analyses of civil
confict type and civil confict attributes require “screening” of the ex-ante
probability of confict outbreak. For that reason, we employ a Heckman
selection model estimation. Te Heckman selection modeling strategy is an
approach that allows examining for bias in the sample under analysis. Since
the outbreak of civil war is nonrandom, the probability that a given state
fnds itself embroiled in a civil confict is a function of a set of factors. Hence,
from a causal inference perspective, the “treatment sample” is not randomly
assigned. Te factors that account for the outbreak of civil confict may have
an impact on the attributes and outcomes of such conficts. Heckman selec-
tion models proceed in two steps. Te frst step estimates the bias in the
selection process. Tis step involves estimation that is quite similar to the
single-step logit equations (except that it uses probit estimation). Te second
step augments the test of the attributes of the civil confict with the inherent
bias in the selection process (represented by a signifcant rho value) so that
the estimates of the attributes of the civil confict correct for the bias in the
“selection” of the state into the confict. Tis allows for a more credible esti-
mate of the type, duration, and intensity of the confict, given the (potential)
bias in states’ selection into such conficts. It also allows us to test the efect
of such biases in terms of settlement types. 
6. Results 
6.1 War outbreak 
We start our analysis at the nation-year level of analysis. Table 7.1 shows the
results of factors afecting civil war outbreak. Te full results are presented
in the book’s website. 
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Table 7.1 Civil war occurrence 
COW UCDP FL NAVCO 
Religious Homogeneity 0.089 0.161** -0.023 0.311** 
(0.064) (0.06) (0.063) (0.062) 
Relig-State Relations -0.306** -0.052 -0.035 -0.107 
(0.074) (0.07) (0.076) (0.072) 
Match State-PRIE Maj. Relig. Groups 0.016** 0.005 0.018** 0.02** 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Match State-PRIE Min-Maj. Relig. Groups -0.015* 0.023** 0.014 0.009 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Secularism -1.756** -4.119** -4.994** -4.432** 
(0.549) (0.736) (0.795) (0.602) 
Pct. Christians -0.497** -0.163 -0.162 -0.673** 
(0.184) (0.203) (0.222) (0.189) 
Pct. Muslims -0.59** 0.057 0.278 -0.832** 
(0.208) (0.217) (0.237) (0.215) 
Pct. Hindus 0.315 0.001 0.006 0.557 
(0.348) (0.399) (0.478) (0.443) 
Democracy -0.388** -0.492** -0.622** -0.376* 
(0.144) (0.153) (0.172) (0.151) 
Per-Capita GDP (logged) -0.846** -0.726** -1.124** -0.843** 
(0.131) (0.122) (0.136) (0.128) 
Change in PC GDP -6.935** -5.818** -4.002 -4.047 
(1.993) (2.111) (2.049) (2.552) 
Pct. Excluded Population (EPR) 0.969** 1.215** 0.675** 1.034** 
(0.179) (0.159) (0.173) (0.17) 
Past Confict 0.626** 0.134** 0.167** 0.042** 
(0.039) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) 
Spatial Difusion 0.058** 0.003 0.052** 0.091** 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Log Population 0.516** 0.483** 0.752** 0.611** 
(0.082) (0.078) (0.085) (0.081) 
Constant -2.369** -2.394** -3.116** -4.737** 
(0.518) (0.5) (0.525) (0.515) 
Statistics 
N 6,952 6,704 6,865 6,952 
Chi-Square 742.10 780.65 1,100.00 1,100.00 
R-Squared 0.216 0.377 0.433 0.371 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
Cubic splines omitted due to space considerations 
*p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
Te results suggest that religious homogeneity and religion-state relations
do not have a consistent and signifcant efect on the occurrence of civil con-
fict. Tis runs contrary to the expectations of all the key theories linking
religious factors to civil confict. Te degree of secularism—measured as the
percent of the non-religious population—is the only variable that is indicative
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of a consistent and robust relationship between the religious characteristics
of societies and the probability of civil war occurrence. We also do not fnd
a consistent relationship between the religious makeup of societies and the
religious makeup of their politically relevant environments. Nor did we fnd a
consistent relationship between a given religion and civil confict. 
Tere are several reasons for the apparent nonrelationship between reli-
gious factors and civil confict. First, the percentage of excluded population
based on the EPR dataset as well as the log of total population wash out the
relationship between religious-state relations (and in some cases between
religious homogeneity) and civil confict. Since the coding of ethnic groups
in the EPR dataset converges in many cases with the religious breakdown
of societies, this may account for some of these results. Indeed, if we drop
the percent excluded population, we fnd a statistically signifcant efect of
religion-state relations on the outbreak of civil confict in three out of the
four datasets. (UCDP, FL, and NAVCO. See results in book website.) 
As noted above, past civil confict has a consistent efect on current civil
confict occurrence. In addition, economic wealth, measured by per-capita
GDP, and change in economic conditions, measured by per-capita GDP
change, as well as democracy have a signifcant dampening efect on civil
confict. On the other hand, total population (logged) and spatial difusion
have signifcant positive efects on civil confict occurrence. Tis is consis-
tent with the extant empirical literature on this subject. 
Te fndings up to this point suggest that approaches that propose a sim-
plistic religion-confict nexus probably are not capturing these alternately
confict exacerbating, confict dampening, or nonconfictual relationships
borne of the particularity of these interactions in individual states. In par-
ticular, the interplay of exclusion and specifc political, social, and economic
conditions that results in more bellicose propensities, is more likely rooted
in the specifc confict histories of individual states, which is evident in the
robustness of that variable in our analyses. Tis may explain why the inclu-
sion of the state’s confict history does so much to diminish the salience of
the religion variables in our analyses as compared to previous fndings on
the relationship between religious factors and civil confict in the literature. 
6.2 Civil Confict Attributes 
How do religious factors afect the attributes of civil conficts? Te analy-
ses on these matters are given in Table 7.2. Te frst and most important
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Table 7.2 Heckman selection models of religious factors and civil confict attributes 
Variable War Type1 Duration Intensity2 Settlement1 
War Type 0.100** 0.863** -0.232* 
(0.029) (0.092) (0.097) 
Religious Polarization 1.993** 0.025 -1.173** 0.562* 
(0.23) (0.088) (0.318) (0.277) 
Religion-State Relations 
Some Relation 0.516** -0.119** 0.177 -0.358** 
(0.099) (0.039) (0.116) (0.101) 
Cohabitation 1.084** -0.371** -0.241 -0.411** 
(0.113) (0.046) (0.137) (0.120) 
Match State-PRIE Maj. Relig. Groups 0.006 -0.001 -0.001 -0.024** 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.009) 
Match State-PRIE Min-Maj. Relig. 0.021** -0.013** -0.012 -0.016** 
Groups 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.008) (0.006) 
Secularism 0.791* 0.899** 0.001 0.232 
(0.336) (0.147) (0.431) (0.413) 
Democ -0.006** -0.002** -0.002 0.000 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Per-Capita GDP -0.311** 0.24** -0.236 0.177 
(0.099) (0.04) (0.121) (0.109) 
GDP Change 1.858 -0.252 -2.096 -4.323 
(2.001) (0.842) (2.554) (2.354) 
Pct. Excluded Population -0.061 -0.275** 0.418* 0.644** 
(0.141) (0.062) (0.168) (0.154) 
Constant 0.152 2.554** -0.835* -1.22** 
(0.315) (0.131) (0.400) (0.355) 
Statistics 
N 6,457 6,478 6,478 6,478 
N_selected 1,455 1,476 1,476 1,476 
Chi Square 221.777 196.424 138.179 107.218 
Rho -0.668 -0.891 0.33 -0.32 
p(Rho) 0.000 0.000 0.0000 0.005 
Notes: First-stage results (civil confict outbreak) are not presented; they are similar to those in 
Table 7.1 above. 
1 Heckman probit model 
2 Ordered Heckman probit model 
evidence provided by Table  7.2 is the signifcant selection bias that is
observed in the analyses of civil war attributes. Tis is evidenced by the
signifcant rho statistics measures for the Heckman selection models. Tis
vindicates our suspicion that states select themselves systematically into
repeated civil conficts. Specifcally, past civil confict and global spread of
civil confict, as well as state-specifc conditions (e.g., excluded populations,
low economic development), have an important impact on such selection
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processes. Consequently, studying the attributes of only those civil con-
ficts that broke out leads to potentially fawed inferences about the factors
that afect such confict attributes in the frst place, due to such selection
mechanisms. 
Once we control for selection bias, the results of Table  7.2 provide
important insights into the efects of religious variables on the attributes of
civil confict. Tey corroborate some previous analyses of these matters, but
cast doubt on others. We start with a discussion of the type of war outbreak.
First, we fnd that the regime score reduces the probability of “religious”
conficts. Civil conficts on religious issues tend to be fought in states with
less democratic characteristics than in democracies. 
Second, religious polarization has a positive impact on “religious con-
fict” outbreak. When a society approximates a bipolar religious structure
(two large religious groups, each controlling close to half of the population),
the probability of a civil confict over religious issues increases signifcantly.
Tis is so even though the probability of civil war is not consistently related
to religious polarization in general. Again, states that select themselves into
civil wars in general appear to evince a tendency to fght over religious issues
when their populations are highly polarized in terms of religious aflia-
tion. Yet, given the methodological and inferential problems we have noted
regarding the classifcation of “religious wars,” it is just as likely that confict
in religiously polarized states is more likely to be categorized as “religious
confict.” 
Tird, we fnd that religious-state relations increase the probability of
civil confict over religious issues. We tested the specifc dimensions of
religious-state relations (religious discrimination, religious regulation, and
religious legislation, Fox 2016) and found signifcant efects of each of these
dimensions on the probability of “religious” civil confict. Interestingly,
while these factors were associated with a signifcantly lower likelihood
of peaceful settlements, they were associated with relatively shorter con-
ficts, which were not signifcantly more or less intense than “non-religious”
conficts. Te latter may be contrasted with the efects of the percentage
of excluded populations, in general, which is associated with signifcantly
more severe conficts, and that, nonetheless, are more likely to reach a nego-
tiated settlement. 
Fourth, we fnd that when the second-largest religious group in a state
is matched with the religious majority groups in the state’s PRIE, the
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probability of a civil confict over religious confict increases. Tis supports
the argument of Jackson, San-Akca, and Maoz, (2020) that potential or
actual opposition groups that expect the support of neighbors with religious
afnity are more likely to rebel. 
We also fnd that secularism increases the probability of confict over
religious issues. Tis may well be a reaction of religious groups to growing
secularization. It may also stem from the dissatisfaction of secular popula-
tions with the status of relations between political and religious institutions. 
Economic development reduces the probability of civil confict over
religious issues. However, economic growth is not related to the issues at
stake in such conficts. We also did not fnd a signifcant efect of the per-
cent of excluded groups on the probability of a “religious” civil confict. 
Looking at the characteristics of civil conficts, given selection bias, we
fnd that civil conficts that are waged on religious issues are more intense
and last longer than those conficts that are about non-religious issues. We
also fnd, in line with previous research, that civil conficts that are fought
over religious issues are less likely to end in a negotiated settlement than
those fought over other issues.19 
A key result concerns the efect of the relations between political and
religious institutions on the outbreak of “religious war.” We fnd that once
states that maintain close ties between religious and political relations
select themselves into civil confict, the likelihood of “religious confict”
increases signifcantly. Te diference between states that separate religion
from politics, and states that maintain a close relationship between religious
and political institutions is especially stark in this respect. Tis is demon-
strated by Figure 7.3, which shows that as religious polarization increases—
especially in states that are characterized by close ties between political and
religious institutions—the probability of civil war increases signifcantly. At
levels of 0.7 or higher of religious polarization, in such states the probability
is that, accounting for selection bias, all wars that break out are likely to be
over religious issues. 
Religious polarization does not have a signifcant efect on the dura-
tion of civil conficts, but it tends to reduce their intensity. Interestingly,
religious polarization increases the probability of a negotiated settlement in
civil conficts. State-religion relations reduce the duration of civil confict,
but also reduce the probability of negotiated settlements. 
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Fig. 7.3. Religious polarization, religion-state relations, and the probability of religious war 
outbreak (marginal effects based on Heckman probit selection model) 
A match between the major religious group in a society and the other
majority groups in the focal state’s PRIE, and a match between the second-
largest religious group and the majority group in the state’s PRIE both
reduce the probability of a negotiated settlement. Tis suggests that when
the dominant religious group of the focal state shares high religious afnity
with dominant groups in neighboring states, the likelihood of a negotiated
settlement declines. Te same applies to cases where the second-largest reli-
gious group in a state shares high afnity with majority groups in the focal
state’s PRIE. 
In the book’s online appendix (Table A7.2), we repeat the analyses of
Table 7.2, including estimates of the impact of the percent population in
a country practicing a specifc religion, focusing in particular on the four
most common types of religious afliation: Christianity, Islam, Hinduism,
and secular. Te reason for that is that, in contrast to previous analyses
where we did not fnd that the size of a specifc religious group in a coun-
try increases its propensity to fght external or internal wars, here we fnd
some contrasting results. Tese results resonate with our previously stated
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concerns regarding the greater likelihood of Type 1 errors in research designs
that rely on categorization of “religious wars.” 
We fnd some diferences between religious groups in terms of civil war
attributes. As the proportion of Christians increases, the propensity for
civil confict over religious issues declines. By contrast, increasingly larger
Muslim populations increase the propensity of civil confict on religious
grounds. Both Christian and Muslim populations reduce the duration of
civil confict, and Muslim populations also tend to reduce the intensity of
such conficts. However, the probability of negotiated settlements decreases
in states with a large Muslim population.20 
Tese fndings may simply represent what they seem to: provisional sup-
port for theses proposing a positive relationship between religious factors
and “religious war,” but it also may be that religious factors only appear
to be salient in “religious wars” because the categories themselves are con-
structed using the very criteria that their subsequent models presumably are
attempting to detect. 
Te key takeaway from this set of analyses is that the process by which
states select themselves into civil conficts has a signifcant impact on the
type of wars they fght, on the duration and severity of such wars, and
on the manner by which they end. Tis ofers important insights into the
literature on civil war in general, and on the impact of religious factors on
such wars in particular. 
6.3 Nation History 
We now turn to an analysis of the entire history of states. Tis analysis is ger-
mane in light of the highly skewed distribution of civil conficts over difer-
ent states. We focus on the general civil-confict proneness of states over their
entire history. Te signifcance of these analyses is threefold. First, it allows
assessment of a general propensity of states for civil confict. Because of the
high inequality of civil war occurrence across states, it is useful to qualita-
tively distinguish between war-prone states in terms of civil war occurrences
and those that have had few or none. Second, this enables us to assess the
efect of the more stable religious characteristics of states (e.g., percent of
certain religious adherents, religious homogeneity) on civil war propensity.
Tird, this analysis, as in previous chapters, allows for a robustness test of
our nation-year results. Specifcally, do the aggregate characteristics of states
account for their propensity for political instability? 
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Table 7.3 provides the results of the marginal efects of the same inde-
pendent variables over the civil war participation of states during their
entire history, or over the period 1945–2010. 
When we examine the general propensity of states to engage in civil 
confict, we fnd that the only religious (or rather non-religious) factor 
that consistently reduces the degree of civil confict in states is the aver-
age degree of secularism in the state over its history. States that averaged 
a higher proportion of nonreligious people were signifcantly less likely 
Table 7.3 The effects of religious characteristics on state’s civil confict history—OLS analysis 
(only states with 10+ years of independence included) 
COW UCDP FL NAVCO 
Religious Homogeneity 
Medium 0.03 0.134 0.062 0.091 
(0.025) (0.092) (0.043) (0.053) 
High 0.015 -0.002 0.023 0.006 
(0.02) (0.056) (0.044) (0.041) 
Relig-State Relations 
Some Relation 0.006 0.073 0.061 0.05 
(0.019) (0.052) (0.042) (0.039) 
Cohabitation -0.006 0.149 0.042 0.064 
(0.023) (0.101) (0.047) (0.057) 
Match State-PRIE Maj. Relig. Groups -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Match State-PRIE Min-Maj. Relig. Groups 0.003** 0.004 0.002 0 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Democracy 0.017 0.384* 0.137* 0.143 
(0.025) (0.186) (0.055) (0.082) 
Per-Capita GDP -0.068** -0.343* -0.168** -0.167** 
(0.019) (0.14) (0.044) (0.061) 
GDP Change -1.772 7.024 1.375 0.509 
(2.299) (9.254) (4.298) (4.928) 
Secularism -0.143* -0.725** -0.508** -0.444** 
(0.057) (0.241) (0.148) (0.128) 
Pct. Excluded Population 0.162** 0.385* 0.286** 0.284* 
(0.062) (0.168) (0.101) (0.114) 
MIDs 0.033** 0.125** 0.112** 0.067** 
(0.012) (0.046) (0.03) (0.025) 
Constant 0.253** 1.073* 0.556** 0.569** 
(0.065) (0.435) (0.148) (0.201) 
N 150 150 150 150 
F-Statistic 9.571 5.571 7.001 5.246 
R-Squared 0.336 0.275 0.382 0.264 
RMSE 0.095 0.387 0.192 0.222 
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to engage in civil confict than states that had a larger proportion of 
believers—regardless of the distribution of such beliefs across diferent 
religions. Tis result holds across all of the datasets, thereby corroborating 
the nation-year analyses. 
Other religious factors do not distinguish between civil confict-prone
states and those that are less prone to resolve political, economic, or social
diference through violence. In particular, at this level of analysis we cor-
roborate the fndings of Fearon and Laitin (2003, 2007) and of Collier and
Hoefer (2004) that religious fractionalization (and our measure of reli-
gious polarization) does not signifcantly impact the civil confict propen-
sity of states. Likewise, we do not fnd any meaningful correlation between
religious homogeneity and civil confict, or between religion-state relations
and civil confict. 
As was the case in previous chapters, we fnd no statistically signif-
cant association between any religion and civil war propensity (see online
appendix). Whether a state is populated by a high percentage of Christians,
Muslims, Hindu, Buddhists, or Jews has no efect on its propensity to expe-
rience civil confict. Tis refutes a persistent and popular idea in both the
academic literature and in popular discourse. In particular, it challenges
Huntington’s (1996, 258) widely publicized claim that “Islam’s borders are
bloody and so are its innards.” 
With respect to other determinants of civil confict proneness, we fnd
that the size of the economic system consistently afects civil confict pro-
pensity. Developed countries—not surprisingly—tend to experience sig-
nifcantly lower levels of civil confict than developing ones. Tere is also
support for the relationship between external and internal confict, but this
result is not robust over datasets and model specifcations. Interestingly, the
average regime score (or the proportion of the period during which a state
was a democracy) had no efect on civil confict proneness. 
Te percent of excluded population has a positive and signifcant efect
on civil war propensity, and this result is robust with respect to diferent
confict datasets and model specifcations. Since excluded population can be
grouped along ethnic, racial, class, religious or linguistic lines, there may be
some latent evidence that religious discrimination afects civil war propen-
sity. However, using the Fox religious discrimination measure suggests that
religious discrimination does not have a signifcant impact on civil war pro-
pensity, and this result is also quite general across datasets. As noted above,
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one inference seems clear: exclusion, by itself, may provide motivation for
confict. But motivation must be accompanied by opportunity, and such
opportunities are typically not captured by measures of religious, ethnic,
or racial discrimination. Such factors are those rooted in the confict histo-
ries of individual states that are myriad in the abstract and specifc to each
state’s confict history in the particular—and even these myriad factors may
interact in particular ways (and in specifc time periods)—in the afected
countries to increase the probability of civil war.21 Tis is why the state’s
confict history does so much to wash out the impact of the otherwise here-
tofore signifcant variables in the religion-confict literature in our analyses. 
7. Conclusion 
Te key point in this chapter is that—contrary to the expectations of the
theories connecting religion to confict—civil confict is not typically about
religion. First, we fnd that over the period 1945–2010, religious civil con-
ficts, that is, civil conficts that pit diferent religious groups against each
other, or which are focused on a religious issue, accounted for about a third
of civil conficts (See Figure A7.1 in book website). While there has been a
rise in the number of “religious conficts” during the post–Cold War era, the
claim that this is “God’s Century” is an obvious exaggeration. It is clearly
not supported by empirical evidence. Second, with respect to the outbreak
of civil conficts, our analyses lend support to the argument made by several
authors (Cederman and Wimmer 2009, Wimmer and Cederman 2009,
Wucherpenning et al. 2012, Cederman et al. 2013) that systematic exclu-
sion of ethnic groups from power is a consistent predictor of confict. We
have not been able to ascertain, however, the extent to which ethnic exclu-
sion overlaps with religion and exclusion of religiously defned communi-
ties. Our measures of religious diversity, religious homogeneity, or religious
polarization do not correlate with the measure of exclusion that afects civil
war outbreak. Terefore, we cannot conclude with confdence that religious
factors do not afect civil confict. 
We do fnd, however, fairly strong evidence for three religion-related
issues. First, secularism tends to dampen civil-confict proneness. Tis is
clearly evidenced by our analyses of nation histories. Second, virtually all
our analyses suggest that the dominance of a specifc religious group in a
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given state does not afect its propensity to engage in civil confict. Nor
does any specifc religious group afect the attributes of civil confict. Tird,
taking into account our reservations with respect to labeling some civil con-
ficts “religious” in the sense that they may be fought over religious issues,
we fnd that civil conficts designated as “religious” tend to be more severe,
last longer, and be less likely to end in peaceful settlements than “nonreli-
gious” conficts. 
Tere may be (and typically are) other possible correlates of civil war
outbreak, including inequalities that overlap across economic, social, and
cultural identity dimensions. We have not presumed to cover the entire
spectrum of possible causes of civil wars. What we do fnd is that religious
factors do not have a prominent efect on either the probability of civil
confict outbreak, on their attributes, or on the general propensity of states
to engage in repeated civil conficts. 
What does this tell us about the relationship between religion and civil
confict? Clearly, some of the central civil conficts in the second half of the
twentieth century and frst decade of the twenty-frst century have been
between religious groups: the Israeli–Palestinian confict, the Iraqi–Kurdish
confict, the “Golden Temple” confict between the Indian government and
Sikhs, the massacre of Shiites by the Sunni military of Saddam Hussein at
the end of the frst Gulf War and the continued sectarian civil war in Iraq
after the US invasion, the civil war between the Muslim north and the
Christians/animists in the former Sudan, the Christian–Muslim conficts
in the former Yugoslavia, the confict in Northern Ireland, and so forth.
However, intrareligious conficts during this time were just as numerous
(as most advocates of religious-confict theses acknowledge, see chapter 2),
no less vicious (e.g., in overwhelmingly Christian Rwanda and Liberia, in
the overwhelmingly Muslim countries of Libya, Syria, and Yemen), and
just as long (e.g., in predominantly Catholic Colombia, and predominantly
Hindu Nepal). Moreover, there were quite a few religiously diverse or polar-
ized societies that managed their political confict without resort to violence. 
So, a look at a select list of highly visible civil conficts may form an
impression that they are about religion and/or ethnicity. Yet, a more system-
atic analysis of the relationship between religion and civil confict suggests
that religious factors have little efect on the outbreak of civil conficts in
general. At the same time, once we control for the selection bias in civil war
outbreak, it turns out that religious factors have a signifcant impact on the
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
342
342 Scriptures, Shrines, Scapegoats, and World Politics 
attributes of civil wars. Our analysis casts some doubt on previous studies of
civil war outbreak that suggest the importance of religious factors regarding
when and whether such wars break out. To the extent that it appears to vin-
dicate studies that suggest that religion plays a role in determining the type
of war and in afecting its attributes, one is reminded of our concern that it
may simply be that conficts in states with certain religious characteristics
are more likely to be categorized as “religious” by construction. 
Some of the results do suggest a puzzle:  as the level of secularism in
societies increases, the propensity for civil confict declines. However,
secularism—the proportion of atheists, agnostics, or nonbelievers in a
society—does not necessarily imply that the society does not possess mean-
ingful religious groups. In fact, the average secularism in states is only slightly
more than 5 percent. Tis means that most societies contain one or more
well-defned religious groups. So why is it that the structure of society in
terms of religious groups is not correlated with civil wars, but secularism is?
One possible answer is that secularism is correlated with other factors that
mitigate the propensity for civil confict. If secularism is related to national
wealth or economic growth—or non-economic attributes of   states such
as “quality of life”—and these latter characteristics of a society reduce the
propensity for civil confict, that might explain this puzzle. To explore this
issue further, we need to examine the relationship between religious factors
and various aspects of the quality of life in states. Tis is the topic of the
next chapter. 
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Appendix to Chapter 7 
1. Introduction 
Tis appendix outlines some technical methodological issues that expand
on the issues discussed in the research design section in the chapter. Also see
the online appendix for detailed tabular and graphical results, beyond those
presented in the body of the chapter. 
2. Measures 
Measures of religious diversity/fractionalization and polarization require a
brief discussion. Tere are multiple measures of fractionalization or diver-
sity, as well as a few measures that claim to measure polarization. Fearon
and Laitin (2003) conceive fractionalization to be the probability that a
given person practicing a given religion (or speaking a certain language
or belonging to a specifc ethnic group) will encounter another person
from the same religion by chance. Measures developed by Reynal-Querol
(Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005, Reynal-Querol 2002) are based on
a similar conception. Te correlation between the Reynal-Querol and the
WRP IQV measure is quite high (r = 0.859). Te religious fractionalization
measure is also very highly correlated with the IQV measure we have used
in previous chapters (r = 0.993) so these are virtually equivalent. 
On the other hand, the polarization index is signifcantly diferent from
the other two. As one of us showed elsewhere (Maoz 2010), this measure is
maximized when the network—in our case the society—is split into exactly
two groups of the same size.22 Te correlation between the network polar-
ization index and the other measures of polarization and dispersion is mod-
erate (correlations range between 0.676 and 0.760 with the other indices). 
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Chapter 8 
Religion and Quality of Life 
1. Introduction 
We have analyzed the ways in which the religious characteristics of states,
dyads, and regions, relate to international confict and cooperation. We
have also examined the efect of the religious characteristics of states on
their domestic confict experience. Troughout our analyses we focused on
the internal characteristics of states as well as the characteristics of their
relevant political environment. We found that both sets of attributes—
domestic and international—have a signifcant impact on the domestic and
foreign policy behavior of states. In this chapter we focus on the relation-
ship between the religious attributes of states and a novel conceptualization
of security—human security or, more broadly conceived—quality of life.
Te key question of this chapter is to what extent do the characteristics of the
state and society—in particular their religious characteristics—correlate with
the quality of life of its citizens? 
Since the late 1980s, mainstream IR scholars began to formulate alter-
native and more expansive notions of security. While scholars such as
Matthews (1989) and Homer Dixon (1991) expanded the notion verti-
cally to include resource, environmental, and demographic issues, feminist
scholars such as Enloe (1989) and Tickner (1992) broadened the concept
horizontally to address issues of women’s rights. In so doing, they advanced
notions of human security that focused on individual security and well-
being as well as the social welfare of marginalized social groups more
generally. Combining aspects of both vertical and horizontal expansions
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of mainstream conceptions of international security, IR scholars in what
became known as the Copenhagen School of security studies (Buzan
1983, 1991; Waever et al. 1993, Buzan et al. 1998) argued for a multidi-
mensional approach to security, emphasizing the political construction of
threats across several sectors (military security, political security, economic
security, societal security, and environmental security). In this way, the
Copenhagen School expands on the primarily military and state-centric
concept of security. Even more expansively, IR scholars associated with the
Aberystwyth School of security studies, often drawing on critical theorists of
the Frankfurt School, cast international security squarely at the individual
level of analysis, explicitly concentrating on human security. In their critical
conception, human security could be realized through the emancipation of
the individual from oppressive social structures and the transformation of
political communities (e.g. Wyn Jones 1999, Booth 2005). 
Tese conceptions not only expand but challenge traditional notions
of security that focus on military power, technology, or economic foun-
dations of national power. In contrast, human security focuses on factors
and processes at the individual and group levels of analysis. Such a recon-
ceptualization of security was necessitated by the realization that many of
the threats and vulnerabilities in the global system in the post-Cold War
era were dramatically diferent than those that dominated the Cold War
era and often beyond the scope of the state to address efectively. As the
threat of nuclear war declined with the end of the superpower standof that
marked the Cold War, the rise of transnational challenges such as globaliza-
tion, climate change, or communicable diseases such as HIV, were beyond
the scope of individual states to resolve. 
Further, the post-Cold War era witnessed genocidal conficts in Europe,
Africa, and Asia, as well as a proliferation of violent transnational drug car-
tels and terrorist groups. Tese processes evolved even as a new wave of
democratization began to buttress an expanding international regime of
human rights which mandated international humanitarian intervention.
(Of note, the frst deployment of NATO troops into hostilities was not in
a Cold War armed confict, but in response to the atrocities committed by
Serbian forces in Kosovo in 1999.) Global economic inequality was such
that some regions were characterized by persistent stultifying poverty and
some regimes were unable or unwilling to provide basic services, institu-
tions, and infrastructure to their populations and became “failed states.”
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Such states tended to devolve into internal wars which often spread beyond
single states, targeted non-combatants, utilized child soldiers, employed
rape as a weapon of war, and utilized international trade networks to fnance
the fghting which increased its longevity and lethality. 
In such a context, observers recognized that the concept and con-
tent of international security needed to be reconsidered; and the primary
focus of both should be on security for the individual:  human security.
“Human security,” the International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty (ICISS) insisted, “means the security of people – their
physical safety, their economic and social well-being, respect for their dig-
nity and worth as human beings, and the protection of their human rights
and fundamental freedoms” (ICISS 2001: 15). Tis approach recognized
that “[t]he fundamental components of human security—the security of
people against threats to life, health, livelihood, personal safety and human
dignity—can be put at risk by external aggression, but also by factors within
a country, including “security forces”(p.  15) [original emphasis]. In fact
being hamstrung by narrow state-centric and militarily focused conceptions
of “ ‘national security’ may be one reason why many governments spend
more to protect their citizens against undefned external military attack
than to guard them against the omnipresent enemies of good health and
other real threats to human security on a daily basis” (p. 15). 
Human security became prominent among policymakers with publica-
tion of the UN Development Program’s (UNDP’s) Human Development
Report which argued that “[t]he world can never be at peace unless peo-
ple have security in their daily lives;” moreover, “it will not be possible
for the community of nations to achieve any of its major goals…except
in the context of sustainable development that leads to human security” 
(UNDP 1994: 1) [emphasis added]. Tey maintained that human security
refected “[t]he growing recognition worldwide that concepts of security
must include people as well as states” (UNDP 1994: 15); and “[f ]or most
people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily
life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event” (p. 3). Tus, human
security is people centered: “concerned with how people live and breathe in
a society, how freely they exercise their many choices, how much access they
have to market and social opportunities and whether they live in confict or
in peace” (p. 23). 
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While human security is clearly related to human development it is not
synonymous with it. In fact, human security engages with and in some
cases encompasses each of the aspects of security laid out in Buzan’s (1983,
1991) scheme (i.e. military, political, economic, environmental, societal);
and while it transcends traditional state-centric military security issues it
implicates them as well. Where it does so unequivocally is in its challenge
to state sovereignty and justifcation of military intervention in those coun-
tries where regimes are substantially violating the human rights of their
citizens. Tis is expressed in the notion of the international community’s
“responsibility to protect” (R2P). R2P arises from the report by that name
of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
(ICISS 2001). Like the UNDP, it recognized that “[t]he meaning and scope
of security have become much broader since the UN Charter was signed in
1945” (p. 15). Te basis for this international circumvention of state sov-
ereignty is that “the protection of human security, including human rights
and human dignity, must be one of the fundamental objectives of modern
international institutions” (p. 6). Human security, “including concern for
human rights—but broader than that in its scope—has also become an
increasingly important element in international law and international rela-
tions,” R2P is one of the most prominent and provocative justifcations that
derive from this framework (p. 6). 
Tus, issues related to human security afect not only the domestic poli-
tics of a state, but its international relations as well. In this way, human
security, in highlighting individual level factors, nonetheless, extends our
conception of security to the global system itself. Nevertheless, human
security begins from individual and collective well-being or quality of life. 
Clearly the breadth of human security is not captured in a single indi-
cator; but, previous scholarship investigating its correlates has attempted 
to measure its key components, especially as they relate to what’s come
to be call “human development”. With respect to the latter, the Human
Development Index (HDI) is a composite index designed by the UNDP 
since 1990 (UNDP 2014). Tis index captures a wide array of quality-of-
life indicators including public health variables, education indices, and 
economic variables. Due to criticism of early versions of this index (Hicks
1997, Sharma 1997), the HDI was expanded to control for general social
inequalities and, more specifcally, gender inequalities. However, due to
political sensitivities, the HDI does not incorporate such things as political
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freedoms, civil liberties, institutional democracy, racial or ethnic equality,
and so forth. Nor does it capture human security from internal violence,
both political and criminal, or external threats. Yet clearly, quality of life is
afected by these factors as well. 
Tese and other limitations notwithstanding, the human security con-
ception ofers an expanded view of the similarities and diferences among
people in diferent parts of the globe. Accordingly, it is important to under-
stand the possible connections that may exist between the religious char-
acteristics of societies and the quality of life of their members. Tis is the
focus of the present chapter. Specifcally, we examine the following issues: 
1. What do we mean by human development? Why is this important? 
2. Why should we expect a relationship between religion and human
development? 
3. How does religion afect human development? 
4. Does human development afect religious freedoms and secularism? 
2. Human Security—Measuring the Quality of Life in Societies 
As noted above, the concept of human security is based on a bottom-up
perspective of what constitutes security and well-being. It focuses on the
basic needs each of us requires to conduct a normal, peaceful, and produc-
tive life. Tese needs are physical and psychological. Physical needs include
basic access to health resources, food, and clothing (and the means to access
them); shelter; and protection from physical harm by other individuals or
groups. Psychological needs include those related to access to educational
resources that allow people to develop their skills and spirits. Both physical
and psychological needs may converge in the civic realm with respect to
civil rights and liberties such as freedom of expression and of assembly, and
the voicing opinions and grievances under the protection of law. An impor-
tant aspect of political and social freedom concerns freedom of religion: the
ability to exercise one’s religious rituals and practices under the protection
of law (as long as these rituals and practices do not directly infringe on the
religious freedom of other groups). 
Te underlying idea of human security is that states are supposed to
nurture, develop, and protect those basic needs from both domestic and
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external threats. Advocates of human security would not deny that protect-
ing the state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is an important aspect of
security; however, they insist that a state’s functioning is incomplete if it fails
to provide people with basic needs and does not protect their basic rights.
Tis is not simply an idealist conception; it is also instrumental and ratio-
nal. Defcient human security has an adverse efect on state capacity. Te
ability of the state to mobilize human and material resources for national
security is gravely impaired if the nonmilitary aspects of human security
are missing or weak. Low state capacity increases the likelihood of defcient
performance in the international system. It increases the likelihood of the
state becoming prey to outside predators; it reduces the incentive of exter-
nal actors to trade with or invest in the state and weakens it even further. It
also decreases the job security of political leaders in the state. 
States difer widely in terms of the ability and willingness of their polit-
ical and social institutions to provide for human security. In some cases,
political leaders have a sincere interest in promoting human security, but
they lack the resources for doing so. In other cases, resources are available
but the will is lacking, primarily due to leaders’ fear that the promotion
of human security will endanger their political survival. Specifcally, the
concern that the rise of a middle class that would challenge traditional
elites often results in the suppression of political and economic freedoms,
blocking access to public health and education, and promoting policies
that provide unfair advantage to some social groups at the expense of oth-
ers. In such cases, state capacity is based either on rents (e.g., land owner-
ship, natural resources) that are under the control of some political and
social elites, or on the coercive extraction of human and capital resources.
Other leaders whose rule rests on a tenuous domestic legitimacy, “abjure
political institutionalization out of fear of the development of potentially
rival centers of power that might be used by counterelites to threaten their
authority. Instead, they opt for the creation of sinecures and prebends
over efcient administration and for loyalty over merit in the selection of
administrators.” Such leaders have little commitment to actual political
mobilization or the formal institutionalization of an administrative infra-
structure to facilitate efective governance, much less provide for social
welfare, or in many cases to provide for the protection of personal integ-
rity rights of their citizens (Henderson 2015: 134).1 
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Te concept of human security is based on a fundamental notion of
individual needs and rights. It attempts to identify indicators of the quality
of life in a society. Yet, there is little agreement on what it includes, how it
difers from traditional notions of security, and how it should be measured
(Martin and Owen 2010, Newman 2010, Breslin and Christou 2015,
Eliott 2015). An Internet search for “quality of life” produces multiple list-
ings and indicators, each set of indicators emphasizing diferent dimensions
of this concept. However, two points stand out upon examining these dif-
ferent indicators. First, all of these concepts focus on the individual level of
analysis. Te key questions addressed by these notions concern the factors
that afect individual well-being and protect people’s basic needs and rights.
A  given conception of human security may emphasize a diferent set of
factors (or assign diferent weights to the same set of factors) compared to
another conception. But the common denominator of all these concep-
tions is the same: a person and/or a community requires certain things to
feel physically and spiritually secure and to be able to function efciently.
Te extent to which they have access to these things is what defnes human
security. Tis contrasts with traditional notions of security that focus on the
state level of analysis and, in particular, on the relations between a given
state and its external environment (Buzan et al. 1998). 
Second, in general there exists a very high correlation among the factors
that comprise the various schemes quantifying this concept. States that rank
high on one set of indicators (e.g., economic development) tend to rank high
on another set of indicators (e.g., access to education, public health). Tere is
also a moderately high correlation between the more common indicators of
human security (e.g., economic, health, education) and other indicators show-
ing the extent to which certain meaningful subsets of the population (e.g.,
women) have equal opportunities compared to other subsets (e.g., men). 
For these reasons, we chose to use the HDI and some major modi-
fcations of that index as key indicators of the quality of life across the
globe. We supplement these indices by using regime-related indicators that
emphasize civil and political liberties. Tese measures enable us to assess the
extent to which the religious characteristics of societies are related to various
quality-of-life indicators. 
Before we enumerate the key elements of the quality of life and human
security indices we use to address these questions, it is imperative that we
highlight an inherent bias in the concept of quality of life. Tis concept is
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fundamentally tilted toward Western notions of what constitutes a “good
life.” Tis index relies on the premise that things like wealth, high life expec-
tancy, low infant mortality, and advanced formal education are “good,”
while lack of wealth (but availability of resources that aford for subsis-
tence) or low formal education somehow diminish peoples’ happiness. Tis
premise may refect a particular worldview. However, people can be quite
happy as long as they can provide food and shelter for their family, rather
than accumulating that which is not considered essential for survival and
well-being. Likewise, people can be uneducated but perfectly happy in their
circumstances. Not all cultures agree that high life expectancy is a desirable
property of a society. Elderly people in some cultures become a burden
on their families when they cannot participate in life-sustaining economic
activities. So the concept of human security—or more accurately its quan-
titative manifestations—may be culturally bound. 
Te modifcations to the HDI over time also seem to be culturally
bound. Two important factors highlighted in the literature (Despotis 2005,
Hicks 1997, McGillivray 1991, Noorbakshish 1998)—economic inequal-
ity and gender inequality—are correlated with the other factors that make
up the composite HDI. Tey do convey new information, but this infor-
mation also refects what many consider a Western bias. Other concepts
that many Western values associate with human development concern civil
liberties and political freedom (Freedom House 2016, Marshall, Jaggers,
and Gurr 2010). Here, too, despite the lip service generally paid to democ-
racy, it is not clear that civil liberties and political freedoms are always desir-
able. In some cases, the transition from a regime that lacks these properties
involves instability, violence, economic hardship, and social fragmentation. 
Because of this cultural bias—which also results in high correlations
among the indicators of human security—the concept does not acknowl-
edge social, political, and cultural diversities that lead to diferent, some-
times extremely divergent, conceptions of human development and human
security. Tis important criticism notwithstanding, it is important to note
that the concepts of human development and human security do emphasize
important aspects of personal and communal security and well-being. And
the fact that they correlate quite highly with alternative measures that focus
on mere subsistence (e.g., energy intake, undernourishment, infant mor-
tality) suggests that they tap some of the more fundamental and universal
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human needs for survival. For that reason it makes sense to examine the
possible relationship between religion and quality of life or human security. 
3. Religion and Human Security: Theoretical Expectations 
Religions vary in terms of the degree to which their directives apply to
diferent aspects of everyday life. Tey also vary in terms of their attitude
toward political institutions. Some religions prescribe quite detailed direc-
tives about dietary issues, marital issues, economic transactions, and even
political structures. Other religions have very little to say about day-to-day
life and social processes. As we mentioned in chapter 4, religions vary in
terms of their level of institutionalization. Some religions have hierarchical
institutional structures; others have more diversifed structures; still others
have very minimal institutionalization. 
However, virtually all religions place a high premium on tradition and
view social and political change with suspicion. Modernity, however, embraces
change that emerges from education, science, technology, and greater contact
among people(s). Virtually all major world religions view gender equality
with suspicion. For many religions, women cannot serve as religious leaders;
their roles are typically assigned to childbearing and housework. In many
cases, their marital rights and independence in terms of education or work are
restricted. Tis, of course, is in sharp contrast to what modern societies regard
as personal security and well-being (and this may refect a modern Western
bias of the concept of human security). Other religious restrictions—such as
dietary restrictions, certain economic transactions, rituals—can also infringe
on economic and social opportunities that might be available either to non-
believers or to members of other religions. 
Te “religious economy” model (Gill 2001, 2007, 2013) suggests that
it is not so much the strictness of religion that afects human development;
rather, it is the extent to which the religious market is free for competition.
Tis has to do with religious diversity, which, in turn, afects the propen-
sity of political elites to allow for religious freedom. It is, therefore, reli-
gious freedom—not the extent to which religious groups are cosmopolitan
or restrictive in terms of their rules and rituals—that afects the degree of
human development. Gill (2013, 9) suggests that “the ‘religious economy’
perspective has demonstrated that when regulation on religious activity is
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decreased, religious pluralism and religious activity increase, and overall
religious participation increases . . . To the extent that religious activity is
what people desire . . . religious freedom does add directly to the economic well-
being of society (defned in the broad sense of the word ‘economic growth).”
[original emphasis]2 
Te religious economy model ofers compelling insights into the rela-
tionship between religious factors and human development. However, it
has some important limitations. First, it suggests quite sensibly that the
religious homogeneity/heterogeneity of the society afects the extent of reli-
gious freedom, and that it is this linkage among diversity, religious free-
dom, and human development that we need to examine. However, here
too, one can overstate the role of religious institutions in afecting religious
freedom and, in turn, human development. Political and social groups—
especially ones that pursue non-religious values that may or may not paral-
lel those of religious groups—can afect both religious freedoms and human
development. 
Grim and Finke (2011) ofer a more comprehensive model of religious 
freedom/persecution. To begin with, both their study and that of Fox 
(2016) provide important data on religious freedoms or, more importantly, 
various restrictions on religious freedom around the world. Te descriptive 
part of these studies is illuminating.3 Grim and Finke (2011) and Sarkissian 
(2015) suggest that there exist fundamental regional and political difer-
ences in terms of religious persecution. Tey fnd that both governmental 
and societal restrictions on religious freedoms increase the probability and 
magnitude of religious persecution. Tey report a signifcantly higher pro-
pensity of Muslim-majority countries to engage in religious persecution 
of minorities. Most important, they ofer a complex model of religious 
freedom and religious persecution. Tis model suggests a cycle between 
social restrictions on religious freedom that afects government-imposed 
restrictions on religious freedom, which leads to violent religious restric-
tions. Tese, in turn, increase social restrictions on religion. Tis cycle can 
be positive—a constantly escalating cycle. Tis can happen if the factors 
that increase social and/or government tendencies to restrict freedom of 
religion ofset those that drive societies and governments to ensure reli-
gious freedom. Tese factors include civilizational divides, religious laws 
that require religious monopoly, or percent Muslims. If, however, social 
and political factors that promote social and government tolerance toward 
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religious diversity are prominent, then this cycle can be negative, fostering 
religious tolerance and stability. Factors that tend to promote social and 
government tolerance of religious activities and religious diversity include 
gender equality, democracy, percent Christians, and economic growth. 
Grim and Finke’s analysis focuses on the determinants of religious free-
dom and the efects of these determinants on religious persecution. Tey
do not focus on the broader social and human efects of religious freedom.
Gill, on the other hand, ofers a linkage between religious freedom and
other factors that shape human security—such as economic development. 
We build on these ideas to provide a concrete theoretical linkage between
religious factors and human security. In order to test for the efects of reli-
gious factors on human security, we need to account—as Gill, and Grim
and Finke suggest—for the factors that afect religious freedom. Structural
factors, such as the religious diversity of a society, may have both a direct
efect on human security and an indirect efect via religious freedom. As Gill
suggests, the religious diversity of a society and its level of political open-
ness afect the probability that the society and the government will tolerate
diverse religious beliefs. It is also more likely that social tolerance toward reli-
gious freedom will increase. Consequently, if religious factors afect human
security, they should afect it via the degree of religious freedom. Tis level
tends to fuctuate over time, as both social norms change and as government
policies toward religion undergo signifcant modifcations. 
Also, if we are to accept the correlation between religious freedom and
political stability that both Fox (2016) and Grim and Finke (2011) observe,
then religious freedom should correlate with human security. Terefore,
our theory should go beyond a simple frst-order direct efect of structural
attributes of societies and their level of human security. If religious factors
are to afect human security, we must relate them to the structure of rela-
tions between political and religious institutions. Tese, as we demonstrate
below, are closely linked to the level of religious freedom. 
Accordingly, our theory suggests the following propositions: 
H1.1. As religious diversity increases, the degree of religious freedom
increases. 
H1.2. As the degree of religious freedom increases, so does the level
of human security. 
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Te efect of religion on everyday life in a society depends on the degree to
which people in that society are religious. Secularism is not necessarily the
opposite of religious prevalence. People may believe in God/s, but not fol-
low the guidelines of religious scriptures or religious institutions on a strict
basis. However, in societies marked by a high proportion of non-religious
people—including atheists, agnostics, and generally non-religiously
afliated—the efect of religious values and directives is minimal. Even if a
society is fundamentally religious, the role of religion in everyday life may be
restricted. In such societies, legal, social, and other interactions are guided
by other values. Tese values may well be more open to change, progress,
and opportunity to all people regardless of their religious or non-religious
values and beliefs. Tis is the essence of modernity theory. Accordingly, we
expect the following: 
H2. Te more secular a society, the higher the level of human secu-
rity of its members. 
Te structural characteristics of a society, specifcally, the level of religious
diversity, also afect its human security. Religiously diverse societies require
governments to build winning coalitions among multiple religious groups.
Teir ability to rely on a single religious group is reduced compared to gov-
ernments ruling religiously homogeneous societies. Religious institutions and
religious leaders also attempt to infuence leader selection in diferent ways.
When a society is diverse, competition between religious groups requires
building coalitions across groups because no single group can guarantee that
a favorable candidate would be elected or selected to political leadership. In
homogeneous societies, on the other hand, dominant religious groups can
and often do endorse candidates who are loyal to religious institutions and
are willing to support and provide private goods to such institutions. Tus,
religious diversity is expected to have both a direct and indirect—via reduced
restrictions on religious freedom—impact on human security. 
Tis leads to the third hypothesis. 
H3. Religious diversity is positively correlated with human security. 
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4. Research Design 
4.1 Data and Units of Analysis 
Data on the HDI is available for the last ten years (UNDP 2017). However,
using the nation-year unit of analysis on these data is inappropriate for a
number of reasons. First, meaningful changes in human development indi-
cators are extremely difcult to achieve within a decade. Most of the indica-
tors comprising the HDI—economics, health, education, and even gender
equality—exhibit little change over time. Other indicators not included in
the HDI—such as political and civil liberties, political and criminal violence
rates—are prone to more rapid fuctuations. However, even these are quite
stationary for most states. As noted in previous chapters, the right-hand side
of the equation also contains fairly stationary variables, most importantly,
various indicators of religion. Consequently, we perform a cross-sectional
analysis comparing general characteristics of states accumulated or averaged
over a long period to the most recent indicators of human security. Below we
detail the key variables used in these analyses. 
In order to measure political freedoms, we use the Freedom House
(2016) civil liberties measure as well as the POLITY IV democracy index
defned in previous chapters (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2010). We also
employ the Fox (2012b) dataset on religion and state and the Comparative
Constitutions dataset (Elkins et al. 2014). In order to gauge religious free-
dom, we employ the religious freedom dataset (ARDA 2017). Finally, in
order to gauge religiosity in societies, we rely on the World Values Survey
(WVS 2016). We use waves 5 (2005–9) and 6 (2010–14), including  two
sets of questions that are asked in both surveys: whether a person is reli-
gious, and the importance of God in one’s life. We calculate average val-
ues of these variables for all respondents in a given country (employing
only valid responses and ignoring responses such as “don’t know” or “not
asked”). We replace missing entries in wave 6 by nonmissing values in wave
5, to increase the number of cases. 
4.2 Dependent Variables 
Human Development Index (HDI). Te HDI is measured as a geometric
mean of a standardized set of indicators, including gross national income
per capita (GNI), life expectancy at birth, and expected and mean years of
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schooling (UNDP 2015). Tis is the “raw” HDI. As noted, the HDI was
criticized for heavy emphasis on GNI; consequently, it has been modifed
in two ways. First, the HDI was modifed to account for inequality in the
distribution of the various components of the HDI over the international
system. Tis is the Inequality-Adjusted HDI (UNDP 2015). Second, HDI
was adjusted to refect gender inequalities in societies. Tis was done by
breaking up each of the indicators into gender categories. For example, life
expectancy at birth was separated into male and female life expectancy fg-
ures. Ten the HDI was adjusted by modifying each of the indices to refect
diferences between males and females in a society, taking into account the
proportion of each gender category in the population. Tis enabled a gen-
eration of a gender development index (GDI). Te GDI is obtained by
dividing the female HDI by the male HDI. It approaches one when there
is a high level of gender equality, and zero when male HDI vastly outpaces
female HDI. Te overall HDI can then be adjusted by multiplying it by the
GDI. We use both the gender-adjusted HDI and the GDI as indicators.4 
Tis is the Gender-Adjusted HDI. 
Gender development index. Tis measures the ratio of female to male in
HDI indicators. Ratios smaller than one indicate male advantages; ratios
close to one indicate relative male-female equality; and ratios higher than
one indicate female advantages. 
Civil liberties. Tis index is not refected in the HDI, but it is an
important aspect of human security. We use the Freedom House (2016)
seven-point index of political liberties. Two aspects of this scale are par-
ticularly important for our purposes:  civil liberties index and political
rights index. Te two variables are highly correlated (r = 0.929), so we
employ the civil liberties variable. Te civil liberties index ranges from
1 to 7 with higher numbers indicating fewer civil liberties. Tis index
is based on expert ratings of a range of civil liberties, including “free-
doms of expression, assembly, association, education, and religion.” Tis
also includes a fair legal system—including an independent judiciary—
freedom of economic activity, and equality in terms of gender and minor-
ity groups (Freedom House 2016). We inverted this index so that higher
numbers refect higher levels of civil liberties to facilitate interpretation.
Tis variable is not captured in the other (and more general) measure of
regime score based on the POLITY IV dataset (Marshall, Jaggers, and
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Gurr 2010). Te correlation between the civil liberties index and the
Maoz-Russett (1993) regime score is 0.834 (N = 141, p < 10-7). 
In order to match the value of this index with the other dependent variables,
we use the cumulative distribution scores of states on this index (with states that
have the same value getting the same cumulative score). Analyses run with the
raw value of the index and the cumulative value yield the same results. 
4.3 Independent Variables 
Religious diversity. We use the IQV and religious fractionalization measures
to gauge religious diversity. 
Religiosity. We use two diferent measures to gauge religiosity. Te frst
is the proportion of the population that is not afliated with any religion
or that is atheist/agnostic, based on the WRP. Te second is the response to
the importance of God in one’s life extracted from the WVS. Te number
of valid cases for the latter variable is much lower than the number of valid
cases for the frst variable. However, generally speaking, the latter variable
ofers a more valid index of religiosity in a society than the former. 
Religious legislation. We use the religious legislation index (Fox 2012b)
as a formal measure of legislation based on religious principles. Tis
refects an institutionalized infuence of religious principles on the legal
system. 
Religious freedom. Tis index combines a number of variables based on 
the US State Department Religion Freedom Reports (USCIRF 2016). 
We use an average of two variables in that dataset: aggregate government 
restrictions on religion and aggregate social restrictions on religion. Here, 
too, we invert this variable to refect increased levels of freedom. It var-
ies from zero (absolute lack of religious freedom) to ten (full freedom of 
religion).5 
4.4 Control  Variables 
Interstate war. We use the number of dyadic wars per year through 2010.
It is reasonable to expect that wars afect all the factors that make up
the HDI, so the intuitive expectation is that of a negative impact of war
proneness on HDI, but not necessarily on civil liberties and regime score. 
Civil war. We use the number of civil war years through 2010 as an indi-
cation of the level of domestic unrest in the country. We expect a negative
relationship between civil war frequency and human security. 
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4.5 Estimation 
In order to capture the complex relationship between religious freedom and
human security, as noted by previous authors (Gill 2013, Grim and Finke
2011), a simple regression model relating religious freedom to human
security is inappropriate. Te argument is that social factors that promote
religious freedom will ultimately afect the relationship between religious
freedom, on the one hand, and economic, political, and social develop-
ment, on the other. Terefore, we use three-stage least squares estimation to
frst estimate the factors that afect religious freedom, and then estimate the
efect of religious freedom on human security indices. 
In order to estimate religious freedom, we use log population as an
instrument. Log population is not correlated with any of the human secu-
rity indices (see appendix), but it is negatively correlated with religious free-
dom, so it seems to ofer a reasonably good instrument. 
We also ran separate equations of human security without frst estimat-
ing religious freedom. Te results are dramatically diferent from the more
complex estimation that controls for the endogeneity of religious freedom.
We discuss both sets of results below. 
An important note about time-related issues is in order. Te equations
are cross-sectional. Tere is no temporal dependence here because the
human security indices are point estimates (at 2015 for the HDI and GDI-
related measures) and at 2008 for the religious freedom index. Accordingly,
we have used 2007 indices for the independent and control variables in
order not to confound the time of measurement of the dependent and inde-
pendent variables. 
5. Results 
Table 8.1 reports the results of the three-stage least-squares (3SLS) analy-
ses using the percent non-religious as an indicator of secularism. Table 8.2
reports the results of the same analyses employing a smaller sample where
we use the “importance of God” indicator from the WVS as a proxy of
secularism. Te appendix reports the results of the separate equations of
human security. 
We start with the frst set of equations where we regress religious free-
dom on a number of indicators. First, we note that log population has
a consistent negative impact on religious freedom. Countries with large
    
 
  
   
  
    
     
    
   
 
 
     
  
  
  
   
 
     
 
 
 
   
360 
Table 8.1 Religion and human security—three-stage least-squares 
Religious Freedom 
Civil Liberties 
Civil Wars 
Interstate Wars 
Log Per-Capita GDP 
Log Population 
Religious Diversity 
Secularism 
Religious Legislation 
Constant 
Chi-Square 
R-Squared 
Human Security 
Model 1 
0.099** 
(0.013) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.1* 
(0.048) 
-0.003* 
(0.001) 
0.161* 
(0.075) 
-0.569** 
(0.192) 
-0.015** 
(0.003) 
-0.084 
(0.154) 
185.706 
0.542 
HDI 
2015 
Model 2 
0.076** 
(0.014) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
0.166** 
(0.047) 
-0.003* 
(0.001) 
0.226** 
(0.079) 
-0.576** 
(0.193) 
-0.014** 
(0.003) 
-0.225 
(0.159) 
126.007 
0.466 
Inequality 
HDI 
Model 3 
0.089** 
(0.014) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.125** 
(0.048) 
-0.003* 
(0.001) 
0.122 
(0.078) 
-0.537** 
(0.19) 
-0.016** 
(0.003) 
-0.108 
(0.158) 
168.026 
0.528 
Gender 
HDI 
Model 4 
0.096** 
(0.014) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.045 
(0.049) 
-0.003* 
(0.001) 
0.094 
(0.076) 
-0.489** 
(0.191) 
-0.018** 
(0.003) 
0.178 
(0.16) 
183.714 
0.557 
Gender 
Dev. Index 
Model 5 
0.317** 
(0.048) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.455** 
(0.124) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.222* 
(0.11) 
-0.423 
(0.276) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.596* 
(0.246) 
90.826 
0.136 
Civil 
Liberties 
Religious Freedom 
Religious Diversity 
Secularism 
Religion-State Relations 
Some Relation 
Co-Habitation 
Democracy 
Past Civil Wars 
Past Interstate Wars 
Coup Risk 
Constant 
N 
Chi-Square 
R-Squared 
0.204* 
(0.102) 
-0.153** 
(0.042) 
0.456** 
(0.104) 
-0.026 
(0.026) 
0.061 
(0.059) 
0.049 
(0.026) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
-1.895** 
(0.279) 
0.632** 
(0.091) 
148 
159.991 
0.512 
0.394* 
(0.181) 
-0.225** 
(0.064) 
0.704** 
(0.155) 
0.001 
(0.038) 
0.068 
(0.095) 
0.057 
(0.034) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
-1.318** 
(0.373) 
0.347* 
(0.164) 
129 
108.231 
0.405 
0.360* 
(0.175) 
-0.16** 
(0.047) 
0.552** 
(0.114) 
-0.031 
(0.029) 
0.041 
(0.062) 
0.062* 
(0.029) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-2.204** 
(0.303) 
0.598** 
(0.099) 
136 
179.924 
0.561 
0.151* 
(0.071) 
-0.03 
(0.022) 
0.208** 
(0.053) 
0.003 
(0.014) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
0.009 
(0.014) 
0 
(0.001) 
0 
(0.001) 
-0.81** 
(0.147) 
0.908** 
(0.047) 
136 
104.876 
0.395 
11.289** 
(2.468) 
-0.748 
(0.597) 
3.363* 
(1.399) 
0.861 
(0.442) 
4.551** 
(1.52) 
0.012 
(0.015) 
-0.011 
(0.018) 
-2.898 
(3.766) 
-4.387 
(2.400) 
153 
224.32 
0.39 
Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
Parameters for the religious freedom equations are diferent across models due to diferences in 
sample sizes (N) and model specifcation for the civil liberties equation. 
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Table 8.2 Religion and human security—inequality, gender development, and political freedoms 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Religious Freedom 
Civil Liberties 0.823** 0.69** 0.797** 0.788** 1.25** 
Religious Diversity 
God Important 
Religious Legislation 
Log Per-Capita GDP 
Past Civil War 
(0.102) 
0.134 
(0.091) 
0.036* 
(0.016) 
-0.013** 
(0.003) 
-0.044 
(0.078) 
0.001 
(0.113) 
0.194 
(0.099) 
0.04* 
(0.018) 
-0.014** 
(0.003) 
0.098 
(0.084) 
0.001 
(0.102) 
0.131 
(0.094) 
0.038* 
(0.016) 
-0.014** 
(0.004) 
-0.017 
(0.078) 
0.001 
(0.101) 
0.119 
(0.091) 
0.036* 
(0.016) 
-0.015** 
(0.003) 
-0.045 
(0.077) 
0.001 
(0.177) 
0.21* 
(0.097) 
0.061** 
(0.018) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.074 
(0.084) 
0.001 
Past Interstate War 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0 
Constant 
(0.002) 
0.032 
(0.002) 
-0.447 
(0.002) 
-0.055 
(0.002) 
0.092 
(0.003) 
-0.447 
Chi-Square 
R-Squared 
(0.348) 
151.673 
0.643 
(0.38) 
113.576 
0.589 
(0.35) 
146.212 
0.592 
(0.342) 
146.212 
0.672 
(0.302) 
114.697 
0.703 
Human Security 
Variable HDI Inequality 
HDI 
Gender 
HDI 
Gender 
Development 
Civil 
Liberties 
Religious Freedom 
Religious Diversity 
God Important 
Religion-State Relations 
Some Relation 
Co-Habitation 
Democracy 
Past Civil War 
Past Interstate War 
Coup Risk 
Constant 
N 
Chi-Square 
R-Squared 
0.044 
(0.104) 
-0.098* 
(0.04) 
-0.029** 
(0.006) 
-0.015 
(0.033) 
0.016 
(0.057) 
0.035 
(0.037) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
-3.112** 
(0.649) 
1.045** 
(0.107) 
69 
119.167 
0.643 
0.218 
(0.141) 
-0.13* 
(0.06) 
-0.048** 
(0.009) 
0.03 
(0.041) 
0.068 
(0.072) 
0.001 
(0.046) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
-2.644** 
(0.849) 
0.937** 
(0.154) 
61 
93.205 
0.589 
0.068 
(0.132) 
-0.1* 
(0.051) 
-0.037** 
(0.008) 
-0.002 
(0.041) 
0.001 
(0.071) 
0.028 
(0.046) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
-3.089** 
(0.819) 
1.067** 
(0.135) 
68 
95.755 
0.592 
0.025 
(0.076) 
-0.016 
(0.029) 
-0.015** 
(0.004) 
0.009 
(0.024) 
-0.03 
(0.041) 
-0.016 
(0.027) 
0 
(0.001) 
0 
(0.001) 
-0.646 
(0.471) 
1.084** 
(0.078) 
69 
31.943 
0.290 
0.833 
(0.516) 
-0.178* 
(0.072) 
-0.05** 
(0.017) 
0.006 
(0.082) 
0.045 
(0.294) 
#DIV/0! 
(0) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-1.427 
(0.854) 
0.581 
(0.593) 
69 
224.76 
0.703 
Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
Parameters for the religious freedom equations are diferent across models due to diferences in 
sample sizes (N) and model specifcation for the civil liberties equation. 
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populations tend to have a lower degree of religious freedoms than coun-
tries with smaller populations. Tis is hardly surprising. Since religious
freedom is a component of civil liberties, we should be surprised if there is
no signifcant relationship between the two indices. Second, we fnd—not
surprisingly—that civil liberties have a signifcant positive efect on reli-
gious freedom, and that the extent of religious legislation has a negative
efect on religious freedom. In this respect as well, the magnitude of reli-
gious legislation is aimed at curbing religious freedom and subjecting the
legal system to religious principles. Tis typically works in favor of domi-
nant (or more infuential) religious groups, against non-religious groups,
and at the expense of other religious groups. 
Tird, as suggested by Gill, religious diversity tends to increase religious
freedom. Tis supports his contention that in diverse societies, it is more
difcult for both governments and religious actors to curb religious inter-
action and competition. Te result is typically higher levels of religious
freedoms. Tis inference may be misleading, however, as we discuss below.
Tus, interpreting the relationship between religious diversity and religious
freedom as supporting the causal mechanism put forth by the religious
economy model may not be appropriate. 
Secularism appears to have a negative impact on religious freedom. Tis
is surprising at frst sight, but on refection, a society can be either religiously
diverse or religiously homogeneous, but also have few non-religious people.
Likewise, a society may have a high number of non-religious people, but it is
its diversity that accounts for the level of religious freedom. Te global aver-
age level of secularism in 2007 was roughly 7 percent, and the median was
signifcantly lower (2.5 percent), and the highest fraction of non-religious
groups was either in highly democratic societies (e.g., Belgium, Germany,
Canada, Australia, New Zealand) or in highly authoritarian societies (e.g.,
Vietnam, China, North Korea). However, the percent non-religious in the
latter states far exceeds that of the former type of states. Atheism, as we have
demonstrated in Chapter 4, was an imposed social norm in the communist
world. So the highly atheist communities in the surviving communist states
coincide with their low level of religious freedom. 
We now turn to a discussion of our key dependent variable:  human
security. Te frst and most important observation is that secularism—
defned either as the percent non-religious in a society or the percent WVS
respondents who claim that God does not play an important part of their
daily life—consistently afects human security indices. Te more secular a
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society, the higher its human security. Second, religious freedom does not
consistently afect HDI-related measures, but it does positively afect HDI
and inequality-adjusted HDI. 
Religious diversity has a negative efect on human security. One of the
reasons for that is that HDI indices are heavily infuenced by economic
indicators. Tis pits rent-based countries, for example, the Organization
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries states, that are highly homogeneous
against the high HDI indices. At the same time it places low-income but
religiously diverse countries, for example, most African states, at the bottom
of the HDI ladder. 
Tis suggests one of the reasons why religious diversity positively afects
religious freedom but negatively afects human security. Specifcally, many
religiously diverse countries are also characterized by low political capacity.
Tis defciency in political capacity may be due partly to the diverse social
makeup. At the same time, low political capacity may result from extreme
resource scarcity. Consequently, there are few resources available for govern-
ment extraction. Tere is also a historical legacy of weak political capacity
in such states, suggesting that governments cannot overcome the commu-
nal loyalties of individuals and groups. Tese governments fnd it difcult
to forge a unifying national identity that is above and beyond factional
loyalties. Religious discrimination, religious legislation, and restrictions on
religious practices in such cases amount to political suicide for ruling elites.
Tis explains the positive efect of diversity on religious freedom and, at
the same time, it accounts for the negative relationship between religious
diversity and human security. 
On the other hand, consistent with our expectations, religious freedom
has a positive and signifcant efect on civil liberties and on gender develop-
ment. States that practice a high level of religious freedom seem to allow
more opportunities for women in health, education, and employment. For
that reason, we fnd that religious freedom has a positive efect on human
security that is not directly tied to wealth. 
As we can see in Figure 8.1, secularism has a signifcant efect on the
various indices of human security. However, the large spread at higher levels
of secularism suggests that at that level (above the median level of secular-
ism), there are a number of high-secularism outliers. Tese are communist
states in which secularism may be a state-induced myth rather than a practi-
cal reality. Te general correlation between secularism and human security
indices is in the range of 0 39  . r 0  45 . (145  182 .). However, when  . N 
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Fig. 8.1. Secularism, civil liberties, religious freedom, and human security 
we limit secularism to less than 0.4, thus omitting the highly secular outli-
ers, correlations increase to 0 41  .    0  65 138 . (    ) r N 174 . 
Note that religious freedom is negatively correlated with religion-state
relations (see appendix for correlations). Tis suggests that the efects of
religion-state relations on human security are not signifcant when we use
HDI-based measures of human security. 
Overall, we fnd support for the argument that religious diversity
increases religious freedom and reduces the degree of religion-state cohab-
itation. We also fnd limited support for the efect of religious freedom
on gender development and on civil liberties. But religious freedom and
religion-state relations do not seem to afect HDI-based indices of human
security. Te principal reason for that is the heavy reliance of these indices
on economic indicators; these are spread widely over diferent religious free-
dom characteristics of states. 
By contrast, we fnd strong support for the efect of secularism on human
security. Tis efect is even stronger if we omit the outlier states that tend
to “induce” secularism as a matter of regime policy—not necessarily due to
truly atheistic beliefs of the population (as we have seen following the col-
lapse of communism in Eastern Europe and Central Asia). Secularism has
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long been a favorite straw man of scholars of religion and politics. However,
even small changes in secularism seem to have a marginally strong efect on
human security. 
6. Conclusion 
In this chapter we highlighted the concept of human security: the extent to
which a state provides for basic human physical and psychological needs,
and the ability of individual members to access health, education, economic,
and political resources that ensure their physical and psychological well-
being. Te human security literature contends that it is the role of the state
to provide for these basic needs, beyond protecting its citizens from external
or internal threats to their survival. Te extent to which states perform this
duty faithfully is captured by a wide array of measures of human develop-
ment, political rights, and gender and income equality. Tese indices are
important not only as a scientifc tool that allows comparing societies; they
are also important because they allow governments to detect fundamental
defciencies in their social and economic policies, to learn from one another,
and to potentially improve their policies. 
Measures of human development and human security are not unbiased;
nevertheless, they are manifestly better than subjective assessments of qual-
ity of life in societies. More important, they are transparent in the way they
are generated and explicit about what they include and what they omit. As
such, they ofer an important window into human security from a global
perspective. 
Some governments work hard to protect and improve human develop-
ment and human security. Others work hard to suppress access to health,
education, economic opportunities, and political rights for all or some of
their citizens. Human development, economic well-being, education levels,
and public health are highly correlated; these aspects of human develop-
ment are also correlated with gender development, and moderately corre-
lated with civil liberties and democracy. Tis suggests that governments that
are efective in promoting or protecting one dimension of human security
are also fairly efective in protecting other dimensions. 
But just as we can see the half-full part of the glass in these correla-
tions, we can see also the half-empty part of the glass. Te factors mak-
ing up human security may have been identifed correctly by the various
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composite measures (such as HDI or its gender, or inequality modifca-
tions). However, the weights that we assign to various indicators may be
diferent. What is more important is that diferent governments may and
typically do assign diferent priorities to diferent aspects of human security.
In many cases, the resources that are supposed to go toward the promotion
of human security are appropriated for other goals such as public order
or national security. Tis may happen quite often because there is objec-
tive need to address national security challenges or public order problems
prior to ensuring opportunities for education, health, or gender equality.
But quite a few governments work under the notion that the promotion
of human security risks their political or economic survival. Tese govern-
ments deliberately work to constrain diferent aspects of human security in
order to protect the sectors in the society that safeguard their tenure. Other
governments suppress some aspects of human security as a matter of social,
political, or religious beliefs. It is the latter type of beliefs we have focused
on in the present chapter. 
We argued that religion typically cannot be a force for the promotion
of human security. However, religion can and often does serve as an instru-
ment used by governments to constrain, stall, or dampen diferent aspects
of human security. Tis can happen when governments (and in most cases
religious institutions) use religious values to halt or slow down economic
progress, gender equality, democracy, and income equality. Te notion of
“God’s will” is the epitome of complacency and acceptance of a status quo
that might be hurtful, unjust, and exploitative. Te fnding that the impor-
tance of God in one’s life (although available only for less than half of the
states in our sample) has a strong negative impact on human security is
quite telling in this respect. 
Te headline of this chapter is that secularism—more than any other
religious characteristic of societies—afects modernization and human
security. Te central hypothesis we have put forth in this chapter receives
strong and robust confrmation. 
Interestingly, however, the institutionalized structure of religion—the
degree of religious discrimination, or the institutional or legal constraints
on religious freedom—does not appear to have a robust efect on human
security. Religious diversity has an adverse impact on some aspects of
human security but not on others. It appears that, contrary to our expecta-
tions, more homogeneous societies tend to have a higher degree of human
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security. Tis relationship is not robust and is potentially biased. Some
highly homogeneous societies can have high levels of economic wealth due
to resource-based rents that afect their HDI score. By contrast, diverse
but poor societies can have high religious freedom (partly due to low state
capacity, partly due to constraints imposed on governments by virtue of
such diversity) and low human security scores. 
Religious diversity has a positive impact on religious freedom and a neg-
ative impact on religious discrimination, religious legislation, and religious
regulation, making for a relatively separate relationship between religious
and political institutions. Tis conforms to the religious economy model.
But here, too, a word of caution is in order. Te causal mechanism speci-
fed by the religious economy model—diverse societies make it difcult for
governments to impose religious restrictions because such restrictions risk
the government’s survival—may be true in some cases but misleading in
other cases. Te combination of religious diversity with low political capac-
ity may be due to unrelated reasons such as the arbitrariness of boundaries
of postcolonial powers with regard to the cultural makeup of their societies.
Te low state capacity and the religious diversity of such societies are joint
outcomes of such processes. Te real test of the causal mechanism linking
religious diversity to religious freedom must be performed in high politi-
cal capacity states, and there, this relationship is not as strong as the model
suggests. 
Given the growing importance of human security in both theory and
practice, the linkage between secularism and human security becomes all
the more apparent in contemporary international politics. Religious groups
in many countries have increased both their political power and their level
of activity. In some regions, such as the Middle East and parts of Africa
and South Asia, religious groups engage in rampant violence aimed at estab-
lishing theocratic governments, and run them using violence and the sup-
pression of individual rights, political liberties, women’s rights, gay rights,
and economic opportunities. However, even in more advanced industrial
countries, religious extremism is on the rise. If such groups prevail, not only
will they have a dramatic efect on international security, but they will also
have a profound impact on human security, individual liberties, and eco-
nomic prosperity. Te evidence from this chapter suggests not only the link-
age between secularism and human development; it also highlights the risks
associated with religious domination in domestic social and political afairs. 
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Appendix to Chapter 8 
1. Introduction 
Te appendix provides additional details about the data and analyses. We
start with descriptive statistics of the variables under analysis. Tis is given
in Table A8.1. 
We continue with Table A8.2, which provides correlations among the
dependent variables. Finally, Table 8.3 shows the correlations between mea-
sures of religious freedom and religion-state relations. 
Table A8.1 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
HDI 2015 187 0.698 0.155 0.352 0.949 
Ineq. Adjusted HDI 151 0.559 0.189 0.199 0.898 
Gender-Adjusted HDI 159 0.667 0.178 0.258 0.943 
Gender Development Index 146 0.930 0.074 0.600 1.030 
Civil Liberties 164 4.502 1.742 1.000 7.000 
Democracy 165 0.406 0.493 0.000 1.000 
Cumulative Interstate Wars 240 2.383 10.175 0.000 83.000 
Cumulative Civil War Years 240 4.983 12.345 0.000 111.000 
Log Population 161 3.819 0.657 2.541 5.954 
Log Per-Capita GDP 159 3.422 0.449 2.253 4.424 
Religious Freedom 194 5.970 2.477 0.333 10.000 
Pct. Non-religious 195 0.075 0.158 0.000 1.000 
God Important 72 7.779 1.955 3.482 9.906 
Religious Legislation 161 8.640 6.987 0.250 42.000 
Table A8.2 Correlations among dependent variables 
HDI IneqHDI GendHDI GenDev Civil Regime Log 
Lib. Pop. 
HDI 2015 1.000 
Ineq. Adjusted HDI 0.979 1.000 
Gender-Adjusted HDI 0.985 0.970 1.000 
Gender Development 0.708 0.711 0.811 1.000 
index 
Civil Liberties 0.569 0.681 0.598 0.506 1.000 
Maoz-Russett Regime 0.382 0.570 0.416 0.334 0.853 1.000 
Log Population 0.102 0.119 0.035 -0.079 -0.002 0.116 1.000 
Note: Statistically signifcant correlations (p > .05) are boldfaced. 
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Table A8.3 Correlations between measures of religious freedom and religion-state relations 
Rel. Free Rel. Discrim Rel. Regulat Rel. Legislat. 
Religious Freedom 1 
Religious Discrimination -0.761 1 
Religious Regulation -0.543 0.700 1 
Religious Legislation -0.685 0.574 0.355 1 
Combined Religion-State -0.7851 0.9376 0.8474 0.7012 
Note: Statistically signifcant correlations (p > .05) are in bold. 
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Chapter 9 
The Complex Role of Religion in
World Politics 
1. Introduction 
Tis study is a systematic empirical analysis of the linkages between reli-
gious factors and politics. Tese linkages have attracted much interest
from scholars and practitioners, especially since the end of the Cold War.
Consequently, the number of theoretical and empirical forays into this
topic have been on the rise over the last two decades. We have focused on
scientifcally assessing the empirical validity of some of the more central
and most popular theories on this subject. Our approach to this topic con-
tributes to the study of religion and politics in several important respects. 
Te frst distinguishing aspect of our study is its theoretical scope. We
examined several theories on religion and politics. Identifying both the
compelling arguments of existing theoretical frameworks and their logical
and evidentiary weaknesses, we ofered an integrative approach that com-
bined structural and situational factors. We draw on the structural charac-
teristics of societies, as well as the political, economic, and social conditions
under which political elites are likely to invoke and manipulate religious
factors, religious groups, and religious markers of national identity. We also
tied the characteristics of societies to those of their politically relevant inter-
national environment, an aspect that most studies of religion and politics
have overlooked. 
Second, we based our empirical investigations on multiple and highly
diverse datasets and on multiple levels of analyses. At the center of our
investigation is a novel and systematically derived dataset on the religious
370 
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composition of the international system since 1945, the WRP dataset. We
draw on these data to provide a much more extensive and nuanced analysis
of religion’s impact on politics than previous research focused on individual
states, pairs of states, groups of states, regions, and the global system as
a whole. 
Tird, we examined multiple dimensions of the religion-politics link-
age. Specifcally, we focused on both interstate relations and on intrastate 
processes; both international confict and cooperation; and the previously 
understudied relationship between religion and human security. In each 
of these dimensions of the present study we expanded the scope of the 
theoretical claims linking religious factors to the range of political behav-
iors of states. We noted that virtually all of the literature linking religion 
to international confict addresses—favorably or critically—the clash of 
civilizations (CoC) thesis. We ofered more nuanced ideas about how reli-
gion afects confict. Likewise, in the chapter on religion and international 
cooperation, our ideas went well beyond the structural notions of “similar-
ity attracts, diferences repulse” embedded in the few extant theories that 
address the linkages between religious factors and cooperation. While we 
have developed our own ideas about the linkages between religion and 
international behavior, either confictual or cooperative, we attempted to 
examine multiple theories that address these issues in order to evaluate 
their relative merit. We ofer a general appraisal of these theories below. 
Fourth, we provided several methodological innovations not only in 
variable construction but in research design. Recognizing the stationar-
ity of many of the variables analyzed in the study of religion and political 
outcomes we employed much more rigorous tests of the putative relation-
ships utilizing bootstrapping techniques that required greater consistency 
and robustness among the variables before they’d achieve a threshold 
whereby we were satisfed that the relationships reported actually obtained 
in the data. 
A key element in our empirical analysis is the notion of religious simi-
larity. Tis concept features prominently in all of the diferent perspectives
we have discussed and tested in this study. We are certainly not the frst
to emphasize this concept, and are also not the frst to test the connection
between religious similarity and confict (although we are not aware of a lot
of empirical research connecting religious similarity to cooperative interac-
tions). Our original contribution, however, is in the way we measure this
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concept. In contrast to the cruder measures of religious similarity in the
myriad studies of religion and international confict, and religion and civil
confict, we measure similarity in terms of the degree of overlap of distri-
butions of religious adherents in societies. Two societies may be similar in
that the modal religious groups in both are the same, but they are, in fact,
diferent if one has a single religious group and the other has many other
religious groups, and the largest religious group accounts only for a fraction
of the state’s population. For example, the variation in the majority religious
group if the largest religious group was Christian was from 0.26 to 1. When
the largest religious group was Muslim, this variation was between 0.36
and 1. And when the largest religious group was Hindu, this variation was
between 0.44 and 0.81. So, saying that two societies have the same largest
religious group may be vastly misleading when the largest religious group
in one society is about one-third of the population and the largest religious
group in the other society accounts for 90 percent of its population. We
fnd that, in general, the higher resolution religious similarity index we use
in most of our analyses provides a more precise description of cross-national
comparison than the more coarse indices used in most of the previous stud-
ies. We believe that this renders a more credible inference of the relationship
between religious similarity, on the one hand, and international confict,
international cooperation, and civil confict, on the other. 
Tis chapter briefy summarizes our study of religion and world politics.
Te next section provides a summary of the key results. Te third section
assesses the key theoretical perspectives we have examined throughout the
present study in light of these results. Te fourth section discusses the theo-
retical implications of our study. Te fnal section discusses some policy
implications and identifes directions for future research. 
2. Summary of Key Results 
A general summary of the results is provided in Table 9.1, which outlines
the efects of the key religious factors on confict, cooperation, and qual-
ity of life. As can be seen, the results are illuminating in some respects
and mixed in others. We start by outlining the major insights about
religion and world politics that we can garner from this comprehensive
empirical study. 
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1. Religion is one of the key attributes of the cultural identity of
states. As such, it is among the most important factors that shape
their domestic politics and their behavior in the international
arena. Tis does not mean that religious factors trump other fac-
tors that shape states’ behavior and politics—factors associated
with either realist or liberal perspectives. What our fndings indi-
cate, however, is that culture matters; it shapes identity, defnes
afnities and enmities, and afects politics within and among
nations. Culture, or at least the religious aspects of culture, should
be included in any attempt to understand world politics. 
2. Religious factors:  religious homogeneity/diversity, religion-state 
relations, and the degree of similarity between states and their 
relevant environment, are fairly stationary over time. Te extent 
to which they afect more volatile and diverse relations between 
and among states—such as confict or cooperation—depends on 
the ability and willingness of political elites to invoke religion as 
a mobilization strategy. We fnd that political elites, particularly 
in authoritarian states, are signifcantly more likely to use religion 
to mobilize support for foreign adventures when they believe that 
their job security is at risk. Tis applies mostly with respect to the 
use of religion in potential or actual confict situations. At the 
same time, however, the evidence also suggests that political elites 
tend to invoke religious similarities and dissimilarities to justify 
costly cooperative ventures such as high-commitment alliances. 
3. Contrary to popular theses such as the clash of civilization, we did
not fnd evidence that the post–Cold War era is shaped by a strug-
gle between or among civilizations marked by religious factors.
In fact, struggles within religions are as or more common than
struggles between religions. Moreover, in many of our analyses
on both confict and cooperation we found that religious factors
were more active in the Cold War era than in the post–Cold War
era. Nor did we fnd a greater degree of within-civilizational coop-
eration during the post–Cold War era compared to the previous
period. We discuss this thesis at greater length in the next section. 
4. Our evidence also fails to support the constructivist notion that
the behavior of newly established states is shaped by their religious
identity more than the behavior of older and well-established
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states. We are not claiming that there is no inherent antagonism
among diferent cultures; however, when examined closely, this
antagonism is, on average, overshadowed by common interests
along other aspects of their political interactions. Importantly, the
notion that religions do not possess factors that cause animos-
ity and hatred among believers is fundamentally fawed. Some of
the most violent and intractable conficts are intrareligious while
some of the more surprising and persistent forms of cooperation
are among states of diferent religious makeup. 
5. Perhaps the most robust fnding is a negative one: we did not fnd
consistent evidence linking a particular religion to bellicosity and
confict—domestic or international. Nor did we fnd consistent
evidence that one particular religion is more benign and coop-
erative than other religions. Branding one religion as violent and
another as benign and peaceful is not rooted in the empirical real-
ity of the global system in the post–World War II era. Te same
applies to the role of religion in the domestic politics of states. We
did not fnd evidence that a given religion or religious combina-
tion is related to domestic instability, or that countries dominated
by a specifc religion enjoy higher levels of human security than
other countries. 
6. We remind the reader that characterizing certain conficts as “reli-
gious wars” is problematic. Tis suggests that it is just as likely that
what previous analyses are uncovering is the relationship between
their variables of interest and the probability of being classifed
among so-called religious wars. For example, the fnding of a posi-
tive relationship between religious polarization and “religious war”
onset says more about the probability of violent conficts within
religiously polarized states being categorized as “religious wars” in
the frst place. Te same can be said about conficts in states that
might inordinately identify with the major religions. Conversely,
the fnding of a negative relationship between democracy and
so-called religious wars may be more likely the result of the low
probability that conficts in democracies will be classifed as “reli-
gious conficts.” A caveat is that, once we control for the inherent
bias in civil confict involvement, we fnd the most populous reli-
gious groups on the planet—Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and
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non-religious—to be highly prone to the outbreak of confict on
religious grounds. We also fnd that these religious groups tend to
be less likely to settle their civil conficts via negotiated settlements.
Tese results seem to provide some support for arguments about
the “dangerous” nature of religion. Tey are, however, restricted to
specifc types of civil conficts, and are not generalizable to other
types of confictual or cooperative behaviors, the latter comprising
the overwhelming majority of such interactions. 
7. Several “positive” results that are generalizable across the dimen-
sions of domestic and international politics that emerge from our
study are the following: 
a. Te religious similarity between states and their external
environments—their immediate geographic or their substan-
tive (strategic reference) neighborhoods—reduces the level
of confict of individual states, dyads, and, to a lesser extent,
regions. Religious similarity also increases the degree of cooper-
ation between states—primarily in areas that exact high trans-
action costs (such as security cooperation). Tere is also some
evidence that religious similarity between majority religions
within states and their relevant environment reduces the focal
state’s propensity for civil confict. 
b. Secularism also has mixed efects on international politics.
Secular states, that is, states that have substantial numbers of
non-religious citizens, are not less likely to fght each other, nor
are they more likely to cooperate with each other than are “reli-
gious” states. However, secularism reduces the likelihood of civil
confict within states and has a positive efect on human secu-
rity and quality of life. Secular states are less likely to experience
domestic disturbances than “religious” states, and when such
disturbances occur, they are likely to be less severe and endur-
ing than in “religious” states. Te citizens of “secular” states are
better educated, have better access to health services and enjoy
longer life expectancy, and have generally higher standards of
living than the citizens of “religious” states. 
8. Te manner in which religious factors afect international rela-
tions and domestic politics is rather complex. Te theories linking
religion to politics attempt, as many other theories do, to portray
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a rather simple and straightforward relationship. But even when
a consistent relationship seems to exist, it is context dependent.
Te context, as we show in this study, refers to the specifc type
of behavior one examines. In reality, the impact of religion on
international relations and the domestic structure of states is more
nuanced. We have observed this nuanced relationship both when
we focused on confict behavior (domestic and international),
and on international cooperation, as well as on the quality of life
of individuals within states (i.e. human security). Te implica-
tion is that we should be careful in assigning simplistic and all-
encompassing roles to religious factors. Just as we should not
ignore culture as a factor shaping political processes, we should
avoid attributing to culture a simple, direct, and autonomous
role in domestic and international politics. One of the points we
made early on is that studies of religion and political behavior
tend to focus on a single behavioral aspect. And even if several
studies focus on the same behavioral domain, they do not always
agree on whether and which religious factors afect this type of
behavior. When we cast a wider net—covering multiple behav-
ioral domains—we fnd that sweeping generalizations are inap-
propriate in the general case, and sweeping generalizations about
religious factors are even less justifable. 
3. Religion and World Politics: Theory Meets Evidence 
How do theories on religion and politics fare in light of the evidence? We
have repeated the point that these theories ofer complementary predictions
about specifc associations between religious factors and diferent aspects of
international relations. Tis makes evaluation of the insights of such theo-
ries even more difcult. However, we can aford an admittedly qualifed
evaluation of these theories. 
3.1 Primordialism 
Te key argument of the primordialist perspective is that religion is an inher-
ent, constant, and crucial aspect of national identity. Te extent to which
it forms a central part of national identity is a function of two factors: the
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religious homogeneity of the state and the degree to which political and
religious institutions are closely linked. Religiously homogeneous societies
and states in which religion and politics cohabitate make religion a central
identity marker, often forming the foundation of nationalism. Tis defnes
the nation’s outlook on its international environment, framing friends and
foes in terms of religious similarity, and forming an important determinant
of the state’s behavior. Moreover, a highly homogeneous society in which
religious and state institutions are closely linked tends to be politically sta-
ble. If civil confict breaks out, it is likely to be on issues that have little or
nothing to do with religious disputes. 
Some of our results lend support to this perspective. In particular, we
found that religious homogeneity increases the propensity of confict behav-
ior of individual states. We also found religious similarity to be a consistent
pacifer when it comes to dyadic and regional confict, and a consistent
incentive when it comes to security and institutional cooperation. We also
found evidence that the cohabitation of religious and political institutions
tends to increase the risk of interstate confict behavior. 
However, this theory emphasizes relatively stationary linkages between 
religion and state. Te religious composition of societies does not change 
much over time. Nor does the relationship between religious and political 
institutions fuctuate signifcantly over time. Tis suggests that the more 
direct tests of the theory focus on general propensities rather than on annual 
fuctuations. When we examine the nation-history or dyad-history results, 
many of the expectations of the theory are not supported. For example, 
we do not fnd support for the argument that religious homogeneity has 
a direct efect on confict. We also do not fnd consistent evidence of the 
extent to which the relationship between religious and political institu-
tions afects the confict propensity of states or dyads. Te same applies to 
civil confict patterns. Religiously homogeneous states are no more likely 
to experience civil conficts than religiously diverse ones. Similarly, the 
relationship between religious and political institutions does not have a 
signifcant efect on the propensity of states to experience civil confict. 
Our evaluation of this theory on several issues is decidedly incomplete.
For example, data limitations do not permit us to study the relationship
between state-religious relations and international behavior or domestic
confict over the entire time span of 1945–2010. Nor could we ascertain
whether political leaders in homogeneous societies belonged to or practiced
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the same religion as the majority of the population over the postwar
timespan. For example, about 74 percent of Syria’s population are Sunni
Muslims. However, since 1966, Syria has been ruled by an Alawite minority
accounting for roughly 13 percent of the population.1 In states governed by
communist regimes, the population was largely afliated with various reli-
gions. However, these societies were governed by atheist political leaders, so
the sharp drop in the number of “seculars,” that is, atheists, agnostics, and
other nonbelievers in such societies following the fall of communism sug-
gests that atheism was not prevalent.2 Tus, there is some evidence support-
ing this perspective and also a fair amount of evidence that is inconsistent
with primordialist arguments. Terefore, what we can suggest is that there
are certainly primordialist factors that are signifcantly associated with the
outcomes we examine in this study; however, the role of religion in these
outcomes is only superfcially captured by the factors that are emphasized
by primordialism. 
3.2 Instrumentalism. 
Te central argument of the instrumentalist perspective on religion and 
politics is that religion is a political tool used by political elites to advance 
their aims. Te more static aspects of the instrumentalist predictions are 
almost identical to the primordialist ones. So, in terms of these aspects, the 
evidence ofers neither strong explicit support nor unequivocal refutation 
of this perspective. However, the relative empirical support of the theory’s 
main claims is more robust and more meaningful than the primordialist 
perspective. Te negative impact of regime stability on confict behavior 
along with the negative efect of regime similarity on confict behavior 
receives considerable support. Specifcally, political leaders who feel politi-
cally threatened are likely to invoke religious loyalties to mobilize their 
populations for external adventures if the social conditions are “right.” 
Likewise, the impact of political stability on cooperation toward religiously 
similar states also provides support for the instrumentalist perspective. 
Te fact that religious similarity is a strong determinant of security
cooperation, but not of economic cooperation, also adds credence to this
perspective. Moreover, we fnd that security communities are signifcantly
more religiously cohesive than other types of cooperative communities.
Tis result is also consistent with instrumentalism. Te underlying logic
of this argument is that alliances are politically risky ventures and involve
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more transaction costs than trade, PTAs, or membership in IGOs. Alliances
require commitment of human and material resources in support of other
states at times of war. Forming alliances require more intensive mobiliza-
tion. Another layer of evidence in support of instrumentalism concerns the
fnding that secularism reduces the likelihood of civil confict and elevates
human security. Tis suggests that when a substantial proportion of the
population is not susceptible to the manipulation of religious ideas in sup-
port of certain groups or certain policies, more people in the society seem
to beneft; they get higher levels of education, more economic equality, and
more open political systems. 
However, as in the case of primordialism, instrumentalism’s predictions
are not supported in the case of civil wars and in terms of some key aspects
of confict behavior. On the whole, empirical evidence lends more sup-
port to instrumentalist predictions—in particular, the dynamic aspects of
these predictions—than the more static predictions of primordialism. At
the same time, we do not have sufcient evidence to claim that this perspec-
tive provides a comprehensive explanation of the linkages between religious
factors and key aspects of world politics in the modern era. 
3.3 Constructivism. 
Like primordialism and instrumentalism, constructivism claims that reli-
gion can become (or can be manipulated to be) a central national identity
marker when a society is highly homogeneous and when there is little or no
separation of religion from state. Te key diference between constructivism
and the other two approaches is that national identity is not a constant, but
rather changes as a result of the state’s interaction with its environment, and
as a result of prevailing “international cultures.” 
Constructivism implies that religious factors are more important deter-
minants of identity when states lack interactive experience. In such cases—
and this applies to newly formed states—leaders attempt to form a sense of
national identity via shared social values. Once the state acquires interac-
tive experience, its self-perception, as well as its perception of friends and
foes, begins to refect the lessons of such experience and the role of shared
social values in defning its national identity declines. Te empirical evi-
dence connecting states’ age to their confict or cooperative behavior does
not support this inference. We could not fnd any signifcant diferences
between national (or dyadic) age and confict behavior. Nor could we fnd
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consistent evidence that religion plays a higher role in determining coopera-
tion between “young” states more or less than it afects cooperation between
“mature” states. We argue, therefore, that there is not enough evidence to
support most of the propositions deduced from the constructivist perspec-
tive regarding the role of religion in world politics. 
3.4 The Clash of Civilization (CoC)Thesis 
Te CoC thesis argues that civilizational factors defne the key divides in
post–Cold War politics. Accordingly, we deduced that religious diferences
tend to fuel confict, and that religious similarities tend to promote coop-
eration. Religious divides may also be driving forces in post–Cold War
domestic conficts in factionalized societies. Our evidence lends at best par-
tial support for this perspective in that religious diferences seem to play an
important role in fomenting confict, and—at least in the security coop-
eration domain—similarities tend to attract. By contrast, we did not fnd
evidence supporting this thesis in the case of intrastate confict. We tend to
be highly critical of arguments that religious divides make some societies
more prone to civil confict because these arguments tend to truncate such
confict into religious/ethnoreligious/or ethnic conficts versus other types
of civil confict. Tis typology is methodologically misguided, as we argued
repeatedly. Once we examine the role of religious factors in civil conficts
across all types of civil conficts (where such conficts are defned by their
behavioral attributes rather than by the types of groups that fght each other
or by the types of claims and grievances expressed by such groups), we fnd
little evidence in support of the intrastate clash of civilizations. 
In general, Huntington’s thesis rests on a central temporal claim: civili-
zational divides are characteristics of post–Cold War politics. During the
Cold War era, the ideological, strategic, and economic struggle between
the two superpowers overshadowed intercivilizational tensions. While such
tensions presumably existed under the surface, they did not emerge before
the US–Soviet competition receded. Tis argument has received virtually
no support in our analyses. In fact, we found that religious factors played
a more important role in international conficts during the Cold War era
than during the post–Cold War era, which is diametrically opposed to CoC
claims (see Henderson 2004: 550). 
All told, while we cannot unequivocally reject the CoC arguments,
we certainly can reject that aspect which suggests that the post–Cold War
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period signals a new era of clashing civilizations across religious fssures.
It clearly does not. Te degree of confdence one places in the CoC thesis
depends to a large extent on the relative centrality of the temporal nature of
the thesis compared to the overall claim about civilizational divides. And in
terms of this specifc expectation, we can confdently state that there is no
support for the CoC thesis. 
3.5 The Integrative Theory of Religion and World Politics 
Our integrative theory of religion and world politics builds on the com-
mon themes of these often-competing perspectives. However, it adds two
important elements. First, it connects the static factors that emphasize social
structure and identity markers with specifc political conditions, pointing
out that the convergence of static social and political-situational conditions
brings religious factors to the fore of international and internal processes.
Second, it emphasizes the cultural interaction between the focal state and
its international environment (i.e., its PRIE), which determines to a large
extent its potential targets for both confict and cooperation. Our theory
focuses on the interaction between three sets of factors: the religious struc-
ture of the state, the religious structure of the state’s PRIE, and the specifc
political conditions prevailing in both the focal state and its PRIE. Te inte-
grative theory claims that political leaders are more likely to invoke religious
factors as a mobilization strategy when they feel that their job security is
under threat. Religion can be used as an instrument of political mobiliza-
tion if the religious structure of the society permits. 
We fnd relatively robust support for the claims of this theory in terms
of the linkages between religion and international confict. We also fnd
fairly consistent support for the propositions of the theory in the case of
certain types of cooperative ventures—security cooperation in particular.
We fnd less support for the theory’s propositions in the case of civil con-
fict outbreak, but we do fnd support for the efect of religious polariza-
tion, religion-state relations, and state-environment religious similarity on
several attributes of civil war, such as type of war and type of war settle-
ment. It seems that religious motivations for uprisings may be confounded
with other—economic or political—motivations. Also the efect of ethnic
exclusion on civil confict may overlap with religious exclusion since many
“excluded” ethnic groups may also be religiously distinct from the included
and dominant groups. 
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Overall the support for our theory is reasonably robust if we also consider
the environmental efect on confict, cooperation, and civil war. Clearly, the
integrative nature of our theory tends to combine the more compelling
parts of the other perspectives. As such, the overall support for our theo-
retical expectations is marginally better than any of its individual parts. In
particular, we fnd the interaction of structural conditions, political circum-
stances, and the structure of PRIEs to ofer more theoretical and empirical
insights into the nature of the linkages between religion and world politics
than any of these components taken independently and separately. 
4. Implications for Scholarship on Religion and World Politics 
It is not surprising that our study does not result in a grand theme
regarding religion and world politics as previous forays into this sub-
ject (e.g., Toft, Philpott, and Shah 2011, Huntington 1996, Fox and
Sandler 2004). 
Te reasons for the lack of a grand theme in our study are manifold;
they seem to reside in some of the more substantial diferences between our
study and previous ones. First, our study is theoretically more nuanced than
previous investigations. We do not focus on a single theory of religion and
politics. Rather, we attempt to discern several perspectives linking religion
to diferent aspects of politics. As we have seen several times throughout
this book, diferent theories overlap signifcantly when it comes to mak-
ing predictions about how the religious characteristics of states afect their
behavior. Tis does not make these theories identical. Rather, they tend to
difer in terms of some key elements. 
Second, our analyses of the various aspects of religion and world politics
are much more extensive and multilayered than any of the previous forays
into this subject. To be sure, a limited set of analyses on a limited set of
questions is far more likely to result in what appear to be clear answers than
a comprehensive and multilayered analysis such as ours. Actually, the scope,
depth, and complexity of our analyses reveal that the relationships between
religious factors and diferent aspects of world politics are contingent—
and rarely simplistic: they vary by dimension of behavior and by levels of
analysis. We have used multiple indicators of religious identity and reli-
gious similarity, as well as multiple indicators of the confict or cooperation
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phenomena under investigation. We applied our analysis to multiple units
of analysis. All this suggests that our empirical tests are far more demand-
ing than previous investigations. Te likelihood that a given religious factor
will be robust across all these diferent types of analysis is signifcantly lower
than what one would fnd in the studies we have reviewed in the book. 
Tird, unlike most previous investigations that focus on a single-issue
area in which religion is said to be operative, our analyses cover multiple
issue areas. Consequently, factors that positively afect confict behavior do
not necessarily negatively afect cooperative behavior. Factors that afect
one dimension of cooperation do not necessarily afect other dimensions of
cooperation. Factors that are infuential in an international context are not
necessarily infuential in a domestic context. Here, too, the likelihood that
we can fnd consistent relationships between religious factors and a very
broad array of international and domestic processes is low. Hence, these
contingent efects of religious factors on diferent behavioral aspects should
not come as a surprise. 
Several implications follow. First, we can categorically support the argu-
ment that religion is a force in world politics. It has been a force even dur-
ing the Cold War era, a period that was seemingly dominated by a struggle
between two secular ideologies and worldviews:  liberalism and commu-
nism. Existing theories linking religion to various aspects of confict and
cooperation leave a lot to be desired. Tis means we need a more nuanced
understanding of the role religious factors play in international behavior.
But it clearly does not mean we need to abandon the focus on religion in
favor of more tangible factors that have been emphasized by the strictly
materialistic perspectives of politics. If indeed, our theory combining struc-
tural conditions with situational political factors and environmental (struc-
tural characteristics and situational processes) seems to provide a reasonable
explanation of religion and politics, we must explain not only how political
leaders manipulate religious beliefs, but also why and under what condi-
tions people follow such manipulations. 
Tere is a growing dialogue between scholars of religion and politics.
Tis dialogue is not always coherent; it involves a great deal of polem-
ics and relatively little concerted efort to empirically connect religion to
multiple aspects of international and domestic politics. We believe that a
major implication of this study is to invigorate a debate on these issues that
(a) is more logically and theoretically coherent, (b) covers multiple facets
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of international behavior rather than a single theme, (c)  is more explicit
in terms of the causal mechanisms linking religious factors to behavioral
patterns, (d)  is more explicit in terms of methodological strategies, and
(e) is more systematic and replicable with respect to hypothesis testing, data
transparency, and inferences. 
We do not claim to have resolved all issues regarding these implica-
tions, but we believe we ofer a direction in terms of these desiderata for
future research, and we are open to concerns, questions, criticisms, and
replications. Te book’s website ofers the data, programs, and extensive
analyses that will hopefully help anyone who wishes to follow up on what
we have done. 
5. Policy Implications 
In terms of policy, one of the appealing aspects of the CoC thesis, for some,
especially after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, and perhaps even
more so with the rise of ISIS terrorism, is the branding of a specifc reli-
gion as inherently bellicose. Our research demonstrates that arguments
that single out a specifc religion, such as Huntington’s claim that “Islam
has bloody borders,” are patently false. Islamic states—states with majority
Muslims—are neither more bellicose nor more benevolent than states with
Christian, Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist, or secular majorities. One thing that
we can say about religion and bellicosity, though, is that religious beliefs can
be manipulated regardless of the kind of God, prophet, scripture, or shrine
people worship. Tis means that we should be careful when political or reli-
gious leaders call us to rally around a certain fag against infdels, or against
people who share a diferent set of religious ideals. We should also be wary
of religious leaders working for or against a given religion politically. Tese
calls and these policies have hidden agendas. Religion may be an important
part of people’s belief systems. However, the politicization of religion can
be quite dangerous. 
We did not fnd that the promotion of religious freedom, separation of
political and religious institutions, and secularism is an unequivocal force
for stability, prosperity, or peace. Although some of our results do suggest
that such a connection may exist, we must be very careful about calls for
more religious infuence or about advocacy for less religious infuence in
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politics. Societies should establish their own equilibria on these matters;
there is no single policy prescription that fts all. What we do claim is that
social institutions—communities, media, political and economic institu-
tions—should be conspicuous when political leaders start using political
and religious symbols to mobilize support for militarized confict or for
oppressing segments of their own or other societies. Social checks and bal-
ances against such manipulations are important and need to be developed
and safeguarded—religiously. 
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Notes 
Preface 
1. Our datasets are publicly available for use. Tey can be found at the two organiza-
tions that helped us generate them. Te ARDA website is at http://www.thearda.com/
Archive/Files/Descriptions/WRDGLOBL.asp. Te Correlates of War Project hosts our
dataset at http://www.correlatesofwar.org. 
Chapter 1 Religion and World Politics—Theory and Evidence 
1. Te only exception to this is the Esther story in the Old Testament, which is a
story about a plot to eliminate the Jewish community in Persia. Another explicit tale
of religious warfare concerns the Maccabee books that take place in the second century
bce. However, these books did not make it into the Old Testament. 
2. It is important to note two things about this comparison. First, we chose title-
word combinations rather than topic-word combinations because the former selection
algorithm refects a more precise focus of the publication on the particular word com-
bination. Second, many of these publications have no direct IR content. For example,
the combination of power and world politics produces titles such as “Cuba as a World
Medical Power: Te Politics of Symbolism (Feinsilver 1989), or “New World States and
Empires: Politics, Religion, and Urbanism” (Smith and Schreiber, 2006), where “New
World” refers to the Americas and the article is an archeological study. WOS allows
fltering of such titles by discipline, thus limiting the number of irrelevant works that
come up in the search. However, this precludes comparison to the more general search
enabled by GS. Nevertheless, a fltering of WOS search by discipline, limiting this to
only works in political science and IR, reveals similar diference ratios as in the more
general search. 
3. Shah and Philpott (2011, 46–50) argue that the rise of religious factors in mod-
ern international relations began in 1967, due to the disappearance of prominent secu-
lar leaders such as Nehru and Nkrumah and the defeat of Nasserist secular pan Arabism
by Israel in the Six Day War. While they may be correct about the factual rise of religious
factors in the practice of international relations, this did not resonate in mainstream
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theories of IR until much later. One of the reasons for that may be that the leading
paradigms of IR were and still are dominated by Western liberal thought (Fox and
Sandler 2004). 
4. We calculate this statistic to refect changes in the number of publication venues
and the search engines’ ability to detect publications in the latter (1991–2017) period
compared to the earlier (1945–90) period. 
Chapter 2 Scholarship on Religion and World Politics: A Critical Review
of the Literature 
1. For reviews of the role of religion in IR theories, or more precisely the lack of
the role of religion in these theories, see Snyder (2011); Shah and Philpot (2011); Toft,
Philpott, and Shah (2011); Fox and Sandler (2004, 1–32); Sandal and Fox (2013). 
2. Cited in Shah (2012, 1–2). No source is given. Italics in original. 
3. Richardson (1985, 104) noted that “secularization theory served as something of
a ‘sacred canopy’ for most research in the social sciences of religion.” 
4. Anecdotally, however, Lebow’s (2016) book, which ofers a critique of the con-
cept of national identity, does not even have an index entry for “religion.” His discus-
sion of the concept of self-induced (as opposed to attributed) national identity focuses
on history and political vision, all encapsulated in a conception of “role.” Culture, in
general, and religion, in particular, play no role in this “role” conception. 
5. Note that the table in appendix 4 (pp. 32–37) of that study has a code of iden-
tity type but none of the variables in this table is explained anywhere in the text or
appendix. 
6. Note that empirical evidence (e.g., Svensson 2013, 23) shows that a vast majority
of the cases in his sample involve civil confict between government and rebels from the
same religion. Likewise, religious incompatibility does not appear to be a critical issue
in most of the cases in that sample (p. 36). 
7. Note that it is possible that the trend seen in the absolute fgures is also apparent
in the states that are missing from Fox’s sample. If that is the case, then both the abso-
lute and the relative fgures in this chart would show the same trend. However, there is
no way of knowing this unless we actually examine the religious policies of those new
states. 
8. Tis is a key argument of Philpott (2007), Toft (2007), and Fox (2015), as well
as that of the religious economy model (Gill 2007, 2013). 
Chapter 3 Religion and World Politics: An Integrated Theoretical
Perspective 
1. Conversion to Judaism is possible through a certain process that involves signif-
cant learning and preparation, and is conducted under the supervision of rabbis who
are specifcally trained for this matter. It is also a source of acute confict among the
various families of Judaism (Orthodox, Conservative, Reform). 
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2. Clearly, the relationship between religious and political institutions may fuctuate
over time within a society. Tey also may be a source of domestic as well as international
confict, as some groups may wish to change the relationship between religion and state,
and other groups may wish to sustain them as they are. 
3. Tese rational orientations, such as the social contract theses that underwrite
realism, liberalism, and constructivism, may delimit similar “othering” of communities
through a “scientifc” racism (see Henderson 2013). 
4. Beyond the Old Testament, there is a debate among scholars regarding the dates
of this invasion, but the range of dates are somewhere between the ffteenth and thir-
teenth centuries bce. 
5. Although in this case, the modern incarnation of Jewish nationalism, Zionism,
emerged out of a long period of persecution of Jews, primarily in Eastern and Central
Europe. Moreover, the principal thinkers and activists of the Zionist movement were
largely secular (Sachar 2007). However, the idea of a Jewish homeland in Palestine rests
on the theological bond between the Jewish religion and Judea/Israel (Palestine). 
6. Interestingly, some Jewish communities in Ethiopia and Central and East Asia
survived for centuries despite constant persecution and harassment by their surround-
ing communities (Baron 1983, Ehrlich 2009). 
7. However, religion can be invoked to incite action against certain political fg-
ures or groups if the society is highly religious and the leaders are perceived as secular
or in violation of religious values, such as in the Iranian Revolution and Ayatollah
Khomeini’s incitement of the overwhelmingly Shia Iranians against the laicity of the
Shah of Iran, or the prominently Catholic Solidarity union’s successful struggle against
nominally atheistic communist rule in Poland, which appealed to and received assis-
tance from Pope John Paul II. Tis is a utilitarian twist of Philpott’s (2007) concept
of “political theology,” further suggesting that political theology is not a factor that is
independent of political goals. Rather, it is a device whereby political elites legitimate
collective action against the regime or another state. 
8. Galtung’s theory of neoimperialism (1971) is an apt description of this process. 
9. Miller focuses on national characteristics, emphasizing ethnicity. We focus on
religion as a key determinant of shared afnities among people comprising a given state. 
10. For example, Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) changed the Turkish/Ottoman legal sys-
tem to base it on secular laws and separated religion from educational and political
practices. By contrast, the imposition of Islamic laws in Iran after the Iranian revolu-
tion changed the relationship between religious and political institutions. Tese are
dramatic, “revolutionary” changes. However, they do not happen very often even after
fundamental regime changes. 
11. Nevertheless, in our shorter-term analysis we draw on responses to World Values
Survey questions on the importance of God in one’s life to derive a more valid index of
religiosity in a society. 
12. Maoz (1996, 39 and 2010) provides a list of states that satisfy criteria (ii) and
(iii) above. Empirical research (Lemke and Reed 2001, Maoz 1996, Bennett and Stam
2004) showed that most conficts (about 82 percent to 85 percent of all militarized
interstate disputes (MIDs) take place between members of PRIEs). Evidence also sug-
gests that politically relevant dyads are about three times more likely to form an alliance
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and twice more likely to trade with each other than what is expected by chance alone.
We will return to these results in subsequent chapters. 
Chapter 4 The Religious Landscape of the World, 1945–2010 
1. Tis is an expanded and updated version of an article that appeared in International
Interactions (Maoz and Henderson 2013). We thank the editor and the publisher for
their permission to use the materials from the article. 
2. A list of sources is provided on the project’s website at: http://correlatesofwar.org. 
3. Tis defnition is used by other studies in the literature on religion and politics
(e.g., Toft, Philpott, and Shah 2011, 21; Toft 2012, 133). 
4. A useful example of how this criterion operates is available on the ARDA website
with respect to Christian denominations in the United States. See http://www.thearda. 
com/Denoms/Families/trees.asp. 
5. Te statistical description may be slightly diferent from that in Maoz and
Henderson (2013). Tis is because the current analyses are based on version 1.1 of the
WRP which employs a wider and a more precise array of sources than version 1.0 on
which Maoz and Henderson (2013) was based. 
6. For example, average record reliability scores in 2010 are twice those of 1950. 
7. Tis ratio has changed since 2010. By 2013, Israeli Jews constituted the single
largest Jewish group in world Jewry, their share rising to roughly 50 percent of the
world Jewish population. 
8. In subsequent chapters, we compare this measure to other measures of fractional-
ization (Fearon and Laitin) and polarization (Maoz 2010), and show that this measure
is very similar to these other measures. We use this measure here and in subsequent
chapters because it has some advantages over these others. We discuss these diferences
in greater detail in the appendix to chapter 7. One caveat about IQV is that when a
society contains only one religious group, this measure converges to infnity as the
denominator (k − 1) becomes zero. We arbitrarily convert this to zero in such cases, as
clearly there is no variation in such a society. 
9. We defne religious similarity precisely in the next chapter. Here, however, the
data refect the average degree to which the populations of any two states in a given
region are distributed similarly in terms of their religious beliefs. 
10. Also, as mentioned above, postcommunist or post-Soviet states tended to report
more religious afliations than during the Soviet/communist era. Tis accounts, to a
large extent, for the growth in reporting of Islamic beliefs among post-Soviet republics. 
11. For a complete list of sources, see the annotated bibliography on the project’s
website at: http://correlatesofwar.org. Te website also contains a detailed coding
manual. 
12. Tis would be 1945 for states that existed at that time, or the frst half-decade
year for states that were formed after this point. 
13. We kept this category because it featured prominently in the actual data on reli-
gious afliation. Te lumping together of this category with the religions turned out to
be confusing in the survey (more below). 
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14. We allowed multiple categories here, so categories are not mutually exclusive and
do not sum to 100 percent. 
Chapter 5 Religion and International Confict 
1. Tese COW data were frst utilized in published work by Regan (1996) to code
religious characteristics of third-party interventions into civil war; and also by Lai and
Reiter (2000) and Lai (2006) to code religious similarity in alliance making and Middle
Eastern conficts, respectively. 
2. Huntington’s (pp.  47–48) civilizations are not precisely religious designations
(e.g., Western, Sinic, Japanese, African, and Latin American include diverse religious
traditions), and where they are specifcally religious, they are broadly so, arbitrarily sub-
suming major doctrinal or denominational groups (e.g., Islamic—as opposed to Sunni
and Shia). 
3. Generalizations from the fndings of both Tusicisny (2004) and Charron (2010)
are limited by the studies’ research design faws:  the former relies mainly on cross-
sectional bivariate analyses without theoretically relevant statistical controls. Te latter
study focuses only on the post–Cold War era, and therefore fails to compare the relative
likelihood of fault-line conficts to earlier periods, in contrast to earlier studies (e.g.,
Henderson 2004). As noted, studies that relied on a more long-term time span found
that states of diferent civilizations straddling a fault line were signifcantly more likely
to fght each other both during and after the Cold War era. 
4. Average change in the percentage of a given religious group over a fve-year period
is about two-tenths of one percent. When considering this change over a single year,
as would be the case in most studies that use the dyad-year unit of analysis, the annual
percent change of the size of religious groups is less than fve-hundredths of one percent
(0.0005). 
5. Te same applies to some of the common controls used in such analyses such
as contiguity/distance, major/minor power status, and even joint democracy dummy
variables. 
6. For example, several scholars, following Maoz and Russett (1993), have focused
on a sample of politically relevant dyads, that is, dyads that are made up of contiguous
states, or dyads that consist of at least one major power. 
7. Tere are, however, systemic shocks that may alter the religious identity of soci-
eties. For example, we saw in chapter 3 how the collapse of communism in Eastern
Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union increased the level of religious iden-
tity in the postcommunist states, and established states that have become more reli-
giously homogeneous than their predecessor states (e.g., in Central Asia, the former
Yugoslav republics). However such systemic shocks are rare, and part of the implica-
tions of such shocks are captured in P2. 
8. We use Maoz’s (2010) defnition of major and regional powers and his list of such
powers. Data are in Maoz’s website at: http://maoz.ucdavis.edu/datasets.html. 
9. Note that in cases of disagreement between RS and CCS datasets, we follow the
former, which is more detailed regarding practical aspects of religion-state relations, in
contrast to the more textual basis of the latter. 
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10. Here, too, we use the continuous coup-risk variable in some of the analyses; the
results are largely the same. Te need to generate an ordinal coup-risk measure arises
from interactions between coup risks and religious similarity state-PRIE. 
11. We have also tested the extent to which Judeo-Islamic dyads are more likely to
engage in confict. We fnd no signifcant relationship there as well. We do fnd some
evidence that Hindu-Islamic dyads are more likely to fght each other than other types
of religious combinations. However, this is also not a robust result. 
12. Maoz (2010) ofered a new list of major and regional powers. See online appen-
dix to Networks of Nations at http:// maoz.ucdavis.edu/ datasets.html. 
Chapter 6 Religion and International Cooperation 
1. Examples of such social dilemmas include the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Flood
1952, Axelrod 1984), the Stag Hunt (Jervis 1978), and the tragedy of the commons
(Hardin 2009). 
2. We defne “substantial” trade between two states as trade from state i to state j
greater than 0.1 percent of its GDP. On the “Catch-22” relationship between trade and
confict, see Barbieri and Levy (1999). 
3. Here, too, we defne “substantial” overlap in IGO membership between two
states if their shared membership in IGOs was higher than the average dyadic overlap
in IGO membership for that year. 
4. We provide data on this point in the appendix to this chapter. 
5. Some of the seminal systematic theses on international cooperation are not easily
ftted into extant paradigms of world politics, such as Deutsch et al.’s (1957) thesis on
amalgamated and pluralistic security communities. 
6. Trend data on these fgures are given in the book’s website. 
7. Te paradox is more severe, however. Te state that dragged its ally into an
unwanted war, sometimes bails out of the war and leaves its ally to fght alone against a
third party with whom it had no quarrel before the alliance was formed. 
8. Powers (2006) observes exceptions in the case of PTAs in Africa, which largely
emerged as attempts at economic cooperation, and which ramifed into security coop-
eration, epitomized in the embedding of security agreements in the trade treaties (also
see Henderson 2015). 
9. Note that Wendt identifes a Hobbesian culture—a “warre of all against all”—in
which no cooperation is possible. However, he claims that this is a hypothetical culture
and has no historical equivalent. 
10. One may argue, particularly so, given both the signifcance of race (Mills 1997)
and gender (Pateman 1988) in Kant’s original conception; and in the common con-
ception of anarchy drawn from social contract theorists’ view of the state of nature
(Henderson 2013, 2015). 
11. Haas (1992, 3) defnes an epistemic community in terms of a group of individu-
als with shared norms and beliefs that have expertise with respect to some issue domain. 
12. See Maoz (2010, Ch. 2) as well as the appendix for technical details. 
13. All states with the same cooperative rank (e.g., with the same number of allies)
get the same rank. 
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14. Tis is even more necessary here than in the study of confict, because we do not
have a meaningful flter (such as the concept of political relevance) to reduce the size of
the population. In principle, any state can cooperate with any other state, regardless of
distance or reputational status. By contrast, the probability of confict is strongly con-
ditioned by distance and reputational status. Tis generates, for cooperative behavior, a
population size of over 800,000 undirected dyads over the period 1945–2010. 
15. Tis resonates with Powers (2006) and Henderson’s (2015) fndings on the
greater likelihood of African states to create PTAs with embedded security agreements. 
16. Henderson (2015) provides a fuller discussion of the diferential process of social-
ization on newly independent states in the post-WWII era and its impact on their
international relations. 
Chapter 7 Religion and CivilWar 
1. Te conservative estimate considers the dawn of human communities as the
Neolithic period, roughly 10,000 years ago, when farming developed. Te more realis-
tic estimate considers signifcant parts of the era of hunter-gatherers, which ranges for
over three million years. See Gat (2008), Ciof-Revilla (1991). 
2. Japan, up to the Meiji Restoration (1868), is a prime example, but other exam-
ples in Africa and Asia prior to the expansion of colonialism and imperialism in the
nineteenth century also apply. 
3. Te Gini coefcient has an upper limit of 1-1/N (Ray and Singer 1973). 
4. In principle, it is possible to include extrasystemic—imperial and colonial—wars.
However, we focus on the interactions within and between independent states, so we do
not include those here. 
5. Te turn of focus for quantitative-oriented IR scholars was facilitated by publi-
cation of the COW project’s data on civil wars from 1816 to 1980 (Small and Singer
1982). Te frst published study utilizing these civil war data appears to have been
Altfeld and Sabrosky (1990). 
6. Although they found that ethnolinguistic polarization was signifcantly associ-
ated with the onset and duration of civil wars, for 1960–92. 
7. For an alternative view implicating realist factors (i.e., neopatrimonial balancing)
in these relationships for African cases, see Henderson (2015). 
8. A number of early post–Cold War era studies that took as one of their concerns
the impact of “ethnicity” on civil war (e.g., Collier and Hoefer 1998, Henderson and
Singer 2000) did not include specifc religion variables. 
9. Using Toft’s (2009, Appendix 1) and Toft, Philpott, and Shah’s (2011, 154) des-
ignation of civil wars as “religious” or “non-religious,” and applying this designation to
our civil war data (discussed below), we fnd that 33 percent of the COW civil wars
were “religious,” 32 percent of the UCDP civil conficts were “religious,” 37 percent
of the civil wars identifed by Fearon and Laitin (2004) were “religious,” and 26 per-
cent of the violent resistance campaigns identifed by the NAVCO project (Chenoweth
and Stephan 2013) were “religious.” Tis suggests a fairly robust result indicating that
religious civil wars constitute a rather hefty minority of all civil wars over the period
1945–2010. 
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10. Much of this literature was spurred by the racial and civil rights conficts in
the United States during the 1950s and 1960s—and the domestic opposition to the
VietnamWar. 
11. Tey operationalize grievances in terms of the largest discriminated group within
a country rather than the total excluded population and the inequality among groups
by comparing the relative wealth of the poorest and richest groups to the country
average. 
12. As noted above, we focus on the work of Fox and Akbaba on religious discrimi-
nation, and of Basedeau and his colleagues on the more general causal mechanism
connecting religious practices and religious institutions to the outbreak of political vio-
lence. Tese exemplify the main concerns  we discuss herein. 
13. In Africa, the site of a disproportionate number of civil conficts and the origi-
nal focus of the greed versus grievance framework (i.e. Collier and Hoefer 1998),
this assessment of the potential for anticipated external support has been theorized by
Henderson (2015) as a form of “neopatrimonial balancing,” whereby neopatrimonial
elites realize that the most likely source of their downfall—and that of other neopatri-
monial leaders in the region—is domestic. Balancing power in such a context is aimed
at supporting rival regimes’ rebels who constitute the greatest potential threat to their
rule. State A’s support of state B’s rebels typically results in state B’s  reciprocal support
of state A’s rebels, which is a form of balancing power among African dyads:  neopatri-
monial balancing. 
14 We thank James Fearon for making the updated dataset available to us. 
15. Note that if a state experienced more than one civil war in a given year, the dura-
tion and severity variables were aggregated over all civil wars fought during that year. 
16. Tis is part of a more general measure of network polarization and is a product
of two components: group polarization (GPOL) and group cohesion (GC). However,
for a set of discrete groups, as is the case with religious afliation, the network polariza-
tion index reduces to GPOL because the group overlap (proportion of people practic-
ing more than one religion) is—with some minor exceptions—zero. Terefore, group
cohesion is assigned uniformly a value of 1. 
17. Te EPR dataset (Wimmer et  al. 2009) outlines the access of various ethnic
groups to political power in states. Te problem, as we have already pointed out, is
that ethnicity and religion are not synonymous and their measures are not consistently
comparable across states. 
18. Note that the relationship between war type (religious/non-religious) and settle-
ment becomes statistically insignifcant if we use a simple logit estimation, without
taking into account selection bias. 
19. We applied a number of analyses on religious groups’ efect on war type. Te
table reports results for measures of the relative size (percent) of the specifc religious
group in the state’s population. We found similar results when we used only dummy
variables for a majority religious group (i.e., a majority Christian country is one where
50 percent+ of its population practice Christianity, and so forth). Te results for the
specifc religious groups are the same. Te only exception is the non-religious group; the
efect of this group (when counting only instances of majority non-religious country
years) is washed out given this type of measure. 
  
   
 
 
  
 
 
 
    
  
  
  
  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
   
      
    
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
395
Notes 395 
20. For example, considering the plethora of civil wars that resulted from or in the
direct aftermath of anti-colonial armed struggles, racial diference and racist discrimi-
nation are candidate variables in analyses of those wars; but they may be less salient as
precipitants of civil war in the country’s later post-independence era where issues and
policies related to personalist (neopatrimonial) leadership, political survival, and third
party support of the regime or its dissidents  may exacerbate domestic tensions and lead
to civil war. 
21. And the groups do not overlap, which—with two national exceptions, Haiti and
Japan—is always the case. 
22. Data sources are listed in the chapter’s appendix. 
Chapter 8 Religion and Quality of Life 
1. Prior to Bueno de Mesquita et al’s more famous usage, Migdal (1988) had char-
acterized the calculus of leaders of such political systems as the “politics of survival”
(Henderson 2015). 
2. Gill (2013) reviews other models of religion and economic development. He also
warns that the path to religious freedom can, and often does, go through religious and
political confict, as some religious groups lose their preferential status and some seek
to gain hegemony, and politicians often form alliances with one group or another. Te
bottom line, however, is “the case for religious freedom has greater appeal if it is tied
to some tangible beneft . . . If there is one thing other than raw political power that
captures the attention of rulers, it is the accumulation of economic resources” (p. 18). 
3. Te work of Sarkissian (2015) is also notable in this regard. Unfortunately, both
Grim and Finke’s and Sarkissian’s data are primarily cross-sectional, and therefore of
limited usage in a more general context. Moreover, Sarkissian’s focus is on authoritarian
regimes, and hence his data do not represent the entire spectrum of states. However, for
this particular aspect of our study, both the data and the substantive arguments about
the determinants of religious freedom/repression are extremely useful. 
4. We ofer a detailed explanation of the measurement process of the various HDI-
related indices in the appendix to this chapter. 
5. Te correlation between these variables (see appendix) is r = -0.785, N = 193,
p < 10-7. We have also analyzed each of these variables separately. Te results are largely
the same. 
Chapter 9 The Complex Role of Religion in World Politics 
1. Lai (2006) examines the impact of such relationships where leaders and popula-
tions in the Middle East have distinct religious afliations. 
2. As noted, such datasets as the EPR contain an assessment of the access to power
of diferent social groups; however, they mix ethnicity, religious, racial and linguistic
characteristics of groups, thus making it difcult to single out religious groups’ access to
political power. 
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